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Executive summary  
Immigrant integration, although it usually constitutes a minor policy domain for local 
governments (already struggling with many newly decentralised responsibilities), reveals 
sensitive issues of identity, belonging or citizenship. Analysing immigrant integration policies 
brings out the very meanings of what constitute the uniqueness of a city, and, at the same time, 
its permeability and openness to the outside. Thus this policy domain makes it possible to 
investigate the transformations of the State, and its administrative and political system, in a 
context of neoliberalisation and increased devolution of responsibilities. Moreover, as migrants 
are often marginalised, it is important to ask to what extent local governance may offer a better 
path for immigrant participation in democratic decision-making. 
The main question I address is: do mid-sized cities located at the margin of capitalist economic 
networks govern the social life of the places they administer, or are they being governed? To this 
extent, I analyse the particular immigrant integration policy domain in four Israel frontier 
towns: Acre, Arad, Kiryat Gat and Kiryat Shmona. Although I assume these towns have little 
autonomy — in a context of overlapping, crosscutting, unbounded and fluid scales —, this work 
represents an important step to recognise the purposive agents who organise the social life of 
these cities. Through this research, I aim at challenging their autonomy and their capacity to 
address immigration. In fact, when making local policies, they reinterpret a national policy and 
adapt it to what they define as their local needs and interests.  
The first part of the thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter focuses mainly on the 
theoretical model adopted in this project. The concept of scale is crucial to analyse the 
transformations of the hierarchies of power and authority. It provides the methodological 
boundaries necessary for fieldwork — the local scale then corresponds to a town —; while 
giving the possibility to apprehend a fluid and unbounded multiscalar space where actors 
located at various scales collide — the local governance. The second chapter elaborates on the 
concept of place. In fact, the transformations of statehood are not homogeneous and each place 
produces and reproduces the socio-political space of immigration integration in a unique way. 
Through the cases of Israeli mid-sized cities (or towns) located out of the socioeconomic and 
political core networks, the project investigates at the margin, in order to reach a better 
understanding of rescaling processes in ‘ordinary cities’ (Robinson, 2006). Here, the production 
of an Israeli periphery, both geographically and socio-politically, through immigration 
settlement, is addressed in better detail. Lastly, the third chapter, focusing on the methodology 
implied from the conceptual framework, restores the social agents as the main producers of 
change. The micro-history of places is a fundamental element to understand the transformations 
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of power. A large place is therefore given to in-depth encounters, participation in activities, field 
observations, as well as to the discourses produced by the towns themselves through the city 
museum, local newspapers, or official pages in social media.  
The second part of the thesis explores the motives of immigration integration policymaking. 
When I tried to understand the reason why certain municipalities engage with immigration 
integration, while some others refuse, two sets of motives were found. The first chapter of this 
part unveils a discourse emphasising the benefits of immigration in marginal places. In that 
context, local leaders who take proactive steps for the development of their communities 
consider immigration to be a potential factor of growth. However, the sources of this growth do 
not entirely fit the hypotheses I first formulated. Findings show that the presence of immigrants 
makes it possible to reach out to State funding; helps maintain demographic levels which justify 
public service delivery; and participates in an ‘in-place economy’, guaranteeing municipal 
incomes to the municipality. The second chapter of this part establishes the fundamental role of 
immigrant politicians in the making of a proactive local immigrant integration policy. 
Immigrants who are part of the deliberation processes and of political parties advance this issue 
in local agendas. Nevertheless, they promote a certain attitude towards immigration, understood 
as restricted to immigrants who are perceived as deserving, productive and participative. Those 
two chapters show that neoliberal reforms in Israel and political and administrative 
decentralisation, combined with the will from local leaders to include immigration in their 
agenda, lead to the production of local immigration policies. Local politicians want to control the 
population that settles in their cities: their interests create tensions with the national 
immigration policy.  
The third part of the thesis focuses on the outcomes of immigration and integration 
policymaking. I analyse here the integration outcomes desired by the actors involved in 
immigrant integration on one hand; and with whom those actors engage on the other hand. The 
first chapter provides an analysis of the narratives collected during fieldwork, and the resulting 
grounded theory of integration. The participants to this research define integration as a process 
in time, where new immigrants gradually access the main institutions of the Israeli state, namely 
religion, education, the armed forces, employment and politics. The role of State agencies, and 
particularly, the municipality, is seen as fundamental to facilitate this access. The last chapter 
therefore looks at the socio-political space created around this public and collective goal of 
immigrant integration. Through the distinct morphology of the institutional landscape of 
immigrant integration in the four cities, I show that each town has a unique way of 
apprehending its role towards newcomers. However, the four cases also converge: they 
illustrate the transformations of power, and the resulting multiscalar governance induced by 
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Israel’s neoliberal politics. I argue that the particular position of peripheral towns, with their 
specific actors and programmes, contributes to maintaining those spaces of difference outside 
the centre. 
The contribution of this doctoral research lies in bringing back social agents to the production of 
the rapid and deep changes of contemporary nation-states’ political system. The triptych ‘scale, 
place and people’ makes it possible to address the transformations of power hierarchies from 
the many interests and skills of agents involved with a specific policy domain, in places that are 
made up of multiple layers of social, political, historical and economic relations. The re-
establishment of ‘ordinary cities’, usually seen as forced to play a “punitive game of catching-up” 
(Robinson, 2006, p. 6), into relevant objects of study, is part of a larger school of thought that has 
advocated for their recognition in urban studies. Lastly, this work also contributes to a debate on 
immigration in small and mid-sized cities, at a moment where their role in immigrant settlement 
is getting more substantial.  
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Résumé 
Bien qu’elles constituent encore un domaine marginal pour les gouvernements locaux (déjà 
submergés par les responsabilités qui leur incombent depuis les réformes de décentralisation), 
les politiques publiques d’intégration des immigrés agissent comme un révélateur de problèmes 
sociétaux liés à l’identité, l’appartenance et la citoyenneté. Analyser les politiques d’accueil rend 
visible ce qui donne à une ville son caractère unique, mais également sa perméabilité et son 
ouverture sur l’extérieur. Dès lors, confronter les questions de la ville et de l’immigration ouvre 
la voie à une enquête sur les transformations de l’Etat, de son système administratif et politique, 
dans un contexte de néolibéralisation et de transferts des responsabilités. De plus, alors que les 
individus issus de l’immigration sont souvent exclus des processus décisionnels démocratiques, 
il est important d’explorer les possibilités qu’offre la gouvernance locale lorsqu’il s’agit 
d’améliorer leur participation. 
 
La question principale qui motive ce projet est la suivante : les villes moyennes situées en marge 
des réseaux économiques capitalistes gouvernent-elles la vie sociale des lieux qu’elles 
administrent, ou sont-elles gouvernées ? Pour y répondre, l’analyse porte sur le domaine 
particulier des politiques publiques d’intégration des immigrés, et ce dans quatre villes aux 
frontières d’Israël : Acre, Arad, Kiryat Gat et Kiryat Shmona. Une étape importante est de 
reconnaître les intentions des acteurs qui organisent la vie sociale de ces villes. L’autonomie de 
leur gouvernance est sans doute relative, alors que les échelles de pouvoir se chevauchent, se 
croisent, et que leurs limites deviennent fluides et perméables. Au travers de ce travail, 
l’autonomie et la capacité des villes à administrer l’immigration sont donc mises à l’épreuve de 
l’analyse. En effet, alors qu’ils forment des politiques publiques, les acteurs réinterprètent la 
politique nationale et l’adaptent aux besoins et intérêts locaux qu’ils définissent. 
 
La première partie de la thèse est divisée en trois chapitres. Le premier présente essentiellement 
le modèle théorique adopté. Le concept d’échelle est crucial pour l’analyse des transformations 
des hiérarchies de pouvoir et d’autorité. L’échelle, d’un point de vue méthodologique, fournit la 
limite du « terrain » — l’échelle locale correspond ainsi à la ville — ; et d’un point de vue 
analytique, elle permet d’appréhender un espace fluide et ouvert, où les acteurs situés à 
différentes échelles se rencontrent — ce qu’on appellera la gouvernance locale. Le deuxième 
chapitre développe plus en profondeur le concept de lieu. En effet, les transformations de l’Etat 
ne sont pas homogènes, et chaque lieu produit et reproduit de façon unique un espace socio-
politique où se rencontrent les acteurs de l’intégration des immigrés. Le cas des villes moyennes 
israéliennes, situées en dehors des réseaux socioéconomiques et politiques, permet une enquête 
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à la « marge », qui dévoile les processus de rééchelonnement dans les villes « ordinaires » 
(Robinson, 2006). Ici, on explorera plus en détails la production d’une périphérie israélienne, 
géographique et socio-politique, au prisme de la politique dirigiste d’installation des immigrés 
telle qu’elle a été élaborée dès les premières années de l’état israélien. Enfin, le dernier chapitre 
présente la méthodologie qui découle du cadre conceptuel adopté, en instaurant les acteurs 
sociaux comme principaux producteurs de changement. La micro-histoire des lieux est un 
élément fondamental pour comprendre les transformations du pouvoir. Les entretiens 
qualitatifs, les observations participantes ainsi que les récits produits par les villes (au travers 
du musée municipal, des journaux locaux, ou des pages officielles des mairies dans les médias et 
les réseaux sociaux) sont au centre de l’analyse.      
 
La deuxième partie de la thèse interroge les raisons de la mise en œuvre d’une politique 
d’intégration des immigrés. Deux causes principales — correspondant aux deux chapitres — 
semblent motiver certaines villes à intégrer à leurs responsabilités la question de l’intégration 
des immigrés, alors que d’autres villes s’y refusent. Le premier chapitre de cette partie analyse 
les discours qui s’attachent à démontrer les bénéfices tirés de l’immigration dans ces lieux. Des 
élus locaux, qui adoptent une attitude proactive face à l’injonction des villes à assurer leur 
développement, considèrent l’immigration comme un facteur potentiel de croissance. 
Cependant, les sources de cette croissance diffèrent des premières hypothèses formulées dans le 
cadre de ce travail. Les résultats montrent que la présence d’immigrés permet d’obtenir des 
ressources de l’administration centrale ; d’entretenir une base résidentielle qui justifie le 
maintien des services publics ; et d’assurer une « économie présentielle », garante de revenus 
pour la municipalité. Le deuxième chapitre, quant à lui, établit le rôle fondamental des élus 
locaux nés à l’étranger dans la mise en œuvre d’une politique locale d’intégration des immigrés. 
Les immigrés qui prennent part aux délibérations et qui sont membres de partis politiques sont 
à l’origine de l’avancement de ces questions sur l’agenda municipal. Néanmoins, ces mêmes élus 
vont promouvoir une certaine attitude face à l’immigration, qu’ils entendent restreindre à des 
immigrés méritants, productifs et participatifs, et ce dans une perspective d’immigration 
« choisie ». Ces deux chapitres montrent que les réformes néolibérales en Israël et la 
décentralisation politique et administrative, combinées à la volonté des élus locaux d’inclure 
l’immigration à l’agenda municipal, entraînent la production de politiques locales 
d’immigration caractéristiques. Les élus locaux veulent choisir les individus qui s’installent dans 
leur ville, un choix à l’origine de tensions entre les différentes échelles de pouvoir.    
 
Les résultats de l’élaboration de politiques publiques d’intégration des immigrés sont abordés 
dans la troisième partie. L’analyse porte sur les résultats désirés par les acteurs ayant un rôle 
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actif dans l’intégration des immigrés, et leurs actions pour les atteindre. Le premier chapitre se 
penche sur les récits collectés pendant le travail de terrain, et ce que ces récits disent de 
l’intégration. Les participants définissent l’intégration en tant que processus dans le temps, au 
cours duquel les immigrés accèdent graduellement aux institutions principales du pays, soit la 
religion, l’éducation, l’armée, l’emploi et la politique. Le rôle des agences de l’Etat, et en 
particulier la municipalité, est perçu comme crucial pour faciliter cet accès. Le dernier chapitre 
explore l’espace socio-politique créé autour de l’objectif d’intégration des immigrés, tel que 
défini par la collectivité. Chacune des quatre villes a une façon unique d’appréhender son rôle 
face aux nouveaux venus, qui apparait à travers les différentes morphologies des paysages 
institutionnels, Cependant, les quatre cas convergent sur certains points : ils illustrent les 
transformations du pouvoir, et la gouvernance multi-échelle qui découle de la politique 
néolibérale israélienne. Enfin, les caractéristiques de ces villes moyennes périphériques, avec 
des acteurs et programmes qui leur sont propres, contribuent à maintenir ces espaces de 
différence à l’extérieur du Centre. 
 
Ce travail doctoral a pour objectif de replacer au centre de l’analyse les acteurs sociaux, qui 
produisent les changements rapides et profonds du système politique de l’Etat-Nation. Le 
triptyque « échelle, lieu et acteurs sociaux » rend possible l’analyse des transformations des 
hiérarchies de pouvoir à partir des intérêts et compétences des acteurs qui interviennent dans 
un domaine particulier, et dont les décisions sont ancrées dans les lieux, définis par les couches 
multiples de relations sociales, politiques, historiques et économiques. Rétablir les « villes 
ordinaires », généralement perçues comme jouant « un jeu punitif de rattrapage » (Robinson, 
2006, p. 6), en objets d’étude pertinents, est un objectif que l’on cherche à atteindre avec le 
concours d’une plus grande école qui promeut l’étude des villes moyennes. Finalement, ce travail 
contribue également à une meilleure compréhension du rôle de ces villes moyennes qui se 
voient administrer l’immigration, alors que l’installation d’immigrés en dehors de la « ville 
globale » s'amplifie. 
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Preface  
Amandine Desille was granted a Marie Curie fellowship in 2013 within the framework of the ITN 
Marie Curie Programme “INTEGRIM”. The aim of this research training programme is to 
structure the existing high-quality research capacity on migration and integration policies and 
processes in the European Union and neighbouring countries. Based on a long-standing 
cooperation, the programme includes eight partners: UDeusto (ES), CEDEM (BE), SCMR (UK), 
IGOT (PT), IMES (NL), MiReKoc (TR), CEU (HU) and MIGRINTER (FR). Amandine benefited from 
her immersion into a pan European research network of experts on immigration and integration 
issues. She was part of the work package four of the programme “Urban integration, residential 
patterns and mobility”, in which she was in close contact with leading experts of her field such as 
Lucinda Fonseca in Lisbon or Floris Vermeulen in Amsterdam. Members of this work package 
organised scientific meetings twice a year and provided guidance to the doctoral fellows. 
Besides her insertion into the team Migrinter and the university of Tel Aviv, she spent 12 weeks 
in IGOT, university of Lisbon, in winter 2015. She also participated in seminars in Bilbao, 
Amsterdam, Budapest, Istanbul, Harvard, Birmingham and Lisbon on immigration, integration 
and urban governance. Beyond scientific aspects, it is worth noting that Amandine’s training also 
included an initiation to innovative methodological tools. She participated in a film school at 
Budapest in December 2014 and May 2015. She made use of her skills to shoot a short video 
documentary on a representative of the immigrant party Israel Beitenu during the campaign for 
general elections in 2015. 
Amandine has also been a lead organiser of two international seminars. The first one took place 
in December 2015. The event, entitled, “International Migrations and New Local Governance” 
took place in Poitiers on the 10th and 11th of December. It gathered speakers from France, South 
Africa, Switzerland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Japan, and the United 
Kingdom. A selection of papers presented during the seminar will be published as an edited 
book at Palgrave in the series “Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship”. The second seminar is a 
joint initiative of doctoral students from Migrinter. It focused on ethnographic approach to 
international migrations. This one-day seminar inaugurated the conference celebrating the 30th 
anniversary of Migrinter.  
Her inscription in dense and international institutional web of migration centres enabled 
Amandine to be part of two networks of students. She is an active member of the Réseau 
Migration (http://reseaumig.hypotheses.org/), which gathers over 150 junior researchers from 
France and beyond. The network organises a yearly conference and circulates information about 
 16
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Amandine is part is the one formed by Integrim fellows. Together, they submitted in 2016 a 
proposal to the COST funding programme of the European Union. This proposal is titled 
“Migration Research and Policy Speaks” (MIGRAPS) and its aim is to create a platform linking 
academic research and policy makers on migration issues. Her active participation in these 
networks is already paving the way for future scientific collaborations at an international scale. 
As the coordinator of the INTEGRIM programme for Migrinter, I would like to thank Izhak 
Schnell. The co-supervision of Amandine’s with William Berthomière has been an extremely 
fruitful collaboration. 
Thomas Lacroix, CNRS research fellow, deputy director of Migrinter 
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Chapter 1 ◊ Governing or being governed? A scalar 
approach of the transformation of State power and 
authority through the case of immigration and 
integration policies of four frontier towns in Israel: 
An introduction 
First of all, really, immigrants are on my daily priorities. It means that I see in immigrants a 
resource that can lead the city to social development, to economic development. This is how I see 
the immigrants. Not as them that we have to take care of, but as them, who with the right push, can 
then help the city to develop, to advance, and to be… a very important part of the city. And that’s 
why I travelled to Russia six times in remote places, which nobody heard of in Russia. (Extract of 
the interview with the mayor of the city of Acre, 2015) 
In the last decade, the mayor of the northern city of Acre has taken pride in the extended 
immigrant integration programme offered by the municipality. Many can speculate on the 
reasons that have pushed this town to adopt an immigration policy, despite the many other daily 
struggles the city faces. Of course, this extract is not to be taken at face value: immigration is still 
a marginal domain of policymaking in most Israeli local governments, including Acre. 
Nevertheless, the fact that an elected councillor leads the six-worker municipal department of 
immigration integration, and that many other municipal agents are recruited within municipal 
services for their command of the Russian language, are proofs that the hundred families coming 
every year to settle in Acre are taken seriously. Acre is a sort of microcosm of the Israeli society, 
better known by tourists for being a crusader city, where Palestinian, Jewish and foreign-born 
Israelis share the same place: in this context, what does such an investment mean?  
This short extract already holds many threads for research. One might wonder what the reasons 
of the concern of the mayor for the city’s economic development might be; what is the nature of 
this abovementioned ‘push’ for the personal development of those immigrants who chose Acre 
as their home, and the resources summoned to make it possible; and what are those trips he 
mentions to reach out to Jewish communities in Russia. Through this discussion with Acre’s 
mayor, the withdrawal of the Israeli central government from a matter that has been central for 
the first decades of its existence materialises. This shift in the administration of public affairs is 
revealed here, and is symptomatic of broader transformations, where cities voluntarily invest 
resources toward immigrant integration, leading to a variegated landscape of local immigrant 
integration policies.   
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The main question I address, through the analysis of the particular immigrant integration policy 
domain, is: do mid-sized cities located at the margin of capitalist economic networks govern the 
social life of the places they administer, or are they being governed? For this purpose, I 
investigate immigration integration policies in four frontier towns in Israel: Acre, Arad, Kiryat 
Gat and Kiryat Shmona. The autonomy of their governance is, I assume, relative, in a context of 
overlapping, crosscutting, unbounded and fluid scales. However, challenging their autonomy and 
their capacity to address immigration, to reinterpret a national policy and adapt it to what they 
define as their local needs and interests, represents an important step to recognise the 
purposive agents who organise the social life of these cities.  
This work is embedded in debates central to social geography the last decades: the 
transformations of statehood and power; the constant dialectic between the State and the 
territories they administer, which are produced by, but also inform, policies and public actions; 
and the agents at the core of these transformations. In this introduction, I therefore hope to 
address the current and larger debates that I relate to all along this volume. I then present the 
Israeli case, which in my opinion, can bring to light many of the interactions between the 
transformations of the State and immigration and integration issues. I explain more particularly 
to which scholarly discussions this work potentially contributes, within the modest limit of a 
piece of doctoral research. The approach I have adopted to do so is briefly presented, and is 
anchored in a three-dimensional conceptual framework, built on the concepts of scale, place and 
agency. Finally, I describe the structure of the thesis, divided in three larger parts, and nine 
chapters.  
1 Transformations of the hierarchies of power: toward a new 
governance of immigration and immigrant integration 
When it comes to immigration issues, scholars have not reached a consensus on the analysis of 
policymaking processes and the resulting policies. Opposed to one camp firmly believing that 
the deep changes experienced worldwide have not yet eroded the nation-state — the ultimate 
producer of the ideologies that oversee policies —; is a growing camp calling to go beyond 
‘methodological nationalism’ and adopting postnational and transnational arguments. The 
nation-state loses its monopoly over power, in favour of new — or consolidated — actors, 
whether they be supranational organisations, transnational networks, subnational governments, 
grassroots organisations, representatives of the civil society or even private industrial or 
business actors.  
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I suggest that neither is entirely wrong, or entirely right. Instead, I argue that we ought to look at 
both phenomena: the attempts deployed by the central administration to keep a grip on certain 
state affairs, while getting rid of others; and the strategies of other actors to penetrate sovereign 
policy domains, or to avoid their devolution. For this purpose, I am particularly interested in the 
rise of cities in policymaking, and more specifically immigration and integration policymaking. 
The next subsections deal with the general debate around those questions. The transformations 
of statehood, but also of the role of the State and the subnational state in immigration and 
integration matters, represent the main issues this doctoral work raises.  
1.1 From decentralisation to multiscalar governance 
The late 1970s and early 1980s saw the beginning of a new order, against the post-war Welfare 
State, characterised by: the expansion of a free market ideology and its diffusion in multiple 
governmentalities; the withdrawal of the State from the social sphere and the cut in public 
expenditures; the parallel increased responsibilities devolved to local governments and private 
actors; and the triumph of values based on individualism and economic success. The flagships of 
this new order are the structural adjustment programmes imposed by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund in the South; and Thatcherian and Reaganean reforms in the North. 
Those profound transformations have usually been regrouped under the label ‘neoliberalism’, 
and have reshaped the meaning of this word, giving it the definition widely used today. 
Neoliberalism is the new global capitalism, argues geographer David Harvey (2005).  
In this context, geographers have been increasingly concerned with the rise of cities in the 
worldwide power structure and the shift from ‘local government’ to ‘local governance’. This 
means that under the conditions of more aggressive and dematerialised forms of capitalism, 
globalisation, and accelerated dissemination of information and communication technologies, 
power hierarchies have been transformed, giving more authority to strategic urban sites. 
Moreover, the territorial choices affecting those cities are not solely in the hand of the national 
government or its local administrative branches, but a variety of actors have penetrated the 
administration of cities, with complex and often conflicting interests. This has led to a shift from 
simply decentralised government to multiscalar local governance.  
The first works in geography documenting the increasing role of cities can be dated from the 
1980s. In the English-speaking scholarship, Kevin Cox and Andrew Mair (1988) published the 
article “Locality and Community in the Politics of Local Economic Development” the same year 
Peter K. Eisinger (1988) published his volume The Rise of the Entrepreneurial State, State and 
Local Economic Development Policies in the United States. The economic role of cities, and their 
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capacity to assume the economic development of the territory they govern, was revisited. In this 
context, geographers restored the concept of ‘scale’ as an analytical category.  
Two decades later, the seminal work of geographer Neil Brenner (2004) New State Spaces: 
Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood, endorsed the concept of scale as the relevant 
tool to address the transformations of the hierarchies of power. In fact, “the geographical scale at 
which political power and authority is located does not constitute a natural order, but rather is 
constructed and subject to change” (Leitner in Sheppard & McMaster, 2008). Scales are 
produced, reproduced and contested, from scalar flux to scalar fixes. Under new forms of 
capitalism and globalisation, globalisation and localisation become dialectically related 
processes. In that sense, rescaling means that a redistribution of power occurs in a complex and 
interscalar way: power is not simply located at local level (Herod, 2011). Supranational 
organisations, transnational networks, but also the State, and a myriad of locally grounded 
actors, all participate in the rescaling of power.   
To elaborate on this argument, I turn to a French-speaking social geography, led by French 
geographer Guy Di Meo, who links territorialisation and the rescaling of public action. In his 
opinion, actors aggregate to form a governance regime and design public policies and actions 
that target a specific territory. Those actors are located at different scales, so that endogenous, 
exogenous and transitional actors cross the territory for which they intend to form policies (Di 
Meo, 2008, pp. 6–7). Di Meo’s social geography is not far from Patrick Le Galès (2011)’s political 
analysis, but it extends the understanding of governance to its connection with a territory, which 
informs — as much as it is subjected to — the strategies of actors. 
In Israel, where this doctoral project was conducted, the language of scales is not yet 
preponderant among geographers. First, the role of supranational organisations such as the 
European Union is irrelevant. Second, Israel is still considered a rather centralised state. Tel Aviv 
is usually described as the only city that has the bargaining power to make choices outside the 
central authority. This exceptionalism is pointed out in particular when it comes to its 
immigration policy (Raijman & Kemp, 2002; Alexander, 2003; Berthomière & Hily, 2006; 
Rozenholc, 2010; Schnell, 2013; Kalir, 2014).  
However, I argue that other cities, located out of — old or more recent — core networks of 
power, do see a shift toward multiscalar local governance. Walking around remote towns in 
Israel, a simple look at the printed logos, belonging to the multiple donors — ministries, 
industrial donors, philanthropists, international organisations and other foundations — funding 
municipal departments and organisations, show the complexity of the financial packages 
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municipalities have to put into place to see their projects finalised. Even in small and mid-sized 
cities, local actors are under the obligation to innovate to access national or even transnational 
networks and their resources (Béhar in Loubière, 2011; Auerbach, 2012). To understand better 
the extent to which those spaces ‘without power’ — which I call ‘frontier towns’, ‘small and mid-
sized cities’ or even ‘peripheries’ in the course of this work1 — indeed have the capacity to join 
the production of new scales of power, authority and responsibility, I turn to the case of 
immigration and integration policies.  
1.2 Immigration and integration issues in the contemporary city 
Following the worldwide trend described above, cities have become important sites where 
immigration and immigrant integration is discussed (Penninx, Kraal, Martiniello, & Vertovec, 
2004; Varsanyi, 2008; Good, 2009; Caponio & Borkert, 2010; Schiller & Çağlar, 2010; Walker & 
Leitner, 2011). Even though immigration policy is still very dependent on national governments 
or European Union’s regulations, decentralisation and fragmentation of power along various 
scales have translated into new ‘political opportunity structures’, that is a new institutional 
context for policy-making (Jørgensen, 2012). Since rationalities and logics diverge at local level, 
and are place-dependent, policy outcomes vary from city to city.  
Apart from issues of devolution of power, where immigration policies are conceived following a 
top-down logic of ‘activation’ (Penninx et al., 2004), immigrant integration issues also raise from 
the idea that cities, being the sites where integration occurs, are more responsive to the needs of 
the immigrants they host. In fact, “In every European context, most immigrants live in cities. 
That is where the jobs, housing, schools, support services (whether governmental or non-
governmental), religious and leisure facilities, and their own social networks are concentrated” 
(Penninx et al., 2004). Bottom-up ‘mobilisation’ (Ibid.) is more and more seen as an option in the 
production of divergences in immigration and immigrant integration policies. Examples from 
the 1990s include Frankfurt’s case study by John Friedmann and Angelika U. Lehrer (1997), who 
have documented the development of a multicultural policy in the German city of Frankfurt, 
against the national take on immigration at the time. In Israel, Tel Aviv has similarly challenged 
the national immigration policy and has established a municipal service for non-Jewish 
immigrants (Raijman & Kemp, 2002; Alexander, 2003; Berthomière & Hily, 2006; Rozenholc, 
2010; Schnell, 2013; Kalir, 2014). More recently, the most visible demonstration of the role of 
                                                          
1 The term ‘frontier’ reflects the political construction of these places, out of core networks, at the borders; 
the term ‘periphery’ emphasises more strongly their economic dependence to core networks; while the 
term ‘mid-sized city’ is more associated to their situation in an administrative system of cities. All those 
aspects are intertwined in the four cities under scrutiny.  
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cities in immigrant integration has been the development of forms of  ‘local citizenship’ in 
‘sanctuary cities’ (Walker & Leitner, 2011; de Graauw, 2013).  
Those cases are still seen as exceptional. Activation is more common than mobilisation, or at 
least more successful in forming policies. Hans Mahnig, amongst others, argues that immigrant 
policies are generally reactive: “The presence of immigrants becomes a topic in the political 
debate only when it starts to be perceived as a threat to the society as a whole” (Mahnig in 
Penninx et al., 2004). Later in his chapter, he also writes: “local conservatism prevails” (Ibid.), 
arguing that cities are not more accommodating than the national administration. 
Here again, examples and their counter-examples show that there is no straightforward trend. 
However, it seems that, even within inclusive policies, there is a new convergence toward 
limiting immigration to certain immigrants. I turn to political philosopher Will Kymlicka 
(2015)’s recent work on solidarity. Kymlicka suggests that multiculturalism and neoliberalism, 
although coming from different ideological frames, have developed together. The same agencies 
have pushed them forward. This resulted in a situation of ‘inclusion without solidarity’ where 
multiculturalism is limited to certain categories of immigrants (Kymlicka, 2015). Is there a 
‘neoliberal’ immigrant, who is favoured in immigration policies?  
1.3 A neoliberal immigrant?  
When I state that cities are more and more considered active immigrant integration 
policymakers, what does ‘integration’ mean? Integration is a concept deeply connected to a field 
of research concerned with citizenship and nation-state issues. It refers to the inclusion of 
foreign-born individuals into the nation. One way the scholarship has addressed integration, 
which I dismiss altogether here, is to measure immigrants’ performance, relatively to the 
performance of the ‘average’ national. A second way — anchored in Benedict Anderson 
(Anderson, 1983)’s ‘imagined communities’ —, can refer to the way the national discourse is 
geared toward the inclusion or exclusion of certain groups, and hence the collective imaginary of 
the nation. In drawing the boundaries of the nation, immigration provides a sense of its limits, of 
what is outside: “Because immigration constitutes the limit of what constitutes the national 
state. Immigration is the limit that reveals what it is intrinsically, or its basic truth” (Sayad 
(1996) reprinted in Martiniello & Rath, 2010, p. 166).  
Another way to address integration is through the multifaceted policies designed by public 
agencies to deal with immigrants once they have settled in the country. Here, scholars have 
looked more particularly at the way immigrants are depicted as a problem, and consequently as 
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the object of public actions. Thus, the role of institutions is crucial when “[…] integration [is] a 
collective societal goal which can be achieved through the systematic intervention of collective 
political agency […]” (Favell, reprinted in Martiniello & Rath, 2010, p. 374). Depending on the 
outcomes aimed at by public agencies when they think of immigrant integration, attitudes and 
associated policies vary between transient, assimilationist, multicultural or intercultural policies 
(Alexander, 2003; Penninx et al., 2004; Schnell, 2013).  
Integration, in this sense, has been subjected to many changes along the recent developments I 
have described in the first part of this section. In the European context for instance, integration 
has shifted with the new European social project, as: “Integration acquires a new purpose – the 
purpose of achieving social cohesion in society driven by active, participatory and productive 
individuals” (Soysal, 2012). The deservingness of immigrants is more and more correlated with 
their capacity to be employed, even when they are undocumented, and to prove their social 
integration (Chauvin & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012). This translates into new immigration 
schemes, such as the European blue card for high-skilled immigrants.  
At the national level, French politician Nicolas Sarkozy’s proposal for ‘targeted’ immigration 
policies (immigration choisie in French) is in line with other trends in Europe where immigrants 
are more and more expected to be self-sufficient. The transformations of frames of 
deservingness mean that immigrants are envisaged as neoliberal subjects, who can achieve 
integration with the right entrepreneurial and independent spirit. The counterpart is the 
common marginalisations of the ‘undeserving’ — disabled, Roma and undocumented migrants 
(Rajaram, 2014). As Thomas Faist has rightly put it: “It is not only the categorization of people 
along nationality/citizenship and thus the accident of birthplace, but also their distinction with 
respect to economic utility and social adaptation that make a difference to the life chances of 
many individuals” (Faist, 2013, p. 1644). 
How do those new neoliberal immigrants feed the ambitions of the cities engaged in endless 
competition over resources? Some would answer: they become part of the competition (Schiller 
& Çağlar, 2010). Indeed, “Cities compete to attract the most skilled and creative migrants, and 
the municipalities are responsible for poorly skilled and less resourceful immigrants and 
descendants” (Jørgensen, 2012, p. 245). However, it does seem that this equation is not that 
simple.  
The very first hypotheses for this doctoral work lay in the understanding of the relations 
between immigration and economic development in cities. What is found is that this link is not 
obvious. In the context of South Africa, Caitlin Blaser and Loren Landau argue: “[…] in most cases 
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local authorities have neither the tools to capitalise on the opportunities presented by multi-
locality nor the ability to respond to the challenges it presents. In many cases, shortcomings 
start with the local officials’ poor awareness and acceptance that movement and multi-locality 
can be positive vehicles of change or that their actions can help determine outcomes” (Blaser & 
Landau 2016). What about other national and local contexts? In the case of desired settlement 
immigration in particular — Israel representing one example of such immigration —, is the 
contribution of immigration to cities seen with more clarity? How can I address this issue in a 
context of changing hierarchies of power?     
2 Governing or being governed? 
In this rather broad debate, one can see that North America and Europe are the main fields of 
research. Nevertheless, those regions are far from being the only recipients of mass immigration, 
and are certainly not the only ones which experience transformations of their political and 
administrative regimes.  
Despite its relative isolation in the scholarship — Israel being usually treated as a standalone 
example —, the Israeli case presents several features which can provide new angles to bring 
light to the transformations of the State. In the first subsection, I address more particularly the 
position of immigration in national politics, as Jewish immigration represents a strong feature of 
nation building in this much disputed area. Second, Israel has experienced an important rupture 
in the late 1970s, following a worldwide trend, characterised by the progressive — and rather 
jittery, with sporadic strong interventions — withdrawal of the State from planning, and by 
extension, from immigration policies. The advantage is that immigration and planning are both 
well-studied fields, with a peak of research works following the mass immigration of the 1990s, 
which provides me with a benchmark to evaluate the current situation.  
Nevertheless, if there is a consensus that since the 1980s, there has been a ‘neoliberalisation’ of 
the State, coupled with a de facto decentralisation, there has been little interest, if any, on the 
impacts of the devolution of responsibilities on immigration issues. In the last subsection, I 
address more particularly the role of cities in immigration, and I wonder: are Israeli towns 
governing or being governed?  
2.1 On immigration in Israel 
The building of a ‘Jewish home’ in mandatory Palestine at the turn of the century is profoundly 
associated to immigration to Israel, also called Aliyah. Aliyah and the ingathering of the exiles are 
inscribed in the declaration of independence, and in 1950, Israel’s immigration policy the ‘Law 
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of Return’ became the legal expression of the Jewish character of the State (Yoav & Peled in 
Semyonov & Lewin-Epstein, 2004). In particular, Jewish immigration after 1948 was 
instrumental for “creating […] a fait accompli” (Kimmerling, 1982), legitimating the existence of 
Israel. Immigration settlement is conceived in parallel with goals of strengthening secure 
borders for the state and the quick populating of the sovereign territory (Efrat, 1988).  
However, immigration settlement followed ethnic logics, where European Ashkenazi immigrants 
were mostly settled in core areas, while immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East were 
directed toward transit camps, and then to new towns established at the frontiers. From the 
1980s on, there has been a consensus in the Israeli scholarship that in the 1950s, the State was 
at least partially responsible for engineering spatial segregation (Shama & Iris, 1977; Lipshitz, 
1991, 1998; Yiftachel, 2000; Khazzoom, 2005; Tzfadia, 2006). The result of this settlement policy 
was the production of spaces of difference, along the Simmelian sense of frontier (Groupe 
Frontière, 2004). Immigrants were unevenly integrated, following an ‘ethnic logic of capital’ 
(Yiftachel, 2000). Today, towns located away from the socioeconomic, political and geographic 
core are composed mainly of individuals of North African and Middle-Eastern ascent (called 
oriental Jews or Mizrahim), and more recent immigrants from the former Soviet Union.  
Despite those differentiated paths of integration, Israel has taken pride in its integration policies. 
Indeed, the idea persists that immigration integration in Israel is easier, since immigrants are 
‘Jews coming to a Jewish society’ (Oudenhoven & Eisses, 1998). In a context of ‘repatriate’ 
migration, “The presumed existence of historic, cultural, and/or religious heritage shared with 
the host society leads to the expectation of fast and painless social integration of the repatriates” 
(Remennick, 2003, p. 25).  
Surely, the massive immigration wave of the 1990s has benefited — and probably also 
participated — in a new integration policy, less assimilationist and more open to sociocultural 
pluralism. Russian-speakers have created a multifaceted cultural world of their own, translated 
into a de facto cultural autonomy (Remennick, 2003) 
The last decades have also meant new challenges for Israel’s integration policies.  Israel’s access 
to the industrialised world has led to more diverse and plural immigration: non-Jewish 
(halachically) immigrants among the former USSR, Ethiopian, Argentinean and Romanian 
beneficiaries of the Law of Return (Lustick, 1999); and non-Jewish immigration induced by the 
transition toward a post-industrial economy (Raijman & Kemp, 2002). This ‘new second 
generation’ (Elias & Kemp, 2010) characterised non-Jewish immigrants, Black Jews and children 
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of migrant workers in Israel, largely ignored by the central administration, has become a reality 
that cities start dealing with.  
2.2 The city in Israel  
Walking around the four cities I have selected for fieldwork — Acre, Arad, Kiryat Gat or Kiryat 
Shmona — can be misleading: the apparent apathy, even backwardness and feeling of 
overstretching time, hide the tremendous changes they have gone through during their short 
history. Prior to the establishment of the Israeli state, under the Ottoman and the British 
mandates, Israeli cities enjoyed rather large autonomy. In 1948, and as the central 
administration sought legitimacy, their authority was transferred to the new national state 
(Gradus, 1983; Elazar, 1988). The first years following the establishment of the state saw central 
planning aimed at creating new cities and settlements, sometimes above the ruins of former 
Palestinian villages, to accommodate the large flows of newcomers and secure the new territory 
(Efrat, 1988). As early as the 1960s, the government expressed renewed desire to strengthen 
local governments (Gradus, 1983; Elazar, 1988). The most important step of this de facto 
decentralisation is the reform toward direct mayoral elections in 1978 (Ibid.). After the 1980s, 
more changes affected cities: on the one hand, the progressive withdrawal of the State from 
public service means that local governments took over new responsibilities; on the other hand, 
local politics began to be considered more important, and national parties intervened more and 
more in local politics (Elazar, 1988).  
Against this very brief historical background, one can see the progressive liberalisation of Israel. 
In the 1970s, Israel sees the infiltration of a ‘new right’ ideology from the UK and USA (Razin, 
1990). In 1977, the right-wing Likud party won the national elections, a pivotal year in Israeli 
politics, with the shift from a founding Labour Zionist bloc to a more neo-Zionist, neoliberal 
Likud party (Shafir & Peled in Semyonov & Lewin-Epstein, 2004). Yet the real turn, that led to an 
actual withdrawal of the State and reduced public expenditures occurred in 1985, under 
American pressure (Kay, 2012). In 1997, the IMF included Israel in the developed countries list. 
From that period on, the prestige of business careers exceeded the prestige of military careers 
(Shafir & Peled in Semyonov & Lewin-Epstein, 2004). When I started fieldwork, in 2013, the 
result of the elections confirmed this trend. The coalition was made up of parties that all believe 
in free market, tax reduction, cutting welfare subsidies, weakening labour unions and in general, 
whittling away at the government’s principles (Rubin, Navot, & Ghanem, 2014).  
The impact of this new state of affairs for cities, is that “A faltering, ineffective central 
government and increasingly pressing local problems, encouraged the emergence of more 
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assertive, entrepreneurial and effective local governments” (Ben-Elia, 2006). Caught in a 
‘Darwinist environment’ (Ibid.), local governments must deploy necessary actions to maintain 
levels of public service delivery, and attract public resources, investments and residents.  
However, and following the multiscalar character of governance as defined in the European and 
North American contexts, “relations between central and local governments are not simply 
hierarchical but rather form a web of multiple actors” (Auerbach, 2011). What about spaces that 
are traditionally described as powerless in the Israeli scholarship — peripheral mid-sized cities? 
2.3 The peripheral mid-sized city in Israel 
Planning has been a substantial function of the Israeli State, especially after its establishment, in 
its semi-socialist form. As I have mentioned before, and as old urban centres quickly reached 
saturation point, an important task for planners at the time was the creation of new settlements 
to host the on-going flow of Jewish immigration. In this context, a large number of new 
settlements, among them around thirty mid-sized towns, were planned at the borders of the new 
state, to act as administrative and economic centres for their rural hinterlands. Those new 
towns, designed along the principles of Walter Christaller’s central place theory, were called 
‘development towns’ (ayarot pituach in Hebrew). However, soon after they were built, signs of 
their failure were quick to show: ethnic segregation, out-migration, unemployment, lack of 
public infrastructures, and isolation from the hinterlands they were planned to benefit from… 
their marginalisation has produced correlative negative effects of socioeconomic stratification 
on the population they have hosted until today (see for instance Semyonov & Lewin-Epstein, 
2004).  
These peripheries, described by Israeli geographers such as Yehuda Gradus (1983), have also 
suffered from the political regime of Israel. Gradus explains that Israel is mostly centralised, and 
fosters high political stakes when it comes to planning. In that context, development towns were 
very dependent on the central administration, which even sent representatives from the centre 
to act as local leaders. In the 1960s, a decade after their establishment, some cities finally saw 
leaders emerge from their own communities — usually Jewish immigrants from North Africa 
and the Middle East. However, at the central level, the Israeli parliament — the Knesset — still 
displayed overrepresentation of members from the centres (Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, but also from 
the older rural settlements, or kibbutzim). In that sense, Israeli politics was sectorial rather than 
territorial (Ibid.).  
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The core/periphery dichotomy described by Gradus led to what he calls the emergence of 
‘ethnoregionalism’, or a reactive political regionalism (Ibid.). The main beneficiaries of this 
marginalisation are the nationalist, conservatory right-wing parties in Israel. In fact, the success 
of Likud in 1977 is a result — among other reasons — of the resentment of the inhabitants of 
development towns toward the Labour party. With the strengthening of the right-wing bloc, the 
justification of the occupation of frontier areas has shifted from defence justification (Labour) to 
historical ideological and religious reasons (Likud) (Smooha & Peretz, 1982).  As “[…] Mizrahi 
identity has been preserved at the social and economic peripheries, not as a distinct cultural 
orientation, but as a diffused sense of origin and solidarity, fuelled by persisting marginality and 
hardship”2 (Yiftachel & Tzfadia, 2004, p. 229), Likud has permitted the reunification of the image 
of the settlers and the defenders (Kellerman, 1996). 
The arrival of around 800,000 new immigrants from the former Soviet space in the 1990s has 
revived the debate around development cities in Israel (Berthomière, 2003). As the immigration 
policy shifted in the 1980s — a result of the new neoliberal reforms of the State —, the 
government took steps to develop incentives to lead the newcomers to the Northern and 
Southern districts of the country. Even if the housing policies adopted by the State to encourage 
settlement in the development towns have been rather successful, the question remains: who 
will stay in those areas? In fact, out-migration in development towns was always high, as high as 
20% in the 1950s (Ibid.). And indeed, even though many cities have benefited from a 
demographic burst — Former Soviet Union immigrants still represent around a quarter of these 
towns’ residents —, the continuous building of housing for low purchasing power families in 
development towns has translated into a vicious circle of precarity (Aymard & Benko, 1998). 
Immigrants who settled and stayed in development towns were generally older, less educated 
and with lower professional prospects than the ones settling in the centre.  
Nevertheless, the 1990s mass migration has revealed new capacities among local leaders in 
those peripheral towns. First of all, some elected mayors were more and more professional and 
were able to counter decisions from the central administration to prevent mass settlement in 
their cities (Auerbach, 2001). They succeeded in transforming themselves from ethnic brokers 
to ‘more capable, entrepreneurial and independent mayors’ (Razin & Hazan, 2004, p. 90). Strong 
local governments managed to resist mass installation, while the weakest one were forced to 
accept, leading to even poorer predicaments (Tzfadia, 2006). With new flows of immigration, 
residents of the peripheries have participated actively in immigrant integration (Berthomière, 
1996). 
                                                          
2 In italics in original text.  
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Another effect of the 1990s immigration has been the rise of new political parties in the political 
landscape of development towns. Immigration weighs on politics, as Soviet immigrants and 
oriental immigrants tend to strengthen the Zionist, anti-democratic coalition (Acosta, 2014). 
Immigrant parties Shas and Israel Beitenu are well settled in the periphery (Achouch & Morvan, 
2013; Berthomière, 2004). Israel Beitenu municipal councillors are present in every city council 
in the towns under scrutiny, as Russian-speaking immigrants tend to affiliate to radical Jewish 
nationalism (Tzfadia & Yacobi, 2007; Lerner, 2015). At national level, this means that the 
peripheries continue to provide voters for right-wing parties, with an inclination for extreme 
rightist positions and security discourses (Rubin et al., 2014).  
Despite this rather ‘negative’ portrait of immigration settlement, Israel is often quoted as an 
example for its best practices when it comes to its relations between the diaspora and Israeli 
socioeconomic development. Transnational institutions such as the Jewish Agency3 — and its 
programme linking diaspora groups and local authorities ‘Israel’s partnership 2000’ —, the 
American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee — and the Taglit-Birthright Israel programme— 
are set as examples, since they make the best of the financial resources of one group, and the 
development needs of the other (Agunias & Newland, 2012).  
3 On the importance of immigration issues, an indicator of 
contemporary societal and political transformations  
In this rather rich theoretical and empirical context, it has been quite a challenge to adopt an 
inductive position. In fact, the idealised research guideline that researchers have no 
preconception before they start observations is impossible. However, and especially as I do not 
aim at collecting data for the purpose of elaborating a general theory, I adopted a ‘dialogue’ 
between fieldwork and the literature. Hence, the data collected can challenge existing theories 
and enrich them (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This inductive approach involves looking at things 
differently, in order to add a new layer. 
What did I do differently? I decided to enquire into ‘ordinary cities’, and more particularly, to 
encounter their actors. In that sense, my aim was to bring back agency within a field that has 
been mostly occupied by structuralist theorists. Those agents, re-empowered as they are with 
the capacity to make choices, produce policies, bear an impact on scales and constantly define 
the places they inhabit, even if they do not necessarily push forward social justice!  
                                                          
3 Founded in 1922, the Jewish Agency is a public agency, whose board includes Israeli citizens as well as 
representatives of the Jewish Diaspora. Through its local offices worldwide, the Jewish Agency has 
organised immigration to Israel since its establishment until now. It also manages absorption centres in 
Israel, as well as decentralised cooperation projects between Jewish communities and Israeli cities.  
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One question that remains, and which I intend to answer in the conclusions of this work, is 
whether the ‘singularity’ of those cases means that they constitute particular cases, leading to 
better understanding of broader phenomena, or exceptional cases that do not stand 
comparison?  
3.1 Contributing to a better understanding of rescaling and place-making 
processes through agency  
If we were to ask what a thesis in social geography brings to a better understanding of the 
transformations of statehood and power, the answer lies in an analysis framed through the 
concept of scale. In fact, the concept of scale makes it possible to capture the multiple interests 
that collide when one comes to decide upon the development strategies of a bounded territory. 
The spatial element is methodological: it determines the place under scrutiny. But the rescaling 
processes I study do not so much fall in a geographic space, but rather a socio-political space.   
The rescaling of statehood has often been studied from a top-down perspective: with the 
withdrawal of the State and the growth of a free market ideology, places compete to reach 
resources. The rescaled responsibility, Brenner or Leitner argue, is a strategy of the State to 
avoid taking the blame for its failure (Brenner, 2004; Leitner in Sheppard & McMaster, 2008). 
However, what is the role of the actors on which these new responsibilities are transferred? My 
project contributes to a scholarship which attempts to fill this void and address the role of 
subnational levels of government in the production of scales, rather than their simple reaction to 
what is depicted as an inevitable devolution of power.  
Through a constructivist grounded approach, I hope to document several possibilities of this 
scalar production. I do not pretend to draw a typology, a rule determining — provided I can 
define a range of variables — what local governance will look like. Instead, I will provide 
empirical cases, each one constituting one possible way cities present forms of agency to 
rescaling the political system. Informed by actors, and by the history of the place that they 
administer, scales of power and responsibility are produced, reproduced and contested. The city 
does not simply replace the State where the latter has stepped back, but new interests drive new 
attitudes, sometimes beyond the city’s formal responsibilities.  
Perhaps each of these constellations, of these possibilities, can become part of a larger 
‘assemblage’. Assemblage, such as proposed by urban theorist Colin McFarlane (2011), enables 
the researcher to look at the city as an ‘on-going construction’, and to take into account the 
history, the materialities of the city, while connecting it to the future, to its multiple potentials. 
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And in fact, if I bring back to the analysis ‘neoliberalism’ as an ideological framework that 
impacts on rescaling processes, geographer Jamie Peck or anthropologist Aihwa Ong harness 
‘assemblage’ to enable their analysis. For Peck: 
[…] the hegemonic grip of neoliberal ideology continues to be manifest in the form of unrelenting 
political pressure for market-oriented and voluntarist modes of governance, based on the 
principles of devolved and outsourced responsibility, along with a correspondingly circumscribed 
regulatory solution space. (Peck, 2013, p. 147)  
In that context,  
[neoliberalism] designate but one strand of a diffuse complex of individualized post-social 
governmentalities, a never more than small-n, flexible assemblage of technologies, routines, and 
modes of conduct, as more ‘deflationist’ and particularized analyses are more inclined to argue. 
(Ibid. p. 135)  
The singular cases that constitute my ‘fieldwork’ — the places where I walked around, took 
pictures, met with people, the places I read about in the news, in articles and in books for the 
time of this doctoral research — offer empirical specific analyses. Those analyses feed into a 
broader picture of worldwide trends that are sometimes adopted, sometimes contested, but 
usually reinterpreted and filtered through the specificity of the places where they occur. Their 
aggregates then provide scholars and other practitioners with threads to follow to understand 
the transformations of the State and of power at work in our contemporary society.  
One major contribution is therefore the analysis of the interrelated processes of scalar 
production, place-making and social actors’ gain of power.  
3.2 Contributing to a better understanding of the peripheral, mid-sized 
city 
A second attempt, through this work, is the reinstallation of small and mid-sized cities, located 
outside the core social, economical and political networks, as relevant objects of study. Here, I 
agree with Jennifer Robinson — and with a new scholarship which revisits towns — when she 
states: “I want to achieve a collective refusal of the categories and hierarchising assumptions 
that have left poor cities playing a punitive game of catch-up in an increasingly hostile 
international economic and political environment” (Robinson, 2006, p. 6). 
Places located in the periphery surely undergo different processes than those in large 
metropolitan areas. But the fact that they have less power does not mean that they do not have 
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the possibility to induce changes at all. When tackling immigration issues, towns, periurban and 
rural areas have become more important sites of immigration settlement than before. Dramatic 
restructuring and demographic change in small towns, in parallel with new immigration, have 
triggered processes of othering and racialization, or ‘negotiations of difference’ (Leitner, 2012; 
Walker & Leitner, 2011). 
Since “Space and place clearly matter in the construction and daily experience of citizenship and 
belonging” (H. Smith & Ley, 2008), immigration settlement in places at the margin is not a minor 
issue:  
Drawing on the insights of these studies, we find that in order to interpret how geography matters 
in anti- or pro-immigrant initiatives attention must also be paid to the history of social/power 
relations (broadly conceived) in particular places, which in turn help to construct and reconstruct 
belief systems such as race thinking as well as conceptions of nation and place. Recognizing that 
place is more than location helps to understand why places occupying the same type of location 
(suburbia) might be associated with contrasting imaginaries of community and place, which are 
rooted in contrasting imaginaries of the nation. (Walker & Leitner, 2011, p. 165) 
On top of re-establishing small and mid-cities for what they can produce, I also believe that 
speaking of margins, of peripheries, or of frontier towns presents the additional advantage of 
speaking of the national level. Indeed, because of the rescaling processes I just mentioned, 
practices developed in those towns do hold something of the national level — its ideology, its 
strategies, its actors and resources.   
3.3 Contributing to a better understanding of immigration and integration 
policy processes 
A final proposal lies in the example I chose to draw the analysis from: immigration and 
immigrant integration policies. Immigration policies and immigrant policies refer respectively to 
policies elaborated to define entries of foreigners into a nation-state, and to policies designed to 
deal with the presence of foreign-born populations in this state (Penninx et al., 2004; Martiniello 
& Rath, 2010). Immigration and immigrant policymaking and policies have been the object of 
intense research in the past decade, leading to the fast development of a field of study in its own 
right.  
In this rather fertile context, the question of the extent to which cities engage in immigration and 
immigrant policies can be redundant, but it is not very well documented when it comes to small 
cities. Second, if in fact small and mid-sized cities start to engage with immigration 
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policymaking, do they diverge from national policies, and how? Are they more accommodating, 
or does ‘local conservatism prevail’? And more importantly, what are the reasons why those 
towns get involved in immigration issues, and who are the actors producing new logics and new 
rationalities?  
The case of Israel can be enlightening: firstly because at least for Jewish immigrants, Israel has a 
policy favouring an immigration of settlement; secondly, immigrants are part of the decision-
making process. The Israeli case makes it possible to look at policymaking without an obvious 
majority/minority dichotomy. Immigrants participate in politics – they work at the ministries, 
they are elected members of parliament, but as I have mentioned, in the periphery, they are also 
councillors and members of immigrant parties. A final reason lies in the relations between urban 
planning and immigrant settlement. As geographer William Berthomière has argued: “the 
immigrant policy for Former Soviet Union immigrants, implemented by the Israel government as 
‘direct absorption’, permits immigrants to chose freely their residence, and therefore, enables to 
measure the relation between State logics and immigrants’ logics”4 (Berthomière, 2002).  
Very little has been done in Israel on those topics. Gedalia Auerbach (2001, 2011) and Erez 
Tzfadia (2005, 2006) have looked at the ‘local autonomy’ gained by towns through their mayoral 
and municipal activities, but their work mainly focuses on the 1990s. On the use of municipal 
services by immigrants, Gila Noam (1994) has shown that 50% of new immigrants did not know 
that there was a department of absorption to turn to at city level. Users did not rate those 
departments positively, as they denounce heavy bureaucratic procedures, high costs and 
discourteous treatment (Noam, 1994). Much more recently, Orna Yehuda Abramson shows that 
those services are more present and more used, but her survey exclusively purports to describe 
the new organisational developments in municipalities (Yehuda Abramson, 2013).  
Israel’s Jewish immigration is too often considered ‘unique’, and little critical research work on 
immigration and immigrant policy processes in Israel has been carried out. When presenting my 
work to Israeli scholars, they have encouraged me and assured that Aliyah is like any other 
immigration. I myself think the contrary: any immigration is like Aliyah. In fact, immigration 
always holds the hope that life will become better, especially for the second generation. 
Immigration always represents a moral ascent — this is precisely what the term Aliyah means —
; it always encompasses a desire for emancipation. Once they settle, immigrants often experience 
the backlashes of uprooting and relocating in a foreign place. Much as in other places in the 
world, Israel has paid the price of ignoring the crises induced by immigration, and of enforcing 
                                                          
4 Translation of the author. 
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assimilationist policies. As new developments have occurred in the past few decades, maybe 
there is indeed something to learn from the Israeli experiences.    
4 Conceptual framework: Scale, place and people 
Even though the first part of this volume does follow this order, here, for simplicity's sake, I will 
start with the concept of agency, since deep encounters provide the main methods of enquiring 
local immigration and integration policies. I will then speak of the concept of place, anchored in a 
humanistic school of thought, which has endowed place with a broader sense than a simple 
geographical location, including the feelings and collective imaginary attached to it. Finally, I will 
briefly detail the way I have harnessed the concept of scale, since I have already presented its 
development in the first section.   
4.1 Agency 
A first choice I made was to put forward the voices of people. This thesis work is based on sixty 
in-depth encounters with elected politicians, government officers and other stakeholders 
involved with immigration integration issues, or with economic development issues in the four 
cities under scrutiny — Acre, Arad, Kiryat Gat and Kiryat Shmona.  
This concern with the role of agency in the production of places and of scalar processes fits in 
with a humanistic and constructivist tradition. In fact, both humanistic geographers and 
theorists of constructivist grounded theory have argued in favour of including everyday lives 
within the analysis (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Tuan, 1976; David Ley & Samuels, 1978; D. Ley, 
1981; Adams, Hoelscher, & Till, 2001; Charmaz, 2001).  
To that end, I have based my analysis on the life stories, narratives and biographies that I heard 
and recorded during the year I conducted fieldwork. I believe that those narratives are a 
hermeneutics, an interpretation of the social life that is produced and constructed by the 
multiple actors meeting around — in this case — immigration issues. As Christine Delory-
Momberger, who has largely worked on the biographical method, argues:  
We never stop biographying, that is to fit our experience in orientated time schemes which 
organise mentally our moves, our behaviours, our actions, following a narrative configuration’s 
logic. This biographisation activity could be define as a dimension of human thinking and acting 
which, in the form of practical hermeneutics, enables individuals, in the conditions of their socio-
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historical settings, to integrate, to structure, to interpret situations and events they live.5 (Delory-
Momberger, 2009, p. 30) 
But next to an orientation toward the past, where participants in the research restructure past 
events, those narratives also hold a powerful orientation toward the future. This future is what 
lies in the ‘potential’ or in the ‘possible’. Here in particular, since I meet with people in 
governments, the political significance of the chosen words is substantial.  
More particularly, I will emphasise the narratives produced by those who deal with immigration 
matters, but who also have experienced immigration themselves. Here, as I suggested before, the 
Israeli case offers the possibility to look at immigrants who have access to politics and to analyse 
the impact of their stories in the public sphere. I believe that their language will reflect their 
position of ‘mediators’. For instance, political scientist Marco Martiniello has explored the role of 
ethnic leaders in Belgium, and defines them as privileged actors who mediate with the State and 
polity (Martiniello & Rath, 2010). I argue that, through their participation in governmental 
affairs, they produce new discourses and logics of immigrant integration.   
4.2 Place 
A second aspect of the theoretical and methodological framework I adopted is to ground the 
research in places. In fact, people’s narratives are essential, but their analysis needs to be 
situated and contextualised in time and in space.  
Beginning with frontier towns, I have scaled the analysis at local level. Those towns are not 
simply administratively bounded places. Following John A. Agnew’s theory, places include three 
dimensions: a location, or a site in space, typically a city or another settlement; a series of locales 
where everyday life activities take place; and a ‘sense of place’, that is the feeling to belong to a 
unique community and a unique landscape, therefore following an Aristotelian tradition which 
sees place — contrarily to space — as being unique (Agnew, 1987, 2011). Agnew’s account has 
had a profound impact in geography. The deep changes experienced over the past decade in our 
contemporary societies have led scholars to fine-tune this definition, and counter the attacks of 
some who have assessed that places are obsolete in the global world of non-lieux (Augé, 1992) 
and flows (Castells, 1998; Bauman, 2013). Thus feminist geographer Doreen Massey has argued 
that places can host multiple, often conflicting identities; they foster a sense of place that is 
extroverted, open to the world; and the spatial organization itself impacts the divisions within 
the place (D. Massey, 1991).  
                                                          
5 Translation of the author. 
 38
The openness of places means that they are ‘external forces’ that define places. Agnew points out 
the crucial role of the modern territorial State which organises the local administration and 
decides upon redistribution (Agnew, 1990). This remark leads me to the third aspects of my 
approach: scale.  
In fact, places represent the methodological scale at which the enquiry is conducted. However, 
scales also appear in places. As geographer Izhak Schnell suggests:  
This means that different scales may all be represented in the local as a hologram in which the part 
maintains the structure of the whole in different scales. The local, in this conception, becomes the 
hologram reality that mirrors the ensemble of forces, operating in a unique combination of horizontal 
and vertical or scalar orders that participate in shaping the place. (Schnell, 2007, p. 259)  
4.3 Scale 
The concept of scale has emerged from the analysis as particularly relevant to address the 
production of new governance devices, rules and norms by the actors located in the places I 
inquire.  
In this work, I try to break free from a conception of scales as hierarchical spatial ensembles, to 
turn to a more fluid approach of scales. In fact, geographers have renewed the concept of scale, 
under conditions of globalisation and intense capitalism, therefore following larger claims in 
social sciences to give up ‘methodological nationalism’. At the end of the 1990s, Erik 
Swyngedouw (1997) and Roland Robertson (1997) both coined the concept of ‘glocalisation’, 
breaking up the hierarchical order of scales, while Peter Taylor proposed a world city network 
with both regional and hierarchical tendencies (Taylor in Sheppard & McMaster, 2008). Here, I 
agree with Neil Brenner who reaffirms the chaotic results of processes affecting the scalar 
architecture of capitalism, which he defines as “a mosaic of superimposed, tangled, crosscutting, 
and unevenly overlapping interscalar hierarchies whose units are rarely coextensive or 
isomorphic” (Brenner in Schiller & Çağlar, 2010, p. 33). Scales are defined here as hierarchies of 
power, authority and responsibility. Rescaling processes are therefore the transformations of 
these hierarchies.  
More importantly, scales are produced, reproduced or contested by the actors themselves. This 
aspect is marginal in the major works addressing scale issues — mostly because they are 
produced by critical theorists who focus on macro levels of analysis. However, as Schnell argues 
when addressing the scalar forces affecting places, “while agents are practicing, they play an 
active role in response to these external forces” (Schnell, 2007, p. 260). Understanding agents’ 
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logics and strategies, but also the cooperation and conflicts between them, sheds light on the 
governance of immigration and integration issues in those cities.  
All through my fieldwork, the multiplicity of actors and their organisational belongings have led 
me to discover a multiscalar landscape, where local actors such as municipalities gain power. 
But with each programme or policy on which their responsibility increases, their dependency on 
other actors (usually the sponsors) increases accordingly. In fact, the more local actors see 
responsibilities devolved, the more dependent they become. From this interconnected web of 
‘endogenous, exogenous and transitional actors’ (Di Meo, 2008) dealing with immigration and 
integration issues in the towns, the analytical category of scale has proved to function as a 
pointer of the power — certainly relative, but existent — of local actors in places at the margin.   
5 Outlines 
Firstly, let us recall that the main question I address, through the analysis of the particular 
immigrant integration policy domain, is: do mid-sized cities located at the margin of capitalist 
economical networks govern the social life of the places they administer, or are they being 
governed?  
The first part of this thesis addresses the theoretical and methodological choices supporting the 
analysis. More specifically, it tackles the intersections within the triptych scale, place and agency. 
The first chapter of this part is an attempt to brief the scholarly debates on scales, places and 
agency, and to locate my research within these prolific fields of study. The following chapter, 
focusing on the ‘places’ I chose to enquire, aims at presenting the specific context of Israel on the 
one hand, and of mid-sized cities located away from the centre, close to the country’s borders on 
the other hand. I argue that those frontier towns are relevant pointers of the transformations of 
the State, and of the transformations of the local, as well as the national. The methodological 
implications of the theoretical and empirical choices I made are detailed in the last chapter of the 
first part.  
The second part of this work addresses the motives driving local immigration policymaking. The 
first set of motives, detailed in chapter 5, is grounded in place. Immigration is perceived as one 
mechanism leading to local (in-place economic) development. Immigration changes the course 
of a place, the dynamics of its social relations, the way social life is organised. The chapter shows 
that participants to the research strongly believe that these disruptions can lead to positive 
change, can entail the rescaling of local development strategies, and support the repositioning of 
the city. The second set of motives, presented in chapter 6, is grounded in the actors. The social 
engagement of actors with the multiple aspects of life in the city, and more importantly the 
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engagement of actors in government, actors who take decision for larger groups, has a 
significant impact on the production or reproduction of realities in this city. The immigration 
experiences of leaders make them more sensitive to the issues, but also more inclined to ‘choose’ 
immigrants they perceive as more contributing. 
The third part of the work addresses the processes of policymaking and policy implementation, 
when it comes to immigrant integration. The first chapter of the third part presents a grounded 
definition of integration. Through the deconstruction of the concept of immigrant integration 
itself, the meanings of integration, as expressed by the policymakers themselves, are unveiled. 
Finally, in order to switch from discourses and symbolic policies, to actual public actions, I look 
at the organisation features of immigrant integration governance. The last chapter will therefore 
offer an opportunity to map the actors, their activities, and the relations between them. The 
entanglement of actors, institutions, policies, supervision tools and funding opportunities will 
support my understanding of scales. ‘Split’ responsibility in a context of ‘unfinished’ 
decentralisation leads to a complex multiscalar governance of immigrant integration.   
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Part I: Setting the stage 
  
 42
Chapter 2 ◊ To govern or to be governed? Re-
introducing agency and place to account for rescaling 
in mid-sized cities 
When I first came up with a title for a doctoral project in 2013, I wrote down: “local policies for 
the economic integration of new (Jewish) immigrants in peripheral Israel”. This title quite 
strongly implied that I was about to carry out yet another research project on local integration 
policies, another monographic work, or at least a comparative study between several cities that 
have implemented (so-called) local immigrant integration policies. As I grew convinced that this 
was not what I aimed at, I had to change the title accordingly. In fact, this project does explore 
immigrant integration policies as formulated by four city governments. However, the aim is not 
only to unpack the different variables that establish distinctive types of policies, but also to ask 
the next question one may have in mind: how does this inform the changes that affect our 
political system, and ultimately the potential for local democracy to function? Therefore, the 
objective I have set up is markedly different. I chose to explore immigration and integration 
politics because, although they usually constitute a minor policy domain for local governments 
(already struggling with many newly decentralised responsibilities ranging from education, 
economic development to physical engineering), their potential to reveal sensitive issues of 
identity, belonging or citizenship is great. Thus, analysing immigration policies brings out the 
very meanings of what constitutes the uniqueness of a city, but at the same time its permeability 
and openness to the outside.   
Immigration and integration policies formulated by the cities I investigated became more and 
more a pretext to look into the transformations of the State, and its administrative and political 
system, in a context of neoliberalisation and increased devolution of responsibilities. Moreover, 
as I looked at a policy domain profoundly affecting populations that usually stand at the margins, 
I wondered if local governance offered a better path for immigrant participation in democratic 
decision-making. Unfortunately, the cities I have explored have not proved to be more 
democratic that the State system. Nevertheless, I will show that they have gained in power and 
capacity to participate in the political deliberations that concern them.   
In order to come to a deeper understanding of these transformations, I gave particular attention 
to three concepts that I will develop extensively in the following pages: scale, place and agency. 
Geographer Bob Jessop (2008) argues that the last decades have shown a growing interest for 
four distinct spatial lexicons — territory, place, scale and networks. In particular, there is 
increasing interest in investigating two or more dimensions of sociospatial relations. This 
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growing interest is illustrated by the use of such neologisms as “glocalization, glurbanization, 
neomedievalism, territorial networks, scaled places, virtual regions, polynucleated cities, 
graduated sovereignty, network states, multilevel governance, global city hierarchies […]” 
(Jessop, Brenner, & Jones, 2008, p. 392). Nevertheless, he argues, scholars have focused on their 
new developments rather than “exploring the mutually constitution relations among those 
categories6 and their respective empirical objects” (Jessop et al., 2008, p. 391). This work is 
therefore an opportunity to explore the mutual constitution of scale and place. Another claim 
that had a significant effect when I planned this research has been mostly made by human and 
social geographers, concerned with the role of agency and its impact on sociospatial relations.  
With that in mind, the main question is: do mid-sized cities located at the margin of capitalist 
economical networks govern the social life of the places they administer, or are they being 
governed? Additionally, five questions structure the investigation:  
• To what extent can an enquiry ‘at the margin’ provide the researcher with the possibility 
to identify “practices, identities and autonomies” (Carrier & Demazière, 2012, p. 141) 
that either reproduce or produce specific scalar spaces of politics?  
• Is immigration considered a possible lever for city economic development and social 
change? Is there a positive correlation between cities that are engaged in actions aiming 
at rescaling their development strategy and cities that proactively address immigration 
issues?  
• Do city officials’ own immigration experiences affect the immigration discourse brought 
to the council and the public? If so, what are the discursive performances I attended, and 
how do they differ from other discourses on immigration and/or immigrant integration?  
• What is the immigrant-integration-narrative framing at work and how do these 
narratives impact the formulation of immigration integration as an issue for public 
action?  
• How do the strategies deployed by social actors involved in immigration and integration 
policy formulation and implementation transform the urban governance that targets 
specifically this policy domain into a multiscalar and fragmented political space?   
                                                          
6 To explore these mutually constitutive relations, Jessop develops the TPSN (Territory, Place, Scale, 
Network) model. The model allows research to focus on “contradictions, conflicts, dilemma, 
marginalisation and volatility”(Jessop, Brenner, & Jones, 2008). It acknowledges the variation of 
structures and practices of each sociospatial category along time, from a fix — for instance the Fordist-
Keynesian spatiotemporal fix —, to a crisis, strategies of crisis resolution, to a shift and therefore a new fix 
— for instance the postnational, unevenly developing global economy — (Ibid., p. 397). 
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The main hypothesis is as follow: if I were to draw a theoretical model to understand local policy 
responses, it might take the following shape. On the one hand, I would represent the agency and 
will of social actors in formulating policies for the city; and on the other hand, the sense of place 
and the collective imaginary of place linked to the city, where immigration finds its meaning. To 
put it bluntly, a proactive immigration policy (that is a set of communication actions and 
matching public actions, which openly welcomes immigrants to settle in the city and offer them 
support) is much more likely to be found if actors involved in the governance of immigration and 
integration in the city have the will and capacity to act upon immigrant integration actions; and 
they govern a place that is characterised by an inclusive collective imaginary of place, where 
diversity is positively connoted.  
   
Figure 2.1. Local policy response, depending on leadership style and sense of place. Realised by 
Amandine Desille 
The following sections focus on defining the concepts of scale, place and agency, as well as on 
explicating the theoretical and methodological possibilities they allow.   
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1 Transformation of scales of State power, authority and 
responsibility  
This first section aims at presenting the core concept of this doctoral research: scale. The spatial 
lexicon ‘scale’ has gained a growing interest the last decades to address sociospatial 
transformations (Jessop et al., 2008). I will first present a brief state-of-the-art based on both an 
Anglo-Saxon and French-speaking tradition of geography, which have addressed the 
epistemology and heuristics of scales. Then, I will describe more particularly the extent to which 
this core geographical concept is useful to address the deep transformations of State power and 
government experienced by nation-states the last decades.  
I will locate my analysis at the city level, the city having become a strategic site in the light of 
these transformations. Indeed, the contemporary restructuring of the space-economy has 
consecrated the city as a prime site for economic development and social change. The second 
subsection will therefore describe the reason why subnational spaces have gained increasing 
attention — this doctoral project itself participates in the rise of city-based research —, and the 
consequent shift from an urban/local government to urban/local governance.   
Finally, I will argue that immigration and integration policies — although often deemed marginal 
in urban policymaking — do offer a rich angle to understand the rescaling of statehood: deeply 
rooted in identity, belonging and nation-making matters, immigration and its corollary 
immigrant integration are litmus tests to ‘reveal society’.7  
1.1 Scales, rescaling, scalar fixes and scalar flux  
The notions of scale, and therefore of scaling, rescaling, scalar fixes and scalar flux, have 
undergone tremendous ontological and epistemological changes in geography. Inherited from 
cartography and geomorphology where they simply indicated a reduction or enlargement of a 
spatial unit, scales are now “socially produced […] dimensions of particular social processes” 
(Brenner, 2004, p. 9). This subsection therefore aims at giving a brief overview of the evolution 
of research on scales, as well as proposing a working definition of scales for the purpose of this 
research project.  
Indeed, scale is not to be reduced to a level of government and society phenomena — global, 
transnational, national, local and body — but it means a process of transformations — from 
                                                          
7 Eminent French sociologist Maryse Tripier has written a short essay entitled “The immigrant as an 
analyst of our society” (Translation of the author) where she draws a parallel between immigration 
research and the national crises in France (Tripier, 2004). 
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scalar fixes to scalar flux — of State power, authority and responsibility, not fixed in a bounded 
space. In that sense, it helps methodologically isolate a certain spatial level for the purpose of the 
enquiry, while at once offering the possibility to capture the multiplicity of actors, institutions, 
socio-historical legacies and ideological frames that superimpose, overlap and compete for 
power at this specific level of analysis.    
1.1.1 From spatial envelopes…  
Geographers have started using scales, long restricted to the practice of cartography and 
geomorphology, to determine the extent of the reduction or enlargement of observed spatial 
units. Thus, a scale represents the mathematical relation between the distance on the map, and 
the distance in the field.  
In the 1950s and early 1960s, scales were examined with more attention by positivist physical 
geographers. More particularly, they questioned the relation between scales and reality. 
However, as they were preoccupied by an approach to spatial phenomena ruled by scientific 
laws and measures, they addressed the methodological aspect of scales, and determined that 
each order of magnitude corresponded to a different reality (Orain, 2004). This was 
revolutionary in itself, as it proposed that the scale of observation did influence observation 
itself.   
The end of the 1960s and the 1970s were in line with these new debates on scales. On both sides 
of the Atlantic, the use of scales shifted from methodological implications to a theory of 
geographical structures. Scales were not limited to observation stances, but led to the creation of 
spatial ensembles. Scales gained substance (Orain, 2004). Essentially mobilised to describe the 
width of frame used for research projects, scales were reified ‘space envelopes’ (Lefebvre in 
Herod, 2011, p. 6), boxes or containers ranking from the global/international scale, to the 
national, regional, urban, neighbourhood and individual scale. In this sense, scales corresponded 
to the Kantian approach where space and time are “subjective constructs through which humans 
make sense of the world” (Herod, 2011, p. 6).  
This is precisely the subjectivity of scales that was central to the profound questioning that took 
place from the 1980s on. As both materialist and humanistic scientists worked toward 
substantiating positivist approaches of sociospatial phenomena, the ontological and 
epistemological status of scales started to be scrutinised.  
Geographer Peter Taylor (1981) first addressed the entanglement of scale with capitalism 
through a world-systems analysis. His model incorporates three scales: a global scale, that of the 
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world economy, which he defines as the scale of reality; the scale of the nation-state, defined as 
the scale of ideology; and the local scale of experience. He explores the roles that those various 
scales play under capitalism. Neil Smith also provided an account based on Marxist materialism 
(Flint & Taylor, 2011; Herod, 2011, pp. 6–8).  
Anthony Giddens (1984) introduced, through his structuration theory, the dialectic of structure 
and agency. Basing his analysis on ‘regionalisation’, he argues there is a scalar differentiation of 
space, between core and periphery (or in his words, front and back regions). He adds that scales 
result from everyday practices, and therefore are constantly renegotiated (Herod, 2011, p. 11).  
The French-speaking social geography that first developed in the 1980s is more in line with 
Giddens’s proposal and emphasises social representations and the central role of actors that 
‘live’ space (Di Meo, 2008). Olivier Orain (2004) rightly refers to the publication in 1980 of a 
‘discreet’ paper of Jean-Bernard Racine, Claude Raffestin and Victor Ruffy who denounced ‘scalar 
realism’8 and advocated a new heuristic role of scale. They argued that scale corresponds to an 
experimental frame, and endowed it with a function of ‘coherent denial’9 (‘oubli cohérent’ in 
French) (Racine, Raffestin, & Ruffy, 1980, pp. 89–90). They give the reader a simple example: the 
description of an itinerary from point A to point B. Through this example, they show that a 
person describing how to reach a destination voluntarily omits details and focuses on a bounded 
space that is rich enough for a person to navigate, although it does not contain all the space. 
Describing an itinerary aims at efficiency. Focusing on a scale is a similar exercise they argue, as 
the researcher will voluntarily overlook certain details to focus on a specific sociospatial 
experience. I will return later to this proposal, as it offers a highly relevant methodological 
frame, in the constructivist approach of grounded theory I adopt along this work.    
Even though Andrew Herod locates the moment when scales are rethought and become a core 
concept of geographical thought with the publications of Taylor, Smith and Giddens, he also 
pinpoints the limitations of those first contributions. They rightfully acknowledge the social 
production of scales, but they are not yet concerned by their construction, and by the crucial role 
of actors in their production. Scales were still fixed constructs which were studied a posteriori 
relative to their existence.  
Additionally, scales continued to follow a global/national/local bounded hierarchy. Escaping the 
reification of scales is probably the most difficult task for any theorist concerned with the status 
of scales. The terminology limits the possibility to think out of a spatial/areal hierarchy. Even 
                                                          
8 Translation of the author. 
9 Translation of the author.  
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Herod’s volume Scale (2011) is divided into five parts — the body, the urban, the regional, the 
national and the global.  
1.1.2 …To a de-territorialised process? 
New contributions by geographers at the end of the 1990s brought some light on the social 
production of scales. Moreover, they addressed the spatiality of scale, previously bounded in 
space, to acknowledge its fluidity, unboundedness and intricacy.  
This evolution was coincident with that of other fields of the humanities and social sciences. 
Indeed, just looking at the new conceptual frameworks that emerged in the field of citizenship 
and/or migration studies, which were often summoned in the framework of this thesis, 
numerous calls from social theorists have been made to go beyond ‘methodological nationalism’ 
(see for instance the work of Glick Schiller & Salazar (2013), and for claims to a postnational or 
transnational citizenship, see for instance Soysal (1994)).   
In this intellectual context, Erik Swyngedouw (1997) and Roland Robertson (1997) both coined 
the concept of ‘glocalisation’, which makes it possible to think out of hierarchical order of scales, 
and shows that under political economic forces driving globalisation, the global scale as well as 
the subnational regions become more important scales in the geography of economic change 
(Sheppard & McMaster, 2008, p. 16; Herod, 2011, p. 18). Since then, the ‘glocal’ concept has been 
addressed repeatedly, mainly to show the need to acknowledge the constant negotiation 
between the different levels of governance to acquire or regain more power or to shift 
responsibilities to other levels (see for instance Vanier (2015)). 
Kevin Cox (1998) adopted a ‘networked  — rather than areal — vision of scales’ (Herod, 2011, p. 
23). In his view, social actors moved from one scale to another through developing networks of 
association and navigating between ‘spaces of dependence’ and ‘spaces of engagement’ (Ibid.). In 
this proposal, the hierarchical vision of scales is questioned again. Cox also engages with 
different geographical concepts — here scales and networks constitute one another. Peter 
Taylor has also implemented a network approach, in order to produce a typology of European 
cities. He argues that European cities represent a world city network with both regional and 
hierarchical tendencies. Some cities are global, like London, some international, like Frankfurt 
while others have only a regional influence over Western or Eastern Europe. For instance, he 
shows that London has more links with the United States that with other European cities (Taylor 
in Sheppard & McMaster, 2008, pp. 213–235). Taylor re-establishes a hierarchical vision of 
space, but also acknowledges its fragmentation at regional and national level.  
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Even though those proposals have permitted a scalar approach that partially abolished the 
bounded character of scales as envisaged until the 1980s, I have mostly established the working 
definition I will propose in the next subsection following the reading of Neil Brenner’s seminal 
work New State Spaces, Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood (2004). This volume 
investigates “the relationship between the rescaling of state space and the rescaling of other 
institutional forms — in particular, capitalist economies and urban systems” (Brenner, 2004, p. 
9).  
His core proposition is as follows: 1) geographical scales are “socially produced […] dimensions 
of particular social processes” (e.g: state regulation) (Ibid.); 2) “the institutional configuration, 
functions, history, and dynamics of any one geographical scale can only be grasped relationally, 
in terms of its upwards, downwards and transversal links” (Ibid., p. 10); 3) scalar organisations 
follow a mosaic pattern, and not a pyramid pattern; 4) social life is enframed within 
“provisionally solidified ‘scalar fixes’”, […] composed of temporarily stabilised geographical 
hierarchies” (Ibid., p. 10);  and 5) those scalar fixes are transformed in a “[process of rescaling 
which] occur through a path-dependent interaction of inherited scalar arrangements with 
emergent, often highly experimental strategies to transform the latter” (Ibid., p. 11).  
Contributing to the volume Locating Migrations, Rescaling Cities and Migrants, Brenner reaffirms 
the chaotic results of processes affecting the scalar architecture of capitalism, which he defines 
as “a mosaic of superimposed, tangled, crosscutting, and unevenly overlapping interscalar 
hierarchies whose units are rarely coextensive or isomorphic” (Brenner in Schiller & Çağlar, 
2010, p. 33). 
His theory paves the way to the study of cities and their governance through a scalar lens, 
unveiling the relations of power occurring at different scales, but colluding at the city scale. Even 
though in the next sections I will deplore the marginal role of ‘agents’ in this process, and 
attempt to re-establish it (within the limits of this doctoral work), Brenner’s constitutes a 
powerful proposal to study the rescaling of power, authority and responsibility.    
1.1.3 Rescaling as a process of transformation of the State and society  
The concept of scale as I have described it in the previous two subsections, together with the 
debates that have surrounded its definition, have provided a fertile ground for this doctoral 
research. The intellectual stimulation I have benefited from followed a two-step process. First of 
all, and in a constructivist perspective, the local and/or urban scale (I will explain why I use both 
adjectives interchangeably in the following section) has become the level of geographical space I 
chose to frame my enquiry. It has therefore provided a methodological frame, nevertheless 
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anchored in a solid theoretical field that recognises the city as a subnational strategic space. As 
argued by Racine, Raffestin and Ruffy, it was scale that made possible a stance of ‘coherent 
denial’, where I focus on the city to conduct the research.  
However, once this methodological choice made, I opted for a fluid and unbounded approach of 
scale. I mean that I operated a scalar assessment of the socio-political space I surveyed — city-
level local politics and policies10 of immigration and integration. The emphasis is therefore on 
political and social agents that influence the collective social life of the city, and particularly of 
new and settled immigrants.  
The urban scale is not a mere zoom-in, a bounded spatial envelope or a reduction of a reality 
that could occur at national level. At this scale of observation, layers of historical legacies and of 
collective representations superimpose, social agents located at various scales, inside or outside 
government, intervene. The eyes must look out of the physical boundaries of the city and grasp 
the ‘upwards, downwards and transversal links’.  
Additionally, those scalar fixes are just momentary. Rescaling occurs, which informs processes of 
transformations of hierarchy of authority, power and responsibility. These rescaling processes 
are not new, but as a result of neoliberal logics at work (for a definition of the disputed term 
‘neoliberalism’, see annex 1), they occur at a speed never experienced before.   
The next subsection will therefore expose the reasons why I chose to focus a priori on the city 
scale. Then, I will take a more in-depth look at the emergence of new modes of urban/local 
governance, consequent of the rescaling of State power and authority.   
1.2 The city: a multiscalar political and social space 
This subsection is a concise discussion of the rising importance of the city in a context of 
statehood rescaling.  
With the hegemony of capitalism, cities have become the consequence but also a platform for 
capitalist accumulation. Even with the rapid development of information and communication 
technologies, and the consequent de-territorialisation of the economy, cities remain strategic 
                                                          
10 Maurice Tournier and Simone Bonnafous (both members of the research laboratory ‘Lexicométrie et 
textes politiques’ in Saint Cloud, France) define politics as the art to govern a group of citizens, and 
therefore emphasise the power of politics to organise and manage collective social life (Tournier & 
Bonnafous, 1995). Policies in turn, refer to a set of rules or principles issued by organisations like 
governments, usually translated into an action plan or working procedures, whose aim is to guide 
decisions or to achieve specific results. In that sense, it is different from politics, although politics 
influence policymaking and policies.  
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spaces for a free market economy, concentrating the activities of modern capitalism — financial 
institutions, dematerialised economy industries, services, media, communication companies… — 
and creating the conditions for their reproduction. Globalisation and Europeanisation have 
fostered the development of mega cities, also called city-regions, metropolises or global cities. 
Today, as more than 50% of the world population are urbanites, cities have gained an increased 
attention. Evidently, mega-cities represent only a fraction of cities, and most of the population 
lives in small and mid-sized cities. This doctoral project focuses on these ‘ordinary cities’ often 
forgotten (Amin & Graham, 1997; Robinson, 2006), but I will return to those distinctions later 
on.  
Many aspects come to mind when talking about the city. As French urban theorist Patrick Le 
Galès summed up, the city has various faces: the material and physical city; the cultural city of 
representations, imaginations or arts; the economic city of labour, trade, consumption and 
production; the social city of riots, social movements, inequalities and everyday life; but also “the 
politics and policies of the city in terms of domination, power, government, mobilisation, public 
policies, welfare, education”. 11 This is this last set of aspects that I will focus on. As I briefly 
mentioned in the previous section, the transformations of the hierarchy of power have led to 
growing responsibilities in the hands of the city. Rescaling is not just a delegation of power 
straight from the central administration to the city government. It is a complex process, leading 
to a fragmented and multi-actor political and social space, the main outcome of which is ‘new 
local/urban governance’ .    
1.2.1 Strategic subnational spaces  
The 1970s and 1980s witnessed substantial changes in the political and administrative 
landscapes of virtually every country in the world. Decentralisation reforms took place, either 
forced and conditioned by the Structural Adjustment Plans in the South, or conducted in the 
name of administrative efficiency in the North (Taylor in Sheppard & McMaster, 2008, p. 218). 
Provincial, regional and municipal levels of government were created or were given new 
responsibilities and power. Autonomy increased: subnational levels of government changed 
from local administration only, to government with more initiative and immunity (Clarks, 1984, 
quoted in Flint & Taylor, 2011, p. 264). 
In 1988, two seminal works are published which systematically explore the renewed role of 
subnational State in the United States. Kevin Cox and Andrew Mair published the article 
                                                          
11 See the syllabus of Le Galès’s class “Cities are back in town” at https://www.coursera.org/learn/urban-
development  
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“Locality and Community in the Politics of Local Economic Development”. The same year, Peter 
K. Eisinger published his volume The Rise of the Entrepreneurial State, State and Local Economic 
Development Policies in the United States. For Cox and Mair, the contemporary restructuring of 
the space-economy in the United States generated rapid changes in the structures of the 
different local economies — deindustrialisation, unemployment and more —, which led to an 
increase in planning local economic development. Local economic development is described as a 
highly territorialized policy, which praises competition among localities. Cox and Mair adopt an 
approach based on ‘local dependence’. Local State institutions are dependent on local taxes paid 
by existing firms. Therefore, retaining or attracting investors becomes a central task to be 
carried out (Kevin R. Cox & Mair, 1988, p. 311). To enhance the chances of the local level in 
attracting investors, subnational institutions may use federal grants, or public-private 
cooperation.  
Similarly, Eisinger defines: “Economic development policy refers to those efforts by government 
to encourage new business investment in particular locales in the hope of directly creating or 
retaining jobs, setting into motion the secondary employment multiplier, and enhancing and 
diversifying the tax base” (Eisinger, 1988, pp. 3–4). Eisinger adequately underlines that this type 
of policies belongs to a tradition of intervention, of ‘strong State’ usually attributed to European 
or Japanese economic development (while the United States’ economic development policy is 
usually one of a ‘weak State’). A discrepancy is to be observed between interventionist 
subnational strategies and ‘weak State’ national economic strategies (Ibid.). Following Cox and 
Mair, and Eisinger, the entrepreneurial character of subnational governments gained in 
popularity: in 1989, David Harvey came up with the ‘transition to entrepreneurial urban 
governance’ (Brenner, 2004, p. 2); later on Jessop (1998) gave a new lease of life to the phrase 
‘entrepreneurial state’ (Galès, 2011, p. 326).  
Brenner in turn framed his argument with a political economic approach, emphasising the fact 
that the State deliberately displaces development strategies. City-regions became key 
institutional sites in which a major rescaling of national State power unfolds (Brenner, 2004). He 
argues that post-Keynesian competition states mobilise diverse institutional realignments and 
regulatory strategies to “[enhance] fiscal constraints and competitive pressures upon cities and 
regions, impelling their regulatory institutions to privilege the goals of local economic 
development and territorial competitiveness over traditional welfarist, redistributive priorities” 
(Brenner, 2004, p. 176). He calls those new urban policies ‘urban locational policy’ as they target 
cities and urban regions. In responses to globalisation and European integration (in the case of 
European countries), a multiscalar geography of economic development, which “promotes 
economic development by positioning a particular scale strategically within broader, 
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transnational interscalar hierarchies and networks” prevails (Ibid., p. 206). This new geography 
leads to a pattern which he calls ‘Archipelago Europe’ (Ibid., p. 178), linking those subnational 
strategic sites through a transnational urban network, and therefore creating new — or 
reinforcing existing — zones of marginalisation and exclusion. Saskia Sassen’s popular ‘global 
cities’ also gained power through translational politics anchored in strategic localities (Sassen, 
2005).  
The different founding works I just mentioned are based on a political economic analysis, where 
the rise of cities is explained through its economic role in a capitalist economy. The 
‘entrepreneurial city’ is trapped in worldwide competition to attract resources — whether they 
be investments, cheap labour or talents — and has no choice but to develop strategies to take 
part in the competition, if it is not to ultimately decline and fail. Those accounts leave little space 
for autonomous responses from the cities. They describe an imposed displacement of 
responsibilities toward the city, where local agency is virtually absent (which is obviously the 
central concern in a political economy analysis, mainly preoccupied by structure).  
Another school has focused more on the bottom-up responses provided by subnational 
institutions. Theorists of the New Urban Politics (NUP) focus on “the decline in importance of the 
public provision of social services, housing and other good of collective consumption, and the 
simultaneous growth of entrepreneurial forms of urban governance” (DeFilippis, 1999, p. 974). 
As transferred resources rarely matched the newly inherited responsibilities, new forms of 
entrepreneurial activities emerged (Feser, 2014). In a context where capital is globally mobile, 
there are two ways of looking at it: either cities have lost their autonomy, or cities compete to 
attract this capital. Partisans of the latter view, whom DeFilippis calls ‘new localists,’ are 
themselves divided into two schools: the new localists who recognise the importance of place-
based characteristics in investment decisions; and regime theorists who argue that local politics 
matter. In their opinion particular, local, political coalitions of urban governance shape local 
policy outcomes (Ibid.). Even though the premises of their analysis are very similar to the works 
I mentioned in the first part of this subsection, they introduce new actors: local political actors.  
Another interesting point of the NUP theorists is the broader sample of cities they look at. For 
instance, Craig Young and Sylwia Kaczmarek assess local economic development policies in 
Polish communes (2000). After 1989, Poland established local self-government and initiated 
decentralisation. Local economic development policies were understood as plans and strategies 
to orient the growth of their local economies, what DeFilippis called ‘new localism’. 
Nevertheless, Polish communes face several problems — compared to bigger cities —, including 
lack of industry, entrepreneurs and new technology, poor quality of the commune infrastructure, 
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level of public finance, demographic and social factors, problems with attracting direct foreign 
investments (Young & Kaczmarek, 2000). Young and Kaczmarek’s survey of Polish communes 
shows what local institutions actually do. They are mainly involved in the planning and 
management of resources; the development of infrastructure, one of them being the creation of a 
new municipal department in charge of local economic development; promotion and marketing 
— 91% of them are engaged in place promotion! — and cooperation with other organisations, 
including European networks, other Polish communes, private actors and more (Ibid.).  Even in 
small and medium cities, Young and Kacsmarek acknowledge the role of local actors in 
producing scales. Indeed, “As local government constructs policies which reflect their own 
priorities they are both shaped by an already existing set of institutional resources, and in turn 
themselves shape (to a degree) geographical variation in development” (Ibid.).    
It is with these preliminary remarks on institutions and actors that orient policies — whether 
they be economic development policies, or what will interest me more all along this work, 
immigration and integration policies — that I turn to the recently defined concept of 
governance.  
1.2.2 Urban/local governance 
But there is one further point here, which you may already have thought of yourself. This is that 
‘cities’ in themselves are not actors. ‘Cities’ as singular entities do not really design strategies for 
‘themselves’. (D. B. Massey, Allen, & Pile, 1999, p. 116)  
Among the many dimensions of the city, I chose to explore its political facet more in depth, and 
more particularly those who govern and organise the social life of the city. Many have done so, as 
reflected in the broad lexicon used to name those strategic actors who represent the interests of 
the city (and their own interests) and work toward their advancement: local State, local 
statehood, urban regime, arena and urban governance.  
Flint and Taylor define a world system divided into three scales, where the local scale is the scale 
of experience. However, they distinguish the local scale from the local State. They coin ‘local 
State’ as for them, “The term ‘government’ merely implies imposing authority in a locality 
whereas ‘State’ suggests a wider set of relations in which to view the formal politics of a locality” 
(Flint & Taylor, 2011, p. 261). The local State is no longer a simple administrative arm of the 
national government, neither is it entirely autonomous. It reflects “The particular balance 
between the local State as an instrument of the State and as an instrument of the locality […]” 
(Ibid., p. 262). The local State is one of many actors involved in local politics. The sum of these 
actions is what they call urban, local, or city governance. In this governance turn, actors create 
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strategies for cities around the notion of ‘growth’ that react to and reinforce the dominant 
discourse of neoliberalism. Governance rather than government is therefore closely correlated 
to mandatory development at subnational levels.  
Brenner uses the term statehood, rather than State. ‘State’, he says, does not reflect the 
polycentric, multiscalar, and non-isomorphic configuration of ‘statehood’ (Brenner, 2004, p. 4). 
He also coins the term ‘urban governance’, which represents the constellations of social, 
economic and political forces that shape the process of urban development. Moreover, national 
State institutions continue to play a key role in urban governance, participating in its multiscalar 
character. 
Kristin Good in Municipalities and Multiculturalism bases her argument on Clarence Stone’s 
urban regime. Although the concept of ‘urban regime’ was criticised for not being as wide-
ranging as ‘urban governance’ (which includes non-State actors), Good argues it still includes the 
private sector, and is therefore a more flexible concept than what was criticised. Urban regime 
represent “informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function 
together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions” (Stones, 1989 in Good, 
2009, p. 18). Stone defines urban regime through three components: a capacity to achieve policy 
goals, i.e. the ‘power to, not power over’, a set of actors and a relationship (Ibid., p. 20). Stone 
follows a ‘growth machine’ perspective, where we find a disproportionate representation of the 
business community. What is interesting, however, is that it permits a micropolitics of 
policymaking in cities. In her volume, Good acknowledges political agency, as local leaders’ 
choices are embedded in social structures and the political economy (Ibid., p. 22).   
Taylor and Flint, Brenner, and Stone therefore define urban governance (or regime) through a 
set of actors, public and private, often located at different levels, whose (sometimes conflicting) 
interests converge toward the governing of the city. Moreover, they all locate the strategies of 
multiple actors in an economic perspective, at the heart of which lie economic growth and 
socioeconomic neoliberalisation.   
If I look at French schools of thought, and even though the capitalist economy, globalisation and 
increased communication are still taken as causes for the city fragmented governing system, 
urban governance is more envisioned through the transformations of its regulatory system 
rather than in terms of economic outcome.    
Patrick Le Galès identifies three schools that mobilise the concept of governance (gouvernance in 
French). The first derives from an economic approach where governance means the 
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improvement of firms’ efficiency. Second, economic sociology and political economy take into 
account power conflict (politics, state regulation), social groups’ interactions (social structures, 
regulation through cooperation) and control mechanisms (market, regulation by the market). 
For those theorists, governance is a process by actors, social groups and institutions’ 
coordination to reach collectively discussed and defined goals. Governance is therefore the 
institutions, networks, directives, rules, norms, political and social political uses, and public and 
private actors which contribute to the stability of society and its political regime, its orientation, 
its capacity to lead, its capacity to provide services and ensure its legitimacy (Galès, 2011, pp. 
64–65). The regulation of society is thus closely linked to politics. The third school is that of 
political sociology, for which governance relates to the government. Governance does not 
replace the government but it shows the transformation of the state’s role and of such political 
regulation modes as were attached to it. Through governance, the emphasis is on horizontal 
interactions with other actors, interdependencies, regularity and rules of interactions and 
exchanges, the autonomy of sectors and networks vis-a-vis the State, temporal dimension, 
coordination processes of political and social acts and sometimes, constraints linked to decision 
(Ibid., p. 66).  
As Clint & Taylor and Brenner suggest, governance comes from globalisation and 
‘europeanisation’ which disrupted traditional political communities and led to a reconstruction 
of scales and actors, outside the nation-state (Ibid., p. 152). Actors became interdependent, 
governmental organisations fragment, leading to polycentric and multileveled European 
governance. In this political scene without government, Le Galès argues, there are norms, 
representations, rules, resolution modes and regulations: therefore, governance (Ibid., p. 153).  
The centrality of cities in the new governance mode is derived from its tradition of democracy 
and legitimacy, which naturally provides them with the resources to ‘play the role of the 
government’12 (Ibid., p. 156). In fact, in this constellation of actors, identifying the boundaries of 
the case can be sometimes problematic. Administrative and political boundaries are not always 
similar (Dupuy & Pollard, 2012; Giraud, 2012). Philippe Gervais-Lambony, in his study of South 
African government reform, shows that a new political structure does not always fit in with the 
territorial identification of urban dwellers, leading to a dysfunctional local democracy (Gervais-
Lambony, 2010).  
One of the founders of social geography in France, Guy Di Meo, links the territorialisation and 
scaling of public action. Public actions are territory-oriented, as they target a specific territory 
but also lead to its fragmentation. In his opinion, actors aggregate to form governance regime. 
                                                          
12 Translation of the author. 
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Those actors are located at different scales, so that endogenous, exogenous and transitional 
actors are spread throughout the territory for which they intend to form policies. Those actors 
may be located in different governmental institutions (regional, department and city councils, 
but also other forms of regional authorities) or can be private actors (Di Meo, 2008, pp. 6–7). Di 
Meo’s social geography is not far from Le Galès’s political analysis, but it extends the 
understanding of governance to its connection with a territory, which informs — as much as it is 
subjected to — the strategies of actors.  
In general, the multiscalar, polycentric, non-isomorphic character of city governance is a result 
of what Olivier Giraud (Giraud, 2012) has called an ‘unfinished decentralisation’13 or Monica 
Varsanyi (Varsanyi, 2008) a ‘fragmented, incomplete, contingent devolution’ of responsibilities. 
Decentralisation is not a straightforward devolution of power and responsibilities. The many 
actors in this multiscalar environment are involved in a constant bargaining process to retain, 
regain or gain power and resources. Decentralisation is not a solution for interscalar 
cooperation, coordination and articulation, says Martin Vanier (Vanier, 2015), and it did not lead 
to the implementation of more ‘coherent’ policies (Ibid.).  
Then “how to isolate local cases in a context of multiple interdependences?”14 (Pollard & Prat, 
2012). In this doctoral work, I do not look at the entire spectrum of policies designed by the 
institutions at the city scale. Instead, I focus on a particular ‘policy domain’, which Eisinger 
defines as follow: “A policy domain is an arena15 in which actors seek to craft and implement 
solutions and responses to one or a set of given public problems” (Eisinger, 1988, p. 6).  The 
basic assumption of this work is that the study of a particular policy domain — immigration and 
integration policy — occurring at city scale will inform the transformations of State power and 
explicit the multiscalar character of urban governance.  
1.3 Understanding rescaling of the State through immigration and 
integration policies in the city 
Immigration and integration policies have become a field of research in its own right from the 
1990s onwards. Most of this field is occupied by a North American and European scholarship, 
                                                          
13 Translation of the author. 
14 Translation of the author. 
15 Eisinger’s use of the term ‘arena’ is not isolated. Indeed, it has been employed as a methodological tool 
in socio-anthropological research. Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan characterises “An arena [as] a place of 
concrete confrontations of social actors in interaction around common stakes. It falls under a ‘local’ space 
[…]” (Olivier de Sardan, 2010, p. 179). Place — as the territory in Di Meo’s proposal — is used as an 
anchoring, a grounding concept, but the arena is unbounded, multiscalar and changing with time. Indeed, 
Olivier de Sardan affirms that arena is a transversal space, “a space of ‘play’ and ‘stake’” — hence a place of 
conflicts. Moreover, an arena is interactionist (Ibid., p. 178-179). 
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focusing on Western receiving society (even though 40% of international immigrants settle in 
the ‘global South’ (UN, 2013)). It is a multidisciplinary field, invested by economists, sociologists, 
anthropologists, political scientists, historians, geographers and urban theorists.  
In this subsection, I return to core definitions: what is immigration, what is integration, and 
what are immigration and integration policies, specifically at city scale? Moreover, I will propose 
a very brief overview of the various monographic works on immigration and integration policies 
in the city. Second, I will present previous works that have deeply influenced my doctoral 
project, and have addressed immigration and integration policymaking and policies through the 
concept of scale. Finally, I will address some of the limitations which have challenged me in my 
project. In particular, I will speak of the fact that most research focuses on global cities rather 
than ‘ordinary cities’; the differentiated ground in which those policies emerge; and the absence 
of agency in a process that is generally viewed through structure.  
1.3.1 Immigration and integration in the city  
My doctoral research addresses the rescaling of State power through the case of immigration 
and integration policies in mid-sized cities. By immigration, I mean international immigration as 
defined by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM): “A process by which non-
nationals move into a country for the purpose of settlement”. Therefore, I deliberately ignore in 
and out-migration within the state borders.  
The concept of ‘integration’, together with its substitutes — assimilation, incorporation, 
absorption, acculturation (each one of them introducing a different take on the ultimate purpose 
on integration) — is an object of research in itself. I aim at providing a grounded theory of this 
loaded concept, which I will develop in one chapter in particular. However, an annex, which 
includes a brief state-of-the-art of the notion, is available at the end of this volume (see annex 2). 
Here, I will mainly focus on the governance of integration, which I understand as the 
intervention of public agencies toward the integration of immigrants. This work is therefore 
meant to be in line with integration definitions provided by sociologist Adrian Favell. Favell 
conceives of “[…] integration as a collective societal goal which can be achieved through the 
systematic intervention of collective political agency […]”(Favell (2003) reprinted in Martiniello 
& Rath, 2010, pp. 374). This collective social goal is therefore contextual and profoundly 
connected to nation-making. One year later, Rinus Penninx, Karen Kraal, Marco Martiniello and 
Steven Vertovec introduced their edited volume Citizenship in European Cities with their 
definition of integration: a “process of becoming part of the society” (Penninx et al., 2004, pp. 1–
16). They argue that the process occurs at three levels: individual, collective (e.g: immigrants’ 
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associations) and institutions (Ibid.). Again, governmental institutions or agencies are 
considered central to integration.   
‘Immigration policies’ therefore relate to policies managing the admission, entrance and 
expulsion of immigrants. ‘Integration policies’, also called immigrant policies, cover a large 
spectrum of policies related to immigrants and their position in society (Hammar in Martiniello 
& Rath, 2010, pp. 51–52; Borkert & Penninx in Zincone, Penninx, & Borkert, 2011, pp. 14–15). I 
will focus on the study of these policy domains. For this purpose, Penninx suggests:  
The study of policies is fundamentally different from the study and understanding of those processes 
that policies aim to address. The essence of policies is their intention to guide and steer processes in 
society — in our case processes of immigrant integration. Explicit policies are part of a political 
process of a normative nature in which the topic of integration is formulated as problem. The problem 
is given a normative framing (What do we want to be the outcome of the integration process?) and 
concrete actions are designed and developed to reach the desired outcome. Therefore, the systematic 
study of policies should investigate the framing and normative elements as well as practice and what 
relation these have (or do not have) with the process of integration as empirically measured. Ideally, 
this should be done using a terminology that is independent of policy concepts. (Penninx, 2013, p. 18) 
Penninx therefore refers to the ‘governing’ of the integration of immigrants, i.e. the setting of 
rules and their translation in administrative terms by subnational governments. Anouk Flamant, 
in her doctoral work on French cities and integration policies, speaks of ‘mise en administration’ 
(Flamant, 2014, p. 18).  
Both Penninx and Flamant have chosen to frame their studies at city scale. Indeed, in the last two 
decades, scientific productions on immigration policies and the city, as well as repeated claims 
by politicians and international organisations’ leaders dealing with immigration issues, have 
seemed to acknowledge that cities have become the scale of integration (Caponio & Borkert, 
2010; Penninx et al., 2004; Schiller & Çağlar, 2010). Local officials are depicted as ‘pragmatic’ 
figures who understand the realities that immigrants face, and are therefore skilled to design an 
integration policy that would be coherent and efficient (see for instance an analysis of IOM 
director’s discourse in 2015 in Ahouga (2015)). The devolution of responsibilities to the local 
level is not only seen as the result of administrative and political decentralisation, but is a 
response to a reality in the field. Immigrants settle in cities, they live, study, work, build up social 
relations in cities. City is the place of their integration, and the local government needs to take its 
responsibilities.  
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It is quite impossible to quote all the monographs and comparative cases that have been 
produced since the 1990s on local immigration and integration policies. However, I will try to 
mention some works that have helped me start exploring the topic.  
In Europe, I found a quite abundant literature, particularly among the publications of the 
IMISCOE network (Caponio & Borkert, 2010; Garcés-Mascareñas & Penninx, 2015; Heelsum & 
Garcés-Mascareñas, 2013; Penninx et al., 2004). Founding father of IMISCOE Rinus Penninx has 
worked extensively on the question, one seminal publication being Citizenship in European Cities 
(2004), with the collaboration of Michael Alexander, Romain Garbaye and Hans Mahnig, among 
others. Another important volume is the one edited by Nina Glick-Schiller and Ayse Çağlar 
(2010), but I will come back to their contribution in detail later, as they adopted a scale 
approach. Before those, a first founding article focusing on European local immigration policies16 
was written by John Friedman and Ute Angelika Lehrer and extensively described the 
emergence of a local multicultural policy in Frankfurt (Friedmann & Lehrer, 1997). A 
determinant of this policymaking was the participation in the city council of German Green Party 
member Daniel Cohn Bendit.  
In France17, although municipalities do not have authority over immigration issues, Olivier 
Masclet (2001) and Elise Palomares (2005) have studied the evolution of municipal policies in 
suburban towns which face large immigration. Françoise de Barros (2008) has taken an 
historical stance, and analysed the production of administrative categories by local officials, also 
in suburban areas. An important argument here is therefore the production of administrative 
categories, which then become operative as categories of belonging, by municipal clerks, even 
though French municipalities do not have immigration discretionary power.  
In Canada, the situation is similar to France, and immigration is considered a federal issue. 
Nevertheless, Kristin Good’s (2009) comparative study in Vancouver and Toronto metropolitan 
areas has provided me with a rich analytical frame to understand the formation of municipal 
policies from the municipal officials’ intervention. In the United States, several works produced 
by geographers have adopted a scalar approach to immigration and integration issues (Varsanyi, 
2008; Walker & Leitner, 2011). I will come back to them in the following subsection. Els de 
Graauw (2013) has studied the emergence of a local citizenship for undocumented immigrants 
in large American cities. Finally, studying the development of a ‘pro-immigrant’ policy in 
                                                          
16 Other research works in Europe over the past few years concern Danish cities (Jørgensen, 2012), Danish 
and Swedish cities (Emilsson, 2015) or Dutch cities (see Myrte Hoeckstra’s on-going thesis, or Foner 
(2014)). 
17 Other research works focus on French large cities, such as Nantes, Lyon, Strasbourg or Calais, especially 
another work on categorisation conducted by Charles Suaud and Anne Gotman (2013) and two PhD 
theses by Anouk Flamant (2014) and Mélanie Pauvros (2014). 
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Philadelphia, Hilary Sanders (2015) shows the importance of the figure of the mayor. In both 
cases, De Graauw and Sanders document ‘sanctuary cities’.  
In Israel, studies on local immigration policies primarily focus on the constitution of a local 
policy for non-Jewish immigrants in Tel Aviv, the second largest city in the country. Alexander 
has conducted his doctoral thesis on the topic, but others have worked on the involvement of 
multiple actors in the particular administration of those immigrants that do not fall under the 
Law of Return (Alexander, 2003; Berthomière, n.d.; Raijman & Kemp, 2002; Schnell, 2013). 
Regarding Jewish immigration, Erez Tzfadia and Gedalia Auerbach have produced some works 
on the municipal response to the large immigration from the former Soviet Union (FSU) in cities 
located in the southern district of Israel, where they emphasise the role of the mayors and new 
processes of decentralisation and autonomy at work (Auerbach, 2011; Tzfadia, 2005). Finally, 
Ester Hertzog has studied another kind of street-level bureaucrats involved in immigrant 
integration, that are not municipal workers but workers at an ‘absorption centre’ (Hertzog, 
1999).  
Although I will focus more particularly on those among them who have taken a scalar approach 
to immigration and integration policymaking, all those studies have comforted a city-level 
approach to immigration and integration policies, and helped me understand the different 
elements inherent to policymaking in the city. Second, they have enable me to identify various 
actors that are involved in policymaking, from the mayor figure to street-level bureaucrats.  
1.3.2 Scales as a core concept: founding works on scales, immigration and integration  
Over the past twenty years, geographers have produced analyses of rescaling processes, which 
profoundly affect statehood, migrations and urban spaces. I will first mention the volume 
Locating Migrations, Rescaling Cities and Migrants edited by Nina Glick-Schiller and Ayse Çağlar 
(2010). But Helga Leitner (1997) has already used a scalar approach to analyse European 
immigration policies. In the United States, Mark Ellis (2006), Monica Varsanyi (2008), and Kyle 
Walker and Helga Leitner (2011) have adopted a scalar lens to analyse the fragmented politics of 
immigration and identity, a result of a devolution of responsibilities from the federal State to 
states and cities.  
A contributor to the edited collection Locating Migrations, Rescaling Cities and Migrants, Brenner 
states: “Ayse Çağlar and Nina Glick-Schiller propose, a scale-attuned approach [that] has the 
potential to generate new perspectives on the urban dimensions of rescaled migration processes 
and on the role of migration in the ongoing rescaling of urban spaces” (Brenner in Schiller & 
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Çağlar, 2010, p. 24). And indeed, the main proposal of the volume is to figure out how neoliberal 
projects — understood as the “reduction in state services and benefits, the disinvestment of 
states in urban economies, the diversion of public monies and resources to develop private 
service-oriented industries […], and the relentless push toward global production […]” (Ibid., p. 
4) — result in “a qualitative transformation of the hierarchy of authority and power of a set of 
relationships geographers refer to as scalar” (Ibid., p. 5).  
The authors advocate a dialectical relation where “migrants as social actors […] both are shaped 
by and participate in these forms of power” (Ibid., p. 7). Apart from their adoption of a scalar 
approach, Glick-Schiller and Çağlar therefore introduce two important aspects that fed my 
conceptual framework: they take into account the meaningful interventions of social actors — 
here the migrants — in the production of scales; and — I will come back to that in the next 
section of this chapter — they also connect immigration and placemaking, arguing that cities 
position and market themselves in order to attract migrants, themselves neoliberal agents. 
Indeed, they claim that “When it comes to urban studies, the robust literature on the neoliberal 
remaking, reimagining, and competitive marketing of cities is strangely silent about migration” 
(Schiller & Çağlar, 2010, p. 2). Yet, “Migration, when considered locally, is part of this global 
restructuring and reimagining of urban life” (Ibid.). Therefore, they call for a more systematic 
enquiry of the relations between migrations and city promotion and branding. One year later, 
Walker and Leitner published a paper on the role of the imagining of place in the differentiated 
responses of local governments to the devolution of immigration policies (Walker & Leitner, 
2011). They defined an exclusionary imaginary of place versus an inclusive imaginary of place, 
the latter being much more responsive to immigrants’ settlement. Setting the descaling of power 
against a sense of place helps account for variations in policy responses.  
Other geographers have addressed immigration policies through a scale approach. Leitner 
(1997) has studied the rescaling of immigration policies from the national to the supranational 
scale in the European Union. She claims that transnational immigrant organisations and 
networks, as well as nongovernmental organisations have been important agents of rescaling 
(Leitner in Sheppard & McMaster, 2008, p. 241). She follows an analytical line that was already 
adopted by other theorists who addressed mutual transformations of scales and networks: 
Yasemin Soysal and James Hollifield have shed light on the role of transnational networks in 
rescaling personhood, notably networks of organisations working on human rights and 
immigration. Indeed, conditions of membership transform and become more and more attached 
to a universal conception of rights rather than citizenship-based (Hollifield, 1992; Soysal, 1994).  
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Monica Varsanyi addresses the rescaling of immigrant policies in the United States arguing that 
Law plays a major role in the rescaling processes associated with neoliberalisation: she believes 
in a legal production of scales, where law-making — particularly welfare law — causes the 
“partial, incomplete and contingent devolution” of immigration power to the local State 
(Varsanyi, 2008, p. 882), in turn constraining spaces of personhood (Ibid., p. 888). In many 
countries in the world, as in the United States, the devolution of responsibilities linked to 
immigration — immigration issues, but also welfare, education and more — is a legal and 
administrative process, fragmented, but most importantly, rarely accompanied with the 
necessary funds (Ellis, 2006). As Ellis argues, “States and localities have no control over who 
enters or exits but bear a considerable degree of responsibility, some of it mandated by federal 
law, for all who are residents. In this sense, immigration is a huge unfunded federal mandate”.    
All those studies by Glick-Schiller and Çağlar, Leitner, Varsanyi and Ellis have been of 
considerable help to explore immigration and integration policymaking in scalar terms. They 
address scale production at various levels: by supranational and transnational institutions (e.g: 
the European Commission and its networks), by transnational immigrant networks, by national 
governments and the laws they issue, or by migrant themselves. Nevertheless, subnational 
governments — which seem to become more important actors in the rescaling of power — are 
not analysed as potential producers of scales, but always as products. Analyses usually 
acknowledge the descaling, although the question of rescaling is critical, with the adoption by 
local actors of a more hands-on attitude to immigration-related issues. My project aims at filling 
this void and addressing the role of subnational levels of government in the production of scales, 
rather than their simple reaction to what is depicted as an inevitable devolution of power.     
1.3.3 Current limitations addressing the production and transformation of scales: 
ordinary cities, placemaking and agency   
In a review of the founding article “Modes of immigration policies in liberal democratic states”, 
by Gary Freeman (Freeman, 1995), Roger Brubaker (1995) points out how little importance 
Freeman has given to place. Brubaker urges Freeman to recognise differences across countries, 
regions and even municipalities. He argues that the different histories of places lead to 
differentiated responses. Since Brubaker’s review, many other scholars have insisted on the 
divergences in immigration and integration policies across cities, due to their particular history, 
legacies and relations to immigration (see for instance Walker & Leitner (2011) in the United 
States or Zincone  (2011, pp. 382–391) in Europe). The emergence of a literature on immigration 
and integration policies in cities has partially filled this gap, nevertheless, mostly in ‘world-
cities’, ‘global cities’ or ‘transnational cities’.  
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Studies concerned with immigration and small and mid-sized cities, in rural areas and in 
peripheral areas, are much scarcer. The suburban areas have been more investigated, notably in 
France (see works on Paris suburbs and integration policies by Barros (2008) and Cartier et al. 
(2010)). Kristin Good (2009) also explores suburban towns in the Toronto and Vancouver 
metropolitan areas. Research works focusing on rural areas or mid-sized towns and immigration 
have been conducted, but they do not inform policymaking (Fonseca, 2008; Leitner, 2012). And 
yet, those areas do receive immigration (Ibid.). Indeed, the restructuring of the economic 
traditional industrial and agricultural activities in rural and periurban areas has led to higher 
demand for a cheap labour, often provided by foreign labour. In the case of Israel, peripheral 
mid-sized towns were established to host immigrants and are until today mainly inhabited by 
first and second-generation immigrants.  
One reason why scholars usually discard those towns is the little leeway they are perceived to 
have when it comes to immigration settlement issues. For instance, in Glick Schiller and Çağlar’s 
chapter Downscaled cities and migrant pathways. Locality and agency without an ethnic lense 
(Schiller & Çağlar, 2010, p. 190–212), a ‘downscaled city’ refers “to its relative positioning within 
emerging national, regional, and global hierarchical configurations of power” (Ibid., p. 191). 
Scoring very low in those new hierarchical configurations of power, those ‘downscaled cities’ 
can sometimes benefit from immigration, particularly when it comes to the regeneration of a 
deserted town centre, or the demographic growth necessary to the maintenance of public 
services. However, Schiller and Çağlar argue that they often suffer from new settlements and 
have to carry the burden of the extra resources immigrants require.  
Relevant though those arguments might be, it does not mean that mid-sized cities are not 
appropriate areas to study when looking at immigration, city transformation and statehood 
rescaling. On the contrary, it seems absolutely urgent to look at those specific places and 
understand the rescaling of governance in areas less equipped to adapt to the devolution of 
responsibilities and to face mandatory economic development. Indeed, issues of immigrant 
integration, development strategies, including placemaking, are usually framed in a ‘you play or 
you lose’ fashion, where towns either adopt the rules of the neoliberal game, or barely survive at 
the margin. I argue that those processes are more complex and I believe that a deeper 
understanding of immigration and integration policies, as well as associated identity and 
placemaking issues in mid-sized cities, located away from large economic centres, can be 
enlightening to better understand power rescaling processes.   
Finally, these processes must include strategic social actors that intervene in urban governance. 
The role of actors — politicians, civil servants, civil society and community representatives — in 
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the production of scalar fixes has been overlooked, denying their autonomy and resistance to a 
perceived relentless neoliberal project. Agency has been discarded in an academic tradition 
dominated by critical theorists. In the third section of this chapter, I will refer to humanistic and 
social traditions of geography, concerned with the agents and their interventions in the making 
of spatial transformations such as scale or place.   
2 Social agents sit in place, therefore are informed by it  
The geography of place has more recently reappeared within this important school of economic and 
political geography through a variety of concerns. These include, among others, a re-examination of 
the struggles around the reconfiguration of scale by state, capital, and social movements in ways that 
challenge the pre-eminence of the global (Swyngedouw, 1998); a renewed interest on “the production 
of place” through a complex, and often contradictory, set of spatial dynamics of capital and 
governance; attention to the impact of neo-liberal policies on the reconfiguration of places and 
regions, such as inner cities or model urban development schemes and local responses to them; and a 
keen theorization of scale and scalar politics (Swyngedouw 1998, 2000; Peck, 2000). […]. Needless to 
say, some of these tendencies are in tension with each other, if not in outright conflict. (Escobar, 2001, 
p. 145) 
Section two addresses one set of the limitations I mentioned in the last paragraph: to which 
extent does place — and particularly those places I conduct my enquiry on, mid-sized peripheral 
cities — influence rescaling processes? The main goal is to show that place — as a nod of social 
interactions anchored in space — informs local politics of identity and belonging on the one 
hand; and on the other hand informs the type of relations with the ‘centre’ — a centre which 
they aim at resembling, and challenge at the same time. The mutual constitution and 
transformations of place and scale will be more particularly looked at. The impacts of 
immigration and integration issues on the rescaling of statehood and on the production of places 
are intertwined and in tension.  
I will first attempt at defining the geographical concept of ‘place’, or ‘lieu’ in French. While I give 
a working definition of place, for the purpose of this work, I will explain the reasons that led me 
to define the mid-sized cities I base my analysis on as places, therefore conflating town 
boundaries with place boundaries.  
Secondly, I will focus on definitions of placemaking, especially in a context of globalisation, 
increased mobility and transnationalism. Indeed, placemaking, as I have mentioned when 
addressing the demand for mandatory economic development faced by subnational spaces, is 
seen as an activity carried out by local actors to foster social cohesion and economic 
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development. I will try to discuss the extent to which local immigration policies, placemaking 
and economic development are connected. More particularly, I question how much those 
marginalised spaces challenge identity and placemaking politics. My idea is to show that 
resistance to the neoliberal project is not always ‘losing’ or failing to adopt, but could be an 
attempt at inventing new ways of living together.  
Following this remark, the last subsection will question the exclusionary or inclusive collective 
imaginary of place that can emerge from placemaking activities, therefore linking scale, place 
and immigration integration issues.  
2.1 From place to (the mid-sized) city  
This subsection presents the definition of ‘place’ I retain. Place has been a fertile ground for 
research, especially with the structuration of a humanistic school of geography, led by Anne 
Buttimer, James Duncan, Yi Fu-Tuan, David Ley or Edward Relph, and deeply interested in issues 
of territory and place production. In parallel, a French social geography led by Bernard 
Debarbieux or Guy Di Meo, among others, has also fostered great interest in the concepts of 
‘territoire’ and ‘lieu’.    
This subsection aims to explain the reasons why I use the concepts of place and city 
interchangeably. Doing so, I do not mean to ignore the existence of other ‘places’ within or 
outside city boundaries. However, in the numerous interviews I have conducted, and during 
observations, city identity is strong enough to methodologically conflate the place and the city. 
Therefore, I will look at the city as a place, a crucible of networks of social relations, at a specific 
moment, built on historical layers of social relations.  
I believe it is a possible methodological position because I study small cities, which host 20,000 
to 50,000 residents, are isolated geographically, far from the central Jerusalem-Tel Aviv axis 
(although this distance is to be relativized, given the small size of Israel) and socially and 
politically marginalised. Therefore, the last part of this subsection will address more particularly 
the specificities of those spaces I visited during the months of fieldwork.  
2.1.1 Place, locale, locality 
I have previously established that scale is the core concept I rely on to assess the 
transformations of the State, through the example of immigration and integration policies. In the 
rescaling of statehood and power, subnational spaces — cities — emerge as strategic sites. 
Urban governance is a concept that enables us to grasp the dynamics of politics at this 
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subnational level, where multiple actors are engaged, at various scales, primarily toward the 
economic development of the city. However, I believe that to understand those dynamics, place 
is required to ‘ground’ scalar processes. Indeed, place is key to take into account history, layers 
of development, of decisions, of interactions, which shaped and still shape the space overseen by 
urban governance.  
In actual fact, several lexicons exist to describe the crystallisation of social relations, everyday 
life, common sense and meanings in a specific spatial area: locale, place, and locality. These 
lexicons reflect the different schools of thoughts which have addressed place — from a neo-
Marxist school to humanistic, post-colonial of feminist approaches of place. Very bluntly put, 
theorists mobilising the concept of localities emphasize their role in the world-economy while 
theorists mobilising the concept of place, in a more humanistic framework, emphasise aspects of 
culture and identity. Indeed, ‘locality’ was defined by Kevin Cox and Andrew Mair (1988), James 
DeFilippis (1999) as well as Colin Flint and Peter Taylor (2011). ‘Place’ emerges more from a 
humanistic tradition, initiated by Yi Fu-Tuan but also by John Agnew, who coined the well-
known concept of  ‘sense of place’ (1987).  
Cox and Mair define the locality as the space of dependence, the space where firms, people, State 
institutions are tied and dependent on each other (Kevin R. Cox & Mair, 1988). These same 
actors may develop ties out of the localities in what they call the space of engagement (Herod, 
2011, p. 23). They therefore provide a definition that primarily focuses on the economic 
relations that bring economic and political actors together. However, their theory brings to light 
the possibility for actors to be involved in various localities.  
Flint and Taylor describe a locality as the ‘daily urban system’ (Flint & Taylor, 2011, p. 248). 
Apart from its economic role, the locality is also the place where different mixes of social groups 
live, therefore generating different patterns of social relations. Those previous patterns lay the 
ground for different experiences for the populations. The locality as a node of social relations is 
also linked to politics. Indeed, localities present a collective social energy defining new strategies 
and futures. Lastly, Flint and Taylor draw on a literature concerned with culture and the city, 
arguing that “everyday life is embedded within place-specific social settings” (Ibid., p.250). 
Nevertheless, Flint and Taylor do not see scales and localities as separate geographical concepts. 
They argue that localities are nested within a hierarchy of other scales, and discard an analysis 
based on “exploring the mutually constitutive relations” of the different geographical core 
concepts of place, scale, territory and network (Jessop et al., 2008, p. 391).    
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DeFilippis lays his argument out in a distinct way, originating from autonomy and the locality, 
rather than the capital production of space. In his article “Alternatives to the “New Urban 
Politics”: finding locality and autonomy in local economic development”, he defines locality as 
“the scale of experience, constructed through unequal power relations and conflicts between 
those social actors and structures that are functionally immobile as they try to create a ‘common 
sense’ and define their position in the relations with the supra-local world” (DeFilippis, 1999, p. 
978). Similarly to Flint and Taylor, he conflates scale and place.  
Even though those scholars focus more on the capital production of place, commonalities are 
found between those accounts and the theories I will present later on. Places entail social 
relations, although the latter involve power and conflicts; they imply experiences and everyday 
life; and they bear common sense or meanings.  
The notion of ‘place’ has found its more enthusiastic supporters in a humanistic approach of 
place (Adams et al., 2001). One of its eminent representatives, Tuan, claims: “How mere space 
becomes an intensely human place is a task for the humanistic geographer; it appeals to such 
distinctively humanist interests as the nature of experience, the quality of emotional bond to 
physical objects, and the role of concepts and symbols in the creation of place identity” (Tuan, 
1976, p. 269).  
In an attempt to close the divide between neo-Marxist and humanistic geographers, John Agnew 
has largely contributed to the development of the concept of ‘place’, anchored in a belief in 
human agency, which requires that the experience of this place exist. For Agnew, the definition 
of place follows three dimensions: a location, or a site in space, typically a city or another 
settlement; a series of locales where everyday life activities take place; and a ‘sense of place’, i.e. 
the feeling of belonging to a unique community and a unique landscape, therefore following an 
Aristotelian tradition which sees place — contrarily to space — as being unique (Agnew, 1987, 
2011). As place has been often attacked for becoming irrelevant in a globalised society, Agnew 
(2011) has reaffirmed the unbounded character of places and the central role of mobility in 
defining places.18     
French social geography has revisited the Anglo-Saxon debate on places (Clerc, n.d.). Di Meo’s 
definition of territory or territoire can be compared to place. Indeed, a territory is seen through 
                                                          
18Geographer Tim Cresswell has explored more particularly the mutual constitution of mobility, 
immobility and place. More precisely, he has studied the evolution of mobility from the threatening 
character of the hobo to the contemporary positively connoted image of the cosmopolitan traveller. Once 
regarded as social deviance, mobility is now desirable — although different kinds of mobility are 
sanctioned with more or less openness. Indeed, immigrants are part of a modern place as much as they 
define its boundaries, its limits (Cresswell, 2006). 
 69
the social relations individuals have, their lived experience (or vécu in French) of the place, and 
the collective social representations of the places in the territory (Di Meo, 2008; Di Meo, 
Sauvaitre, & Soufflet, 2004). Similarly, Debarbieux has defined places or lieux through single or 
small ensemble of buildings, or other material spatialities. His definition of territory is also 
closer to what the Anglo-Saxon scholarship has called place. The territory is a location in space, 
but also includes forms, and practices. The different places that constitute the territory 
constitute legitimate visual symbols of the territory (Debarbieux, 1995).  
Despite those different contributions to place, many have been convinced by a literature that has 
reduced place to a reactionary, self-closing and defensive response to a globalising world (D. 
Massey, 1991). Geographers interested in places in a postmodern world — where the argument 
that globalisation leads to the spread of ‘non-lieux’ (Augé, 1992) — have had to demonstrate that 
places were always subjected to instability, permeability and power relations. In order to 
complete this subsection, I would like to present briefly two more authors whose arguments I 
was especially appealed by: the definition of place by development anthropologist Arturo 
Escobar and the one by Feminist geographer Doreen B. Massey. Against the reduction of place, 
Escobar believes in an open and networked character of place, whereas Massey advocates a 
‘progressive sense a place’. 
In fact, Escobar argues that “[…] we understand by place the experience of a particular location 
with some measure of groundedness (however, unstable), sense of boundaries (however, 
permeable), and connection to everyday life, even if its identity is constructed, traversed by 
power, and never fixed” (Escobar, 2001, p. 140). His work is an appeal to consider the 
production and making of place — not by capital and global forces —, but from “the ‘senses’ or, 
more generally [through a] cultural construction of place — how places are endowed with 
meaning and the constitution of identities, subjectivities, difference and antagonism, following 
phenomenological, interpretivist, and constructivist paradigms” (Ibid., p. 153). The concern with 
mobility and deterritorialization should not erase place but should help recognise the open and 
networked character of social relations grounded in place.  
By place, Massey does not particularly mean a space enclosed by administrative and political 
boundaries. She encourages scholars to think of “networks of social relations and movements 
and communications in one's head, then each 'place' can be seen as a particular, unique, point of 
their intersection. It is, indeed, a meeting place. Instead then, of thinking of places as areas with 
boundaries around, they can be imagined as articulated moments in networks of social relations 
and understandings” (D. Massey, 1991, p. 28). Massey argues that places can host multiple 
identities, often conflicting ones; they foster a sense of place that is extroverted, opened to the 
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world; and the spatial organization itself impacts the divisions within the place. I will leave most 
of Massey’s account on place for the next subsection, as in City Worlds (D. B. Massey et al., 1999), 
she thinks of places and cities quite interchangeably.  
Following those definitions, place is conceived as a variable of difference. Place is the crucible of 
networks of social relations, at a specific moment, and is therefore built on numerous layers of 
social relations. The history of these social relations, their conflicts and their relations of power, 
informs today’s relations. In Israel, several geographers, Israeli and French, have studied places 
and their transformations due to globalisation processes (Berthomière, n.d.; Fenster, 2004; Ram, 
2007; Rozenholc, 2014). They have all included immigration settlement in their analyses. 
Indeed, looking at the particular topic of immigration and integration, relations between locals 
and immigrants along the years can be particularly important in defining today’s ‘communal 
imaginary of place’ and the model of living together supported by the residents. 
2.1.2 When is the city a place?  
As I briefly mentioned in the introduction of this subsection, I made the methodological choice of 
conflating the sites of the towns I explore with place. In that sense, towns or small or mid-sized 
cities are considered places: they correspond to a location, in space, that someone can point on a 
map, and even draw the boundaries of; they are places because everyday life takes place, people 
reside, and mow their grass, they grab lunch or a coffee with friends, join their neighbours at the 
local synagogue, attend an art class for amateur painters, and shop at the local store; finally, they 
share a collective imaginary of belonging, as their residents insist in our encounters: “I am proud 
to be a resident of Kiryat Gat” or “The people of Kiryat Gat, this is who we are”, completing those 
statements by illustrations of a characteristic that they believe all residents share. The 
singularity of the place is contrasted with the multiplicity of belongings, which residents 
synthesise and make one.  
In that sense, cities are not uniform. They are made up of many locales, symbolic places and 
different neighbourhoods — the latter being depicted by interviewees through their imagined 
borders and their perceived demographic homogeneity. Those symbolic places are even shared 
with other towns, connecting them through a particular architectural style that was typical to 
the different periods of building extensions. In that sense, many collective representations and 
the narratives supporting them can overlap: some that are nationally shared, some that are 
typical of the city, although one city can host different representations from the various groups 
and interests that co-reside, and some narratives are linked to a specific neighbourhood, a locale, 
a building or a religious site.  
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I mentioned in the previous part that Massey used city and place interchangeably. Indeed, even 
though in 1991 she argued that places are “[…] articulated moments in networks of social 
relations and understandings” (D. Massey, 1991, p. 28), in City Worlds, Massey described “the 
city as an intense focal point or a node of social relations in time and space” (D. B. Massey et al., 
1999, p. 97). 
In her opinion, several dimensions are important to take into account: first, places do not house 
single communities, but are arenas of multiple identities in conflict. As those identities fluctuate, 
places are not static: “if cities are places of cultural mixing, then the social terms of that mixing 
will vary both historically and geographically. […] and even [the glorious ‘mixity’ evoked by the 
likes of Jane Jacobs] will have its terms, its power relations” (Ibid., p. 104). Second, places are 
processes. Massey supports “a sense of place which is extroverted, which includes a 
consciousness of its links with the wider world, which integrates in a positive way the global and 
the local” (D. Massey, 1991). In this context, cities are essentially open, they are places of wider 
interconnection. Finally, “geography (or ‘space’) may also be of fundamental importance in the 
expression and organization of this urban ‘mixity’. The important point here is that these 
divisions within the city are not just the result of mapping already existing, different 
communities on to distinct spaces. It is also that the spatial organization itself — the geography 
— is important in maintaining, maybe even in establishing, the difference itself” (D. B. Massey et 
al., 1999, p. 105).  
This last remark, which must not be mistaken for spatial determinism, can be connected to a 
Simmelian frontier where internal social borderlines exclude certain member groups of the 
society from the whole. Residential dispersion, or concentration of groups in segregated areas 
located beyond those social frontiers, reduce their mobility, their social everyday practices and 
their participation in politics (Groupe Frontière, 2004). And in fact, the four towns that my 
analysis is based on, if looked at from a national perspective, are spaces of exclusion, to the point 
that social theorists have even largely discarded them.   
The following subsection will therefore discuss the particularities of these small and mid-cities.    
2.1.3 Ordinary cities? Specificities of small and mid-sized cities 
The four cities that I have observed for the purpose of this research occupy a particular position 
in the urban and national hierarchy of the country. In this sense, they can be looked at through 
different lenses. First, they are small cities, with a 20,000 to 50,000 population. As such, they 
have limited resources, and limited influence toward their hinterlands. Second, they are located 
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at the geographical frontiers of the country, close to Lebanon, Syria, and the Gaza strip. In the 
chapter dedicated to the Israeli context, I will come back in detail to the establishment of these 
cities and their exclusionary and segregated character. But for now, I just mean to simply 
underline their ‘peripheral’ character, geographically, socially and economically. In a process of 
rescaling of power, only certain subnational spaces are considered strategic and drive economic 
growth, leaving entire regions of countries out of the most productive economic networks.  
As I want to emphasise the potential of autonomy and creativity of these cities, I will not develop 
in too much detail the different approaches that have developed in geography to study those 
cities. In a nutshell, the past century has seen the progressive transformation of analytical 
frames from a centre/periphery perspective based on a functionalist school to a 
centre/periphery perspective that is similar, yet based on the capitalist production of space, and 
led by theorists of dependence, to a networked approach of ‘archipelagos’, linking the capitalist 
production of space with globalisation, mobility and the rescaling of political governance. 
However, the new approach of cities, as networked rather than contained within the boundaries 
of the nation, has not eliminated old hierarchies (Leitner in Sheppard & McMaster, 2008, pp. 
236–255).  
No matter what approach has been adopted, the scholarship has mostly focused on the centres, 
the large cities, rather than the small and mid-sized cities, remote from the metropolitan areas, 
located ‘at the margin’, in every sense of the term. From the 1930s’ Chicago, to Los Angeles and 
the postmodernist world-cities, global cities or transnational cities that have been at the centre 
of scholars’ attention, research has largely ignored the “variegated, fragmented and incoherent 
nature of contemporary urban life” (Amin & Graham, 1997, p. 416). Indeed, Ash Amin and 
Stephen Graham argue that a small group of urban examples became paradigmatic, and that 
urban studies have been largely based on generalisation from these cities. Moreover, the 
definition of a city itself is problematic, they claim, when ‘multiple spaces’ can coexist, and 
sometimes locate in extending urban spaces (Ibid.).   
Bringing back ‘ordinary cities’ into research is therefore crucial. Recovering the concept of 
‘ordinary cities’, Jennifer Robinson puts forward an argument for post-colonialising urban 
studies. She suggests to leave behind the hierarchy and categories of cities that have separated 
an urban scholarship focused on Western, ‘modern’, creative, dynamic cities; and a scholarship 
she calls ‘developmentalist’, which has considered cities in developing countries mostly as 
subjects of development projects. She states: “I want to achieve a collective refusal of the 
categories and hierarchising assumptions that have left poor cities playing a punitive game of 
catch-up in an increasingly hostile international economic and political environment” (Robinson, 
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2006, p. 6). Instead, she argues that theorists should call for autonomy, diversity, creativity and 
innovation in all cities.  
Without rejecting the argument that capitalism, neoliberalism and globalisation have reshaped 
our space in a way which left important areas at the margin, small and mid-sized cities can take 
advantage of the lack of dedicated policies to participate in rescaling from below. Indeed, as 
renewed enthusiasm for mid-sized cities has emerged across urban studies in the past decade, 
they are now seen as sites of innovation. Several special issues of scientific journals have been 
dedicated to mid-sized cities. For instance, in 2011, Urbanisme published Mid-sized cities strike 
back19 edited by Antoine Loubière. In 2012, the Revue d’Economie Régionale et Urbaine published 
a special issue devoted to the progress of research in the analysis of economic dynamics of small 
and medium-sized towns edited by Mario Carrier and Christophe Demazière. In 2017, Espaces et 
Sociétés will publish a special issue on those cities we hardly talk about.20 In Urbanisme, the 
authors claim that, as there is no national policy dedicated to them, mid-sized cities are places of 
innovation (Béhar in Loubière, 2011, p. 16). Similar accounts can be found in Israel, with 
research work conducted by Nachum Ben-Elia for instance, who argues that a “faltering, 
ineffective central government and increasing pressing local problems, encouraged the 
emergence of more assertive, entrepreneurial and effective local governments” (Ben-Elia, 2006). 
Carrier and Demazière most crucially state: 
Studying small and mid-sized cities would mean demonstrating that a daily level continues co-
existing with the effects of goods, capital, people and symbols’ international flux. It would mean 
examining local practices, identities and autonomies. If we draw from works on “the ordinary 
city” (Amin & Graham, 1997), we can say that small and mid-sized cities, even much more than big 
cities, are simultaneously connected to other urban spaces, crossed by flux, influences, but also 
rooted in history, in heritage. This inclusion and this distancing of the world make small and mid-
sized cities complex research objects, at least as sensitive to analyse as very big cities.21 (Carrier & 
Demazière, 2012, p. 141) 
The potential for autonomy and innovation held in small and mid-sized cities could be analysed 
in the light of James Scott’s seminal work on subaltern politics. In his essays on ‘little tradition’ 
and ‘resistance’, Scott (1977) brings in a ‘folk’ or ‘little tradition’ (a term first coined by Robert 
Redfield) perspective. He explains, “Any transfer of ideas or institutions from one group to 
another entails a shift in meaning […]. The particular category of cases which concerns us is that 
of the transfer of ideas within the same society: from elites to non-elites, from the city to the 
                                                          
19 Translation of the author. 
20 Translation of the author. 
21 Translation of the author. 
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countryside, from the centre (socially and spatially) to the periphery” (Scott, 1977, p. 5). For 
Scott, the social and spatial periphery’s politics differs because “Ideological principles are 
replaced most often by an identification (positive or negative) with concrete social groups and 
by political reasoning from the immediate experience of family, job, and friends” (Ibid., p. 6). 
Scott’s proposal can also be found in Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony when he claims that 
“marginal groups tend to adopt not a systematic consciousness comprising incompatible values 
and ideas rooted in hegemony-seeking social groups but ideas that spring from more their 
direct, everyday life experiences” (Gramsci in Schnell & Mishal, 2008, p. 244). The periphery is 
therefore a place of political dissidence, of normative opposition to the political tradition of the 
ruling elite (Ibid., p. 4). Scott believes that this political dissidence is different from the one that 
characterises the proletariat — as its political culture is not a consequence of its relationship to 
the means of production (Ibid.).  
However, relations between the periphery — the ‘little tradition’ — and the centre — the ‘great 
tradition’ — is a mix of collaboration and tension. Indeed, the local administration of peripheries 
usually operates in the framework of a political project that supports hegemony (Agnew, 1990). 
Scott elaborates and explains that the little tradition is culturally dependent on the elite. Folk 
culture admires and aspires to elite culture. This stratification of culture corresponds to a 
stratification of power and wealth. Therefore, deference and loyalty are expected of peripheries. 
But subordination is negotiated: domination is accepted against protection. And the elite may 
suffer the consequence of a lack of protection. Additionally, the counterpoint to the great 
tradition is a symbolic opposition, which may provide the cultural basis for movements of 
political and cultural dissent (Scott 1977). This is a crucial point in my opinion: subordination is 
always negotiated, contingent and political dissent expected.  
In that sense, Scott’s theoretical framework provides an appealing argument to look at small and 
mid-sized cities in peripheral Israel not only as the victims of what Colin Flint and John Taylor 
have called ‘uneven development’, and the last ladders of the ‘hierarchy of spaces’ (Flint & 
Taylor, 2011, p. 258), but also as places of autonomy and agency.  
2.2 Rescaling and the making of place(s) 
The activation of the multiple social interactions in a physical site, itself defined by multiple 
layers of urbanistic and architectural decisions, to establish a place, is not a mere incident. Scales 
appear in places. As geographer Izhak Schnell suggests:  
This means that different scales may all be represented in the local as a hologram in which the part 
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maintains the structure of the whole in different scales. The local, in this conception, becomes the 
hologram reality that mirrors the ensemble of forces, operating in a unique combination of horizontal 
and vertical or scalar orders that participate in shaping the place. (Schnell, 2007, p. 259)  
On top of the structural issues that define the attractiveness of a place at certain periods in 
history, there are many agents involved in the making of place, at various scales and with 
diverse interests. Schnell argues that scalar forces affect places, but that agents also affect scales: 
“while agents are practicing, they play an active role in response to these external forces” (Ibid., 
p. 260). 
In the context I have described so far, placemaking aims at repositioning the city in its wider 
relations with other spaces. In that sense, it could mean the rescaling of development strategies 
— like those I have extensively described in the subsection on subnational strategic spaces — 
but in the particular case of immigration policies, cities can engage in placemaking in order to 
renegotiate their position within the national and even transnational map, and therefore to 
become an attractive place for immigrants to settle. These placemaking activities can include 
construction of narratives of diversity, immigrant-friendly services and their marketing, and for 
the small cities located far away from economic centres, spreading discourses aiming at the 
reduction of the perceived distance from the centre. Those are the various assumptions that this 
project aims at testing.  
In this section, I would like to briefly return to the notion of placemaking, and to link a political 
economy analysis of rescaling and placemaking more directly. Indeed, as subnational spaces 
become more strategic, there are expected to take part in ‘interlocality competition’, where 
placemaking becomes a positioning tool, its public result being known as city branding. A similar 
logic applies to immigration issues, where the marketing of the city aims at putting forward 
cheap labour and/or high-skilled migrants, both groups participating in the neoliberalisation of 
the economy.  
Adopting this perspective directly brings the autonomy of those places into question. Indeed, in 
the last subsection, I would like to make a parallel with the last remarks I concluded with in the 
previous section, that is the questions of innovation, contestation and resistance in marginalised 
cities, and to question the placemaking strategies that emerge from below, the local innovations 
and grassroots social movements that produce new scales.  
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2.2.1 Placemaking for economic development 
When tackling the concept of placemaking, three main and contrasting dimensions of the 
process seem to appear. The first dimension, which I can refer to as the ‘pragmatic’ dimension, is 
the activity of placemaking as envisioned by international organisations, many consulting offices 
working with developing countries, and countless workers in the development apparatus, which 
socio-anthropologist of development Olivier de Sardan calls ‘development brokers’ (‘courtiers du 
développement’ in French). They promote planning activities led by various stakeholders at city 
level to encourage its positioning in a larger region, or even worldwide, and increase its 
potential to compete nationally and internationally for investments, resources and residents. 
The result of these activities is often called ‘city branding’ and it goes hand in hand with the rise 
of an independent sector of local economic development, which has seen the emergence of 
specialised professionals, independent municipal departments and consultants the last forty 
years (Feser, 2014). As a case in point, Young and Kazmarec have shown that the most 
important tool of local economic development deployed by communes in Poland is ‘place 
promotion’ (Young & Kaczmarek, 2000).   
Second, it is this very approach that has been criticised by a political economy scholarship 
concerned with the effects of the relentless neoliberal project that affects space and the social 
and economic life of its inhabitants. Indeed, what development brokers try to promote as a 
community-based project which aims at harnessing the perceived (by participants in the 
process, usually decision-makers and very often even external consultants) potentials (usually 
economic) of the community, and leveraging them toward community-based development, is 
really the result of the ‘interlocality competition’ resulting from the rescaling of statehood. In the 
‘pragmatic’ approach, placemaking relies upon the idea that, for a city to be well integrated in 
the economic networks, what matters is not the actual resources it possesses, but the resources 
that the ‘community’ (the residents) can create in a deterritorialised, dematerialised economic 
order.  
Cox and Mair, whose definition of place I have already endorsed, situate placemaking in a 
perspective of local dependence (although they speak of ‘community-making’). They argue that 
places go through a process of reimagining of community, understood as a focal point of 
‘modern’ social relations grounded in the locality. They trace the origin of this remaking of place 
in the necessity to reinvent social bonds whilst traditional social relations are destroyed. 
Business-oriented local governance will virtually create a new sense of place, recasting the 
concept of community. Cox and Mair characterise this place promotion as a ‘local form of 
patriotism’ (Kevin R. Cox & Mair, 1988). Forging local communities is in their view a strategy by 
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local business coalitions to fill the voids of modern local dependence of people (Kevin R. Cox & 
Mair, 1988, p. 315). In that sense, Cox and Mair, but also DeFilippis, acknowledge that 
community-based development is a very entrepreneurial vehicle of local economic development. 
They are usually not emancipatory, as a naïve belief in what is locally formed could appear to be, 
but those forms of local control can be as oppressive and exclusionary as any other (DeFilippis, 
1999). Community-based development, including placemaking activities, is not an act of 
resistance, but another feature of the neoliberal logics of economic development. 
Controlling the kind of people who can settle in a city can also derive from strategies to position 
the town, in a context of mandatory development. Immigrants can be seen as actors in the 
economic development of the city, as workers, as residents and business owners in urban 
revitalisation programmes… etc. The role of immigration in economic growth has been well 
acknowledged for some decades. Theorists of international migrations, whether belonging to a 
neoclassic school or to critical schools (dual labour market theorists and world systems 
theorists) all believe in the entanglement of economic globalisation and immigration (D. S. 
Massey et al., 1993). As argued by Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, “the new industrial 
reserve army of immigrant workers is a major stabilising factor of the capitalist economy” 
(Castles and Kosack, 1972 in Martiniello & Rath, 2010, p. 36).  
In the volume I mentioned before, Glick-Schiller and Çağlar deplore the fact that “when it comes 
to urban studies, the robust literature on the neoliberal remaking, reimagining, and competitive 
marketing of cities is strangely silent about migration” (Schiller & Çağlar, 2010, p. 2) Indeed, 
“migrants respond to the differential opportunities provided by the positioning of cities. These 
opportunities include variations in regulatory regimes, local infrastructures and possibilities for 
entrepreneurial activities, employment, education, housing, and entrance into local political and 
cultural life” (Ibid., p. 3). The main problem with the rather scant literature available on this 
topic, although it has became of growing interest, is the instant success met by those who write 
about it, even if (or because) the analysis is superficial. Richard Florida’s ‘creative class’ (Florida, 
2003) has met with enthusiasm among policy makers who have selected bits of his work to 
justify the promotion of their cities toward high-skilled migrant workers (even though Florida 
did not directly refer to immigrants, but rather to artists, high tech managers and engineers… 
etc), and the promised economic growth that this new diversity entails (Hoekstra, 2014).  
A third dimension of placemaking is less concerned with the structural aspects that impose 
placemaking as a quasi survival strategy. It is addressing the on-going placemaking process that 
any place in space engages with, if it is to remain an actual living place. Here, the main idea is 
 78
that placemaking aims at repositioning the city in its wider relations with other spaces. Massey’s 
description of the articulations between both is particularly accurate, e.g.:  
It is, precisely, a reorientation of the City within a restructured wider geography. And that 
restructuring of the wider geography, of the networks within which the City is set, provokes 
effects within the City itself. Moreover, among those effects are what Jacobs calls ‘active 
placemaking events’. That is to say, the reconstruction of spaces and places within the City was an 
active part of the reordering of the wider relations within which the City is set and the aim was 
that the local reconstruction would respond to—and hopefully even influence— the remaking of 
the wider relations. (D. B. Massey et al., 1999, p. 107) 
Massey further argues that cities are at the meeting of networks of social relations, at their 
intersections. Nevertheless, she goes on to say:  
the mere criss-crossing of wider networks of social relations (their simple intersection) is not 
enough to produce a city. At best it might result (using an example of economic relations) in a 
staging post, a transhipment point, a locus of simple exchange. For development towards city-dom 
what is needed is positively activated interaction. This could mean the bubbling-up of new 
activities, it could mean specific policies to trade on or maintain the potential effects of 
intersection (to turn it into interaction). (D. B. Massey et al., 1999, p. 115)  
To activate interactions and expand connectedness, she says that cities conduct strategies. These 
strategies can be commanded by a new economic order, as mentioned in the previous 
subsection, or can be the result of activation from below. In both cases, they are a result of 
rescaling, and they produce scales.  
2.2.2 Placemaking and resistance at the margin 
In this second stage, I wish to address again the autonomy or structural constraints that weigh 
on the small and mid-sized cities, distant from ‘centres’, that are at the heart of my analysis.  
Indeed, I have explained that the first definition of place is that it is a location in space. The fact 
that the places I study are located far away from the metropolitan areas that concentrate 
economic and political power, affects them deeply. Indeed, I have presented Gramsci or Scott’s 
theoretical models, where peripheral groups deal with the constant tension of reaching out to 
the centre, to the hegemony, while being involved in negotiation, dispute, contestation and 
resistance from this same hegemonic centre they aim at resembling.  
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A French tradition of scholarship concerned with placemaking in small cities has also addressed 
the marketing strategies put in place by cities (partially) excluded from the economic dynamics 
of large metropolitan areas. In a context of ‘interlocality competition’, ‘territorial marketing’ was 
adopted by most, even though the resources they put in these communication activities is scarce 
and the results very modest. Hélène Mainet underlines that these small cities adopt discourses 
that aim at resembling the major cities, while claiming for a rural-urban character (Mainet, 
2011). However, French scholars have shown that those remote areas put in place innovative 
strategies and support systems to improve their connectivity and develop economic activities 
(Carrier, Thériault, & Véronneau, 2012; Tallec, 2012)).   
DeFilippis agrees that autonomous development originated in places, and, because it aims at 
rescaling power, can be as anti-democratic and oppressive as other entrepreneurial forms of 
urban governance directed at growth. Bearing that in mind, DeFilippis explores economic 
initiatives aiming at anchoring capital in localities, thus countering the capitalist and globalising 
economy. He advocates “forms of local economic development that offer actors working within 
localities the potential to realize autonomy in their relations with the supra-local world” 
(DeFilippis, 1999, p. 974). His definition of autonomy is as following: “the ever-contested and 
never complete ability of those within the locality to control the institutions and relationships 
that define and produce the locality” (DeFilippis, 1999, p. 980). Instead of thinking that cities 
should work on attracting a mobile capital, DeFilippis advocates for alternative forms of 
development organised around ‘reclaiming’ capital or anchoring capital within localities such as 
worker-owned cooperatives, community land trusts, mutual housing associations or community 
development credit unions. These organisations aim at improving social justice at the local level.  
Bridging with this idea of social justice — and if I look more at the political autonomy of places, 
rather than their economy — is also central for Escobar, who makes a plea to “make visible the 
manifold local logics of production of cultures and identities, economic and ecological practices, 
that are ceaselessly emerging from communities worldwide” (Escobar, 2001, p. 158). Those 
practices, in his opinion, pose important and original challenges to capitalism and Euro-centred 
modernities. What is interesting in Escobar’s account is that he explicitly argues that it is 
possible to “enact(ing) a politics of scale from below”. He says: “Social movements engage in the 
politics of scale by engaging biodiversity networks, on the one hand, and through coalition 
making with other place-based struggles” (Ibid., p. 161). Not only does he make a case to bring 
back locality or place, but also the strategies linking those places with larger networks, which 
participate in rescaling. It is not only the devolution toward subnational levels and the a 
posteriori reaction of local actors, but also strategies emerging from places that participate in 
rescaling processes. Escobar describes 
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subaltern strategies of localisation by communities and, particularly, social movements. These 
strategies are of two kinds: place-based strategies that rely on the attachment to territory and 
culture; and glocal strategies through meshworks that enable social movements to engage in the 
production of locality by enacting a politics of scale from below. (Escobar, 2001, p. 161)  
Escobar does not discard the capitalist production of scales, but “social movements and 
progressive NGOs often times also create networks that achieve supra-place effects that are not 
negligible” (Ibid., p. 166). In this context, attachment to places is not reactionary but definitely in 
line with modernity and transnationalism.  
An important assumption for this doctoral work is that place is not only a capitalist production 
— where locale surrenders to globalisation — nor do I believe in the uniquely cultural 
construction of place (which derivates from a history of relative isolation). As Escobar points 
out:  
Surely places and localities are brought into the politics of commodification and cultural 
massification, but the knowledge of place and identity can contribute to produce different 
meanings — of economy, nature and each other — within the conditions of capitalism and 
modernity that surround it. (Escobar, 2001, p. 164) 
Understanding that agents in places request “development in their own terms”22 is therefore a 
first step to analysing rescaling processes. However, at the present time, the autonomous 
strategies of placemaking essentially refer to economic development, and less to identity, sense 
of belonging and immigration issues (apart from brief comments by Glick-Schiller and Çağlar). 
The next section will therefore aim at reconciling issues of placemaking with ‘racialised 
imaginaries of place’ (Leitner, 2012), in the context of small and mid-sized cities.   
2.3 Inclusive and/or exclusionary imaginaries of place  
In this subsection, my aim is to briefly introduce the assumption that immigration issues are 
fundamental for placemaking (and the resulting sense of place), and that the adoption of 
placemaking strategies that are either inclusive or exclusionary will also inform immigrant 
integration policies. Those questions are to be asked through a historical long-term placemaking 
process, but also through the micro-politics of current placemaking activities. Indeed, the 
                                                          
22 Emancipatory social movements are hardly captured as planning agents (Lopes de Souza, 2012, p. 326). 
Marcelo Lopez de Souza therefore calls for the recognition of the political power of James Scott’s 
resistance theory. This critique of urban critical theory by Lopes de Souza is part of an issue of City (2012) 
in which Sharon Meagher also contributed. Meagher studies rural Mexico. She mentions a Mexican-Indian 
activist woman, and she says: “she and her community do not resist all economic development; rather, 
they want development on their own terms” (Meagher, 2012, p. 478). 
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production of differentiated places — inclusive or exclusionary — goes through complex 
interactions of historical, political and social dynamics.  
I have previously mentioned Glick-Schiller and Çağlar’s (2011) account on cities’ response to 
this relation. Indeed, they question the extent to which immigration is part of the global 
restructuring of cities. To attract immigrants, they argue, cities can develop a certain set of 
policies. When it comes to small cities, “The mutual constitution of cities and migrants within 
processes of restructuring and rescaling is found in such “forgotten cities” as well more powerful 
cities” (Ibid.). “In cities that have been unsuccessfully struggling for capital, political clout, and 
representation, migrants may provide flows of capital and labour that would otherwise be 
unavailable”, but they can also contribute to the city’s decline (Ibid., p. 191-192). Leitner also 
studied immigration in small cities in America. She argues similarly that “migrants may prove to 
be active agents of the reconstitution of urban life” (Leitner, 2012, p. 211). More and more 
immigrants settle in these towns, providing a new labour force in areas of important out-
migration; occupying vacant business sites in the city centre; or changing the housing features.  
If both those studies portray small and mid-sized cities potentially appealing to immigrants, and 
potentially harnessing immigration benefits for their development, it partially examines the 
distancing of mid-sized cities from national policy frames through their “practices, identities and 
autonomies”23 (Carrier & Demazière, 2012, p. 141). Continuing in this direction could only 
provide research with invaluable elements to better understand placemaking from a social as 
well as cultural point of view. 
Basing their argument on place (or locale), Walker and Leitner assess local immigration policies 
in the United States. Some cities and states have adopted inclusive immigration policies, while 
others have adopted jurisdiction aiming at excluding immigrants or driving them out (Walker & 
Leitner, 2011, p. 157). One of the hypotheses Walker and Leitner test is the extent to which 
“ideological conservatism and strong nationalistic sentiments are positively related to attitudes 
supporting immigration restrictions” (Ibid., p. 158). They assert that drawing on ‘locale’ and 
‘sense of place’ helps describe the distinct spatial imaginaries of social and cultural belonging. 
And indeed, in their textual analysis of policy documents and local media, they argue: 
Two contrasting imaginaries of community and place emerged from these texts: (1) an inclusive 
imaginary that celebrates and values cultural diversity and an open and constantly emerging 
community, place, and nation; and (2) an exclusive imaginary that values and appreciates cultural 
homogeneity and a clear bounding of place, community, and nation. (Ibid., p. 172) 
                                                          
23 Translation of the author. 
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Walker and Leitner urge us to reconcile social and cultural productions of places and the 
narratives they generate, they suggest more attention should be paid to “the history of 
social/power relations […] in particular places, which in turn help to construct and reconstruct 
belief systems such as race thinking as well as conceptions of nation and place” (Ibid., p. 165). 
Leitner also conducted another study assessing the relations between place and racialised 
imaginary of place in small-town America (Leitner, 2012). Her work is of utmost importance 
here because it focuses on a small 20,000 town, which underwent tremendous socio-economic 
transformations but also demographic transformations. She studies the processes of othering 
and racialization, or in other cases the ‘negotiations of difference’ through ‘encounters’ (Ibid.). In 
that sense, she draws on ‘everyday life experiences’ to assess values and ideas.  
This section mainly aimed at explaining how I have framed ‘place’ as a grounding concept for 
rescaling processes. Indeed, place is first and foremost a location in space. This location at a 
certain time in history, and in a certain social, economic and political system, informs the 
accessibility of the place to social, economic and political resources. Its social agents can 
therefore engage in strategies to reposition the place within a broader network of cities, 
displacing for instance the scale at which they view their interventions. Thus, a city can engage 
in transnational activities, even though it is ‘peripheral’ at national level. Immigration in this 
context could be perceived as a potential engine for the rescaling of interventions and the 
positioning of the city. Second, a place is a site where everyday life activities occur. Residents 
feel they share a common experience, and perceive the other is at reach, they can meet with all 
others in multiple encounters. Those everyday experiences are considered an important factor 
to understand local politics. People in marginalised places tend to aim at resembling the 
dominant groups, but at the same time, they also advocate economic development or politics in 
their own terms. Lastly, place involves a ‘sense of place’, a series of representations and 
narratives, that bring forward certain values and meanings. Here again, they inform politics and 
might be the base for autonomous and innovative actions, as I have mentioned in the particular 
case of small and mid-sized cities remote from centres.  
Those three dimensions cannot make us oblivious to the fact that places are open, and 
constantly affected by rescaling processes, while at the time affecting them (Schnell, 2007). The 
dynamic process of placemaking informs the constant production and reproduction of places. 
The making and remaking of places, in a political economy perspective, is often seen as a result 
of the capitalist production of space. However, I have argued here for the consideration of the 
role of social agents in these processes of production of places, and the resulting rescaling that 
occurs. The meaningful interventions of those actors could inform the potential of autonomous 
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innovation in cities, especially when it comes to urban immigration and integration issues. 
Strategic agents can act and ‘make history’. However, those agents represent specific interests. 
Their intervention is not necessarily more beneficial to the residents of these cities, and not 
devoid of power relations.  
3 Social agents produce and transform scales of power, authority and 
responsibility 
I have introduced the concept of scale, which leads me to address the transformation of the State 
power. The concept of place is a grounding concept, which anchors research not only in a 
methodological local scale, but in a space of social interactions, of history and therefore a 
‘political space’ (Lefebvre 1974). However, the main challenge is to ‘bring back agency’ (Desille, 
2015). Indeed, Leitner claims that “Theorising the politics of scale requires recognising the 
dialectical relationship between structure and agency as played out in a variety of realms of 
society” (Leitner in Sheppard & McMaster, 2008, p. 241). In the context of this doctoral research, 
my main hypothesis is that actors, taking part in the local governance of immigration and 
integration, based on their own motivations (biographical) and the history of the place, make 
sense of immigration and integration, form policies and therefore produce scale. The ‘rescaling 
of statehood’ (Brenner, 2004) is not only the result of neoliberal logics: people in place have 
autonomy, they resist, they negotiate, they interpret, and therefore, they participate in those 
transformations. In this section, I aim at acknowledging the role of elected politicians and street-
level bureaucrats in the production and transformations of the State.  
This section will therefore include a definition of the concept of agency, as well as offer a glimpse 
into the methodological choice that results from a focus on social agents’ interventions. Indeed, 
through an analysis of strategic agents’ personal and professional backgrounds, my purpose is to 
understand their take on city sovereignty when it comes to immigration issues, as well as on the 
role of the city government and other stakeholders in immigration and integration issues, and 
the translation of this role into public actions.  
My next step will be to present the social agents I choose to focus on. First, my enquiry 
emphasises the role of local officials, whether politicians or elected government officials. Those 
are mainly the mayors and the members of the city councils, especially those who deal directly 
with immigration issues in the city. Next, I also address the interventions of municipal agents, 
often referred to in the literature as street-level bureaucrats. Here, two levels of hierarchy are 
targeted: the municipal departments’ directors and staff. Other non-elected stakeholders, 
working at city level, from other organisations, also take part in the local governance of 
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immigration and integration. Very often, those work for public organisations (such as the local 
office of a ministry) or public-funded NGOs. I have found very few private initiatives, which very 
often benefit from public funds.  
From language to actual planning and service delivery, these agents act, sometimes reproducing 
State power, sometimes challenging it, and reinventing other spaces for politics. Giraud suggests 
that defining the social actors involved in the definition of the ‘public issue’, and then involved in 
the treatment of this issue, helps understand the politics of scales (Giraud, 2012). By intervening, 
actors produce a scalar space, he says (Ibid.). An important question remains, to be addressed in 
the last subsection: do immigrant officials and agents influence this scalar space of integration 
politics differently?   
3.1 Agency, meaningful interventions and politics 
Ontological and epistemological accounts of agency, also debated in ‘action theory’, can be traced 
back to the Enlightenment debate — I think, therefore I am (Descartes 1637) —, and later on to 
a Kantian philosophical tradition, both endowing individuals with the capacity to make rational 
choices. In geography, the renewal of agency occurred in the early 1970s with the emergence of 
a ‘humanistic geography’, responding critically to the prominence of the positivist approaches 
that prevailed until the 1960s. Humanistic geographers, Buttimer, Duncan, Tuan, Ley, or Relph, 
all believe in man’s capacity for thought and critical reflection on his acts (Adams et al., 2001; D. 
Ley, 1981; David Ley & Samuels, 1978; Tuan, 1976). They emphasise the social construction of 
history and of collective memory. Indeed, Tuan argues: “People have history; […]. History is not 
only the passage of events but their conscious reconstruction in group memory for current 
purposes” (Tuan, 1976, p. 272). This first orientation is crucial to studying immigration and 
integration, and it strongly impacts the politics of belonging at work in specific places, and the 
identification of an Other. The methodological implications of bringing back man’s 
understanding of the world at the source of his actions are manifold. Most importantly, 
humanistic geographers suggest:  
Expressed belief and behaviour often conform, but they sometimes do not. Opportunity, for the 
humanist, lies in attempting to understand in depth the nature of beliefs, attitudes and concepts; 
the strength with which they are held; their inherent ambivalences and contradictions; and their 
effects, direct as well as indirect, on action. (Ibid., p. 273)   
Humanistic geographers are one group among social theorists who reaffirm the centrality of 
human agency, but they are not the only ones. In the following paragraphs, I will draw on 
contributions from other fields of social sciences. But all share a common understanding of 
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agency as the capacity of individuals to engage with their surroundings, across space and time, 
and intervene in a meaningful way to try and change the conditions of their life.  
3.1.1 Defining agency  
Emirbayer and Mirsche provide a comprehensive definition and propose “to reconceptualise 
human agency as a temporally embedded process of social engagement, informed by the past (in 
its habitual aspect), but also oriented toward the future (as a capacity to imagine alternative 
possibilities) and toward the present (as a capacity to conceptualise past habits and future 
projects within the contingencies of the moment)” (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 963). Several 
remarks can be made on the basis of this definition. First, they see agency as a process of social 
engagement. By that, they mean that agency is relational — “agency toward something, by 
means of which actors enter into relationship with surrounding persons, places, meanings and 
events” (Ibid., p. 973). Actors engage in and disengage from different contextual environments 
and their orientation might change accordingly. In this work, their engagement with the various 
stakeholders as well as the beneficiaries of immigrant integration policies will be predominantly 
scrutinised, as well as the meanings of these interventions and policies.  
Secondly, they acknowledge three temporal dimensions of agency. The first dimension is the 
iterational dimension of agency, i.e. its orientation toward the past through the mobilisation of 
pre-existing patterns or schemas. This dimension has probably been the most important focus of 
agency. Pierre Bourdieu has theorised the strategic mobilisation of preconscious expectations in 
accordance with the contingencies of particular empirical situations (Ibid., p. 978). Another 
theorist concerned with the mutual constitution of agency and structure, Giddens, turns his 
attention to the activation of rules and resources or structures within social practices (Ibid.,). 
Emirbayer and Mische specify that habitual action is agentic, but largely unreflective and taken 
for granted. Nevertheless, “as actors encounter problematic situations requiring the exercise of 
imagination and judgment, they gain a reflective distance from received patterns […]” (Ibid., p. 
973). Emirbayer and Mische list the main empirical studies conducted on this topic. Particularly, 
research on life course development conducted by Berteaux (1981), Elder (1985), O’Rand and 
Krecker (1990) and others “explores the connection between social structures and socio-
psychological development, as manifested in the life trajectories resulting from particular 
intersections of biography and history” (Ibid., p. 982). Those social agents I met during this 
research project mobilise various pre-existing patterns, from their personal life and their 
different professional experiences. They can also ground their acts in the collective memories of 
the different groups they belong to, whether they be national, transnational, local or even at the 
smaller scale of the peers and family. However, as they face specific problems, they may also 
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innovate and patterns may bifurcate. This leads me to the next dimension described by the two 
authors.  
The projective dimension of agency, i.e. the one oriented toward the future, includes scopes of 
project, problem solving, experiment and ‘changing the given’. Emirbayer and Mische argue that 
one dominant tone of projectivity is ‘narrative construction’, that is the “construction of 
narratives that locate future possibilities in relation to more or less coherent causal and 
temporal sequences” (Ibid., p. 989). All social groups possess repertoires of stories, they say. 
This aspect is also crucial for my methodology in the sense that it posits narratives and collective 
narratives as important patterns on which the future is forecast.  
The present dimension of agency, which they call the practical-evaluative dimension, has also 
led to empirical research, notably research on resistance, subversion and contention like the one 
conducted by James Scott or by Charles Tilly. In those cases, practical evaluation consists in 
watching for opportunities and mostly values improvisation. Other empirical works in the field 
of political decision-making and deliberation in publics have addressed this practical-evaluative 
dimension of agency.  
Those clarifications, even though they assume the central role of agency of social actors in 
provoking and producing changes, still acknowledge the existence of an influencing environment 
providing meanings, collective narratives, for other people to interact with at certain times and 
in certain places. And indeed, Giddens’s structuration theory maintains that structure and 
agency are mutually constitutive. Giddens asserts: “The basic domain of study of the social 
sciences, according to the theory of structuration, is neither the experience of the individual 
action nor the existence of any form of societal totality, but social practices ordered across space 
and time” (Giddens, 1986, p. 2). Emirbayer and Mische add: “We might therefore speak of the 
double constitution of agency and structure: temporal-relational contexts support particular 
agentic orientations, which in turn constitute different structuring relationships of actors 
toward their environments” (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 1004). Social theorists who bring 
human agency to the heart of social life, even though they acknowledge the influence of 
structure, emphasise the fact that individuals “attempt to live society instead of being passively 
lived by it” (Ferrarotti, 2003, p. 3).  
Ferrarotti argues that the object of sociology should be “the living substance of men and women 
in society, their memories and their life experiences; that is, history in the making” (Ferrarotti, 
2003, p. xxix). ‘Making history’ has also be coined by Giddens as “the conjunction of a linear view 
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of time with the idea that, through expanding the knowledge of their past, agents can change 
their future” (Giddens, 1986, p. 202). Thus Ferrarotti believes: 
Human behaviour is inspired by instincts but also by the project, and is teleological. That is to say, 
it sets itself a goal, turns back critically on itself; it thus accumulates memories and on this basis of 
collective memory is able to formulate the meaning of man's own decisions and evaluate them. 
(Ferrarotti, 2003, p. 7) 
Those are precisely what interests me here: to which extent social agents, through their 
meaningful interventions, can change the course of history, even at a micro-level: i.e. a policy, a 
vision of immigration in the city, and the impact of this immigration on the urban landscape. 
How can I, in the context of a doctoral research, reconstitute the many dimensions that underlie 
decision-making processes from past experiences and collective patterns, to present judgements 
and future imagined possibilities?  
3.1.2 A quick glance into methodology  
The question I have just asked might well never be fully answered. However, I will attempt to 
briefly explain a first and fundamental proposal I attempted to follow during the data collection 
stage, and when using the data to write this thesis work. The proposal is the following: the 
collection of narratives by decision-makers, elaborated in a context of interaction with the 
interviewing researcher, when contextualised in space, time and in the collective patterns that 
interact in these places and times, can enlighten the making of political decisions.  
Indeed, narratives are means of expression of the agentic processes underlying decision-making. 
Christine Delory-Momberger asserts:  
We never stop biographying, i.e. channelling our experience into orientated time schemes which 
mentally organise our moves, our behaviours, our actions, following a logic of narrative 
configuration. This biographying activity might be defined as a dimension of human thinking and 
acting which, in the form of practical hermeneutics, enables individuals, in the conditions of their 
socio-historical settings, to integrate, to structure, to interpret situations and events they live.24 
(Delory-Momberger, 2009, p. 30) 
To understand human agency, she submits human experiences to stories and narratives. For her, 
“the narrative is the place where human existence takes shape, where it elaborates and 
experiments in the form of a story”25 (Ibid., p. 29). Delory-Momberger is one representative of a 
                                                          
24 Translation of the author. 
25 Translation of the author. 
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growing trend in scholarship that redefines the role of biographical methods in research 
nowadays, usually to be found among social psychologists and sociologists.  
The study conducted by William Isaac Thomas and Florian Znaniecki (1918, in Bessin, 2010) 
who tell the story of a Polish peasant migrating to the USA is usually referred to as the pioneer of 
biographical method. Several studies based on biographical materials by Chicago sociologists 
follow (Ibid.). Nevertheless, the soon-to-arrive positivist stance in social sciences was to put the 
collection of life stories to a halt (Ibid.). Studies on the biological methods were renewed in the 
1960s with the works by Everett C. Hughes, Anselm Strauss or Barney Glaser (Ibid.). In France, 
Marc Bessin drew attention to the important role of Daniel Bertaux (1976)’s work in bringing 
back biographical methods. However, one more time, the relevance of this method was 
questioned, notably by Pierre Bourdieu (1986), who coined the term ‘biographic illusion’26 
(Ibid.). However, that criticism worthfully included the relations with the researcher in the 
production of this material, as well as other power relations that participate in discourse control. 
From then on, the debate continued, and the illusion of objective life stories was replaced with 
the concept of narratives (des histoires de vie aux récits de vie) (Ibid.), which acknowledges the 
intervention of the storyteller, who bends information to explain his acts to himself, and to 
whom one listens. In this sense, I have collected data with special emphasis on biographies, but I 
have tried to situate the encounters within the broader stakes of the research (see annex 3 on 
joint research), within the broader relations of the interviewee with other actors, comparing the 
different narratives, as well as within the broader national and local contexts, as I have collected 
daily news articles from the national and local press, as well as through social networks.  
Indeed, as Didier Demazière and Olivia Samuel argue, the spatial and political contextualisation 
of biographic performances is too often a superficial exercise in empirical research (Demazière 
& Samuel, 2010). Places inform agency. Indeed, Emirbayer and Mische and Delory-Momberger 
consider that the biographical activity is a process, oriented in time schemes, but also oriented in 
space, as space provides forms and meanings (Delory-Momberger, 2009, p. 49), and in relation 
to a social world.  
The opposite is also true. Places are meetings of social relations. Therefore, they are constructed 
by people, through narratives: people are not passive recipients, they shape the places they live 
in; places are rendered meaningful by people — through their knowledge, their language, their 
artistic production (Escobar, 2001, p. 151). If places are nodes of multiple interactions, then 
places are crossed by multiple narratives that juxtapose (Ibid. p. 164).  
                                                          
26 Translation of the author. 
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Focusing on narratives can then open the way to analyse power-filled social relations, 
reconciling the political economic and cultural constructions of places. But whose narratives did 
I select? How does this selection influence the way the research is conducted?   
3.2 Identification of social agents: the State, its elected and technocratic 
institutions, and the immigrants 
If I have defined agency, I have not yet identified the social agents that are at the heart of my 
work. The scholarship that has focused on immigration and integration policies, bringing people 
back into the core of policymaking and policy implementation processes, has highlighted several 
categories of strategic actors: 1) elected politicians (see for instance works by Gary Freeman, 
Peter Schuck or Kristin Good, who have emphasised the economic benefits of immigration 
envisioned by politicians;27 works by Friedmann and Lehrer in Frankfurt, or by Michal 
Alexander in Tel Aviv, who all show that politicians are driven by the increased attention for 
‘universalistic rights’,28 rather than citizenship rights; and works by Good, Myrte Hoekstra, 
                                                          
27 When it comes to immigration policies, several theorists have shed light on the ‘gap’ which makes it 
possible that more immigrants enter receiving countries every year. For them, the economic argument 
dominates against a hostile public opinion to immigration. Gary Freeman’s article Modes of Immigration 
Politics in Liberal Democratic States is often considered the cornerstone of immigration politics and 
policies’ study. Freeman argues that, in-between election times, politicians are influenced by pro-
immigration lobbies, mostly representing employers, thus designing looser immigration policies than 
what they promised to a more anti-immigration public opinion when elected (Freeman, 1995). A similar 
argument was made later by Peter Schuck: organisations which benefit more from immigration 
(employers, pro-immigration organisations) are better organised and lobby to politicians, while the ones 
which experience more the costs of immigration (workers) are not organised and do not influence politics 
(Schuck, 2007). James Hollifield’s volume Immigrants, Markets and States contributes to this argument, 
complementing it with a more detailed and balanced analysis, claiming: “The attraction of markets 
(including the demand for cheap labour) and the protection given to aliens in right-based regimes taken 
together explain the rise in immigration and its persistence in the face of economic crises, restrictionist 
policies, and nationalist (anti-immigrant) political movements” (Hollifield, 1992, p. 216). More practically, 
Kristin Good’s work on Toronto and Vancouver metropolitan areas in Canada shows a relatively current 
use of the relations between immigration and economic growth: specifically, Vancouver’s greater 
responsiveness to immigrants is clearly identified with a ‘proactive economic-development regime’ (Good, 
2009, p. 144). Good also shows that municipalities find it easier to raise funds from foundations for clear 
immigration/economic growth initiatives (Ibid.).  
28 In fact, both James Hollifield and Yasemin Soysal have shown that a more universalistic view of rights 
has an impact on immigration and integration policies. Soysal argues that a more universal concept of 
citizenship has unfolded, based on universal personhood. This new postnational model means that 
incorporation into a system of membership rights does not inevitably require incorporation into the 
national collectivity. If the transformation of national rights into more universalistic entitlements 
including non-citizens undermines the categorical dichotomies patterned after the national citizenship 
model — more particularly Marshall’s model (1964) —, the debate over how well they adjust and their 
cultural otherness intensify. And indeed, in the last chapter of her book Limits of Citizenship, Soysal argues 
that universalistic status of personhood and post national membership coexist with assertive national 
identities and intense ethnic struggles (Soysal, 1994, p. 135). Universal personhood does not mean that 
nation-state boundaries are fluid, but that that they are characterised by “increasing interdependency and 
connectedness, intensified world-level interaction and organizing, and the emergence of transnational 
political structures, which altogether confound and complicate nation-state sovereignty and jurisdiction” 
 90
Hilary Sanders or Alexandre Tandé29 focusing on a desire from politicians to increase ‘diversity’ 
in their city); 2) institutions and their staff (see for instance Virginie Guiraudon, who highlights 
the role of European technocrats and the decision processes in the European institutions in the 
formation of immigration policies, or Christina Boswell, who highlights the role of institutions 
dealing with immigrants in legitimising the State); and 3) what I will call the civil society, which 
includes social movements, grassroots organisations but also national and transnational 
organisations that constantly challenge and shape immigration politics, although they are not 
themselves elected or designated by the State (see for instance Monica Varsanyi (2008) and 
Davide Gnes (2016) in the US, or Céline Cantat (2015) in Europe).  
Here, I will focus primarily on the first two categories, and more specifically at city level. In the 
first subsection, I will explain more in-depth why I chose to focus on local officials in 
municipalities. In the second one, I chose to look at the institutions at large — which have a 
culture, a language and norms of their own — as well as at their staff. Municipal agents, ministry 
staff or workers in non-governmental organisations who work toward the settlement of 
immigrants are not elected, but are hired as professional technocrats. They can be at odds with 
the politicians, but they can also serve similar interests. Finally, I will dedicate a paragraph on 
the specificities of immigrant officials and immigrant workers, who make up a majority of the 
interviewees. Indeed, three of the four mayors immigrated to Israel, as well as all interviewed 
deputy mayors and/or municipal councillors. Among municipal agents dealing with immigration 
issues, a large majority were themselves immigrants, particularly in the municipal department 
of immigration and integration.     
3.2.1 Local officials  
The main argument advanced to explain the devolution of integration policies to local 
policymakers is that the city level is the ‘pragmatic level’. For example, a the Conference on 
Migrants and Cities organised by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) on 26 & 27 
October 2015, its director general William Swing asserts that “Mayors get it”, therefore 
reinforcing the belief that local politicians offer the most pragmatic responses (Ahouga, 2015). As 
immigrants live in cities, city officials should know best how to address their needs. This belief is 
not unique to international organisations like the IOM. However, my argument is distinct. I do 
not believe that mayors or other local officials are more pragmatic. My point is that, in a context 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(Ibid., p144). For instance, sending countries hold claims vis-à-vis their emigrants. Also, Soysal witnesses a 
proliferation of transnational arrangements, grounded in human rights discourse (Ibid., p145-151).  
29 CityDiv project at the Max Planck Institute in Germany collects data among French and German large 
cities to analyse their understanding of diversity and its impact on economic development, but 
preliminary results show that, even though the benefits are acknowledged, measures are still very limited 
(Tandé, 2015). 
 91
of rescaling of power, with decentralisation being one phenomenon informing this rescaling, local 
officials inherit a new responsibility to carry out programmes emerging from national policies, as 
well as a responsibility to design city policies. Between a national policy frame and its actual 
implementation in the city, there is room for manoeuvre, or a ‘room for interpretation’ 
(Jørgensen, 2012, p. 250). It is this local reinterpretation that I will be addressing.   
And indeed, among scholars looking at immigration policies, the local leadership is what 
Giovanna Zincone calls a ‘pilot of policy change’ (Zincone et al., 2011, p. 389): a new leadership 
with a strong vision — may it be inclusive or exclusionary — will have an impact on immigration 
and integration policies. She warns the readers that politicians are constrained by electoral 
cycles, changes in political parties’ and coalitions. In that context, the period during which 
mayors and their councillors are in office is important. The political system also has a profound 
effect, and it is not totally surprising that what cities have witnessed the formation of 
immigration policies, against national frames, should all be located in federal countries, such as 
the US, Germany, Switzerland or Spain, where regions are granted autonomy in many fields that 
govern social life.  
Here, what is interesting is this idea of a vision: local officials that are convinced of the necessity 
to act toward immigration issues will be actors. Indeed, Di Meo, who focuses on the French 
territorial system of government, claims that there are many actors that constitute the 
government of local territories: mayors and their deputies, departmental and regional council 
members, members of parliament and senators, but also entrepreneurs and heads of large non-
governmental organisations (Di Meo, 2008, p. 6) — what I have called governance. Nevertheless, 
“the status of actors falls within a position, a behaviour and a will, an intentionality associated 
with a more or less strategic position within the territorial complex, at different scales, rather 
than a clearly defined and established function” 30 (Ibid.).   
The mobilisation of the concept of agency is fundamental when addressing the role of 
individuals who are elected or appointed to introduce changes — or even to maintain continuity 
and avoid major disruptions — in a larger community. For the local politicians, the municipal 
agents or other stakeholders I interviewed during fieldwork, the habitual patterns they base 
their action on, the practical evaluation they conduct at the moment of taking decisions, the 
future projects they built are not only for themselves. Their interests conflate with the interests 
of their institution, and of their community. Commenting on the development of individual 
autonomy in a context of enhanced complexity of roles, Emirbayer and Mirsche quote the 
sociologist Rose Laub Coser who argues that “actors who are located in more complex relational 
                                                          
30 Translation of the author.  
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settings must correspondingly learn to take a wider variety of factors into account […]” 
(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 1007). Drawing on Laub Coser, Emirbayer and Mische suggest: 
“Actors who are positioned at the intersection of multiple temporal-relational contexts can 
develop greater capacities for creative and critical intervention” (Ibid.).   
Perhaps it is not very different from the multiple roles that we endorse when being a family 
member, working in a company, coaching a sports team or volunteering in a local association. 
However, the impact of these ‘people in government’’s actions on many ‘institutions’ — in the 
broad sense of the term — can be great: for instance, choosing the contents displayed in the local 
museum, or the civic activities organised for school, or, in the specific case of this project, 
deciding upon a policy for the accommodation of newcomers, all these will influence the 
collective representation of the city, even, or even more, when those activities encounter 
resistance and counter-discourses among the residents.  
Those interventions will ‘make sense’ of particular issues raised in the public domain. In this 
sense, an actor involved in a particular public issue, whether he be a city councillor, the director 
of a department designing a working procedure, the municipal agent in charge of operating this 
procedure and providing his director with feedback and monitoring, all will make sense of what 
they see through their own experience, as well as through the context in which they are located. 
But they can also draw from other contexts in which they encountered similar issues. The result 
of those confrontations of interpretations and of meaningful interventions amount to 
institutionalisation of values, of a working method, of a know-how…  
Various works have put the mayors and councillors at the centre of policymaking processes. 
Documenting the creation of a department for multicultural affairs in Frankfurt in Germany in 
the early 1990s, Friedmann and Lehrer tell the story of Frankfurt’s local government — made up 
of a social democrat/green coalition — concerned with two aspects of multiculturalism: dealing 
with the reality of a large and diverse immigrant population entitled to rights independent of 
their status (housing, public services); but also working toward implementing of a 
transformative ideal of ‘mutual adaptation’ (Friedmann & Lehrer, 1997). To this end, their 
political objectives range from fighting against racism to improving civil and political 
participation of migrants. Frankfurt initiated one of the first experiences of local citizenship with 
the election of a municipal foreign resident advisory board. The goal set by the political party 
member in charge of this initiative — Daniel Cohn-Bendit, later to be Member of European 
Parliament— was to ultimately influence the national agenda toward immigration and 
integration.  
 93
Judith Goode and Hilary Sanders have worked on the immigration policies of Philadelphia in the 
US (Sanders, 2015; Schiller & Çağlar, 2010, pp. 143–165). Analysing the formulation of an 
immigrant policy in Philadelphia, Sanders emphasizes the role of its mayor Michael Nutter in 
office from 2008 to early 2016, himself an Afro-American. 
Another example is the case of Tel Aviv mayoral policy, documented mainly by Michael 
Alexander, as well as Rebecca Raijman, Adriana Kemp or Izhak Schnell. Tel Aviv initiated a 
municipal-funded project for its non-Jewish immigrant populations — Messila —, therefore 
dramatically distancing itself from the exclusionary immigration policy of Israel. Drawing on his 
negotiating power as mayor of the economic capital of the country, Ron Huldai initiated the only 
clear policy linked to public service delivery in the country (Raijman & Kemp, 2002; Alexander, 
2003; Schnell, 2013).  
Enlightening though those cases might be, they have not gone as far as to explain why these 
mayors and municipal council members — Daniel Cohn Bendit, Michael Nutter or Ron Huldai —
had the motivation to bring these issues on the local agenda.  
3.2.2 Institutions and their staff 
It is very important to understand that when talking about institutions, there are in fact two 
types of actors: institutions proper, and the people hosted by those institutions. In that sense, 
there are two different kinds of analyses to be carried out. On the one hand, an analysis focusing 
on the culture and the discourses of the institution (for instance the municipality) dealing with 
immigrant integration. Indeed, “the anthropologist is interested in the way in which, from 
practices and discourses of its representatives and agents, the institution builds its territory, 
performs activities, and depending on the ideas it generates, defines a political space”31 (Bellier, 
1997). It is possible to find an institutional discourse, as it will be the ‘authorised discourse’,32 
the one that is stabilised and free of conflict (Krieg-Planque & Oger, 2010). This discourse might 
be recurrent among interviewees of a same institution, and it will be the one brought about by 
the institution’s spokesperson, or lodged in symbolic sub-institutions, like the municipal 
museum. On the other hand, leaders and agents also manoeuvre outside of the institutional 
framework and perform independently: discretionary practices of street-level bureaucrats have 
been at the centre of several works.   
Guiraudon’s article “The constitution of a European immigration policy domain: a political 
sociology approach” analyses the logics of immigration policymaking in European institutions 
                                                          
31 Translation of the author.  
32 Translation of the author.  
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(Guiraudon (2001) reprinted in Martiniello & Rath, 2010, pp. 141–164). Guiraudon argues that 
immigration policymaking follows a three-step dynamics: First, “a group of actors vie to become 
the legitimate policy interlocutors against other similar groups”; next, actors suggest a 
“preformatted set of solutions depending on their expertise”; lastly, actors succeed in validating 
a policy “by momentously seizing upon an emergent broader policy frame” (Ibid., p. 158). In this 
case therefore, she believes that experts employed by the commission, outside of democratic 
elections, are policymakers.  
Boswell also claims that immigration and integration policies are not the result of a political 
debate by democratically elected representatives, but a field exploited by institutions, non-
elected but rather technocratic. Boswell answers the question “Theorizing migration policy: is 
there a third way?” by showing that the main immigration policymakers are institutions, seeking 
for legitimacy, which she defines as a “function of the computability of political actions and 
practices with the expectations and values of a particular public (Deutsh, 1970)” (Boswell, 
2007). This quest for legitimacy involves four aspects: security, accumulation, fairness and 
institutional legitimacy, all of which are at odds with immigration issues. Depending on the 
positioning of the institutions on this question, Boswell identifies five types of policy responses. 
Similar to Guiraudon, she recognises the importance of experts in justifying policies (Boswell, 
2008).     
The benefits of such a policymaking method are that it is less liable to be affected by an anti-
immigrant public opinion. Policymaking behind closed doors seems to foster the formation of 
more liberal policies toward immigrants (Bonjour, 2011). However, by introducing 
subjectivities, institutional agents can also interpret policies. Several works inform discretionary 
practices in institutions: Françoise De Barros looked into archives in French towns to see how 
categories of foreigners were formed a century ago (Barros, 2008). Living in an absorption 
centre for Jewish Ethiopian immigrants in Israel in the 1980s, Esther Hertzog provided an 
ethnographic account of street-level bureaucrats and integration policies (Hertzog, 1999). Maria 
Bruquetas-Callejo also accounted for discretionary practices when it comes to immigrants’ 
access to welfare systems (Bruquetas-Callejo in Heelsum & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2013, pp. 21–
33).  
As mentioned before, the methodological choice of focusing on city politics, rather than national 
politics, arose during an on-going debate to determine whether national policies are symbolic, 
and object to a local interpretation which generates variations among cities; or whether cities 
adopt their own symbolic policies which they — sometimes — translate into action plans. In his 
study of four Danish cities, Martin Jørgensen argues that this room for interpretation is what 
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constitutes a Political Opportunity Structure. Symbolic policies at national level find themselves 
up against institutional logics at local level (Jørgensen, 2012). Depending on the Political 
Opportunity Structure, he found out that two cities were more accommodating than what the 
national policy provides, and two were less so. The three works I just mentioned, which focus on 
discretionary practices, are all located at city level.  
Responses given by institutions and their actors also evolve. With time, agents, street-level 
bureaucrats and professionals build competencies, by participating in conferences, seminars or 
other informative events (Boswell, 2008), by being involved in transnational networks where 
experiences are shared (Flamant, 2014; Jørgensen, 2012; Leitner in Sheppard & McMaster, 2008, 
pp. 236–255). 
The benefit of analysing immigration and integration policies through the agents is that it makes 
the researcher familiar with the more direct actions implemented in the city (and therefore in a 
better position to compare them with political discourses). Following the different domains of 
action mentioned by Rinus Penninx ( Penninx et al., 2004; Heelsum & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2013; 
Penninx, 2013), interventions can take place to improve the legal-political dimension,33 the 
socio-economic dimension34 and the cultural-religious dimension.35  
                                                          
33 The legal-political dimension encompasses the establishment of representative structures of the 
different immigrant groups present in the city, their participation in local elections, irrespective of their 
legal status, their participation in policymaking; but also initiatives linked to local citizenship. Friedmann 
and Lehrer in Germany, Good in Canada, and other studies in the USA and in the Netherlands have 
documented the establishment of local government-led agencies aiming at fostering representation at 
local levels, especially for immigrants whose status prevents them from participating in local elections 
(Friedmann & Lehrer, 1997; Good, 2009). The participation of immigrants in policymaking is usually 
studied in terms of non-participation: it is considered that representatives of the receiving society deal 
with immigrant policymaking (Penninx, Kraal, Martiniello, & Vertovec, 2004, pp. 1–16). The most 
advanced policy is the issuing of documentation linked to a ‘local citizenship’, permitting full access to 
local public services, irrespective of legal status. Several cities in the United States have initiated such local 
citizenship (de Graauw, 2013).  
34 The socio-economic dimension includes access to welfare, actions aiming at providing similar education 
opportunities for all, access to decent employment, or entrepreneurship programs. Bruquetas-Callejo has 
documented the access of immigrants to the Spanish welfare system, showing the difficulty to provide 
continuous and decent access to services, due to decentralisation, discretionary practices of street-level 
bureaucrats and outsourcing to non-governmental organisations (Heelsum & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2013, 
pp. 21–35). Access to employment and entrepreneurship is a much explored field. I can briefly mention 
Noah Lewin Epstein et al who studied the different institutional settings determining access to 
employment in Israel and in Canada (Lewin-Epstein, Semyonov, Kogan, & Wanner, 2003), as well as the 
comparative study by Eran Razin who shows the differential participation of immigrants in 
entrepreneurship, and policies set for this objective, in Israel, Canada and the United States (Razin, 1990). 
There has been renewed interest in the role of immigrants in the local economy (see for instance in New 
York and Amsterdam (Foner, 2014) and in urban regeneration in particular (see in Philadelphia (Sanders, 
2015; Goode in Schiller & Caglar, 2012), and in the Hague (Santocki in Heelsum & Garcés-Mascareñas, 
2013) .  
35 The cultural-religious dimension comprises actions to recognise the artistic production of immigrants, 
support to festivals or cultural events, actions to increase mutual respect when it comes to religious 
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Examining the actual delivery of public services helps assess the extent to which symbolic 
policies are translated into actual items in the local government’s budget and in its human 
resources. The reverse process is also possible, particularly in my work. In fact, mid-sized cities 
hardly publish immigration and integration policy papers: assessing the available services can 
inform the overall immigrant policy. However, I should keep in mind that symbolic policies are 
usually set by politicians, who follow a particular calendar. Agents implement programmes and 
actions. Their time constraint is different.  
3.2.3 Immigrant officials and agents 
The influence of immigrant policymakers on policies has been generally overlooked and a large 
proportion of this work should bring light to the effect of immigrants’ participation in 
policymaking. At most, the role of immigrant representatives is identified as a majority/ 
minority relation where immigrants are marginal to policymaking ( Penninx et al., 2004, pp. 1–
16; Penninx, 2013). A crosscutting topic of my thesis is therefore to understand the extent to 
which the participation of immigrants in the political institutions has modified the way 
immigrant and integration is defined as a public issue in Israel. I have primarily focused on the 
political and bureaucratic institutions in the city, although I acknowledge that immigrants can be 
involved through other forms of political activities.  
Good interviews immigrant representatives in councils in Canadian cities. An important result of 
her research is a typology of policy responses based on immigrant participation in local 
governance. “In [her] study, municipal responsiveness to immigrants and ethnocultural 
minorities refers to whether municipalities have adapted their services and governance structures 
to facilitate immigrant and ethnocultural-minority access to and participation in local governance” 
(Good, 2009, p. 48). Among the different municipal multiculturalist policies she identifies, she 
mentions the establishment of “a separate unit of government to manage diversity and 
organisational change” or the possibility for immigrants to “enter council deliberations on policy 
matters” (Ibid., p. 53).  
The integration of ethnic minorities, immigrant populations and more generally vulnerable 
communities has been a major concern of urban planning. Dominated by the Chicago School of 
thought, integration has been largely understood as a result of intercontact with other social 
groups. Therefore, there has been persistent belief that dispersion is key to integration (Ellis, 
2006) (or that integration is a matter of de-segregation (Ruiz-Tagle, 2013b)). Nevertheless, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
beliefs and practices as well as support to arrange venue and religious buildings; and more. Eltje Bos has 
explored the government support toward immigrant art in the Netherlands (Heelsum & Garcés-
Mascareñas, 2013, pp. 123–141).  
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there are many accounts proving that concentration means power (Ellis, 2006; Penninx et al., 
2004, pp. 1–16): in cities where large immigrant communities reside, their voices are better 
relayed. Concentration means access to politics, but it can also increase pressure to respond and 
provide access to welfare, education, employment and more. In the volume edited by Penninx et 
al, Romain Garbaye compares political participation in Birmingham (UK), Lille and Roubaix 
(France). Each city has immigrant local politicians on the council; nevertheless, depending on 
the political parties as well as previous community organisations, their participation as well as 
the type of power36 they have differ. In Birmingham, the Labour party has allowed the elections 
of representatives from boroughs with high immigrant concentration. In Lille, immigrants 
occupy ‘token’ positions, as the socialist party does not facilitate their entry into the municipal 
council; while in Roubaix where political parties are weak and community organisations 
predominate, the entry of immigrant representatives has been easier (Garbaye in Penninx et al., 
2004, pp. 39–56). Assessing the municipal electoral campaign and the promotion of ‘diverse’ 
candidates in a suburban town in France in 2008, Marie Cartier et al show similar results 
(Cartier et al., 2010). In the latter two cases, however, immigrants grew up in receiving 
countries, or even are second-generation immigrants (provided such a reality does exist). The 
participation of non-citizens usually occurs through parallel structures (for instance, the 
constitution of immigrant committees in Canada, the Netherlands or Germany, recognised by the 
municipalities but not constituent of the council).  
Assessing the participation of immigrants in council deliberations, in policymaking, and then in 
their implementation could bring to light new aspects of the formation of immigration and 
integration policies. Moreover, analysing the extent to which immigrant politicians have a voice, 
and have the capacity to mobilise their experience and introduce changes in the political 
treatment of integration is also a measure of democracy, of the possibility to participate,37 not as 
a simple representative bringing in voters, but as part of the polity. 
                                                          
36 Obviously, these examples are locally anchored. The historical development of political participation, 
through grassroots organisations, church associations, and formal political participation is unique. Lille 
and Roubaix for instance are located quite close to each other but have developed two very different 
patterns of immigrant political participation (Garbaye in Penninx et al., 2004, pp. 39–56).  
37 Giving an account of Nancy Fraser’s participation theory, Estelle Ferrarese exposes Fraser’s definition of 
participation. “A measure or a society is fair to the extent that it makes participation possible for all 
members, that it ensures a parity of participation in the construction of institutionalized value patterns, in 
processes of deliberation about the rules of redistribution; and more generally, in all forms of social 
interaction” (Ferrarese, 2015, p. 5). Social justice therefore means parity in participation. But participation 
is not a simple expression of ones’ needs or opinion. “The participation the individual is entitled to is a 
matter of taking-part in the construction of the world, of cultural values, of norms, of two-way relations, of 
the political community, and so on” (Ibid., p. 6). 
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4 To govern or to be governed?   
The main question I address, through the analysis of the specific field of immigrant integration 
policy, is: do mid-sized cities located at the margin of capitalist economic networks govern the 
social life of the places they administer, or are they being governed? The autonomy of their 
governance is, I assume, relative, in a context of overlapping, crosscutting, unbounded and fluid 
scales. However, challenging their autonomy and their capacity to address immigration, to 
reinterpret a national policy and adapt it to what they define as their local needs and interests, 
represent an important step to recognise the purposive agents who organise the social life of 
these cities. In this context, five specific questions provide a frame on which this thesis is 
organised:    
• To what extent can an enquiry ‘at the margin’ provide the researcher with the possibility 
to identify “practices, identities and autonomies” (Carrier & Demazière, 2012, p. 141) 
that either reproduce or produce specific scalar spaces of politics?  
• Is immigration considered a possible lever for city economic development and social 
change? Is there a positive correlation between cities that are engaged in actions aiming 
at rescaling their development strategy and cities that proactively address immigration 
issues?  
• Do city officials’ own immigration experiences affect the immigration discourse brought 
to the council and the public? If so, what are the discursive performances I attended, and 
how do they differ from other discourses on immigration and/or immigrant integration?  
• What is the immigrant-integration-narrative framing at work and how do these 
narratives impact the formulation of immigration integration as an issue for public 
action?  
• How do the strategies deployed by social actors involved in immigration and integration 
policy formulation and implementation transform the urban governance that targets 
specifically this policy domain into a multiscalar and fragmented political space?     
I elaborate briefly on these questions, each one them corresponding to a chapter of this volume.  
4.1 Conducting an inquiry ‘at the margin’ provides a rich angle to address 
State rescaling processes 
At several points of this chapter, I have deplored the fact that social theorists working on issues 
of immigration, development and cities have discarded a large number of the urban places that 
constitute our world. Those small and mid-sized cities, located away from political and economic 
centres and networks, are in fact urban, even though they do not fit the archetype of the large 
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metropolitan areas that have been a central focus of urban studies or of immigration studies. 
Through this doctoral project, I therefore hope to make a modest contribution to the renewed 
research field of ‘ordinary cities’.  
Doing so, I do not mean that small cities provide a similar urban experience than global cities. I 
acknowledge the lack of resources due to their size or their location away from subnational 
strategic spaces. However, their ‘peripherality’ (marginality or downscaled position) is usually 
associated with a perceived reduced room for manoeuvre. They are seen as left behind, forced to 
play a “punitive game of catching-up” (Robinson, 2006, p. 6). I actually believe that even remote 
small cities have the ability to produce complex modes of governance, making them as sensitive 
objects of study as large cities (Carrier & Demazière, 2012, p. 141).   
In that theoretical context, my question is: to what extent does an enquiry ‘at the margin’ 
provide the researcher with the possibility to identify “practices, identities and autonomies” 
(Carrier & Demazière, 2012, p. 141) that either reproduce or produce specific scalar spaces of 
politics? In that sense, as different scales collide in a place — the place being what Schnell 
(2007) has called a hologram —, those peripheral places could to some extent inform the 
national and its mechanisms of reproduction and/or contestation.   
The following chapter is an attempt to answer this question. It focuses on the Israeli experience 
of immigration and integration and the evolution of its politics. It underlines more particularly 
the powerful relations between immigration and the production of places — first by the State 
and its actors, and then the reproduction and production of places by their inhabitants. The State 
of Israel has established immigrant settlements, generally known as ‘development towns’ (or 
‘new towns’, to adopt an international planning lexicon, therefore referring to a post-war 
planning and architectural movement). Those places have been, up till today, places of 
difference. Throughout the years, they have been maintained at a geographical, political, 
economical and social frontier, because of the very spatial organisation of space and of 
immigration settlement. Their geographical position at the borders meant that they were deeply 
affected by the conflicts in Israel and at its border. Their political and socioeconomic position, 
away from the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv axis, but also away from the networks constituted between 
rural settlements (notably Kibbutzim) and the centre, have reinforced their status of  ‘trapped’ 
communities, between a European Ashkenazi hegemony and a socially constructed Arab enemy 
( Yiftachel & Tzfadia, 2004; Yiftachel, 2000; Tzfadia, 2007; Tzfadia & Yacobi, 2007, 2011).  
Nevertheless, it is this entrapment that I aim at deconstructing. As I have argued, drawing on 
Scott’s theoretical models, residents of peripheral places constantly mean to resemble the 
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hegemony, while at the same time challenging it. Political dissidence always exists, even in 
marginality. Acknowledging the power of people located in these relegated places to produce 
changes, and to influence the on-going transformations of statehood, is a first step out of their 
marginality.   
4.2 Immigration issues participate in the rescaling of city development 
strategies 
The economic benefits and costs associated with immigration have been studied from different 
angles: in receiving countries, economists have produced a large body of knowledge on the 
economic impact of immigrants on the labour market, on wages and on the national insurance 
scheme for instance, as well as on entrepreneurship; while other fields of social sciences have 
focused more on the measures of labour market and employment integration of new 
immigrants. In sending countries, the main focus has been on the circulation of human, financial 
and social resources, through immigrants and their networks that impact the economy of origin 
areas. Nevertheless, those fields of studies have not provided me with a relevant framework to 
understand the motives to design immigration policies in receiving areas. This is why, all along 
this chapter, I have turned to literature concerned with the rescaling of power toward 
subnational sites, particularly for economic growth purpose, on the one hand, and literature 
concerned with place and placemaking on the other hand.  
I wonder if, in a context of ‘interlocality competition’ — over State resources, private 
investments and residents (whether they be talents, cheap labour, residents who consume or 
residents who invest) —, the cities I examine envision immigration as a possible resource. 
Indeed, immigrants have been described in the literature as agents of economic change, but also 
of social change, associated with an increased use of the rather vague notion of ‘diversity’. In this 
constellation, immigrants are: 
active agents in the neoliberal transformations of the cities: (1) as part of the labour force upon 
which cities build their competitiveness; […]; (3) as agents of neoliberal urban restructuring who 
contribute to or contest the changing status and positioning of neighbourhoods and cities; (4) by 
facilitating privatisation and neoliberal subjectivities […]. (Schiller & Çağlar, 2010, p. 12)  
If I look more particularly at decaying cities, immigrants have been considered potential actors 
for urban regeneration, and a labour force in regions that suffer from out-migration. Indeed, 
following a belief that placemaking is a tool that fosters development, certain cities have 
engaged in activities to reposition themselves, writing new narratives of diversity, promoting 
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immigrant-friendly services, or producing discourses aiming at reducing the perceived distance 
to economic centres.   
Examining four mid-sized cities located at the borders of Israel, populated with a large 
immigrant population, my question is: to what extent is immigration considered a possible lever 
for city economic development and social change? Is there a positive correlation between cities 
that are engaged in actions aiming at rescaling their development strategy and cities that 
proactively address immigration issues? This first chapter of the second part of this work thus 
addresses the entanglement between immigration and socioeconomic development, an overall 
motive found in most interviews.  
In this chapter, the motives leading to consider immigration as a dimension of the city’s 
positioning in national and transnational political and socioeconomic networks are here 
dominated by ‘place’ issues: bringing the city ‘closer’ to the centre, redeploying everyday life and 
the practices associated to it, and altering the meanings and identities in the place. The next 
question also addresses the motives of the city engagement in immigration issues, but it 
challenges the actors that inhabit these places and their narratives.   
4.3 Local leaders’ belief in the potential of immigration to drive 
development impact the production of scales 
Undeniably, there are two ways of understanding policymaking: through the projected outcome 
of a policy on the social life and the place/territory it targets (what I have described in the 
previous paragraph), and through the people who came up with this projection, based on their 
own understanding of the issue they examine. Moreover, mapping the institutional actors that 
should be relevant to policymaking is not sufficient. As Di Meo has suggested, an actor becomes 
such only if he or she acts upon an issue. My concern is thus to find out why a person becomes an 
actor and how he/she positively intervenes in order to form a policy and to implement it.  
Here, I have developed the conceptual framework that brings agency at the centre of scale and 
place production. Transformations of power occur through the interventions of actors located at 
different scalar fixes, who induce scalar flux or rescaling processes. My main hypothesis is that, 
through language, through their discursive performance, the storytelling of their immigration 
experience, strategic social actors take an active part in designing the collective patterns of 
immigration narratives (although they are not necessarily representatives of these experiences).  
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In fact, agency is a social engagement, a conscious reconstruction of events that affect group 
memories. ‘Biographisation’ is an activity that is at the basis of the human existence itself. No 
place, no social group, no people exist without language, and therefore without stories (of 
course, narratives is not the only means through which experience is analysed. Urban theorists 
for instance have intensively studied the urban practices of city dwellers, from walking to 
affecting the physical aspects of buildings, public spaces and more). Even though these 
narratives are to be contextualised in collective patterns, time and space, they do have a capacity 
to inform as much as to produce.  
Throughout this doctoral work, I seized the opportunity to hear from the ones that experienced 
immigration first-hand, and whose narratives become public. I therefore assume that their 
stories set the political frames that regulate immigration experiences. Hence my question: do the 
city officials’ own immigration experience affect the immigration discourse brought to the 
council and the public? If so, what are the discursive performances I have attended, and how do 
they differ from other discourses on immigration and/or immigrant integration?  
The second chapter of the second part draws on the biographical performances of selected 
immigrant local elected officials. I was a main recipient of the life stories they reconstitute and 
tell to the public. But I also had the opportunity to compare these performances with other texts 
and third-party accounts on their lives. I assume that immigrants who have made it to a public 
office will adopt a rather conservative approach of immigration, where they will support more 
easily values of self-reliance, at least when it comes to economic integration. Nevertheless, I also 
believe that they might help foster a multicultural approach to immigrant integration, at least 
when it comes to their sociocultural identities and practices.  
4.4 As local leaders define integration, they influence the dimension and 
scale of the transformation of immigrants’ into full-fledged members of 
their society 
Through the biographical method, I have made a first step towards understanding the normative 
framing of immigration and integration policies. Indeed, policymaking raises various questions: 
what does one want the consequences of integration to be? Through which concrete actions can 
those consequences be achieved? In the first chapter of the third part of this work, I will be 
basing my argument on all the encounters I elicited during fieldwork.   
That chapter will again put a great emphasis on language practices. In the previous sections, I 
have repeatedly mentioned the article edited by Friedmann and Lehrer, exploring the 
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establishment of a multicultural policy in Frankfurt in the early 1990s. The authors framed the 
analysis of the policy as a ‘symbolic policy’, which corresponds to ‘communicative action’, as 
defined by the Frankfurt-born philosopher Habermas. To defend what has been depicted as a 
purposeless policy, they argue: “a symbolic politics aimed at creating a multicultural city in 
which people can live peacefully with each other at close range therefore seems an entirely 
appropriate response” (Friedmann & Lehrer, 1997). Symbolic policies refer to what Alexander 
(2004) calls ‘attitudes’ or ‘assumptions’ toward immigrants, and the declarations, policy papers 
and other slogans it might encompass. Its ‘communicative’ effect might be positive, especially to 
achieve cultural transformation of the receiving society (although the conditions of this process, 
and the results they aim at like lower racism and discrimination are blurry).  
Here, I do not so much defend the possibility for public declarations, policy papers, or in the case 
of this research, storytelling and narratives, to have an impact on the cultural transformation of 
the places I analyse. However, I do believe that these communicative actions have an impact on 
the formulation of immigration and integration as public issues, and objects of public actions. By 
staging their own integration experiences, and by defining how they conceive of immigrant 
integration, interviewees participate in the normative framing of immigrant integration. This is 
not new, and I have cited several works that have explored the formation of an immigration 
issue, before it was transformed into policy. However, I ask: does this normative political 
process differ when immigrants are included in deliberation? Or in other words, what is the 
immigrant integration narrative framing at work and how do these narratives impact the 
formulation of immigration integration as an issue of public action? Moreover, contextualising 
narratives, does this normative political process differ when the places under scrutiny have a 
long-standing history of immigrant settlement? 
Comparing the various definitions found with definitions of immigrant integration found in the 
literature (see also annex 3 on ‘integration’) can shed some light on the production of meanings 
and the consequent possible interventions at the city level, and more generally the impact of 
these transformations of immigrant integration.  
4.5 Immigration and integration issues become public actions and create a 
multiscalar governance  
The last chapter of this volume is an attempt to understand the institutional and organisational 
features of the local governance of immigration and integration in each city. I have claimed that I 
focus on the local scale, as it provides me with methodological frame of observation; but when it 
comes to analysis, I adopt a fluid and unbounded approach of scale to assess the socio-political 
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space. Actors located at multiple scales occupy this space. The analysis therefore focuses on 
grasping the “upwards, downwards and transversals links” (Brenner, 2004, p. 10),  and 
identifying the endogenous, exogenous and transitional actors that cross the places for which 
they intend to form policies (Di Meo, 2008, pp. 6–7), more particularly immigration and 
integration policies.  
Apart from identifying the actors, the main task is to understand the connections, the 
cooperation relations or the conflicts between them. It makes the reconstitution of the 
transformations of power possible. At the time of observation, I have the option to unveil scalar 
fixes, but at the same time, the interviewees inform scalar processes. 
That last chapter is based on the interviews that were conducted in the four cities. For each 
interview, I have identified the stakeholders that are mentioned, and the context of their 
identification by the interviewee. The programmes and activities conducted by each stakeholder 
are equally identified and mapped. Through the institutional and organisational features of the 
immigration and integration policy domain, I can get a more concrete image of policy 
implementation.  
Additionally, mapping the actors, the relations between them and their ‘location’ in multiscalar 
governance, is a possible way to analyse the transformations of statehood. More particularly, it 
can show complexity in mid-sized cities that are usually seen as dependent on the central 
administration, for finance, planning and more. Hence my question: how do the strategies 
deployed by social actors involved in immigration and integration policy formulation and 
implementation transform the urban governance that specifically targets this policy domain in a 
multiscalar and fragmented political space?     
Conclusions 
In this first section, my purpose was to lay the theoretical framework of this doctoral 
dissertation. The core proposal of it could be summed in this way: actors, taking part in the local 
governance of immigration and integration, based on the history of the place and their own 
(biographical) motivations, make sense of immigration and integration issues, form policies to 
address them and therefore actively participate in the production and reproduction of scalar 
processes.  
 
 
Figure 2.2. Conceptual framework: a dialectic between place, scale and agency. Realised by 
Amandine Desille 
Scalar processes, I have argued, are process of transformations — from scalar fixes to scalar 
flows — of State power, authority and responsibility, not fixed in a bounded space. In that sense, 
addressing immigration and integration issues through scales makes it possible to 
methodologically isolate a certain spatial level for the purpose of the enquiry, while at the same 
time offering the possibility to capture the multiplicity of actors, institutions, socio-historical 
legacies and ideological frames that superimpose, overlap and compete for power at this specific 
level of analysis.    
I have framed ‘place’ as a grounding concept for rescaling processes. In this analysis, I define 
towns or small or mid-sized cities as places, methodologically speaking. First, places correspond 
to a location in space that someone can point on a map, and even draw the boundaries of. Places 
are unique, matchless. Their location at a certain time in history, and in a certain social, 
economic and political system, informs the accessibility of the place to social, economic and 
political resources. Moreover, “the spatial organization of places is important in establishing and 
in maintaining the difference itself” (D. B. Massey et al., 1999, p. 105). However, the production 
A place (where everyday life occurs) : 
- is impacted by the various endogenous, hexogenous and transversal 
agents that govern it; 
- those agents are located at various scales; 
- the hierarchy between those agents is not straighforward, nor the 
devolution of power that occurs under new governance patterns; 
- instead, agents (including local agents) compete, negotiate, resist… 
for the authority to shape the place.  
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of differentiated places — inclusive or exclusionary — goes through complex interactions of 
historical, political and social dynamics. Social agents in a city engage in strategies to reposition 
the place in a broader network of cities, displacing for instance the scale at which they view their 
interventions. Thus, a city can engage in transnational activities, even though it is ‘peripheral’ at 
national level. Immigration in this context could be perceived as a potential engine for the 
rescaling of interventions and the positioning of the city. 
Second, places are where everyday life takes place, where people reside, work, study and carry 
out activities. Residents feel they share a common experience, and perceive the other is at reach, 
they can meet with other people in multiple encounters (even if this never occurs). Those 
everyday experiences are considered an important factor to understand local politics. People in 
marginalised places tend to aim at resembling the dominant groups, but at the same time, they 
also advocate economic development or politics in their own terms.  
Finally, people in places share a collective imaginary of belonging, representations and 
meanings. This ‘sense of place’ informs politics and might be the base for autonomous and 
innovative actions, as I mentioned when discussing the specificity of small and mid-sized cities 
remote from centres.  
I would like to add, at this stage, that one town does not only fit one place. The cities I study are 
not uniform, but they accommodate multiple locales, groups and identities. This has always been 
true. Places were always subjected to instability, permeability and power relations, therefore 
they are processes.  
Immigration issues are fundamental for the production of places, just as much as the adoption of 
inclusive or exclusionary placemaking strategies inform immigrant integration policies. Those 
questions are to be asked through a historical long-term placemaking process, but also through 
the micro-politics of current placemaking activities.  
Reflecting on the intersections between scales, places and agency, I wonder if cities govern or 
are being governed. This discussion is based on the case of immigration and integration policies 
in mid-sized cities located at the frontier of Israel. The following chapter will therefore aim at 
presenting the specific context of Israel on one hand, and of mid-sized cities located away from 
the centre, close to the country’s borders on the other hand (part 1, chapter 3). The 
methodological implications of the theoretical and empirical choices I made will be addressed 
immediately afterwards (part 1, chapter 4).  
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The second part of this volume will address the motives that support local immigration 
policymaking. The first set of motives is grounded in place. Immigration changes the course of a 
place, the dynamics of its social relations, the way social life is organised. Believing that these 
breaks can lead to positive change may well lead to the rescaling of local development strategies, 
and support the repositioning of the city (part 2, chapter 5). The second set of motives in 
grounded in the actors. The social engagement of actors with the multiple aspects of life in the 
city, and more importantly the engagement of actors, who take decisions for larger groups, in 
government, has a significant impact on the production or reproduction of realities in this city 
(part 2, chapter 6). 
The third part will address the processes of policymaking and policy implementation, when it 
comes to immigration issues, but more particularly with immigrant integration, i.e. at the 
moment the immigrant choses to settle in a particular place. The formulation of a normative 
frame for policymaking calls for the deconstruction of the concept of immigrant integration 
itself, through unveiling the meanings of integration, as expressed by the policymakers 
themselves (part 3, chapter 7). However, as I do not conduct a longitudinal study, but focus on 
the leadership and its accomplishment between 2014 and 2016, I decided to look at the 
organisation features of immigrant integration governance, in order to switch from discourses 
and symbolic policies, to actual public actions. The last chapter will therefore be an opportunity 
to map the actors, their activities, and the relations between them. The entanglement of actors, 
institutions, policies, supervision tools and funding opportunities will support my understanding 
of scales (part 3, chapter 8).  
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Chapter 3 ◊ Immigration and frontier towns in Israel  
From the first European Zionist movements in the late 19th century to today, Jewish immigration 
to mandatory Palestine and to Israel has played a central role in the renewal of a Jewish identity, 
its territorial anchoring in Eretz Israel, the making of an independent State, and nation-building 
in general. In that context, Jewish immigration has been conceived first and foremost as a 
settlement immigration similar to early European settlement immigration in the United States, 
Canada or Algeria; and second, as a return migration, albeit imaginary, of alleged descendants of 
the Hebrews in biblical Israel. In that sense, Jewish immigration played and still plays a central 
role in establishing Israel’s sovereignty — despite Palestinian, Pan-Arab and growing 
international accusations of illegal occupation —, and in establishing Israel as a Jewish state. 
Moreover — and I will get into details in the following sections —, immigrants who were settled 
in the peripheral mid-sized cities that are at the core of this work have been the main backers of 
a ‘Neo-Zionist’ anti-democratic ideology that supports the Jewish ethno-national character of the 
state, and discards solutions for a long term peace.    
I conducted my doctoral research project between 2013 and 2016. Those years were marked by 
relatively low immigration in Israel. Despite an increase in the immigration of European Jews, 
and more particularly French and Ukrainian Jews, to Israel from 2014 onwards, there were no 
more than 25,000 immigrants arriving in the country every year, a much less disrupting number 
than that experienced by Israel at its establishment in the 1950s, or following the fall of the USSR 
in the 1990s. Nevertheless, Israel keeps on deploying efforts to rally Jews of the world to Israel. 
The worsening of the security situation in major European cities as well as the on-going conflict 
in Ukraine have given Israeli leaders opportunities to call on Jewish members of the diaspora to 
“return home”, and reassert the fact that “Israel only is a safe haven for Jews”38. 
Immigration is still an issue in Israel, albeit not as central as it used to be. Even though it is true 
that there is less debate among ministries and at the Knesset (see “Tables of Netanyahu’s 
meetings with ministers 2013-2014,” 2015), and that immigration was not a highly debated 
issue during the national election campaign in March 2015, some related topics such as the 
integration of Ethiopian-Israeli second generation39, the conversion law40 or the nation-state 
                                                          
38 See articles in the Israeli press on French, Danish, Ukrainian and even Ethiopian Jews (Lebor, 2014; 
Courrier international, 2015; Farkash, 2015; Haaretz.com, 2015; Hasson, 2015; Lior, 2015; TheMarker, 
2015; Rabid, 2015). 
39 This series of articles highlight the debate that surrounded the adoption of a comprehensive plan for the 
integration of Ethiopians. However, they also came at a time when several large-scale protests were 
organised by Ethiopian-Israeli youth in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem mainly, to call for public attention 
regarding police violence toward Ethiopian-Israelis as well as wider issues of integration in education, the 
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law41 were the objects of intense public debates between 2014 and 2015 and were widely 
covered by the media. Lastly, immigration is a topic of debate during municipal elections, as I 
had the opportunity to witness in June 2015 in Arad municipal elections. This last point raises 
questions around the growing role of municipalities in immigration issues in a context of 
decentralisation.  
The latest research works published on the topic of municipal responsibilities and immigration 
were mainly based on the 1990s immigration from the former USSR (Auerbach, 2001, 2011; 
Tzfadia, 2005; Tzfadia & Yacobi, 2007; Yacobi & Tzfadia, 2009). More recently, the Union of 
Local Authorities in Israel ordered a survey to establish a picture of immigration and integration 
issues in local authorities in Israel (Yehuda Abramson, 2013). This assessment has shown that a 
large number of municipalities have established independent departments for immigration and 
integration, or units under the authority of welfare or education departments.42   
This chapter therefore aims at a more in-depth presentation of the national and local 
socioeconomic and political contexts on which those new developments are based. Following the 
triptych I presented in the previous chapter, I will focus on people, places and the process of 
production and reproduction of specific sociopolitical scalar spaces. More particularly, I will put 
greater emphasis on the role of mid-sized cities in peripheries in welcoming new immigrants, 
the production of places of marginality — in space, but also in terms of social, economical and 
political status —, and the specific challenges met by those peripheral places in a neoliberalising 
national context.   
The first part will present a brief historical review of immigration to Israel. Next, I will show the 
extent to which the State established places of difference, through planning, housing and 
employment policies, which have shaped social differences up to today. I will illustrate this point 
by presenting the four cities that constitute my research field, each of them describing a 
particular outcome of the production of space. Finally, I will turn to the transformations of the 
Israeli State and power. The peripherality of these places, located outside socioeconomic and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
army and more (Cahn & Spigel, 2015; Kashti, 2014, 2015c, 2015d; Li, 2016; Lior, 2015a; Orfez, 2015; 
Skoop, 2015). 
40 The conversion law was finally put on hold during the March 2015 elections, and cancelled in July 2015. 
However, it did bring into the public debate the issues faced by new immigrants who benefited from the 
Law of Return although they do not fit the Halacha definition of Judaism (Atinger, 2014; Idelman, 2014; 
Lis, 2014a, 2014b). 
41 The nation-state law aimed at strengthening the Jewish identity of the State. Opposition to the law led to 
the dissolution of the government, and eventually to new elections four months later (Gross, 2014; Lis, 
2014c, 2014d, 2014e, 2014f; Verter, 2014).  
42 I have conducted a phone survey in December 2013 in municipalities located in the Northern, Haifa and 
Southern districts and I have found similar organisational features. 
 110
political networks, persists until today, although local leaders challenge their status and develop 
new strategies to reach out to the centre.  
1 People: Immigration in Israel  
Jewish immigration to Israel is usually referred to as Aliyah, a Hebrew term meaning ‘ascent’, 
which conceives of Jewish immigration to Israel as a moral imperative. Immigration, in turn, is 
translated by the Hebrew term hagira, therefore distancing Jewish immigrants from non-Jewish 
immigrants. And indeed, only Jewish immigration is the object of a national law, the Law of 
Return, and has a Ministry dedicated to the settlement and absorption of Jewish immigration, 
the Ministry of Immigration and Absorption (Misrad haAliyah vehaKlita in Hebrew, later in the 
chapters MOIA). Other immigrants in Israel43 are under the control of the Ministry of Interior 
and its discretionary regulations. In a comparative perspective, and as the Law of Return is the 
only national immigration policy in Israel, my work addresses mainly Jewish immigration to 
Israel.  
The first subsection aims at introducing immigration to Israel, from the first Aliyah in 1882 to 
now. Next, I will briefly describe the involvement of the State and its institutions in a matter that 
was considered crucial to nation-building.  
1.1 A brief history of immigration to Israel  
Ottoman Palestine was already home to Jewish residents before the 19th century. Those were 
mainly found in the cities of Jerusalem, Tiberias, Safed and Hebron. The immigration of ideology-
driven Jews who participated in the establishment of new Jewish settlements, or the Yishuv in 
Hebrew, following the growing claim for founding a Jewish home in Ottoman and then British 
Palestine, started at the end of the 19th century. From then on, several milestones have shaped 
the curves of Jewish immigration. The following subsections will describe those moments, from 
the acceleration of immigration after the Balfour declaration and before and after the second 
World War, during which six millions Jews were assassinated; to the establishment of the state 
and the ‘ingathering of the exiles’, witnessing the arrival of hundreds of thousands of European, 
African and Asian Jews; to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the cold War, and the 
massive arrival of Soviet Jews from 1989 to now.  
                                                          
43 Other immigrants usually — but not only — fall into these categories: migrant workers, whose visas 
depend of their employer (in the sectors of agriculture, care, construction and food service industry) and 
whose stay is limited to five years; asylum-seekers, who benefit from temporary group protection, granted 
by the State to specific groups (in 2016, immigrants who originated from Sudan, Eritrea and Congo); and 
foreign partners of Israeli citizens, whose visas depend on their involvement in a relationship with an 
Israeli citizen, and whose stay and occupation is unlimited.     
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The following graph illustrates and quantifies Israel’s history of immigration. Nevertheless, I 
have used continents of origin44, as adopted by the Central Bureau of Statistics, therefore it does 
not represent the diversity of Jewish immigration. Second, this graph takes into account arrivals 
only, although remigration to country of origin or to a third country is far from negligible (for 
figures on remigration, see for instance: (Sitton, 1962; Beenstock, 1996; Lipshitz, 1998; Portnov, 
1998). 
  
                                                          
44 Nowadays, central Asian Republics of the Former Soviet Union are classified under ‘Asia’. Indeed, since 
1995, Mountain Jews from Azerbaijan, Georgian Jews and Bukhara Jews from Uzbekistan fall under their 
own categories, and not FSU immigrants anymore.  
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Figure 3. 1. Immigration to Israel by year and by continent of origin. Source: Statistical abstract of 
Israel (2015). Design: Amandine Desille. 
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1.1.1 Immigration before Statehood 
In his volume Israël Immigration et Croissance, Shlomo Sitton (1962) reminds the reader that 
Jewish immigration has been historically marked by religious, political and economic 
persecutions. Even in a more recent history, at the end of the 19th century, 2.5 million Russian, 
Romanian, Austrian-Hungarian Jews fled the pogroms and persecutions and found shelter in 
Western Europe and in the United States.  
Even though such massive migration has channelled only a comparatively small number to 
Ottoman Palestine, the very nationalist movements that emerged in the regions from where Jews 
escaped substantially influenced the emergent Zionist movement (Ibid., p. 26). Indeed, founders 
of the Zionist ideology aimed at finding a collective solution through the ingathering of the 
Jewish Diasporas in a Jewish national home. Second, it aimed at the regeneration of Jews through 
labour, and more particularly agriculture. A cultural renewal was also envisioned through the 
revival of Biblical Hebrew as a modern language (Ibid., p. 27). Political Zionism is usually 
associated with the figure of Austrian Journalist Theodore Herzl as well as with the organisation 
of a series of Zionist Congress, the first of which took place in Basel in 1898. The return of Jews 
to the Holy Land, Eretz Israel, and the establishment of a national home, the Yishuv, became a 
concrete undertaking.  
In this context, 25,000 Jews from the Zionist movement associations, Hovevei Zion and Bilu, 
emigrated from Russia and Romania to Israel. This ‘first Aliyah’ founded the moshavot45 Petach 
Tikva, Rishon leZion, Zichron Yaakov and Hadera (Sitton, 1962; Lipshitz, 1998).      
The ‘second Aliyah’ took place between 1904 and 1914, when 40,000 members of the Labour 
Zionist movements emigrated from Tsarist Russia to Israel. They founded numerous rural 
settlements or moshavim46 and kibbutzim47 (Ibid.).  
Following the 1917 Balfour declaration, stating that Great Britain supported the establishment 
of a Jewish home in mandatory Palestine, 35,000 young (intellectual) from the USSR, Poland and 
                                                          
45 A moshava (plural moshavot) is a Jewish settlement established in Ottoman Palestine by members of the 
first and second Aliyot. 28 moshavot were founded in Israel.  
46 A moshav (plural moshavim) is a rural settlement, where land and property are private. Moshavim were 
established from the 1920s on. After the establishment of the State, they absorbed large numbers of 
immigrants from Northern Africa and the Middle East, and are believed to have provided better conditions 
for these newcomers to access the middle-class than the development towns at the heart of this doctoral 
work. Today, there are more than 440 moshavim in Israel.   
47 A kibbutz (plural kibbutzim) is a collective communal rural settlement, where land, property and means 
of production belong to the community. Established from 1909 on, they synthesise communist and Zionist 
ideologies. Today, there are 270 kibbutzim in Israel, but many have gone through privatisation, unable to 
survive in a free-market economy.  
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the Baltic area, newly trained for agricultural work, emigrated to Israel between 1919 and 1923 
(Ibid.).  
Between 1924 and 1931, the ‘fourth Aliyah’ brought to Israel around 85,000 Jews from Poland, 
but also the USSR, the Balkans and even the Middle-East. Those middle-class Jews were driven 
out by discriminatory economic policies. Once in Israel, they occupied positions in commerce, 
crafts and the industry (Ibid.).   
Lastly, in the decade starting just before the Second World War, up until the establishment of 
Israel, the ‘fifth Aliyah’ was made up of 270,000 Jews from Germany and Poland, who mainly 
settled in Haifa and Tel Aviv metropolitan areas (Ibid.). Following the Second World War, 
thousands of European Jews were displaced and large groups gathered in camps. Their transfer 
to British Palestine was almost impossible, with the exception of some illegal rescuing missions, 
many of them ending in the repatriation of the refugees in camps on the island of Cyprus. In 
1948, Israel finally received the displaced populations.    
These first five Aliyot have played a crucial role in the proto-structuration of social and spatial 
relations in Israel. Indeed, European Jewry established communities in the main urban centres 
of the country, as well as in rural settlements. Moshavot and kibbutzim developed quasi-
government structures outside the British mandate’s institutions. At the establishment of the 
state, they were organised in decision-making networks which subsisted even after hundreds of 
thousands of newcomers settled in the new nation. The second and third Aliyot in particular 
were the groups that would make up the core of the future nation for the leaders at the time — 
both in government and in intellectual spheres (Ram, 1995).   
1.1.2 Immigration from 1950s to 1980s 
Accordingly we, members of the People's Council, representatives of the Jewish Community of 
Eretz-Israel and of the Zionist Movement […] hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish state in 
Eretz-Israel, to be known as the State of Israel. […] The State of Israel will be open for Jewish 
immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles; it will foster the development of the country for 
the benefit of all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the 
prophets of Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its 
inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, 
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language, education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be 
faithful to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.48  
As early as in the Proclamation of Independence, the newly established state of Israel declared 
the country ‘open for Jewish immigration and the Ingathering of the Exiles’. In 1950, the Israeli 
parliament — the Knesset — ratified the Law of Return. The Law of Return is Israel’s one and 
only immigration policy and is conceived as a return migration policy. Indeed, it provides that 
every Jew who expresses the desire to immigrate to Israel can do so.49 As stated by the Israeli 
sociologists Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled “[The Law of Return] became the most important 
legal expression of Israel's self definition as a Jewish state. It establishes ethno-nationalist 
citizenship that, in principle, encompassed all Jews, and only Jews, by virtue of their ethnic 
descent” (Shafir and Peled in Semyonov & Lewin-Epstein, 2004). Two years later, the State 
ratified a second law, the Nationality Law,50 granting new Jewish immigrants immediate access 
to Israeli citizenship.   
At a time when approximately 700,000 Palestinian fled to neighbouring countries as a result of 
the 1948 war,51 ‘Jewish immigration and the Ingathering of the Exiles’ started at a high pace. 
687,000 new Jewish immigrants settled in the country within four years of its establishment. 
They were as numerous as the established population in the country at the time (CBS, 2015d). 
Immigrants came from Europe but, also, from Middle East countries. Indeed, many Jews living in 
predominantly Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa made their way to Israel. 
The Jewish communities of Yemen, Iraq and Libya were almost integrally displaced and resettled 
in Israel. Several factors explain their immigration, among them the religious meaning of the 
establishment of a Jewish state on the biblical land, the potential threat to those communities in 
countries which did not support the creation of a Jewish home in the region, as well as the 
logistic and financial help offered by the Jewish Agency and other organisations involved in their 
immigration.  
In the 1950s, immigration started to slow down, and the institutions in charge of immigration 
put greater emphasis on communities directly threatened. Immigrants from North Africa, 
Romania, Poland, Hungary and Egypt settled in Israel. In 1958, ten years after its establishment, 
                                                          
48 Extract of the official English version of the Proclamation of Independence of the State of Israel, 14 May 
1948, available at: https://www.knesset.gov.il/docs/eng/megilat_eng.htm  
49 English version of the Law of Return is available at: 
https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/return.htm. The Law of Return was amended in 1970 and 
right of return was extended to a child and a grandchild of a Jew, the spouse of a Jew, the spouse of a child 
of a Jew and the spouse of a grandchild of a Jew. 
50 English version of the Nationality Law is available at: 
http://www.israellawresourcecenter.org/israellaws/fulltext/nationalitylaw.htm. 
51 See www.unwra.org.  
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Israel had received 936,000 immigrants, approximately half of them coming from Europe and 
half from Asia and Africa (CBS, 2015d). Nevertheless, it is estimated that over the same period, 
100,000 immigrants headed back to their countries of origin or remigrated some place else 
(Sitton, 1962, p. 94).    
In the 1960s, immigration mostly came from Eastern Europe, notably Romania, North Africa, 
with the quasi-entire emigration of Algerian Jews to France and Israel, and India. Another source 
of immigration came from ideology-driven, often Marxist, youths from America. However, 
immigration numbers were to soar again with the immigration of Soviet Jews. This new wave of 
immigration was initiated at the end of the 1960s. Indeed, since 1923, Zionist activities had been 
illegal in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, between 1967 and 1970, a timid loosening of the iron 
curtain allowed 5,000 Jews to leave the USSR. At the same time, the Law of Return was amended 
(1970) to include a larger definition of Jewish descent. After 1971, and as the Soviet government 
was looking for a more favourable opinion from the West (Jones, 1996, p. 18), more and more 
visas are attributed to Jewish candidates to emigration. During this period of ‘détente’, two 
peaks were registered in 1973 and in 1979. In total, between 1968 and 1985, 260,000 Jews left 
the USSR, 165,000 of them reaching Israel (Storper-Perez, 1998, pp. 18–19).  
The encounter between USSR Jews and earlier immigrants in Israel was not an easy one. Indeed, 
twenty years after its establishment, the country could afford to offer better conditions for new 
immigrants, while neighbourhoods and peripheral cities were left with poor infrastructures and 
housing. This led to intercommunity tensions and is considered one of the triggers of the social 
movements initiated by African and Asian immigrants in the 1970s.  
Between November 1984 and January 1985, a comparatively new immigration made it to Israel. 
7,000 Beta Israel, or Ethiopian Jews, were transferred to Israel during the so-called ‘Moses 
operation’. Even though 6,000 Ethiopian Jews had already made it to Israel before them, this 
first operation holds a more symbolic start of Ethiopian immigration to Israel. 11,000 new 
Ethiopian immigrants arrived in Israel after this operation. Lastly, in May 1991, as Israel was 
already experienced an unprecedented immigration from the former Soviet-controlled area, 
Israel conducted the second operation, ‘Solomon operation’, an airlift which brought 14,300 
Ethiopian Jews to Israel in 36 hours (Noam, 1994; Berthomière, 1996; Anteby-Yemini, 2004; 
Elias & Kemp, 2010).     
Even though the Ethiopian immigration to Israel has profoundly impacted the Israeli society, its 
numbers were rather low. With the end of the cold war, and the collapse of the USSR, hundreds 
of thousands of Soviet Jews made their way to Europe, North America, and Israel.  
 117
1.1.3 1990s FSU mass immigration  
From 1989 to 2000, 850,000 Former Soviet Union immigrants settled in Israel, challenging again 
Israel’s absorption system and its possibility to provide them all with housing and professional 
prospects (Berthomière, 2002).  
Indeed, the combined effects of Glasnost and the failure of Perestroika led to mass emigration of 
Soviet Jews. Even though in the 1980s the United States was the first destination of these 
immigrations, the end of the cold war led the country to re-evaluate its political refugees 
programme. As early as 1989, Soviet Jews were no longer considered refugees in the United 
States. Therefore “Washington effectively sanctioned Israel as the only viable destination for 
those Jews who wished to leave the Soviet Union” (Jones, 1996, p. 52). 
This tremendous wave of immigration has fascinated a generation of migration scholars, who 
had the opportunity to concretely analyse the repercussions on wages, employment, housing 
and more on the host society. Moreover, as they represented a large number of the Israeli 
population, they have weighted on many societal transformations over the past three decades.   
First of all, the FSU immigration caused a new demographic burst in Israel. However, the State 
had just adopted a ‘direct absorption’ policy, where immigrants had a choice to settle in the 
country (details of this policy change to be developed in the following sections). Therefore, it 
was not long before Israel adopted a new National Outline Plan, the NOP 31, which provided 
housing in areas where the State wanted to favour settlement. This had the effect of slightly 
favouring immigration settlement in peripheral towns, in comparison to other immigration 
countries where FSU immigrants settled. However, the large cities, Tel Aviv, Haifa, Jerusalem and 
Beer Sheva, and their metropolitan areas, remained the primary sites of settlement. Immigrants 
who settled in the peripheral districts were older and less skilled than average, and suffer from 
relatively higher unemployment (Lipshitz, 1998; Lewin-Epstein, Semyonov, Kogan, & Wanner, 
2003). In the periphery, the southern district benefited more from the settlement of FSU 
immigrants than Galilee (Berthomière, 1996, 2002). Lastly, geographer William Berthomière 
notes the substantial influx of FSU immigrants beyond the green line (Ibid.).  
The FSU immigration had an important impact on the education sector in Israel. Contrary to the 
large immigration of the 1950s, where newcomers had lower educational credentials than their 
hosts, the FSU immigrants were largely educated, with 50% holding academic degrees (CBS, 
2013). As such, they have provided the country with the needed manpower to develop the 
economy, and notably, the boom of the high tech sector in Israel has been largely attributed to 
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this flow of skilled immigrants. Nevertheless, the State experienced a “partial failure to take 
advantage of the human capital of the immigrants who had arrived by the end of 1993 [which] 
produced a loss of $2 billion to the national economy” (Eckstein 1994, in Lipshitz, 1998). Indeed, 
the labour market’s demands and the new flux of immigrants were rather different. Additionally, 
several academic degrees — such as medical degrees — were not recognised and many had to 
get equivalent degrees in Israel.    
And indeed, a large proportion of the immigrants suffered immediate professional downgrading, 
and for some, this remained a long-term situation, profoundly affecting their life satisfaction in 
Israel (Amit, 2009). Indeed, even though the institutional efforts provided by the State to 
recognise education and stimulate employment resulted in FSU immigrants experiencing lower 
rate of unemployment than in the USA or Canada (Lewin-Epstein et al., 2003), only 34 % of the 
newcomers worked in the same profession as the one they had abroad (CBS, 2013).  
Apart from education and employment, the third dimension of integration that mattered for the 
newcomers is culture (Galper, 1995). FSU immigrants reported being frustrated by the lack of 
cultural activities in Israel, mainly because those activities are concentrated in Israel’s few large 
cities, were much more expensive that in the former USSR, and catered for a Hebrew-speaking 
population (Ibid.). FSU immigrants, particularly the intelligentsia (Storper-Perez, 1998), 
supported by State institutions, therefore put a lot of efforts in fostering a vibrant cultural world, 
usually segregated and Russian-speaking.  
Altogether, FSU immigrants have largely challenged the absorption system, and even more 
strongly, issues related to the adoption of an ‘Israeli identity’. They have participated in the 
weakening of the ‘national ethos’, and have contributed to the reactivation of the 
Ashkenazi/Oriental split (Berthomière, 1996). However, they have also suffered stereotyping 
from the Israeli old-timers, particularly as they were portrayed as motivated by push factors, 
with a weaker Jewish identity, even though studies have often demonstrated the contrary. For 
instance, the survey conducted by Gildas Simon, William Berthomière, Lisa Anteby, Yehudit 
Rosenbaum Tamari and Natalia Damian has shown that FSU immigrants came to Israel out of 
choice and that they feel strong about their Jewish identity and optimistic about their future in 
Israel (Simon et al, 1996). A majority of them integrated the secular lower middle-class of Israel, 
and adopted a right-wing nationalist political view (Lerner, 2015). Desire to remigrate seems to 
be more prominent among 1.5 generation immigrants who grew up in Israel, one or two of 
whose parents are not Jewish in the eyes of Rabbinic Law. Indeed, even though the Law of 
Return was amended in the 1970s to adopt a larger definition of the potential beneficiaries, once 
immigrants are in Israel, the Rabbinic Law does not recognise them as Jewish. Around 30% of 
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the FSU immigrants therefore benefited from the Law of Return, although they were not 
halachically Jewish. These ‘unclarified’ immigrants (Lerner, 2015) are therefore permanently 
challenged by the administration.  
Apart from the religious differences among those immigrants, many other differences — in 
terms of education, professional background, language… — make the category ‘FSU immigrants’ 
a rather fragile and questionable category. Indeed, it lumps together immigrants from Russia, 
Eastern Europe but also the Caucasian republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and so on. 
But only in 1995 did immigrants from Georgia, Caucasus Mountain Jews and Bukhara Jews 
benefit from a special status.  
1.1.4 Immigration in Israel today  
At the time when this research project was conducted, immigration in Israel was far from a 
major concern. Numbers were more or less steady, Israel welcoming around 16,000 immigrants 
every year, with a peak at the time of fieldwork with more important arrivals from Ukraine — a 
conflict opposing Russia and Ukraine since the Ukrainian revolution in 2014 — and from France.  
 Asia Africa Europe America and Oceania Total 
2010 1415 1937 9128 4155 16635 
2011 1104 2934 9286 3567 16891 
2012 1137 2643 9361 3417 16558 
2013 1029 1562 10848 3488 16927 
2014 817 394 19093 3807 24111 
Table 3.1. Immigration by year by continent of origin. Source: CBS (2015d). 
As shown in this extract of the Central Bureau of Statistics’ statistical abstract of Israel published 
in 2015, Jewish immigration persists in Israel today, mainly from countries of the Former Soviet 
Union, France and the United States. Among these newcomers, 40% of them ‘chose’ to settle in 
the Southern district, Haifa district and the Northern district (CBS, 2015c).  
Some groups are overrepresented, like the Ethiopian immigrants, 99% of whom settle in the 
periphery. Indeed, Ethiopian immigrants are still welcomed within two years of their arrival in 
‘absorption centres’ organised and funded by the Jewish Agency and the MOIA, and located in 
the periphery of Israel. Part of new Ethiopian immigration is constituted by ‘Falash Muras’, 
members of the Beta Israel community who converted to Christianism. They usually come to 
Israel under family reunification, and as such, fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
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Interior, which administers the entry of non-Jewish immigrants, rather than the jurisdiction of 
the MOIA. In 2011, 125,000 Ethiopian Jews were living in Israel, according to the Central Bureau 
of Statistics.  
The non-Jewish immigrants have been a concern in Israel since the immigration of Soviet Jews. 
Indeed, 30% of the FSU beneficiaries of the Law of Return have only one Jewish parent, or no 
Jewish parents at all, and do not fit the halachic definition of Judaism. This has caused the 
national divide between Jewish and non-Jewish to shift more and more towards a non-Arab and 
Arab dichotomy (Lustick, 1999).  
Since the 1990s, Israel has instituted labour migration quotas to make up for the dwindling 
numbers of Palestinian workers in Israel. Additionally, asylum-seekers from Eritrea, Sudan and 
other African countries have made their way to Israel, by foot, to escape the violence in their 
countries. In 2016, Israel hosted 43,537 asylum seekers, 88,329 foreign workers, and 16,736 
undocumented foreign workers, while 78,500 tourists have exceeded their stay (Population and 
Immigration Authority in Israel, 2016). Despite the rather low levels of non-Jewish immigration, 
and apart from the granting of group protection, the government has opposed all attempts to 
deal with these arrivals within a human rights framework. In fact, a humanitarian approach 
prevails (Kalir, 2014). As such, a guest-worker policy — which is not sustainable — still 
predominates when addressing non-Jewish immigration in Israel (Alexander, 2003). Asylum-
seekers are urged to voluntarily remigrate, while foreign workers see their stay limited to five 
years, and totally depending on their employer. As of today, Tel Aviv is the only city which has 
shaped a municipal policy aiming at dealing with the pressing problems met by non-Jewish 
immigrants in the city (Raijman & Kemp, 2002; Alexander, 2003; Elias & Kemp, 2010; Schnell, 
2013). Nevertheless, other cities in Israel host non-Jewish immigrants. Among the four cities I 
study, Arad is the residence of several hundreds of African asylum-seekers. At the time of my 
fieldwork, the social services just started mapping them to better understand their needs and 
the possible interventions of the municipality (Interview 42, 2015).  
To sum up, Israel’s demographic growth has been largely impacted by large influx of immigrants, 
with very notable peaks after the establishment of the state and following the collapse of the 
USSR. In total, Israel has received more than 3 million immigrants between 1948 and 2010 (CBS, 
2011), making it indeed a nation of immigrants.  
However, despite common assertions that Aliyah poses a lot fewer issues than other 
immigration settlement in the rest of the world, leading decision makers, scholars and the public 
opinion in general have tended to minimise the sociocultural issues generating by the uprooting 
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of large groups and their settlement in a (despite its Jewish character) foreign land. The 
settlement of newcomers in Israel has brought intense social, cultural, economic and political 
disruptions in Israel. Indeed, the organisation of immigration settlement was organised by the 
ones who settled in the early days of the Yishuv. I will describe more in depth those actors in the 
following subsection. The encounters between a European Ashkenazi elite, with values linked to 
the interests of nation-building and pioneering, and new immigrants from North Africa and the 
Middle East, were a source of social and cultural violence, reinforcing the European hegemony, 
and discarding the newcomers as ‘backward’. This had tremendous implications on the social 
stratification of the state, already profoundly divided between Jews and Palestinians, 
exacerbating divisions among Jews themselves, between European Ashkenazi Jews and 
newcomers from Muslim countries.  
1.2 Immigration and its institutions  
In the early years of Israel, Jewish immigration was regarded as a State enterprise. A large 
number of governmental and semi-governmental organisations were involved in reaching out to 
Jewish communities abroad, to organise transportation to Israel and eventually to organise their 
settlement and their participation in the socio-economic development of the country. This 
bureaucratically organised process was — and still is — named klita, a Hebrew term for 
absorption. This huge effort required tremendous resources, making Israel highly dependent on 
external relations.  
1.2.1 State-organised immigration settlement: Immigration institutions before the 1980s  
Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, founder of the Israeli school of sociology and its leader until the 1970s, 
also a member and contributor of Parsons’s functionalist-structuralist school, has developed an 
outline of the development of the Israeli society around immigration to Israel. “To each aliya is 
assigned a specific functional contribution in the nation-building process and a consequent 
location on the centre-periphery continuum” (Ram, 1995, p. 31). In Eisenstadt’s model, the 
second and third Aliyot represent the core of the ‘social system’ necessary for modernisation, 
while the mass migration of the 1950s represents the periphery. The ‘centre’ is ethnically 
Russian and Polish, and bears the universal interests of the society at large, explains Ram, 
whereas the periphery is mostly made up of non-European Jews, from Africa and Asia, and has 
no orientation toward the future (and even the present, argues Eisenstadt). As such, the latter 
has a ‘marginal’ role in nation-building: they were meant to be assimilated within the core 
culture in order to create a ‘unified and homogeneous nation’ (Frankenstein, cited by Ram, 1995, 
p. 38). This assimilationist position has been referred to as the ‘melting pot’ (Kur Yituch in 
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Hebrew).   
Eisenstadt viewed three aspects of a successful absorption of ‘traditional’ immigrants to ‘modern 
Jews’:  
Acculturation — learning of the various norms, roles, and customs of the absorbing society; 
personal adjustment — strengthening of the mental makeup of the immigrants, building 
confidence and satisfaction in them; and institutional dispersion — the proportional dispersion of 
immigrants in the various institutional spheres, residential locations, and so forth (S. N. 
Eisenstadt, 1954a:10 15). ‘Absorption’ was designated in terms of the "diffusion" of values, norms, 
and roles, from the modern absorbing society to the traditional immigrants, until they were 
entirely immersed. (Ibid., p. 38)  
The official policies were very much in line with this sociological interpretation. “State agencies 
were thus advised to relate to ‘absorption’ as a process analogous to ‘adult socialization’ […]” 
(Ibid., p. 40), and to create personal contacts to immigrants, in order to create identification and 
participation (Ibid.).  
The main institution involved in the organisation of Jewish immigration is the Jewish Agency.52 
The Jewish Agency was founded in 1922. Through an expanded network of representatives, it 
reached out to Jewish communities and organised their immigration to Israel, by boat through 
the Mediterranean, or by air. The World Zionist Organisation, mainly in charge of raising the 
substantial funds necessary for those initiatives, assisted it in its work. The Jewish Agency also 
cooperated with other Jewish organisations such as the American Jewish Joint Distribution 
Committee (also Joint or JDC), which assisted in evacuating displaced Jews from camps in 
Europe.    
The flow of immigrants after the establishment of the state soon dried up all available resources. 
In 1952, the Jewish Agency put a halt to its activities to redefine its objectives. The Agency 
decided to focus its efforts in countries where there was immediate threat to the Jewish 
communities. In other cases, priority will be given to young workforce under age 35 — who 
should represent 80% of immigrants.53 These newcomers were requested to dedicate the first 
                                                          
52 Nowadays, the Jewish Agency is still in charge of processing immigration applications of Jewish 
candidates to immigration. It also coordinates decentralised cooperation between Jewish communities 
abroad and Israeli cities. 
53 Even though this policy seems quite contradictory to a belief that any Jew of the Diaspora is welcome in 
Israel, it is certainly not the first time in the history of the region. Indeed, the first waves of Jewish 
immigration to Ottoman Palestine, even if they involved Zionist organisations in charge of encouraging 
and assisting their settlement, prevented ‘penniless’ Jews from immigrating to Israel (Shilo, 1994). 
Candidates to immigration had to be independent, to rely on their own resources and to contribute to the 
economic development of the Yishuv. The first time in history that Zionist organisations organised a large 
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two years after their arrival to agricultural work. Immigration candidates who were relying on 
their own resources were welcomed. Combined with a slowdown in Jewish immigration, this 
new policy considerably reduced the number of arrivals.  
Apart from the Jewish Agency, the new state of Israel was also highly interventionist. Great 
efforts were deployed to direct new immigrants to the rural areas of the country to participate in 
agricultural production. This was a legacy from Labour Zionism, which encouraged land 
cultivation and self-sufficiency. But it also followed the economic need to supply for a population 
that grew twice its size in a short period of time (Sitton, 1962). And more importantly, it 
participated in the policy of population dispersion toward the Galilee and the Negev region, in 
order to gain sovereignty over those lands, as well as to ensure security. As the geographer 
Gabriel Lipshitz has put it, the population dispersion policy was more of an ‘immigrant 
dispersion policy’ (Lipshitz, 1998).  
Nevertheless, the high influx of immigrants within a very short timeframe at a moment where 
Israel did not have much in terms of own resources meant that there was a crucial lack of 
organisation. A lot of immigrants themselves resisted this policy as they wished to live in bigger 
cities at the centre. The low social status and the social unrest among immigrants from Africa 
and the Middle East was attributed by the leadership as well as by sociologists to their lack of 
‘positive predisposition’ to assimilation into the core (Ram, 1995, p. 39). In this context, the 
attribution of cheap housing became a coercive mean to achieve population dispersion. The 
public construction company Amidar was therefore a key institution. It was — and still is 
nowadays — in charge of providing public housing. 
1.2.2 Direct absorption and individual responsibility: Immigration institutions after the 
1980s  
The highly interventionist approach of Israel in immigration matters changed quite radically in 
the 1980s. Indeed, with the adoption of free-market policies — an issue I will address in the last 
section of this chapter —, the State revaluated its role toward the settlement of new immigrants. 
A new integration policy was adopted, referred to as ‘direct absorption’. Immigrants who arrived 
in Israel were free to settle wherever they wanted. From then on, they were granted a six-month 
allocation called ‘absorption basket’, as well as subsidised Hebrew classes and a range of various 
discounts.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
immigration of penniless Jews was in 1911, when 1,500 Yemenite Jews were brought to Israel to become a 
cheap Jewish workforce (Ibid.). 
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With this break, two main institutions remain and play a major role in immigration and 
immigrant integration in Israel today: the Jewish Agency for Israel and the MOIA. 
The Jewish Agency for Israel has offices spread all around the world and is the main organisation 
facilitating and organising immigration to Israel from origin countries. Every municipality in 
Israel that organises outreaching activities is in regular contact with Jewish Agency 
representatives. In the United States, the Jewish Agency no longer has active representatives for 
immigration, as it has been replaced by the non-profit organisation Nefesh benefesh established 
by Tony Gelbart and Rabbi Yehoshua Fuss in 2002. Since 2005, Nefesh benefesh has received 
State funding to organise Jewish immigration. Similarly, the small non-profit organisation Shavei 
Israel has organised immigration of “’lost’ and ‘hidden’ Jews”.54 Other private actors organise 
immigration to Israel. One example concerns French immigration, where those immigration 
entrepreneurs act as go-betweens between municipalities, mainly beyond the green line, and 
French families through the programme known as ‘Aliyah de groupe’.55   
The second key actor is the MOIA, created in 1968. The Ministry funds the absorption basket, a 
six-month allowance received by all Jewish immigrants benefiting from the Law of Return. The 
Ministry has regional branches and local branches all around the country. In almost any city in 
Israel, immigrants can reach out to a councillor and obtain all entitlements, from the absorption 
basket to training vouchers and Hebrew classes. The Ministry’s main program, elaborated in 
cooperation with municipalities and the Jewish Agency, is called ‘group Aliyah’.56 It funds 
immigration coordinators in municipalities who are in charge of outreaching, welcoming the 
immigrants and organising activities at the city level. Even though the MOIA is a major contact 
for new immigrants, it is a rather small ministry.  
Other ministries are involved in specific immigrant policies. The Ministry of Housing provides 
immigrants with discounts after arrival. The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Welfare 
have special programmes for immigrants. They also transfer special budgets for immigrants to 
municipalities. The Ministry of Economy, through the employment service, or through 
entrepreneurship programmes, supports the economic integration of immigrants. More recently, 
the Ministry for the Development of the Galilee and Negev established several programmes 
                                                          
54 See ‘our goals’ at http://shavei.org/about-us/ 
55 For more information on French immigration to Israel, see for instance the work of William 
Berthomière, Marie-Antoinette Hily and Yann Scioldo-Zürcher (forthcoming). Through the MIFI project, 
funded by the French National Institute for Research CNRS, in the framework of the programme “Project 
terrorist attacks-research”, they enquire the immigration of French Jews to Israel, particularly after the 
terrorist attacks that affected French cities at large, and the Jewish communities in France in particular, 
between 2014 and 2016.    
56 See http://www.moia.gov.il/English/ImmingrantToIsrael/FirstStepsList/Pages/Group-Aliyah-and-
Absorption.aspx  
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including encouragement of the settlement of immigrants in peripheral areas. It also expanded 
its youth centres, many of them having hired immigration coordinators.  
There are numerous non-profit and private organisations all around the country to represent 
the interests of immigrants. Some of them are national and represent certain groups, as Nefesh 
benefesh works for English-speaking immigrants, AMI is the organisation of French immigrants, 
OLEI of Spanish and Portuguese speakers and more. Some have lobbying activities in the 
Knesset. Some provide socio-cultural services, employment services, entrepreneurship services, 
training services or education services. Many charities also support immigrants facing difficult 
economic situations. Nevertheless, there is a concentration of those organisations in the central 
area of the country.   
Immigration-linked activities have also benefited from the support of the Diaspora. First and 
foremost, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC or Joint) started many pilot 
projects, which are today adopted by central and local administrations, like youth centres, 
employment centres for Ethiopian immigrants, mediation and dialogue centres in the 
community and more. The Jewish Agency also implemented a twinning programme between 
Jewish communities in the United States and cities in Israel (partnership2gether). Foundations 
as well as individuals from the Jewish diaspora donate funds to carry out sociocultural activities 
for immigrants, to support existing ones or to upgrade infrastructures.  
The emergence of the municipality as a relevant actor is therefore obvious. The MOIA designs 
programmes, such as ‘Group Aliyah’, where it transfers funds to the municipality to hire 
immigration and integration agents. It also transfers funds to organise socio-cultural activities. 
The municipalities establish direct contact with the Jewish Agency. Municipalities adopt pilot 
programmes targeting immigrants in their cities… The following chapters of this work will 
therefore describe in more detail this growing actor in the immigration and integration field.  
The tremendous implication of the State and its institution bears witness to the importance of 
immigration in the making of the Israeli nation. Indeed, immigration was not only conceived as a 
demographic issue, but also as a political and geospatial issue, as well as a sociocultural and 
economic issue. The following section will address the role of the State in the sociospatialities of 
immigration today. In fact, until the 1980s, the location of immigration settlement was in the 
hands of the government, from the encampment of newcomers, their forced settlement in areas 
decided upon by the State, and the dependence of immigration subsidies to areas of settlement. 
Even though the direct absorption policy has enabled the free choice of residence, Israel 
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continued to hold tight on the land planning and housing policies, using them as powerful tools 
of population dispersion.   
2 Places: establishment of the state and structuration of its 
peripheries 
In the first section, I briefly presented the various influxes of immigrants that make up today’s 
Israeli society. The first immigrant groups to pre-state Yishuv have largely contributed to a 
proto-structuration of the society. After the establishment of the state, the sociospatial 
structuration based on group origin was reinforced and has indeed underlain group conflicts. 
The Eisenstadt-led functionalist approaches en vogue until the 1970s in Israel explained this 
concentration of Jews from the Muslim world in peripheral areas by chronological factors — 
European Jews arrived first and therefore got into vacant housing in existing cities — and by 
social capital factors — European Jews were better adapted to the labour market of the central 
areas (Tzfadia, 2007; Achouch & Morvan, 2013).  
Nevertheless, since the 1970s, there has been a consensus within Israeli academia supporting an 
ethnically-based segregation orchestrated by the State (Smooha & Peretz, 1982; Ram, 2000; 
Shafir & Peled, 2002; Yiftachel, 2000; Khazzoom, 2005; Tzfadia & Yacobi, 2011). The Eastern 
European Jewry had already settled in the future decision centres, while the population 
dispersion policy initiated in the 1950s was indeed the dispersion of African and Asian Jewish 
immigrants to the frontiers. The emergence of an Easterner, oriental (Mizrahi in Hebrew) 
discourse stemmed from “The territorial dispersion of many oriental immigrants into peripheral 
communities [that] helped create a sense of ethnic peripheral solidarity against the central, 
European-origin core” (Gradus, 1983).  
The large-scale immigration that took place in the 1990s, after the collapse of the USSR, 
reactivated the long lasting Ashkenazi/Mizrahi divide. However, it also occurred when 
alternative identity discourses have finally made their way to the political scene, fuelling into 
new multicultural and pluralist approaches of the society.  
The upcoming section will therefore address the spatial organisation of immigration, and the 
role of the State, and its planning functions. Next, I will emphasise in particular how this politics 
of difference have triggered distinct paths of integration in those cities located out of the core 
decisional networks. Finally, I will illustrate the ‘common destiny’ but also the diversity of these 
immigrant towns, located at the frontiers of the State, through the presentation of the four cities 
I have chosen to focus on for the purpose of this doctoral work. I will not mention the reasons 
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why I have selected those cities at the moment, as the next chapter will describe more in detail 
the methodological framework of this work.   
2.1 Spatial organisation of immigration  
The constitution of Israel’s geography lies at the crossroads between two histories, so far 
impossible to reconcile: a history of the emancipation of the Jewish people, through the access to 
an independent territory, deeply connected to the biblical holy land; and one of violent 
colonisation and long-lasting oppression of the inhabitants of this territory, Palestine. 
Immigration to Israel occupies an important section in both those histories, as it has made 
possible the quick populating of the new country. More importantly, each wave of immigration 
has seen the production of territorial myths, rewriting a history of occupation of lands as 
pioneering and conquest over a hostile nature (Kellerman, 1996).   
In order to get impression feel of the transformations of immigrant towns between their 
establishment to today, I looked into the large map collection at the university. The librarian 
helped out and showed me scanned maps she had stored on her computer. When looking at a 
folder entitled ‘Kiryat Gat’, she was excited to see that one map was an aerial photograph of the 
area dated 1948, before Kiryat Gat’s first stone was laid. She opened the file and looked in 
astonishment at a village, there, where Kiryat Gat was later to stand. She could not make up her 
mind which village was there. I explained that Kiryat Gat was built on the ruins of the Palestinian 
village of Iraq-al-Manshiya. She did not answer.  
The school librarian is herself an immigrant from the former Soviet Union. Although she works 
at a major academic institution, and thus has access to a broad range of scientific materials, she 
is not immune from the collective representation of Israel as an empty land, conquered by early 
pioneers, whose work was continued by each new wave of immigration brought to the country.  
In this subsection, I will emphasise more particularly the production of new places according to 
immigration settlement planning. I have already mentioned the spatial organisation of the first 
five Aliyot, preceding statehood. Therefore, I will start with the establishment of the state, and 
the draft of a crucial planning instrument for the geography of Israel, the Sharon plan, in 1950. 
Drawing on the failure of the population dispersion policy, the largest immigration wave 
experienced by Israel in the 1990s saw the adoption of a new approach to regional planning, 
with the National Outline Plan 31 (or NOP 31, in Hebrew Tama 31). Finally, I will discuss some 
new instruments to encourage the settlement of immigrants in the Northern and Southern 
peripheral districts.     
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2.1.1 The Sharon plan 
The spatial organisation of immigrant settlements quickly became a cornerstone of Israel’s 
immigrant absorption policy. This organisation followed national goals, which evolved between 
the 1950s and the 1970s. Indeed, the settlement of immigrants at the borders in the 1950s 
corresponded to the necessity to strengthen security borders of state. In the 1960s, the main 
goal was the quick populating of the sovereign territory and the coordination of many 
development projects. After the six-day war in 1967, new national goals were defined, for the 
“occupation as rapidly as possible of areas beyond the green line” (Efrat, 1988). The State aimed 
at establishing new security belts, socioeconomic consolidation of established settlements and 
the expansion of infrastructure.  
In the first months following the creation of the state, immigrants reaching Israel were hosted in 
transit camps, before being redirected to emptied Palestinian houses. Indeed, after the flight of 
700,000 Palestinians as a result of the 1948 war, the State adopted a policy of ‘absentee 
property’ (Monterescu & Rabinowitz, 2007). Vacant Palestinian properties were rented by the 
government to thousands of immigrants in Jaffa, Haifa, Lod, Ramle and Yavne. They became 
rapidly crowded and immigrants were then sent over to Beer Sheva, Ashkelon (former Medjdal), 
Acre, Safed, Beit She’an or Tiberias. In the mid-1950s, all properties appropriated by the State 
under the law of absentee property were distributed (Orni & Efrat, 1973, p. 318). It is estimated 
that 120,000 immigrants were relocated in Palestinian housing (Sitton, 1962, p. 154). 
As immigrant camps became overwhelmingly crowded, the State took two major steps. One of 
emergency, building temporary transit camps or maabarot close to urban centres or in rural 
areas where their inhabitants could participate in the labour force; and the forming of a long-
term masterplan, the Sharon plan, which defined the future of agriculture and water, industry, 
roads, parks and forests, and more importantly for our matter, new towns (Lipshitz, 1998).  
The maabarot were made up of shacks, built of metal sheets, or even of tents. The Jewish Agency 
provided the shacks and the basic furniture, and inhabitants could occupy them for a token rent. 
Some of those maabarot then became towns, like Kiryat Shmona. Contrarily to immigrant camps, 
maabarot were established next to existing towns or to agricultural settlements, providing the 
immigrants with jobs. Other jobs were public work ordered and financed by the State, whenever 
possible (Sitton, 1962, p. 155). Job swelling was a particularly important phenomenon (Lipshitz, 
1998). Even though the maabara was thought of as a temporary camp, in 1958, there were still 
117,000 immigrants awaiting permanent housing (Sitton, 1962, p. 156). Another striking fact is 
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that immigrants were not directed to two other kinds of existing settlements in Israel: the 
kibbutz or the moshava, but rather to moshavim or to camps next to moshavot (Efrat, 1988).  
In parallel, the Sharon plan was adopted in 1950. Arieh Sharon, one of the main figures behind 
the plan, a student of the Bauhaus school, is said to have been strongly affected by the garden-
city movement of British politician Ebenezer Howard at the end of the 19th century, and by 
central place theory, developed by German geographer Walter Christaller and German 
economist August Lösch in the 1930s (Achouch & Morvan, 2013; Berthomière, 2003, 2004; 
Gradus & Lipshitz, 1996; Lipshitz, 1998). As much as Eisenstadt’s sociology has served the 
definition of the absorption policy, up to the 1980s, geographers in Israel were dedicated to 
nation-building and national planning (Schnell, 2004). In particular, they adopted logical 
positivist models to regional planning and population dispersion. Schnell argues:  
Israeli geographers’ commitment to national goals channelled them toward a search for a 
research agenda that served the promotion of national identity and technical control through 
planning and developed those interpretative schemes that served these interests. […]. Since the 
1950s, with the establishment of the national planning authority and the planning of new regions 
for the masses of new immigrants, the adoption of logical positivism as a paradigm that is highly 
oriented toward the praxis of technical control became unavoidable. (Ibid., p. 564) 
Following their principles, the Sharon Plan aimed at establishing new towns in rural areas, 
where they would act as service centres. 29 new towns, called development towns, were 
therefore built between 1950 and 1962, mainly in the periphery of Israel. Each of them was 
planned to fulfil specific economic purposes: for instance, Arad and Dimona were planned to 
serve as residence for Dead Sea industrial workers, and to develop chemical industries (Orni & 
Efrat, 1973, pp. 308–312). Many other smaller settlements were also planned, and pre-state 
settlements, notably the ones in the central area of the country, reached town and then city 
status.     
The Sharon Plan was one of the facets of Israel’s population dispersion policy. Indeed, those new 
towns and settlements were thought to gain sovereignty over the new land, and to increase 
security at the borders. Nevertheless, “the Israeli population dispersion policy of the 1950s was 
essentially an immigrant-dispersion policy” (Lipshitz, 1998, p. 39). From 1954 onward, 
immigrants are directed ‘from the boat to the development zone’, in camps or in permanent 
housing, without getting through immigrant camps (Sitton, 1962, p. 160). And a great majority of 
the immigrants settled in new towns, was from Africa and Asia.  
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Map 3.1. Development towns in Israel, by time of establishment. Sources: Orni & Efrat (1978), 
Lipshitz (1998). Realised by Amandine Desille.   
 131
As early as the 1960s, those new towns were already experiencing tremendous difficulties. They 
did not reach the demographic goals set for them. Although those towns were heavily 
subsidized, and teams of planners were working hard to impose them as regional economic and 
service centres, their failure was quickly admitted. Indeed, provided services — like housing or 
education —57 were insufficient or of poor quality; the social consequences of the uprooting of 
immigrant populations and their resettlement in remote areas in an unknown country were not 
anticipated; the economic projects, mostly relying on a poorly skilled workforce and on the 
agricultural products of neighbouring rural settlements, survived only thanks to governmental 
support.  
Most importantly, the majority of the immigrants settled in those urban centres were Jewish 
immigrants from North African and Middle East countries, and to a lower extent, from Eastern 
Europe. The sense of deprivation was rapidly coupled with a sense of ethnic segregation 
(Gradus, 1983; Chetrit, 2000; Ram, 2000; Yiftachel, 2000; Tzfadia & Yiftachel, 2004; Yiftachel & 
Tzfadia, 2004; Khazzoom, 2005). As Oren Yiftachel (1998) claims, “The development towns and 
the frontier neighbourhoods quickly became, and have remained, distinct concentration of 
segregated, poor and deprived Mizrahi population”. The fact that the newly established State 
primarily dealt with population dispersion, without considering the social question linked with 
the forced settlement of immigrant population is at the root of today’s main social cracks in the 
Israeli society (Berthomière, 2003).  
Nevertheless, the overall planning of immigration settlement remained more or less the same 
until the 1980s. The Soviet immigration from the 1970s has exacerbated the unequal 
distribution of resources, and led to the uprising of North African and Middle-East immigrants in 
Jerusalem and in other Israeli towns, which I will describe in the next section. However, it has 
not fundamentally changed the logics behind immigration settlement.  
As I mentioned earlier, in the mid-1980s, Israel was forced to adopt free-market approaches to 
its administration, and immigration settlement policy shifted toward direct absorption. The 
massive immigration from the former Soviet Union, which started in 1989, was a first test to 
direct absorption.  
                                                          
57 For many youngsters, especially Moroccans and Iraqis, the education provided in development towns 
was even more mediocre than when attending school in their country of origin (Sitton, 1962, p. 84). This 
situation is even more paradoxical knowing that education was an important means of ‘modernisation’ in 
the eyes of the running elite. However, development town pupils were mainly enrolled in the national 
religious system. Indeed, and this trend will continue even until today, religion is thought of as a way to 
‘correct’ perceived deviant immigrants (Djerrahian, 2015).  
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2.1.2 The National Outline Plan 31 
In fact, between 1990 and 1994, the country needed to provide approximately 215,000 new 
apartments at a moment when Israel was building around 20,000 a year (Lipshitz, 1998). Israel 
had to engage in large-scale building, even though immigrants could now choose where to live.  
In 1992, the National Outline Plan 31 (NOP 31) was adopted, providing the new vision for spatial 
and housing policies. This short-range statutory plan confirmed the abandonment of the 
population dispersion and new towns approach. The need for a high pace immigration 
absorption policy would be done following a metropolitan approach (Shachar in Gradus & 
Lipshitz, 1996). Apart from Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa, Beer Sheva became the fourth 
metropolitan area. This metropolitan approach meant the “fall of the geostrategic value of the 
peripheral areas” (Ibid.). In this new context, what is the role of peripheries? How can we justify 
the “continuous stream of public investments that allows these peripheral localities to survive?” 
(Ibid.). The NOP 31 therefore provided that the State will be responsible for public building in 
the periphery, a policy which proved more favourable for the Southern district, but it would 
focus on “building in development towns located within the community range from 
metropolitan employment centres” (Lipshitz, 1998). The private sector will be responsible for 
building in the centre. Therefore “neo-conservative free market approaches to regional 
development became more prominent” (Razin in Gradus & Lipshitz, 1996).  
The major dilemma was that the public housing built mostly in the southern towns did not 
match with employment opportunities. To this end, the State introduced government-
guaranteed loans to finance industrial development, and in parallel, changed the map of 
development zones. In this context, cities like Kiryat Gat were downgraded — or upgraded, 
depending on the angle — from priority area B to priority area A. This has explained why an 
international company like Intel had set up a branch in Kiryat Gat’s industrial park in the 1990s, 
attracted by the fiscal opportunity of this downgrade.   
Still, investments did not increase accordingly, and a third of immigrants preferred central areas, 
while low-income Israel families left to the periphery in search of more affordable housing 
(Portnov, 1998).   
2.1.3 Nowadays 
Today, most new immigrants still benefit from the ‘direct absorption’ policy. Nevertheless, 
certain groups originating from developing countries, especially Ethiopian immigrants or Indian 
immigrants, are first assigned to absorption centres where they stay for approximately two 
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years, before being directed to specific neighbourhoods in determined cities, where they are 
offered more favourable terms to access property. Once again, subsidies are contingent on the 
settlement locality. 
For immigrants from the former Soviet Union, Europe or America, direct absorption prevails. 
However, public housing is more easily available in peripheral cities. Immigrants with lower 
incomes, at age of retirement, single-parent families or disabled people are therefore 
overrepresented in those cities, while younger active professionals find their way to the centre 
(Aymard & Benko, 1998; Lipshitz, 1998).   
To rebalance this unequal distribution of immigrants, several programmes are supported by the 
government, the Jewish Agency, the MOIA and other ministries such as the Ministry for the 
Development of the Galilee and the Negev. For instance, the ‘Go North’ and ‘Go South’ 
programmes provide for higher absorption baskets and personal accompaniment for 
newcomers who accept to settle in peripheral areas. Similarly, the Jewish Agency, the MOIA and 
municipalities have partnered to establish the programme ‘group Aliyah’: I will elaborate further 
on this particular programme in the following chapters, as it funds a large part of immigration 
integration programmes I have found in the cities I explore.  
The following map shows that development towns are still important sites for first settlement of 
new immigrants. In fact, 27% of immigrants made their way to those towns between 2001 and 
2015, providing an average of 4% demographic growth. Some cities, such as Katzrin, Beit 
Shemesh and Eilat, count more than 10% immigrants from 2001 among their residents.  
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Map 3.2. Immigrants’ arrival by developments towns, in absolute numbers and as a proportion of 
the total number of residents, from 1 January 2001 to 30 November 2015. Source: CBS (2016), 
MOIA (2016). Realised by Amandine Desille  
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As I have described, immigration has played an instrumental role in the structuration of Israeli 
space. In particular, the establishment of development towns to absorb the numerous 
newcomers that reached Israel after 1948, while at the same time ensuring the Israeli presence 
at the borders of the state, have definitively marked off Israeli peripheral urban settlements as 
places of relegation and difference. Deserted by its own inhabitants, shunned by Israelis 
belonging to the centre, the State has relentlessly attempted at repopulated those areas through 
planning and housing policies. Up to today, mechanisms — although much less coercive — are 
maintained to encourage the settlement of newcomers in frontier towns. However, the results of 
these incentives are rather limited. The perception of oppression of the inhabitants of these 
towns, often Mizrahi, but also FSU immigrants, has led them to adopt aggressive attitudes 
towards Palestinians and Arab neighbours altogether. Those that have coexisted with Moslems 
for centuries have therefore become their first enemies, in an attempt to distance themselves 
from Arab populations. It is this issue that will be discussed in the next subsection.   
2.2 Periphery, Mizrahi identity and politics  
The ‘ingathering of the exiles’ and Aliyah were a cornerstone of the newly established state of 
Israel. In that context, new immigrants reaching the country met up with a paradoxical discourse 
of integration into the Jewish state, on the basis of their differences in their origin regions; while 
being requested to abandon their language, their cultural and religious practices, as well as their 
previous professions and statuses. Instead, they had to adopt new norms and values, as defined 
by the European founding fathers.  
As early as the 1960s and 1970s, growing resentment and social unrest shook the integration 
frame set by the founders. This period saw the emergence of an Easterner ‘Mizrahi’ political 
movement, representing immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East mostly: the second 
Israel (Israel hashnia in Hebrew). But there are two sides to those emerging social and political 
movements: if they aim at protesting, they do not necessarily produce an integration path 
outside the one set by the elite, instead straining to become part of the majority group and to 
resemble the elite. This situation of in-between is what led post-colonialist Israeli scholars to 
develop the concept of ‘trapped communities’, which I will develop in the second subsection. The 
social movements did not immediately crystallise into political parties. Finally, in the 1980s and 
1990s, new political parties grew stronger to represent Sephardic religious Israelis, and later on, 
immigrants from the former Soviet Union.  
Those parties represent the new divisions of Israeli society. Stratifications occur following 
multiple divides: a Jewish/Palestinian national divide, an Ashkenazi/Sephardic or Mizrahi divide 
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within the Jewish population, but also a religious/secular divide, and lastly, in terms of politics, a 
democratic post-Zionist/nationalist neo-Zionist divide. Those divides are even more challenged 
today, with the new voices of Ethiopian Israelis, non-Jewish FSU immigrants and their offspring, 
non-Jewish immigrants from Asia and Africa and more. As Israel comes to resemble other 
immigration countries, integration frameworks are constantly challenged.  
2.2.1 Rehabilitation and adoption of a modern, new Jewish identity  
In an attempt to analyse whom the Israeli citizens are, the sociologists Gershon Shafir and Yoav 
Peled have shown that Israel has adopted three different discourses of citizenship. On the one 
hand, Israel has adopted a liberal citizenship discourse, where all the inhabitants within the 
borders of Israel are granted citizenship and the bundle of rights associated to it. But it also 
adopted a republican conception of citizenship, primarily based on pioneering through physical 
labour and agricultural settlement, and later on based on compulsory military service. Lastly, it 
adopted an ethnonationalist approach to citizenship, best expressed by the Law of Return, which 
provides that all Jews can take part in the nation. Therefore, Israel’s incorporation regime is 
defined by “a collectivist republican discourse, based on ‘pioneering’ civic virtue, an 
ethnonationalist discourse, based on Jewish descent, and an individualist liberal discourse” 
(Semyonov & Lewin-Epstein, 2004; Shafir & Peled, 2002).    
In this context, Jews from Africa and Asia, even though they were integrated in the ethnonational 
project, were not considered as pioneers as the European Jews who settled before the 
establishment of the state in the collective farms (kibbutzim). They have no right to define the 
collective national project (Ram, 1995; Shafir & Peled, 2002). They were downgraded to the 
status of mehagrim, i.e. regular immigrants, were regarded as ‘traditional’, and were therefore 
the target of the absorption policies which I defined earlier, to integrate the values of the 
pioneers (Ram, 1995). 
In his publication Israël et ses juifs. Essai sur les limites du volontarisme, the French sociologist 
Haroun Jamous (1982) interprets voluntarism in the first years of the establishment of Israel. In 
his research, he focuses on Jews from Asia and Africa who were directed to peripheral new 
towns. Jamous denounces the assimilationist policy of Israel, which has defined new immigrants 
as ‘primitive’, and has justified their rehabilitation toward the adoption of a modern, new Jewish 
identity. The book exhibits the growing resentment of these ‘reluctant pioneers’.58 Based on the 
                                                          
58 ‘Reluctant pioneers’ was first coined by Alex Weingrod (1966), and refers to those immigrants who 
were given housing at the frontiers of the State, particularly in development towns.  
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collected stories of the inhabitants of Dimona, Kiryat Shmona, Karmiel and the Lachish region, 
Jamous argues:  
Thus we understand this paradox of a society where everything seems to aim at and aspire to 
integration, where everyone is constantly invited to participate, to take a close part in collective… 
only provided that one stays in one’s place. To content oneself with internalizing the values and 
conceptions of the founding fathers.59 (Jamous, 1982)  
Altogether, this period of forced assimilation has played the major role of erasing the socio-
cultural diversity among new Israelis — the new generation does not speak any of the 
previously spoken languages, those adopting a religious life follow Ashkenazi traditions… etc. — 
while reinforcing the difference between Jews from Europe and Jews from Asia and Africa. 
Therefore, Israelis who could have a chance to bridge and mediate with the Palestinian 
populations are indeed their fiercer enemies, in an attempt to distance themselves from an Arab 
‘Other’ (Yiftachel, 2000; Yiftachel & Tzfadia, 2004).   
2.2.2 The ‘second Israel’ and the rise of a Mizrahi consciousness 
The pre-eminence of nation-building goals over dealing with the social issues that could arise 
from the uprooting of large communities has created the fault line between an European 
Ashkenazi core and an African-Asian Mizrahi periphery (Berthomière, 2004). Indeed, individuals 
left on the sidelines began to constitute a more coherent group, and forged what became the 
‘second Israel’ (Israel hashnia in Hebrew).  
The first well-know uprising occurred in Haifa, in the neighbourhood of Wadi Salib in 1959. 
However, it is the major second protest that more or less constitutes the emergence of Mizrahi60 
consciousness: “Although the Black Panthers did not formulate an alternative world view,61 they 
were heralds of a new Mizrahi discourse” (Chetrit, 2000, p. 53).   
                                                          
59 Translation of the author. 
60 Harvey Goldberg and Chen Bram provide a comprehensive chronology of the emergence of Mizrahi. 
Mizrahi is usually understood as Sephardic Jewry. Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews existed before, but 
Sephardic related to Jews of Iberian origin, speaking Ladino, thus differentiating between Sephardic and 
Middle Eastern Jewry. Before 1948 in Israel, Jews were referred to by their community of origin: e.g 
Mugrabi or Urfeli. After 1948, the administration in charge of immigrants used a ‘shortcut’, designating 
Jewish immigrants by their country of origin, therefore lumping Jews of Casablanca and the Atlas 
Mountains under a common Moroccan identity. The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics even began to lump 
them together them by continents (Goldberg & Bram, 2007). The category “African and Asian Jew” still 
persists today in CBS reports. Finally, the terms edot hamizrah (Eastern communities) and later on 
Mizrahim (Easterners) emerged, but Shlomo Swirski argues that Mizrahim is more appropriate as it is a 
denomination from the bottom, from society, and not from the hegemony. Other terms like Arab Jews 
were promoted (Shenhav, 2006).  
61 Nevertheless, the Black Panthers did question the occupation of Palestine. Indeed, “The Panthers […] 
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At the time, the Jerusalem district of Musrara was a slum, neglected because of the military 
situation. After the 1967 war — also known as the six-day-war —, the military situation ended 
but nothing was done to better accommodate the residents of Musrara. The Black Panther 
movement emerged from a perception of injustice between the precarious and overcrowded 
homes of 1950s immigrants, and the newly built housings reserved for the 350,000 newcomers 
arriving between 1970 and 1979, most of them from the USSR (Shama & Iris, 1977; Chetrit, 
2000; S. Cohen & Shemesh, 1976). Shalom Cohen describes the protests of 1971 as “a huge 
explosion of popular discontent, a grass roots explosion” (S. Cohen & Shemesh, 1976). 
Demonstrations gathered 10,000 to 15,000 people who wanted to change things. In 1972, the 
Black Panthers created the Israeli Democrats-Black Panthers movement, later on Black Panther 
Party. 
The Black Panthers movement started in Jerusalem and was rather restricted to Jerusalem and 
the centre. Indeed, “The relative detachment of the towns from the major political struggles of 
Israeli society was conspicuous in the early 1970s, when the Black Panthers movement 
mobilized many Mizrahim, especially in Jerusalem’s poor neighbourhoods, but managed to rally 
only scant support in the towns” (Tzfadia & Yiftachel, 2004, p. 6). The Black Panthers have 
probably failed to mobilise a large number of the Mizrahim in Israel, and votes for the party 
were very low (S. Cohen & Shemesh, 1976).  
Erez Tzfadia and Yiftachel studied other kinds of social movements in the new towns where 
residents are mostly of African and Asian descent. They found 345 acts of protest between 1960 
and 1998, with picks during the mid 1960s, the late 1970s,  the mid 1980s, the late 1980s, and 
the mid 1990. 62% of the acts of protest dealt with economic issues, 22% with political issues, 
11% with planning issues and 5% fell into the “other” category (Tzfadia & Yiftachel, 2004, p. 6). 
As they explain that social protest “demands resources from the state and economic forces, 
while attempting to maintain control over the  local ‘turf’” (Ibid.), they state: 
The public protest by Mizrahim in the towns has voiced demands for a fairer share of Israel’s 
public resources, falling within the ‘legitimate’ boundaries of Zionist political discourse. In local 
election campaigns, however, the Mizrahim raised a more intense political voice, focusing on 
competition against the large number of ‘Russians’ immigrants who arrived during the 1990s. 
(Ibid., p. 2) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
were also the first Mizrahim in politics to make the connection between the occupation of the Palestinian 
territories and the difficult economic and social plight of the Mizrahim” (Chetrit, 2000, p. 53).  
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In general, the main problem those protests aimed at addressing was the unfair allocation of 
State resources (S. Cohen & Shemesh, 1976, p. 22). In that sense, the Mizrahi discourse was not 
so much a discourse of contest and production of an alternative path for integration. It rallied a 
need to take part in the European Ashkenazi dominant group. Indeed, when they study the 
entrapment of Mizrahi Israelis, Israeli scholars show that their unity mainly emerges from a 
feeling of deprivation: 
Seemingly, the imposition of a new ethnic identity appears to be one of the main victories of the 
Zionist project. The creation of this new identity involved the de-Arabization of the Mizrahim, the 
near total erasure of their cultures, the nationalisation of their politics, and their assimilation into 
Israel’s economy and expanding middle-class. Yet, as Shenhav demonstrates, Mizrahi identity has 
been preserved at the social and economic peripheries, not as a distinct cultural orientation, as a 
diffused sense of origin and solidarity, fuelled by persisting marginality and hardship. (Tzfadia, 
2007)  
In that sense, Mizrahi populations are trapped in between their desire to achieve the modern, 
new Jewish identity that has been imposed on them from their immigration, while at the same 
time distancing themselves from the Arab ‘enemy’ Israel has created:   
There is a clear nexus connecting the de-Arabization of the country with the marginalisation of 
peripheral Mizrahis, who have been positioned culturally and geographically between Arabs and 
Jews, between Israel and its hostile neighbours, between a « backward » Eastern past and a 
« progressive Western future. (Yiftachel, 1998) 
Even though the Mizrahi movement has not immediately produced new integration paths, it has 
introduced the first fault lines at local levels of the Zionist project of Aliyah and ingathering of 
the exiles. Indeed, blaming an unequal distribution of resources, the Law of Return is not 
accepted by all.  
2.3 Towards a more complex stratification of Israel society  
In the next subsection, I will introduce the deep fault line that is usually dated 1977, the year 
Likud accessed the parliament, overruling the founding Labour party. The changes it induced, 
together with the mass immigration from the FSU, have had tremendous impact on the 
development towns I study. The four cases have their own micro-histories, but they also bear 
the marks of the social, political and historical changes of the country as a whole. They combine 
the uniqueness of the place, with policies, plans and decisions made at different scales, adopted, 
reproduced and sometimes contested.  
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The city of Acre is typical of the existing Arab towns which were extended to absorb immigrants. 
Acre is an old urban centre, and its old city, predominantly Palestinian-Israeli, includes remains 
of the crusaders’ period, the Ottoman period and Jewish life which attract international and 
Israeli tourists. I will present this city first.  
The second ‘category’ of city, includes the towns of Kiryat Gat and Kiryat Shmona. Both of them 
are typical of the former maabarot, transit camps, which became development towns. However, 
their evolution has differed. Kiryat Shmona, located at the Lebanese border, has been in a 
constant war situation from the 1970s to the mid-2000s. Its economic basis is low and it is very 
dependent on the government’s transfers. Kiryat Gat has strongly beneficiated from the NOP 31, 
and now hosts a large technological park, a landmark of which Intel Fab 21 is.   
Finally, Arad is an example of the second-generation development town, where planners insisted 
on organising a better population mix, with old-timers and newcomers settling together, and 
making sure that new residents will be able to adapt to the local labour market. Even though this 
kind of planning has long been perceived as more successful, Arad has been through tough times 
over the last three decades, sometimes put down to its relative geographic isolation, to its 
leadership or to the 10,000 immigrants who made their way to the city in the 1990s.   
Through those portraits, it is one facet of Israel that appears. This facet of the country is often 
absent from the nation’s collective imagination, particularly outside the borders of Israel. 
However, their weight on its history and on Israeli politics is far from marginal.  
2.3.1 The development towns as backers of new social and political positions 
The emergence of a Mizrahi consciousness based on class and ethnicity, the sad predicament of 
development towns’ residents grounded in “geographic marginality, persisting deprivation and 
demographic instability” (Tzfadia & Yiftachel, 2004, p. 1), the failure of the Kippur War in 1973, 
and the economic crisis in the 1970s led to a loss of legitimacy of the Labour party, traditionally 
Ashkenazi. In 1977, thanks to the votes of African and Asian immigrants, Likud came to power in 
the Israeli parliament and Menachem Begin became Prime Minister. This election initiated a 
more complex stratification of Israel society, along socio-economical, political, ethnic and 
religious divisions (Berthomière, 2004).  
Indeed, the Labour party, formerly Mapai, successfully penetrated immigrant settlements in the 
1950s and 1960s. However, with the failure of immigrant integration in development towns, the 
party was held responsible for the disintegration of the family unity, the loss of religious 
symbols and overall discriminations (Bensimon, 2006). The right-wing party Likud, on the 
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contrary, has almost continuously dominated Israeli politics until today (Arad, 2015; Kashti, 
2015a; Levinson, 2015; Spigel & Saidler, 2015).  
Likud will endlessly promote a neoliberal approach to the State, burying the socialist experience 
of Israel and favouring a market-oriented economy. Ironically, the first to suffer from this new 
approach were the residents of development towns, whose transfers from national governments 
would decrease every year. Daniel Bensimon (2006) believes that its success is due to a 
discourse based on status. He argues:  
seeking a rewarding status is sometimes unconscious and provides the ground for a theatrical 
political style which does not aim at solving existing problems, but rather at providing its 
audience with a feeling of importance, of being at the centre of society.62 (Ibid.) 
This election was also to confirm the split of Israeli politics into two new opposed blocks: the 
post-Zionists, mobilising more largely Ashkenazi secular Israelis, advocating a liberal, secular 
Israel alongside a Palestinian state; the neo-Zionists, mobilising more Mizrahi and religious 
groups, believe in a Jewish ethnonational state (Ram, 2000; Shafir & Peled, 2002; Berthomière, 
2004; Semyonov & Lewin-Epstein, 2004). The latter is extremely nationalist, racist and anti-
democratic. It uses a populist discourse fed on the conflict and on hatred of a Palestinian other 
(Ibid.). This last block — although itself divided between a more Zionist and a more religious 
blocks (Acosta, 2014) — has been gaining weight in the past two decades in Israel.  
Likud is not always the only alternative to Mizrahi voters. In development towns, they will give 
their voices to a “range of political movements,63 which promote local patriotism, and especially 
Mizrahi Jewishness (Ben-Ari & Bilu, 1987). Most notable has been the successful ultra-orthodox 
movement of Shas” (Tzfadia & Yiftachel, 2004). Shas (Sephardic Guardians of the Torah) was 
originally formed in Jerusalem in 1983 with the support of Rabbi Schach, and led by Rabbis 
Ovadia Yosef and Aryeh Deri. Shas aimed at representing Sephardic Jews in Israel, as well as 
facilitating their access to resources to carry out their activities. It has a social agenda, 
particularly successful in a context of welfare vacuum. Their success surprised the leaders 
themselves. But Shas has been extremely resilient and has managed to secure a diverse base of 
voters up to today (Berthomière, 2004; Zrehen, 2004; Hecker, 2006). 
                                                          
62 Translation of the author.  
63 Indeed, after the failure of the Black Panther party, a new Mizrahi party rose: TAMI was established in 
1981 and led by Aharon Abuhatzera (Chetrit, 2000, p. 56). Like the Panthers, TAMI did not offer an 
alternative worldview. It appealed to a collective Mizrahi memory. Ultimately it failed but it had paved the 
ground for Shas. 
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As immigration intensified and the NOP 31 was adopted, a large amount of FSU immigrants 
settled in new towns. This second encounter between Soviet Jews and Mizrahi inhabitants of the 
development towns was not smoother than in the 1970s. Once again, protests and social 
movements relating to the perceived unequal distribution of resources were registered in those 
areas (Tzfadia & Yiftachel, 2004).  
Besides changing the face of those towns, the 1990s FSU immigration also had a profound 
influence on Israeli politics. The first national elections in which newcomers took part occurred 
in 1992. The immigrants’ votes ensured the victory of the left Labour party, and consecrated 
Izhak Rabin as prime minister. Indeed, a majority of FSU immigrants were disappointed by the 
immigration absorption process led by Likud and favour Labour (Storper-Perez, 1998).  
In 1995, refuznik and Soviet immigrant from the 1970s Natan Sharansky founded the Russian 
right-wing party Israel beAliyah (a pun meaning ‘Israel on the rise’ as well as ‘Israel in 
immigration’). At the 1996 elections, half of FSU immigrants voted for this party, securing seven 
seats in the parliament. Following political conflicts, Israel beAliyah was to disappear to leave 
Israel Beitenu (Israel our house) to enter the political scene. The Moldavian immigrant Avigdor 
Lieberman founded Israel Beitenu in 1999. It represents Russian-speaking immigrants and is 
primarily secular, nationalist, Zionist and adopts a hawkish position with regard to the conflict. 
The adoption of a nationalist approach is analysed in terms of similar ‘entrapment’ as for the 
1950s and 1960s immigrants. Indeed, “the act of immigration ‘upgrades’ the Russian Jews from 
Ethnicos in the Soviet Union to Ethnos in Israel” (Tzfadia & Yacobi, 2007). Israel Beitenu benefits 
from an expanded local ‘network’. Indeed, since the 1980s, political actions got more and more 
local (Gradus, 1983) and ethnic and religious parties became important actors in the local 
governments. Local politicians in charge of immigration and integration issues in the local 
councils are in majority members of Israel Beitenu.   
The first town I present is not particularly well-known for its intense immigration activities, but 
rather for the cohabitation of Palestinian-Israelis and Jewish Israelis. However, its deputy mayor 
belongs to Israel Beitenu, which represents the interests of tens of thousands of immigrants from 
the FSU.  
2.3.2 Acre, from an old Palestinian urban centre to an immigrant settlement town 
The old city of Acre is a popular tourist attraction for Israeli and foreign tourists. A mere hour 
and a half train ride from Tel Aviv, along the coast and through Haifa, brings the visitors to the 
46,300 town. From the train station, it is hard to imagine that the city includes the vestiges of the 
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crusader city of Saint Jean d’Acre. The main thoroughfare leading to the seafront promenade is 
almost empty, lined by timeworn three-storey buildings. Dozens of soldiers wait for the local bus 
to the nearby military base. It is therefore tempting to hop in one of the taxis offering to drive 
you straight into the old city. Some of the bravest do decide to take the 20-minute walk to the 
battlements of old Acre. Two routes are possible: through the city centre where one will walk 
between the small local shops serving the local population; or past the imposing conservatorium 
and municipal buildings to the newly renovated seafront promenade. There, some restaurants 
and cafés put up English signs to attract tourists.  
 
Map 3.3. Acre in 1940. Source: govmap.gov.il (2017).  
Acre is one of the oldest cities in the world, one that has been continuously inhabited for the last 
four millennia (Orni & Efrat, 1973; Shoval, 2013). However, tourist attractions represent mainly 
three of the city’s temporal strata: the crusader city, with the Knights Hall and the crusaders’ 
tunnel; the Ottoman city, with the embellishments made by the Ottoman governor Ahmad Pasha 
Al-Jazzar, at a time where Acre was a large trading centre, especially for the cotton produced in 
the area (Philipp, 2001) — one can visit Acre’s walls, the Al-Jazzar Mosque, the Turkish bath and 
the Khan al-Umdan caravanserai; and the more recent Jewish presence, illustrated by the 
synagogues or the ethnographic museum. The Palestinian inhabitants of the old city have little 
representation in this historical overview of the city. Indeed, Palestinians inhabited Acre before 
ש ר א ל  י  י   י פ ו  מ  מ ר כ ז  ל  ש © ה  ו  מ  ת נ א י  ש י 
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the establishment of the state. After 1948, many fled to the neighbouring countries. The old city 
absorbed remaining Palestinian residents from the surrounding villages while a new city 
developed around the city walls, absorbing immigrants. At the end of the 1960s, the Jewish 
population was twice as large as the Palestinian Israeli residents (Orni & Efrat, 1973).  
 
Picture 3.1. Old city of Acre. Credit: Amandine Desille (2015) 
 
Picture 3.2. Acre’s harbour. Credit: Amandine Desille (2015) 
Today, the municipality not only continues to promote a stippled historical account of the city 
development, where the Palestinian presence is perceived as almost accidental, but it also 
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expands its activities to integrate the whole city — outside the Ottoman walls — as a potential 
tourist destination. Indeed, the modest budget dedicated to tourism has been invested in new 
tourist maps, including attractions all around the city: synagogues of the different ethnic groups 
represented in the city, parks, the Bahai Baha Hulla temple, but also sites as “the train’s iron 
bridge built by the Jews of Akko in 1922” or “the old railroad station (beg. Of the 20th century) 
About 10,000 Jews came here from Lebanon during the 2nd World War”. 22 out of the 35 sites 
indicated on the maps are labelled “Jewish sites”. The immigration and integration municipal 
department also distributes this map to newcomers to the city. The city has also published a 
book including descriptions of the different sites as well as recipes given by local residents. 
Those efforts are part of a broader initiative to reposition the city. The new branding “Acre, city 
of the Mediterranean Cultures” includes tourism, but also activities linked to the cohabitation of 
Jewish and Palestinian Israelis in the city, as well as to immigrant-oriented activities. As of 2014, 
47,500 residents lived in Acre, including almost 31% of Palestinians holding Israeli citizenship, 
and around 20% of immigrants who arrived after 1990, most of them from the FSU (including 3, 
100 individuals who were not Jewish according to the administration) (CBS, 2015b).  
Additionally, the city has engaged in restoring the image of the city in terms of economy and 
security. Acre’s main activities are tourism, mid-tech factories and services. Its socio-economic 
rank is 4 on a scale from one to ten. In 2011, 34% of municipal incomes came from the central 
government’s transfers.64 A situation the city wants to overcome. Indeed, the spokesperson tries 
to publicise the new steps the city takes. When we first met, he said: 
it was important for them to show that Acre was certainly the city of the old city, and hummus and 
Knafe, but also a modern city and that this combination is the key. Today, Acre hosts 54,000 
residents. 2000 units are in construction. Some years ago, Acre was evaluated as “dangerous for 
investment” but today, it ranks 10th for safe investment. Acre is a city of art, with the 
philharmonic, the opera, the conservatory… 10% of the students study music. (Interview 3, 2014) 
                                                          
64 Data collected on the central bureau of statistics Website: 
http://www1.cbs.gov.il/publications14/local_authorities12_1573/pdf/276_7600.pdf  
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Picture 3.3. Tourism map of Acre, taken in the mayor’s office. Credit: Amandine Desille (2015). 
In this new endeavour, the mayor of Acre has an ally: the industrialist Michael Strauss, former 
CEO of the Israeli food manufacturer Strauss-Elite. Strauss assists the mayor in bringing new 
investors to the city, or in convincing potential donors to support the city’s development.  
Shimon Lancry, Acre’s mayor since 2003, has brought a new lease of life to the city. Before his 
term, he was the director of the centres for culture, youth and sport (matnass in Hebrew). Since 
his first election in 2003, he has been re-elected twice, with more than 70% of the votes. The 
face of Acre is slowly changing: new buildings can be seen in the eastern and southern areas of 
the city, where new communication infrastructures allow fast commuting to the Haifa 
metropolitan area. New sociocultural infrastructures can be found too: between 2015 and 2016, 
the city built a new youth centre, a centre for the Caucasus Jews of Acre, a new leisure park and 
more.  
The mayor, together with one of his deputy mayors Zion, member of Israel Beitenu and himself 
an immigrant from Ukraine, has pushed forward an immigration agenda. Today there are six 
municipal agents employed by the municipality dealing with immigration issues. Their jobs are 
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mainly funded by the MOIA, but also by the municipality. Those agents are in charge of attracting 
immigration candidates to Acre. Moreover, they are in charge of the administrative, social, 
cultural and economic accompaniment of the newcomers. The number of immigration agents is 
the highest among the four cities studied, and this does not include other municipal agents in 
other departments whose job descriptions specifically request command of Russian and other 
intercultural skills. Additionally, the mayor and his deputy travel several times a year to regions 
where Jewish families are present, mostly in Russian-speaking countries, to convince them to 
settle in Acre.   
2.3.3 Kiryat Shmona and Kiryat Gat: from the maabarot to cities, two distinct paths  
Kiryat Shmona is located in northern Galilee, a few kilometres away from the Lebanese border. It 
was established in 1949 on the lands of the former Arab village Al Khalisa, first as a maabara and 
then as a development town, absorbing Asian and African Jews. From Al Khalisa, little remains: 
the local restaurant Mama Khalisa is reminiscent of the former Palestinian village, as well as the 
mosque which today hosts the little municipal museum.  
 
Map 3.4. Kiryat Shmona in 1940. Source: govmap.gov.il (2017)  
100,0001940מ פ ו ת  
100,0001935מ פ ו ת 
1930תל  א ב י ב  
1926י ר ו ש ל י ם  
1919ח י פ ה  
ש ר א ל  ש י מ ו ש © ה מ ר כ ז  ל מ י פ ו י  י  ת נא י  
 148
Picture 3.4. Market of Al Khalisa in 1927. Snapshot of a photograph hanging out of the Youth 
Centre (2015). 
 
Picture 3.5. The Maabara. Credit: municipal museum of Kiryat Shmona. 
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Picture 3.6. The municipal museum of Kiryat Shmona. Credit: Amandine Desille (2014).  
I visited the municipal museum with a former teacher of history, now volunteering at the 
museum. We went through the collection of pictures and newspapers conserved here. Hopefully, 
this little museum will soon be turned into something bigger. Indeed, Tel Hai College and the 
municipality are putting together a national project for a maabara museum. The museum is 
designed as a branch of the Israel museum, and aims at bringing back the maabara into the 
narratives of Israeli nation building. A way for the residents of Kiryat Shmona to be proud of 
their past, shifting from reluctant pioneers to nation builders, says the initiator of the project 
(Interview 56, 2015)  
This is a hard task for a city used to telling a story of remoteness and oppression. Kiryat 
Shmona’s residents have always blamed the establishment and the neighbouring kibbutz 
members for the socioeconomic depression of the town. Tensions between Kiryat Shmona and 
the surrounding kibbutzim already existed in the 1960s (Jamous, 1982), and are still reported 
today. Indeed, the regional council owns the newly built commercial centre; residents reaching 
higher socio-economic levels leave to establish in the newly built ‘archavot’65 of the villages 
around. Those difficulties are also linked to the fact that Kiryat Shmona had been ‘under fire’ 
from the first attacks in 1973 until the second Lebanon-Israel war ending in 2006. Three 
decades of constant firing and Hezbollah attacks have discouraged all investors, leaving Kiryat 
Shmona with very few employment opportunities.  
                                                          
65 New neighbourhoods built in kibbutzim where non-members live  
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Therefore, the city has suffered constant out-migration for years, each wave of immigration to 
the country enabling the city to counterbalance this out-migration. The latest mass migration 
wave from the Former Soviet Union brought thousands of newcomers to the city. In 2014, Kiryat 
Shmona had 23,100 residents (CBS, 2015a), 16% being FSU immigrants. Lately, the local branch 
of the MOIA records only a handful of arrivals every year. The mayor of the city, Nissim (Likud), 
does not emphasize immigration in its political program. Therefore, the deputy mayor (Israel 
Beitenu) — himself a FSU immigrant — took over this issue and until recently was in charge of 
the Aliyah and absorption portfolio of the municipality. It mostly provides sociocultural services 
to the existing communities.  
The socio-economic rank of the city is 5.66 However, the municipality has required reassessing 
this indicator, arguing that it is too high and prevents the municipality from receiving tax 
transfers in order to develop the city. Indeed, the city has few industries, mainly low tech, 
commerce and services. In 2011, the city received more than 50% of its budget as transfers, 
being the second peripheral town benefitting from these transfers, after Migdal HaEmek.  
Today, the city still suffers from out-migration, especially of youngsters who look for 
opportunities in the centre. If the city does not carry out outreach programmes for immigrants, 
it does have a policy for demographic growth. The Youth Centre, under the aegis of the Ministry 
for the Development of Galilee and Negev, is the main organisation in charge of demographic 
growth. Its mission is to retain youths who grew up in the city, to attract young families who left 
the city but could potentially settle back, and to attract new families. The centre does so through 
assistance in job hunting, education but also through its involvement in the development of new 
real estate, like the newly transferred lands where the Yuvalim neighbourhood will soon develop 
(Ben Esher, 2015).  
The Yuvalim project is certainly a win for the municipality, but it does not compare with Kiryat 
Gat’s new development, even though they were both established under similar conditions.  
Kiryat Gat was named after the antique Philistine city-state of Gath, the city of biblical giant 
Goliath. Nevertheless, archaeological excavations conducted since 1996 locate Gath some 
kilometres away from Kiryat Gat, in Tel Zafit national park. Kiryat Gat was founded in 1955 on 
the ruins of the Palestinian villages Iraq-al-Manshiya and Al-Faluja, whose inhabitants were 
forced to flee during the 1948 war.  
 
                                                          
66 Information collected on the central bureau of statistics Website: 
http://www1.cbs.gov.il/publications14/local_authorities12_1573/pdf/315_2800.pdf   
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Map 3.5. Kiryat Gat in 1940. Source: govmap.gov.il (2017)  
Kiryat Gat was established in 1955 as a development town and the service and industrial centre 
of the planned Lachish region (Jamous, 1982). Mainly populated by African and Asian Jews, 
Kiryat Gat crystallizes my own representation of the 1950s immigration planning. Indeed, my 
acquaintance with the Lachish region started when I arrived in Israel in 2010, three years before 
I engaged in my research project. From 2010 to 2013, I worked at the Weitz Centre for 
Development Studies in Rehovot. “Mr. Development” Raanan Weitz, under the aegis of the 
Jewish Agency, established this non-profit company in 1962. The Settlement Study Centre has 
based its work on the integrated regional development approach, for which Lachish has been a 
flagship project. Indeed, Weitz has been involved in the planning of Kiryat Gat and the Lachish 
region together with other planners. Even though I worked right in the midst of books published 
by Weitz, I never had the chance to meet him. However, I did met another planner involved with 
the Lachish team, Izhak Abt. Abt explains that the specificity of Kiryat Gat’s planning was to 
involve a team of planners who would also live on-site, together with the newcomers. Kiryat Gat 
was planned to be the service centre of this agricultural region. Therefore, the team 
implemented agricultural and agro-industrial projects in parallel: the Sugat manufacture 
transformed the sugar beet planted in the area. Some years later, the Polgat industries 
transformed the growing cotton into textile.  
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Picture 3.7. Shikun in Kiryat Gat. Credit: Amandine Desille (2015).  
 
Picture 3.8. The silo in Kiryat Gat. Credit: Amandine Desille (2015). 
Polgat industries have been a symbol of Kiryat Gat’s industrial sector for decades in Israel. The 
first factory was established in 1961. Its establishment is part of the founding myths of the city. 
The industrialist Polack who founded the Polgat group was brought from the airport to Kiryat 
Gat on a Shabbat morning, his driver driving at high speed on the empty road, creating the 
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illusion that Kiryat Gat was only 15 minutes from Tel Aviv. They say that Polack was not fooled 
but decided to build the factory anyway. While we drive around the city of Kiryat Gat, Abt also 
shows me other innovative projects implemented after the establishment of the city, like the 
experimental Glickson neighbourhood planned by German-Israeli architect Arthur Glickson to 
enhance social mix.  
Kiryat Gat displays this paradox of having been a flagship project of the Settlement Study Centre 
and the ministries promoting its activities, while being considered a socioeconomic periphery, 
with the financial and political dependence it means for the town. Indeed, Abt tells me stories of 
national and foreign politicians who came to Kiryat Gat to hear about their planning approach. 
The Settlement Study Centre has conducted training programmes and projects based on the 
Lachish case for decades — I was myself involved in the dissemination of this approach between 
2010 and 2013. Thousands of professionals from all around the world have been trained in 
Israel following this model.  
The Lachish approach as promoted outside Israel is far from the conclusions of scholars who 
emphasise the relative failure of Kiryat Gat’s role as a regional town (Aymard & Benko, 1998; 
Achouch & Morvan, 2013; Auerbach, 2012).  
Contrary to other development towns, Kiryat Gat could at least count on several strong 
industries, like the Polgat textile factories, to provide local jobs. However, in the 1980s, Polgat 
started to slowly outsource its activities first to Jordan, then to China. The last factory closed in 
1995. Today, some of the brands still have local shops, but all the clothes are labelled “made in 
China”. The relocation of factories where a majority of Kiryat Gat residents were employed left 
many without any perspectives. The director of the immigration and integration unit of the 
municipality of Kiryat Gat, before being employed by the municipality, had worked in the Polgat 
compound for 23 years. When Polgat closed he was laid off, only to be asked to star in a TV 
documentary shot in 1992, featuring the unemployment situation in the city.  
At the time, Kiryat Gat was therefore dealing with high levels of local unemployment, while 
receiving hundreds of new immigrants from Ethiopia and from the Former Soviet Union.  As 
defined by the national plan NOP31, Kiryat Gat was located in the nearby periphery of two 
metropolitan areas, Tel Aviv and Beer Sheva. Therefore, new construction projects for the 
settlement of immigrants took place, while the area was downgraded to high priority 
development area.  
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Today, Kiryat Gat is home to 47,400 residents, 25% of whom are new immigrants, mainly from 
the FSU but also from Ethiopia and some Western immigrants.67 Ultra-orthodox Jews have 
recently settled in the city, but so far without any animosity or fear from the local residents. It is 
quite heterogeneous in terms of ethnic and religious background.  
The main symbol of the NOP31 is the installation in 1995 of Intel factory Fab28. The 
microprocessor international manufacturer represents both the saviour and the devil. Indeed, 
the development of a high tech sector in peripheral Kiryat Gat has been a source of pride: Kiryat 
Gat takes part in “the start-up nation”. However, many believe that the development of a high 
tech sector does not benefit the local workforce, a majority of whom is not educated to fit in this 
industry. Several reports published in the news, or the documentary filmed by Ayelet Berger 
“Close, yet Far”, all show the yawning gap between the industrial park and Kiryat Gat residents, 
arguing that managerial positions are held by residents of the centre, commuting every day to 
work (Ayad, 2002; Berger, 2003; “Intel’s inside - Features - Jerusalem Post,” n.d.; Sinai, 2005). 
However, it is estimated that 45% of the industrial park’s workers are from Kiryat Gat, even 
though many of them are employed in low-skilled jobs or as providers (transportation, 
catering…), rather than high-level and mid-level management (Interview 31, 2015). The 
presence of Fab38 and the other companies that settled later have had considerable impact on 
the region (Shachar, Krakover, Razin, & Gradus, 2005), and it is argued that, even with the 
current challenges, Intel has ‘saved’ Kiryat Gat. Today, local politicians still report that 60% of 
the population benefit from discounts or even exemptions of municipal taxes (Interview 2, 2014; 
Interview 19, 2014). The city’s socio-economic rank is 4.68 
Kiryat Gat does not have an immigration-outreach program. The municipality employs an 
immigration and integration coordinator, under the welfare department, as well as a 
coordinator for Ethiopian immigrants, whose office is located in a northern neighbourhood with 
a high concentration of Ethiopian-Israeli residents. However, the city does carry out a huge 
development project to increase its demography.  
The Karmei Gat development project is the result of years of negotiation to obtain land plots 
from the regional councils surrounding Kiryat Gat. Those plots, located in the northern part of 
the city, were transferred and will have a capacity of 8,000 new units. The project is presented as 
a way to improve the socio-economic level of the city, by developing residential units for sale 
and rebalancing the public housing-private construction balance of the city. However, the 
                                                          
67 Information collected on the central bureau of statistics Website: 
http://www1.cbs.gov.il/publications14/local_authorities12_1573/pdf/303_2630.pdf   
68 Information collected on the central bureau of statistics Website: 
http://www1.cbs.gov.il/publications14/local_authorities12_1573/pdf/303_2630.pdf  
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project has been criticised by experts for being a neighbourhood disconnected from the city, 
therefore not solving the lack of investments and infrastructures in the run-down city centre 
(MIT department of urban studies and planning & TAU Laboratory for contemporary urban 
design, 2012). Recommendations to build on available plots within the city have not been taken 
into account. Even the promotion of the new units has been done in such a way that it is difficult 
to connect Karmei Gat project with the city of Kiryat Gat. Banners hung on the main highway of 
the country, radio spots, Karmei Gat’s website: the aggressive marketing done between 2014 
and 2015 to sell the yet unbuilt houses do not mention that the district will be part of Kiryat Gat. 
The development has also been the object of indirect promotion as it was at the heart of the 
housing debates during the March 2015 national election campaign.  
2.3.4 Arad: a minority becomes a majority  
Arad is located in the northern Negev, close to the Dead Sea. Between the summer of 2014, when 
I started fieldwork, and 2016, access to Arad was considerably improved. The State has been 
investing in communication infrastructures in the Northern and Southern areas of the country, 
bringing Arad a bit closer to the centre. In January 2016, road 31 was finally opened, a four-lane 
road connecting Arad to highway 6.  
 
Map 3.6. Arad in 1940. Source: govmap.gov.il (2017)  
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Picture 3.9. First houses in Arad. Source: The Israeli Physical Masterplan (1964, p. 58). 
At the entrance of the city, the Inbar Hotel, quite an unusual phenomenon in development towns, 
reminds us of a better time. A mottled crowd walks about in the pedestrian city centre, behind 
the hotel: black and white dressed Ultra-orthodox Jews, Bedouin residents of the neighbouring 
villages, English-speaking Black Hebrews, Ethiopian residents of the nearby absorption centres, 
Eritrean and Sudanese asylum-seekers working in the Dead Sea hotels and residing in Arad, and 
of course, Hebrew and Russian speakers. The population mix of the centre is rather different 
from the description given by the interviewees, who seem to identify two main groups: the 
Israeli old-timers and the Russian-speaking immigrants. This rather simplified image chimes in 
with the founding myth of the ‘pearl of the desert’, until it developed into a Russian city — a city 
where a minority became the majority.  
Arad was funded in 1962 by former kibbutz69 members. Arad belongs to a second generation of 
development towns, together with Karmiel. It was built a decade after the first development 
towns and the main improvement in planning was to ensure that a group of already established 
Israelis would settle together with new immigrants, instead of isolating immigrants alone. 
Immigrants themselves were interviewed and selected on the basis of their professional 
competences and the possible match with the local industry (Jamous, 1982; Berthomière, 2003). 
                                                          
69 A “kibbutz is a rural collective locality where production, marketing and consumption are collective” 
(CBS, 2011) 
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Interviewees have all explained the economic prosperity of Arad until the 1980s by this careful 
selection. The existence of a selection committee is still very contemporary in Israel, as many 
rural settlements located in the central area of the country have developed new neighbourhoods 
to attract urbanites and organised careful selection processes for the new owners.  
 
Picture 3.10. Arad. Credit: Amandine Desille (2014). 
And almost all of them made a parallel between the difficulties encountered by Arad since the 
late 1980s with the numerous arrivals of FSU immigrants in the 1990s, and the more recent 
settlement of Hassidic Jews. Indeed, Arad has received a very high proportion of immigrants 
from the Former Soviet Union. Even though Arad hosted 12,400 residents in 1983, there were 
20,900 in 1995 (CBS, 2015a).  
Arad’s mayor at the time, Betzalel Tabib, has strongly encouraged immigration, reaching out to 
Soviet Jews. However, in 2003, newly elected mayor Mordechai ‘Moty’ Brill put an end to all 
outreach programmes. Immigration continued to Arad through social networks, however, the 
municipality no longer encouraged it. Despite remigration in the 1990s, a large group of 
Russian-speaking immigrants stayed. In 2014, Arad had 24,200 residents (CBS, 2015a), 40% of 
them being immigrants who arrived after the 1990s, mainly from the FSU. 70 Their presence has 
permitted the election of the first mayor issued from the 1990s immigration, Tali. An immigrant 
from Moldova who arrived in 1991, Tali was elected under the banner of Israel Beitenu. Many 
other activities are reminiscent of this great wave of immigration, from the numerous cultural 
                                                          
70 Information collected on the central bureau of statistics Website: 
http://www1.cbs.gov.il/publications14/local_authorities12_1573/pdf/282_2560.pdf  
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activities in Russian funded or organised by the municipality and the MOIA, the huge Russian 
book collection of the municipal library, and the many signatures of Russian artists who wrote 
on the matnass’ walls after their performance in the desert city.  
 
Picture 3.11. Houses built to host immigrants in 1990 in Arad. Credit: Amandine Desille (2014). 
At the end of her term, Tali had also renewed outreach activities to immigrants, and organised a 
first trip to Moldova. However, she was elected Member of Parliament in March 2015. She left 
the municipality. New elections were organised in June 2015. Nissan Ben Hamo, now the new 
mayor, ran under the banner of the anti-religious party Yesh Atid (There is a future), leading an 
aggressive campaign against the settlement of ultra-orthodox Jews in the city, for which he 
blamed the Israel Beitenu former mayor, therefore discrediting her potential replacement. 
Nissam Ben Hamo has not renewed outreach activities. Some days after getting in office, he has 
even prevented the entrance of asylum seekers in the city (Lior & Ben Zachari, 2015), against the 
previous implementation of a mapping programme by the municipality to identify the social 
needs of this community (Interview 42, 2015).    
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Aside from these various intercommunal tensions, the city is also experiencing a severe backlash 
in its economy. In October 2014, Arad towels, which hired 200 workers, closed down (Bior, 
2014; Mirovski, 2014). This is one of many economic woes for the city in recent years. The city 
leaders are therefore looking for solutions to create employment. In the summer 2014, I listened 
quite sceptically to an external consultant who was bringing together a tourism masterplan, 
rebranding the city and encouraging adventure tourism initiatives (Interview 17, 2014). And 
indeed, despite a slow departure, a new association has been created, new events were 
organised and the city is working hard to improve tourist facilities. Today, Arad’s socio-
economic rank is 5.71 
 
Picture 3.12. Arad isn’t throwing the towel. Credit: Jerusalem Post (2014) 
Other initiatives are on-going, so that Arad can benefit from the relocation of the military 
facilities in the region. The new road 31 also brings hope that the commuting time between 
growing Beer Sheva and Arad will be cut to a mere 20 minutes.  
The brief portraits of these four cities therefore give a hint of the destiny of these immigrant new 
towns expanded or established in the 1950s, at a short distance from the moving borders of the 
state. Even though they share a common history of immigration, marginalisation, socioeconomic 
                                                          
71 Information collected on the central bureau of statistics Website: 
http://www1.cbs.gov.il/publications14/local_authorities12_1573/pdf/282_2560.pdf 
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woes and cultural oppression, they are also places, and by that, I mean that they are unique and 
produce and reproduce their own sense of place. National decisions, local leadership but also the 
residents themselves keep constantly affecting these places, introducing changes and 
innovations in these mid-sized cities, usually stereotyped as backward and slow to catch up with 
the high pace of development experienced by Tel Aviv and its metropolitan areas.  
The next section will discuss the effect of rampant neoliberalisation in the country, which 
brought with it a rather important withdrawal of the central administration on the one hand, but 
also, maybe, the possibility for local governments to take control over their future. 
3 Rescaling of State power: abandonment or opportunity?  
Immigration has always played a major role in the making of Israel as a Jewish home in Ottoman 
Palestine, during the British Mandate, in the first crucial decades of its establishment, and up to 
now. The heavy involvement of the State from the 1950s onwards resulted in the participation of 
institutions in the Diaspora, the most important and sustainable one being the Jewish Agency, in 
immigration organisation and settlement. Today the Jewish Agency, together with the MOIA, are 
still central actors. However, new actors of immigration have made their way into the 
immigration landscape of Israel — I have already mentioned Nefesh beNefesh but there are also 
smaller organisations such as Shavei Israel, or even private actors. The municipality has become 
a new hub where those actors meet. For instance, municipal workers work directly with the 
Jewish Agency to reach out to newcomers and attract them to their city. Shavei Israel negotiates 
with the municipalities where small groups of Indian Bnei Menashe immigrants settle — such as 
Acre or Kiryat Shmona’s municipalities — to plan their arrival, their integration in the labour 
market and in religious communities. One French immigration ‘entrepreneur’ also negotiates 
with receiving municipalities to reach agreements where municipalities agree to put extra 
efforts and resources in housing, education or employment for newcomers. 
Why would these traditionally decayed areas get involved in immigration outreaching? Do they 
believe in the potential of immigration to generate a demographic burst, a fresh start after years 
of marginalisation? Indeed, in the case of the cities I presented in the preceding section, those 
places were produced at the frontiers, near areas that could provide jobs, with the purpose that 
those areas might become the hinterlands of these new towns. Nevertheless, they never 
achieved this aim. Instead, they stayed out of economic and political networks, remaining rural 
settlements directly reaching to the centre, without the intermediation of development towns. 
But, as the core/periphery dichotomy is less relevant and looks more and more like an 
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archipelago, networked geography of powers, do local leaders take a chance and believe they 
can break through? 
As I explained in the previous chapter, those questions are at the core of my doctoral work. The 
following section aims at providing a context for the hypotheses I formulated. The first part will 
briefly discuss the rescaling of statehood in Israel, from independent ‘Jewish republics’ in the 
pre-state Yishuv (Gradus, 1983; Elazar, 1988; Razin, 2003), to a centralised semi-socialist 
planned economy between the 1950s and the 1970s, to a break in the 1980s, leading to a free-
market economy and a more and more disengaged central administration. In that context, it 
seems that local leadership becomes more crucial in understanding the orientations of cities. I 
will therefore make some preliminary remarks based on the existing scholarship on the role of 
cities in immigration outreaching on the one hand; and the development of new integration 
paths on the other hand. I will conclude this chapter with these thoughts.  
3.1 Evolution of City-State relations in Israel  
Even through its short history, cities, towns and rural settlement have taken on various 
functions and have constantly evolved in Israel: from small Jewish political units under the 
Ottoman and then the British rule, to dependent localities under a centralised political and 
economic system, to a free-market economic and neoliberal system (see annex on neoliberalism) 
that rewards certain localities and a de facto decentralisation. Today, the main responsibilities of 
municipalities are engineering (local roads for example), planning and water and sanitation. 
Welfare and education are still national prerogatives but municipalities assist in implementing 
them and partly co-fund them. Municipalities also partly administer health and religious affairs. 
Lastly, they deal with topics they are not legally in charge of, like Local Economic Development, 
and immigration and integration (Razin, 2003).  
To look back to the evolution of city government, I will start with pre-state Jewish settlement. In 
fact, the Zionist ideology provides a territorial democracy that secures political power for Jewish 
communities in a Jewish state (Elazar, 1988). Moshavot, kibbutzim and moshavim were virtually 
autonomous communities in the pre-state days. In the 1920s and 1930s, several municipal 
ordinances issued by the British mandate consolidated the power of local councils (Ibid.). 
However, at the establishment of the state, public functions and leadership turned toward the 
offices of the newly established state administration, reducing the role of local governments 
(Ibid.). 
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At the end of the 1950s, the State decided to strengthen local authorities again (Ibid.). Cities, 
urban settlements and rural settlements were divided into three different categories of local 
governments (CBS, 2011, p. 31): municipalities or city councils govern cities over 20,000 
population; local councils are formed for smaller cities and for cities that are populated by Israeli 
Palestinians; and rural settlements are represented in regional councils, whose administrative 
boundaries are not necessarily continuous.72 In 2014, according to Israel’s Central Bureau of 
Statistics in there were 76 municipalities/city councils, 11 of them being mostly inhabited by 
Palestinians holding Israeli citizenship.73 The remaining 65 municipalities governed cities 
located in the central district (17), the northern district (12), the Southern district (11), Tel Aviv 
district (10), Haifa district (9), the Palestinian Occupied Territories (4) and Jerusalem district 
(2). Those cities host 74.9% of the Israeli population. Moreover, in 2014, 21,945 of the 24,112 
new immigrants settling in Israel chose one of those cities as their first residence. The remaining 
125 small cities (including 70 Palestinian-Israeli cities) are governed by local councils. Villages 
are lumped together in 54 regional councils, three of them being exclusively Palestinian-Israeli.  
Among those three categories, Elazar (1988) identifies different ‘forms’ of local governments: 
mayors and councils, party coalitions, special authorities (such as water authorities or economic 
corporations. In the case of immigration, the immigration and integration authority in Haifa falls 
under this category, as it is detached from the municipality of Haifa), workers’ councils and 
neighbourhood committees.   
In the 1970s, local governments started to gain in power. In fact, Israel does not have a law on 
decentralisation. However, it has been argued that this legal gap does not mean that de facto 
decentralisation has not taken place (Razin, 2003, p. 9). Indeed, since the late 1970s, lack of 
resources at national level, difficulties to impose new policies, not to mention conflicts between 
ministries, have pushed local governments to take over (Ibid.). Political decentralisation started 
with the first elections of mayors independently of the municipal council, a law voted in 1975 
and applied for the first time in 1978 (Gradus, 1983; Elazar, 1988; Razin, 2003). 
Second, decentralisation accelerated with the disengagement of the central administration. The 
access of the right-wing Likud to the Israeli parliament is usually associated with a disruption 
period, characterised by the adoption of new political and economic orientations inspired by 
Thatcher and Reagan. Nevertheless, in the first years, Israel experienced only symbolic 
disruption as public expenditures increased (Kay, 2012).  
                                                          
72 Therefore, in upper Galilee the municipality of Kiryat Shmona, with the local councils of Metula, Rosh 
Pina and more, coexists with several regional councils including moshavim and kibbutzim of the area.    
73 Um-El-Fahem, Taybe, Tira, Tamra, Kfar Kesem, Nazareth, Sachnin, Kalensuwa, Ra’hat, Shefa’Amr and 
Baka-El-Garbiya.  
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Israel definitely adopted a new administration style in the mid-1980s. A combination of the costs 
of war, economic disruption and fuel price increase led the 1970s Israel to a spiral of inflation. At 
that time, the Chicago university-trained free-market advocate Dan Patinkin, accompanied by his 
students, the Patinkin boys, started to increase their visibility in the Israeli media to lobby for 
economic changes (Ibid., p. 107). The Likud, elected in 1977, was then promoting, at least in its 
discourse, a pro-market ideology. Kay describes the meeting of the economist Milton Friedmann 
with Likud leader Menachem Begin. Friedmann submitted a reform proposal for Israel to move 
forward to a market economy. But these recommendations were followed by only marginal 
changes in policy, and public expenditures actually rose during that period (Ibid., pp. 108-109). 
Inflation and public expenses led to a situation such as “by mid-1984 Israel was totally 
dependent on the United States for its economic survival” (Ibid., p. 111). The United States 
applied some pressure but seeing that there was no change, the country decided to freeze all 
monetary transfers to the country. This ultimatum had the expected effect. In 1985, the 
government adopted Israel’s 1985 Economic Stabilisation Plan.  
The Economic Stabilisation Plan had an immediate impact on municipalities. Equalizing grants 
provided by the Ministries to municipalities were reduced and municipalities required to raise 
an increasing share of local resources — their main resource being local taxes on businesses and 
residences (Razin, 2003). Nevertheless, this new management accelerated the marginalisation of 
peripheral local governments, where few industries and businesses settle. In fact, the industrial 
sector in these areas was not as subsidised as it used to, as the State had reduced incentives of 
the ‘Encouragement of Capital Investments Law’ (Razin in Gradus & Lipshitz, 1996). Indeed, 
increased decentralisation and cuts in transfers to municipalities led to a situation where “local 
authorities are trapped in a Darwinist environment” (Ben-Elia, 2006).  
But more importantly for our matter, immigration absorption policy changed entirely, from 
State responsibility to individual responsibility. Indeed, at the end of the 1980s, the MOIA 
adopted a ‘direct absorption’ policy where new immigrants can settle freely, and are responsible 
for looking for a job, while the State provides them with short-term allowance called ‘absorption 
basket’. As French geographer William Berthomière has argued, the absorption policy of 
immigrants from the 1980s onwards, implemented by the Israel government as “direct 
absorption”, allowed immigrants to freely chose their residence, and therefore, makes it possible 
to measure the relation between State logics and immigrants’ logics (Berthomière, 2004). The 
NOP 31 that I presented earlier became a crucial policy for immigration settlement, where 
construction and availability of housing were foreseen as influencing the choice of residence of 
newcomers.  
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These new provisions were put to the test on a very large-scale very soon. Indeed, the mass 
migration from the Former Soviet Union in the 1990s was the first time the new ‘direct 
absorption’ policy had been applied at a national scale. However, the housing policy imposed to 
local governments by the State generated strong resistance and Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY) 
types of reactions, which I will describe now.  
3.2 Immigration and the city in nowadays Israel 
In the 1990s, the accommodation of new immigrants did not fail to entail reactions from the 
local governments. Indeed, even before the implementation of the NOP 31, ministries faced 
considerable resistance from local politicians in their attempts to build temporary and 
permanent housing for the newcomers (Auerbach, 2001, 2011) Although in Israel land 
ownership, land administration, urban planning, approval of statutory plans, and inspection and 
control of construction are mainly centralised functions, Gedalia Auerbach identifies a form of 
‘local autonomy’ against a regional policy of mobile home and caravans for immigrants. He 
explains this autonomy by a vacuum left by the ministries mainly involved —Interior, finances 
and housing — which experienced tremendous difficulties in coordinating activities (Ibid.). 
Second, fearing those temporary housings will become slum-like areas, “Assertive, charismatic 
mayors managed to organise a range of political, legal and bureaucratic actions and to mobilise 
public opinion” against the installation of caravans (Auerbach, 2011). Indeed, in the first mid-
1990, 57 local governments were approached to set temporary housing for FSU immigrants. 
This demand prompted a NIMBY kind of opposition. A great number of local governments 
refused while others dragged their feet. In the latter half of 1990, the ministries of Interior and 
of Housing wrote to 150 councils. 40 mayors answered, 20 of those plans were assessed as 
feasible (Ibid.). But the proposal made by the ministries was refused by those local governments. 
Eventually, a number of projects were implemented in rural councils that had weaker leadership 
and were forced to accept (Ibid.).  
A study sponsored by the Union of Local Authorities in Israel shows that a large number of local 
authorities have established independent municipal units for immigration and integration 
(Yehuda Abramson, 2013). The MOIA publicised the fact that 72 municipalities participate in the 
programme ‘Group Aliyah’, meaning that those cities have municipal agents recruited for the 
programme, and matching funds completing transfers of the MOIA. But other cities can develop 
their own programmes based on their resources.  
My own pre-fieldwork survey shows that, apart from immigration and integration municipal 
departments, immigrants have representation in city councils. Some councillors together with 
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immigration department agents actively outreach to Jewish communities abroad, even travel 
there, and try to attract them to their towns. I have mentioned that since the 1970s, political 
parties have intensified their local actions. The immigrant party Israel Beitenu has extended its 
network of local representatives. Today, immigrant politicians represent the interests of the FSU 
immigrants in almost every municipality hosting a significant number of immigrants. Together 
with the fact that, between 2009 and March 2015, Sofa Landver, member of Israel Beitenu, was 
the minister of immigration and integration, one can believe that adopting a local immigration 
policy and obtaining the funds to implement it, became an internal party affair. Nevertheless, the 
party is losing ground, ridden by corruption scandals, an ageing electorate (Gleizer, 2015), and a 
perception of alienation as fewer and fewer Russian representatives are on the list.   
So far, very few studies document the existence and the operation of immigration integration 
programmes in municipalities in Israel. Several scholars have worked on Tel Aviv non-Jewish 
immigrants’ policy (Raijman & Kemp, 2002; Alexander, 2003; Schnell, 2013), nevertheless, it 
provides only a specific and narrow answer to the rescaling of immigration policy in Israel, 
focusing on non-Jewish immigrants who do not benefit from the Law of Return. Other studies 
provide descriptions and analyses of the local governments’ response, like the decentralisation 
of immigration services to a non-governmental organisation in Haifa (Mesch, 2002), or the 
reaction of mayors to the imposed settlement of immigrants in their development towns 
(Aymard & Benko, 1998; Auerbach, 2001; Tzfadia, 2005; Tzfadia & Yacobi, 2007; Auerbach, 
2011). However, those works analyse what occurred in the 1990s, and generally focused on the 
activities of the council. Moreover, they do not provide details on the programmes elaborated, 
nor the work of street-level bureaucrats.  
In this context, this work aims at better understanding the motives of municipalities to bring 
together financial and human resources and invest in immigration. It seems that it is linked to 
the rise of a discourse of ‘autonomy’, where local governments become more professional and 
request resources from the State to be responsible for their development. For instance, the 
1990s saw an increase in local and regional strategic and economic development plans (Shachar 
in Gradus & Lipshitz, 1996). Cities started to claim additional lands from rural councils 
surrounding them in order to carry out development projects, such as new industrial areas, 
commercial areas or residential neighbourhoods (Razin & Hazan, 2001). Observing those claims 
led Eran Razin and Anna Hazan to state that development towns’ leadership changed “from 
ethnic brokers to capable entrepreneurial and independent mayors” (Razin & Hazan, 2004). This 
trend continues nowadays (see numerous claims published in the Israeli newspapers in 
September 2014).  
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Nevertheless, cities located in the periphery often claim that the central administration should 
take responsibility for the social and economic predicament they meet. As factories close and 
peripheries fail to stimulate employment through small and medium enterprise creation, local 
politicians blame the government for abandoning the remote new towns it had once created. A 
recent example is enlightening: during a strike organised in the southern district on 24 February 
2015, Beer Sheva’s mayor declared that the government only intervened in the South for 
security issues — notably military interventions — but never to remediate the employment 
crisis.74  
Municipalities seem to navigate between discourses and actions emphasising their newly 
acquired autonomy and the possibility to adopt local policies; and discourses and actions 
expressing their perceived abandonment and the impossibility to solve local issues on their own.  
3.3 New integration paths in peripheral mid-sized cities in present day 
Israel?  
As I look at cities hosting a large population of immigrants, I also question the role of 
municipalities and their partners in implementing immigrant integration policies, programmes 
and actions. Therefore, I wonder if municipalities of immigrant cities, which have been defined 
by immigration, and which have elected immigrants as mayors and council members, might 
adopt a more pluralistic approach to integration.   
Earlier in this chapter, I mentioned the role of Mizrahi immigrants and then of FSU immigrants 
in defining alternative citizenship discourses. The latter in particular have conveyed very strong 
claims to participate in the nation-state ‘on their own terms’. For instance, social anthropologist 
Deborah Golden (2001) documents organised encounters between old timers and newcomers in 
the 1990s. She shows that newcomers refused to declare their faith in an imagined better future, 
as well as refused paternalism from veteran Israelis. Instead, they demanded to be equal 
partners in their integration process. In another study documenting more intimate organised 
encounters — workshops on Israeli culture which took place in Jerusalem —, she explains the 
difference between the fact that Russian-speaking immigrants were granted a ‘need for culture’, 
leading to the organisation of sociocultural activities by the government, with government funds, 
while immigrants from Asia and Africa were not considered as having ‘culture’ (tarbut in 
Hebrew), but heritage (moreshet in Hebrew), which often simply meant folklore (Golden in 
Storper-Perez, 1998, pp. 222–223).  
                                                          
74 See http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/local/1.2573286 
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Perhaps another factor that eased the adoption of a relatively pluralistic approach to 
sociocultural expressions of new immigrant groups was the very accession of Israel to 
contemporary neoliberalism. In this context, sociocultural expressions can be freely adopted as 
soon as immigrants form a productive part of the country. Indeed, I mentioned in an earlier 
chapter the thesis adopted by social scientists Yasemin Soysal or Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas on 
deserving, productive, active and participative citizenship (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2015; Soysal, 
2012). Similarly, Israel has long adopted a republican discourse of citizenship based on 
pioneering (Shafir & Peled, 2002). Even though the days of pioneering are over, pioneering and 
volunteering values were transformed by the neoliberal forces at work in Israel today. Indeed, 
compulsory military duty duplicates the sacrifice to the homeland as required by the republic 
(Ibid.). Participation in the armed forces is one argument advanced by immigrant interviews to 
prove their Israeliness and the impossibility to deny their belonging. This explains the success of 
a discourse adopted by emerging political parties like Yesh Atid (there is a future) questioning 
the membership of ultra religious Jews or of Palestinian Israelis, both groups being exempted 
from army service. Apart from the military, values linked to individualism and financial 
autonomy are predominant today, hence the success of the label ‘start-up nation’ (Senor & 
Singer, 2011) to designate Israel. The book whose title inspired the label ‘start-up nation’ 
actually dedicates a large section to the contribution of FSU immigrants to the development of a 
world leading high tech sector in Israel.   
Providing that newcomers participate in the major socialisation institutions of Israel — school, 
the army, the national economy —, more leeway can be given to new immigrants when it comes 
to preserving their languages or cultures.  
However, this apparently more tolerant view of immigrant integration is still extremely 
exclusionary and restricted to Jewish immigrants. Immigrants who benefited from the Law of 
Return but are not Jewish from the point of view of the religious authorities, see their rights 
restricted, notably when it comes to marriage, burial and other individual rights. In fact, many 
rights are tied to an orthodox view of Jewishness. Conversion to Judaism is still perceived as a 
mean to ‘correct’ problematic immigrants.  
To sum up, even though Israel is still a rather centralised country, and has not yet adopted a 
decentralisation reform, the central administration has clearly withdrawn since 1985, leaving 
more space to the market first, and to subnational governments. A municipal reform has been 
implemented, although transfers have dramatically declined, therefore favouring cities that 
already had the resources to increase their own budgets. Towns that were already excluded 
from the economic core were therefore trapped in a vicious circle of catching up, without the 
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capacity to evolve from a simple local administration to an actual government able to implement 
policies and leverage local assets for local economic development. However, I argue that this 
black and white portrait should be completed with the many shades of grey involved when 
addressing the transformations of power in our contemporary societies. Through some 
preliminary examples based on immigration and integration issues, I show that even 
municipalities in peripheral small cities have raised their voices and proved capable to negotiate 
with the central government, and challenge decisions. Moreover, they could be seen as fertile 
ground for social innovation, particularly considering their specific social trajectories.   
Conclusions 
This chapter aimed at presenting the historical, geographical and socioeconomic background of 
this research. More precisely, it highlighted the specific situation of peripheral, frontier, mid-
sized cities of Israel. Those cities, in line with the urban planning movement of ‘new towns’, were 
established from the late 1940s onwards close to already existing Jewish rural settlements, with 
the dual objective of securing the sovereignty of the land and absorbing the large flows of 
immigration. In that sense, they represent a coercive, state-led production of places at an 
unprecedented pace. And like any other places, inhabited and crossed by people, they are 
subjected to instabilities, tensions, conflicts and power relations. These places are thus 
constantly reproduced, reinterpreted and transformed. Sometimes, their residents act in order 
to make them look like the centre, in that case the Ashkenazi European elite, adhering to a rather 
extreme nationalist ideology that rejects a possible pathway towards a liberal citizenship and a 
peace process with the Palestinian neighbour. Sometimes, those places are nests of innovation, 
of alternative paths for nation-building.  
In the first section, I presented the different immigration layers that have made up the places I 
study. The actual demography of those places reflects a micro-history of immigration, with the 
most recent waves coming from Ethiopia and the Former Soviet Union countries. I therefore 
wonder whether the large number of immigrants living in these cities, and therefore the large 
number of residents having experienced migration, means that those places hold a more 
inclusive, open imaginary representation of place, therefore facilitating the making of ‘living 
together’ as a political objective. Moreover, I wonder whether this critical mass has fostered a 
better representation of immigrants in city democratic institutions, and therefore a better 
municipal responsiveness toward immigrant integration issues.  
The second section focused in more detail on the State interventions that structured Israel 
around its places and people. Through a brief history of planning, I tried to make sense of the 
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geography of Israel, strongly characterised by the spatial distribution of its social groups. 
However, the same segregation that has been engineered by a dominant European elite, 
channelling new immigrants from northern Africa and the Middle East to peripheral areas of the 
country, has favoured the formation of a sense of solidarity among residents of the periphery. 
This sense of solidarity, of shared destiny, and moreover, of shared socioeconomic predicament, 
has fed what has become a political movement. Up to today, it continues to foster ethno-religious 
nationalist political parties, such as the immigration party Israel Beitenu. But paradoxically, it is 
also the principal backer of the Likud party, whose socioeconomic programme negatively affects 
the periphery.  
Through the example of Acre, Kiryat Gat, Kiryat Shmona and Arad, I attempt at unveiling the 
growing autonomy of these marginalised places. At a moment when the core/periphery 
framework more and more looks like an archipelago pattern of power, I wonder if the new 
transformations taking place in Israel have affected frontier towns positively or negatively. Do 
their local governments have the capacity and will to govern? If so, how do they perceive 
immigration, a phenomenon that occupied such a great place in their short history? I have 
explained that the meeting of each immigration layer with all others has resulted in great 
tensions, and competition over resources: what does the cohabitation 25 years after the large 
immigration from the Former USSR look like? Moreover, do immigrants in these cities succeed in 
taking part in the deliberations that concern them, and if so, with what results? Do they conceive 
a different approach of immigration and integration, outside national frameworks?  
The next chapter will focus more particularly on how I have decided to address those questions.     
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Chapter 4 ◊ Grounding the research in places, 
listening to the actors, accounting for scalar 
processes: methodological implications 
Traditionally, the section dealing with the methodology adopted for the analysis follows the one 
addressing the theoretical framework. However, I have slightly departed from that tradition, 
first presenting the context in which this project took place. In fact, I advocated an enquiry at the 
margin, in four towns located away from the core geographical, political, economic and social 
networks of the country. I hope I have now convinced my reader of the theoretical and empirical 
contributions of such a choice. In this chapter, I would like to add one layer to the analysis: the 
methodological contribution of such an approach.  
In fact, enquiring at the margin implies taking into account the specificities of those places, or, 
put differently, their ‘singularity’. This ‘singularity’ can be that of a place out of the mainstream 
— hence the use of the concept of marginality; but it can also highlight the potential of their 
participation in the constitution of a core. Without what constitutes its exterior, there will be no 
possibility to identify this core. And indeed, in the previous chapter, I mobilised Ram’s analysis 
(1995): the Israeli intellectual leadership at the beginning of Statehood had provided a role for 
the periphery, necessary in the process of nation-building. Those towns and their inhabitants are 
necessary to the constitution of the national, in their functionalist view. My objective is slightly 
different here. I do not aim at justifying the existence of the periphery to serve an elitist core. But 
what is left for us to see, inasmuch as immigration provides the boundaries of the nation (Sayad, 
1999) is indeed the role of the centre in the production of those places; their attempts to 
resemble this centre; but also their autonomy. What is common to those places in their exposure 
to the many organisations, norms and logics of the State: the State is in disguise in those places, 
together with place-based produced organisations, norms and logics.  
This has implications for the methods I adopted. For collecting and analysing data, the agency of 
social actors located in those places is crucial. Social actors take part in the production of the 
place, but their actions are also informed by the place itself. Second, if I look at scalar processes 
themselves, the analysis takes into account the role of social actors in producing or reproducing 
scales, but also the effects of scalar fixes and scalar jumps that cross the place under scrutiny. In 
sum, if I try to illustrate this methodological stance, the analysis of places implies looking at 
institutional decisions as much as the practices of the residents, which divert top-down 
planning; or the analysis of immigration and integration policies means understanding the 
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tensions between national absorption policies and the practices of street-level bureaucrats in 
local institutions.  
To achieve an understanding of these dialectics between agency, place and scales, I have adopted 
a constructivist grounded theory methodology. I will describe its main principles hereafter, but I 
would like to highlight two important aspects: the absolute necessity of reflexivity and 
comparison, and their interrelations. In fact, “the comparatist spirit and tools are inseparable 
from the mirroring effects inherent to any reflexivity in social sciences” 75 (Remaud, Schaub, & 
Thireau, 2012, p. 18). In a comparative methodology, one should study actors, who themselves 
locate their actions in comparison to other social actors, and to their expectations. Their 
experience is analysed by them in comparison to what they had in mind, the meanings they 
attribute to things. We therefore study comparisons of comparisons (Ibid.). 
This brings me to the method chosen to collect data: this project is based primarily on in-depth 
meetings, which highlight the relations between agency, language and reflexivity. As French 
theorists Emmanuel Désveaux and Michel de Fornel argue:   
The issue of human sciences in general could be summed up as the gradual complexification 
equivalent to the plural form of the equation between language and action. Which individual or which 
collective speaks for whom, and what action, to be undertaken individually or collectively? Which 
individual or which collective undertakes what, in response to the injunctions of which individual or 
which collective? What we see here is the meddling of the good old generalist spectres of convention 
and norm, sign and submission. 76 (Désveaux & Fornel, 2012, p. 26) 
Next, I will explain the rationale for the selection of cases. Those four cases are bounded places 
where I attempted to gain knowledge, and to assess the relevance of existing theory, while at the 
same time I hope to see the emergence of new paths for analysis. Lastly, the last section will 
focus more on the data collection itself, and data analysis, more particularly in cities where there 
are no policy papers available.   
1 Constructivist grounded theory 
The formation of a coherent methodology, corresponding to an epistemological tradition, 
stemmed from various elements: a strong commitment to emphasise agency in an academic field 
dominated by structure; the privilege to be present in Israel for long periods of time, under the 
cooperation agreement between both Poitiers and Tel Aviv universities; and the participation in 
                                                          
75 Translation of the author.  
76 Translation of the author. 
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the European Marie Curie Actions Integrim programme, which make it an obligation for its 
beneficiaries to present scientific outcomes at least once per semester. Therefore, I had the 
possibility to transcribe interviews within a few the days of conducting them, to compare the 
themes found in those transcripts with previous interviews, to constantly fine-tune the 
interview guidelines, and to adapt them to the evolving local contexts and to the knowledge I 
had accumulated, as well as to compare these findings with other academic works, and finally, 
present on-going analysis and get feedback on a regular basis. Retroactively, I elaborated on the 
rather intuitive and constrained methodology I had adopted, and I framed it more specifically 
through a constructivist grounded theory paradigm.      
In this section, I aim at presenting the main principles that underlie a constructive grounded 
theory. Furthermore, I will explain how these guiding principles have enabled me to identify 
three overarching concepts: agency, place and scale.   
1.1 Main principles 
This subsection will provide the basic principles of constructivist grounded theory, which 
provided the framework for this research work.  
Constructivism is part of an epistemological research paradigm, grounded in a Kantian tradition 
of knowledge, which claims that realities are social constructs of the mind. Individuals see the 
world through their experience resulting in as many individual constructions as there are 
individuals (although these constructions can be shared by groups). Constructivist theorists 
acknowledge the fundamental role of agency over structure.  
‘Grounded theory’ is therefore a methodology strongly associated with constructivism. It is 
usually associated with the work of Barney Glazer and Anselm Strauss77 (1967), and 
corresponds to the ‘discovery of theory from data’ (Ibid., 1). This does not mean that each 
empirical study will lead to a new theory, but that data can challenge existing theories and 
enrich them (Ibid.). The field was also renewed by new accounts, a most seminal one being 
Kathy Charmaz’s (2001). She reiterates important aspects of a grounded theory approach: the 
rejection of claims of objectivity, the located character of knowledge (and therefore the 
variations and differences it implies), the co-construction of meanings (Mills, Bonner, & Francis, 
2008), the impact of the interactions between researchers and participants, and the fundamental 
role of reflexivity (Charmaz, 2001, p. 360). In fact, a crucial element highlighted by Charmaz is 
                                                          
77 Following their seminal work, Glazer and Strauss took different paths, each one promoting different 
methods.  
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the co-production of knowledge by the researcher and participants to his research, as  “people 
construct both the studied phenomenon and the research process through their actions” 
(Charmaz, 2001, p. 360). To address this particular issue, I have produced a brief annex on joint 
research and reflexivity (see annex on joint research).  
The methodological implications of the adoption of such an epistemological stance are manifold. 
It lays emphasis on openness, where a clear theoretical framework emerges only after data 
collection started. Second, it gives space to comparison, as the researcher engages in on-going 
analysis of the findings, constantly compares between cases, and compares his/her findings with 
the scholarship. Finally, it affects the report of research findings, and its storytelling.  
The openness and rather inductive logic implies that the analysis moves from the particular to 
the general. It does not mean that constructivist scholars achieve generalisation from isolated 
cases. Rather, it means that through comparison of a case with other empirical findings and with 
existing theory, researchers can see the emergence of new threads or issues that were omitted 
or not addressed before. In that sense, it re-establishes the role of specific cases, singularities, 
and located experimentations in reasoning (Passeron & Revel, 2005). A specific case will lead to 
the identification of emerging issues, it will provide boundaries in order to deepen knowledge, 
and it will allow the toing and froing between occurrences, and characteristics that make each 
case unique (Ibid.). The researcher constantly faces the dual singularity of the observed 
situation: the involved individuals, and the contingent time and place of the observation 
(Désveaux & Fornel, 2012, p. 13). 
Case studies will be put to the test of comparison. In fact, “Grounded theory is a method of 
qualitative enquiry in which data collection and analysis reciprocally inform and shape each 
other through an emergent iterative process” (Charmaz, 2001, p. 360). Comparative research 
has always been an important part of social sciences, quite evidently when it comes to 
quantitative studies, but also very fundamentally in qualitative approaches. Scholars have 
considered the methodological and theoretical vitality of comparative research, mostly because 
comparison is fundamental to reasoning in social sciences, where the main objective is to reveal 
or to bring to light (Verdalle, Vigour, & Bianic, 2012). Several questions immediately come to 
mind: what can I compare? Is it comparable? To what extent does comparison allow the 
identification of convergences and divergences? And indeed, any researcher engaging in 
comparative research reflects on the contradictory appeal for generalisation while appreciating 
the specificities provided by each case (Dupuy & Pollard, 2012; Verdalle et al., 2012). 
Olivier Remaud et al (2012) argue that comparison and reflexivity are intertwined. They find 
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two different objectives for comparison: as an analytical resource, where the researcher brings 
things together or shows how they can be distinguished; or as the object of a research program, 
where the comparison leads to singularisation, or to generalisation (when findings are cross-
referenced and lead to a general statement) (Ibid.). In both cases, comparing is seen as a 
reflexive approach, since comparing already amounts to interpreting (Ibid., p. 14), and leads to 
the production of fresh knowledge. 
If I turn to grounded theory methods in particular, comparative analysis first occurs between 
data and data, data and codes, codes and codes, codes and categories, categories and concepts 
and so on (Charmaz, 2001; Mills et al., 2008). This means that all the data in the hands of the 
researcher should be analysed. The researcher reads through data, and words or groups of 
words are given codes. The redundancy of codes leads to the definition of larger categories. 
Those categories then fit existing concepts. The main purpose of this comparison is to unveil 
variation and to deal with those differences along the process (Charmaz, 2001). Admittedly, I 
have not coded in writing every single sentences of the sixty interviews I have conducted, as well 
as the policy papers, news articles… etc. However, I took extensive notes after finishing the 
transcription of each interview, where I wrote for myself how I came up with specific categories.   
I also engaged in comparison between the four cities I selected. Most comparative research 
projects, especially when it comes to immigration and integration policies, compare 
international cases, or look into one case, and its evolution along time (see for instance Penninx 
et al. (2004) or Zincone et al. (2011)). However, there are also some research projects focusing 
on subnational comparisons78 (Good, 2009; Jørgensen, 2012; Flamant, 2014). These projects 
help identify similarities and contrasts, and address the underlying variables leading to 
convergences and divergences. This doctoral research therefore contributes to subnational 
comparisons, where the national frame is uniform, but important discrepancies are found at 
local levels. The work of the researcher lies in identifying those unique features inherent to 
places, while detecting the impact of the national and even the global: in that sense, the study of 
the singular can inform the national.  
A final comparison has to be made between observation and existing theory. “This constant 
comparison of analysis to the field grounds the researcher’s final theorizing in the participants’ 
experiences” (Mills et al., 2008, p. 27). This aspect in particular was constrained by the European 
Integrim programme, of which I was a beneficiary. Indeed, it required that analysis of collected 
                                                          
78 However, the comparison between cities also has its limitations, as administrative and political 
boundaries are not always similar (Dupuy & Pollard, 2012; Giraud, 2012), and experiences can be 
dramatically different if the exploration takes place at city or neighbourhood level (H. Smith & Ley, 2008). 
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data be done and presented to a group of scholars at least twice a year. Apart from setting a clear 
time frame, it also provided me with regular feedback from experienced researchers. For 
example, it was the discussions in those forums that first led me toward a scale approach.   
A final aspect of constructivist grounded theory is the reporting stage, through thesis writing or 
the edition of articles. As Jane Mills, Ann Bonner and Karen Francis have put it: “the storyline is 
the final conceptualization of the core category” (Ibid., p. 30). In that sense, the writing of the 
thesis offers the opportunity to describe extensively the cases selected (Passeron & Revel, 2005), 
but also to reveal, in the form of a ‘scenario’, the final categories that emerged from the analysis 
and the comparison. The storyline of this doctoral project identifies two types of data: what I 
have considered the overarching concepts of place, agency and scale; and the empirical results of 
fieldwork which emphasise: the role of immigration in the socioeconomic development of small 
and mid-sized cities; the personal motives that lead local officials to draw policies in order to 
achieve socioeconomic development; the content of these policies and more particularly the 
underlying meanings of integration they imply; and the multiscalar character of the political 
space of immigration and integration policies.   
1.2 Grounding the research project in place(s) 
As I mentioned in the theoretical chapter, the local scale is the methodological scale I chose to 
frame my enquiry. It is in line with claims to escape methodological nationalism (Glick Schiller & 
Salazar, 2013; Kalir, 2013), and the acknowledgement that the city is a subnational strategic 
space. Based on this choice, I have explained that the city as a place is where I anchor my 
research. And in fact, Charmaz explains that a grounded theory means that the research is 
located, and recognises that historical, social and situational conditions exert constraints on 
people’s actions (Charmaz, 2001, p. 360). Along with the dimensions of ‘place’ — first, a location 
in space; second, where everyday life deploys; and third, that which holds meanings —, how can 
I account for the production of knowledge? 
First, I have explained that I focus on places that are located at the frontier, at the geographical, 
socioeconomic and political periphery of Israel. However, they do not necessarily form a general 
category of cities. Rather, this indicates a particular location in the urban hierarchy, or the urban 
network, that has led me to challenge the existing theory on cities, and to explore the possible 
autonomy of those cities that get lower attention — from the public administration but also from 
academia — despite the issues they face in a neoliberal economy.  
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Next, if places are sites of everyday life. I have agreed with theorists of hegemony that, even 
more markedly so in these ‘little places’, everyday life is crucial and inform policies. 
Understanding residents’ practices of the city, of space, social interactions… etc., is a first step 
toward the understanding of the politics of place.  
Lastly, as places hold meanings, I emphasise the importance of the history of the place, but also 
more recent developments. The milestones that shape the history of the city are relevant if they 
are part of the collective narratives. The interpretation of those events is crucial. The numerous 
layers of immigration experienced by the four cities for instance, can be staged differently 
through narratives, and influence the way officials look at immigrant integration today.   
In order to get acquainted with these places, I mobilised several methods. First, and even though 
scientific production on Acre, Arad, Kiryat Gat and Kiryat Shmona is scarce, I read secondary 
sources dealing with those places (Jamous, 1982; Aymard & Benko, 1998; Philipp, 2001; Shachar 
et al., 2005; Auerbach, 2012; Achouch & Morvan, 2013).  
Second, in order to remain informed on the municipality’s activities, I delved into a daily 
collection of articles published in national and local newspapers on immigration, municipal 
governance and economic development in Acre, Arad, Kiryat Gat and Kiryat Shmona. 
Newspapers are all available online and are: akkonet.co.il, local.co.il/akko, aradnik.co.il, 
kiryatgatim.co.il, local.co.il/kiryatgat, meida8.co.il, news8.co.il, mynet.co.il, but also haaretz.co.il, 
ynet.co.il and more. I also followed the official Facebook pages on those four municipalities. 
Third, I had the opportunity to take part in a film school organised by the Marie Curie — 
Integrim programme in which I am a fellow. I shot a 16-minute documentary in Kiryat Shmona 
(Desille, 2015). Apart from the short documentary, I kept four hours of rushes shot on 17 March 
2015, national Election Day in Israel, and 9 May 2015, Memorial Day of the WWII peace treaty. 
While during fieldwork, I also took numerous pictures in the four cities I worked on. In her book 
Doing Visual Ethnography, Sarah Pink (2001) distinguishes between shots that the researcher 
uses for observation, shots made by individuals who are the object of the research, and shots 
made by the researcher himself. I took the film and photographs I use during fieldwork. 
Therefore, they reflect choices I made myself, which are influenced by the importance I give to 
image production, as well as the framework of my research. Indeed, I took a series of shots that 
are — in my opinion — traces of immigration in the urban landscape. When I chose to 
photograph a shop bearing Cyrillic letters, it is subjectively an immigrant shop. Another shop 
may be owned by an immigrant but it has — what I believe to be — an ‘Israeli’ front window. 
However, I still believe they are part of the fieldwork. And, if the pictures themselves do not have 
 177
an autonomous meaning, “a reflexive approach to analysis should concentrate on how the 
content of visual images is the result of the specific context of their production and on the 
diversity of ways that video and photographs are interpreted” ( Ibid., p. 114). This is why part of 
the photographs as well as the movie were shown to interviewees and used as ‘object’ for 
further debate.   
Finally, I visited several museums in Acre, as well as the municipal museums of Arad and Kiryat 
Shmona. In Kiryat Shmona, I also met with two of the project coordinators of the future museum 
of maabarot, yet to be built (Interview 55, 2015; Interview 56, 2015). In Kiryat Gat, I had the 
opportunity to meet and visit the city with former city planners (Interview 13, 2014; Interview 
27, 2015).  
As important as the history of the place are the recent developments that alter discourses during 
fieldwork. Indeed, various events that affected the Jewish communities abroad — such as 
terrorist attacks that targeted the Jewish community in France in January 2015 —, the national 
frame — such as the national elections in March 2015, the debate on the nation-state law and 
the debate on the conversion law that took place in the months before the elections, or other 
decisions affecting resources distribution among cities and/or immigrant groups in Israel —, 
and local events — such as the municipal elections held in Arad in June 2015  — all had impact 
on the stories I was told by interviewees. They reflected on the news, and used the interview to 
give their opinion. The impacts of those events show the extent to which reality is fluid, evolving 
and open to change (Charmaz, 2001). The following figure shows the events — local, 
immigration-related, national and international — that occurred during fieldwork: 
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Figure 4. 1. Chronology of events occurring from 2014 to 2016, at international, national and local 
levels, that have affected narratives. Realised by Amandine Desille 
1.3 Engaging with the actors 
Constructivist grounded theory acknowledges the researcher’s active role in shaping the data 
and analysis. Indeed, interviewees face the researcher, and therefore, their storytelling is 
situated. In the interactions I engaged in with local officials, municipal agents, or other 
stakeholders, I came to realise the extent to which the observer — myself — plays a crucial role. 
Interviews involve justification, appeal, detailed explanations but also judgment, reinforcement 
of superiority and more (see annex on joint research).  
Indeed, within minutes of the beginning of the conversation, participants know I will be 
speaking of immigrant integration. As they are anxious to show and demonstrate their expertise 
in the field, they often punctuate the interviews with sentences such as “I provided you with all 
the information you need for a PhD”, or on the contrary, they express their resentment toward 
the university, which is, in their opinion, disconnected from a reality that only decision-makers 
understand. Second, my presence reinforces their appeal to other people and bodies, and 
provides them with new arguments. In fact, if I turn to them to know more about immigration 
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integration in their city, I participate in reinforcing their authority on this matter. Third, as a 
foreigner, I force them to project on their own questions — and sometimes fears — toward 
immigrants. From explicit encouragement to convert, to less explicit silences, embarrassment or 
assurance that they accept my strangeness (see annex on joint research), our encounters are 
symptomatic of a relation of power. 
In order to counter-balance this relation, I always tried to report to the participants after the 
interviews. I met with local officials at the end of fieldwork to explain the work I had done in 
their city, and to confirm results with them.  
1.4 Toward the emergence of a scalar approach 
When presenting my theoretical choices, I had to deal with their methodological implications. 
Indeed, I mentioned scale’s function of ‘coherent denial’79 (Racine et al., 1980, pp. 89–90); as 
well as the ‘hologram’ function of place, where scalar processes collide (Schnell, 2007). In this 
perspective, I deliberately put aside central administration policymaking to focus on the 
specificities of local policymaking. However, once this methodological choice made, I said, I 
opted for a fluid and unbounded approach of scale. I mean that I ran a scalar assessment of the 
socio-political space I surveyed — city-level local politics and policies of immigration and 
integration. Inevitably, policies formed by the central administration came back into the picture, 
but only the ones that bear an impact, directly or indirectly, on city immigration and integration 
issues.  
The focus is therefore on political and social agents that impact the collective social life of the 
city, and particularly the lives of new as well as settled immigrants. It is precisely the variations 
found between interviews, and between places, that help understand the changing nature of this 
policy domain: the specificities of the place — as place is a node of relations — as well as their 
resonance across scales — as actors produce scales whenever they intervene. Discrepancies 
between the four cities and the length of interviews are extremely useful in the sense that they 
make it possible to define the boundaries of this policy domain, to imagine the density of actors 
involved in immigration and integration and to visualise their connections, their conflicts and 
their channels of cooperation.  
The urban scale is not a mere zoom-in, a bounded spatial envelope or a reduction of a reality 
that could occur at national level. At this scale of observation, layers of historical legacies and of 
collective representations superimpose, actors/agents located at various scales, and in or out 
                                                          
79 Translation of the author.  
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government intervene. The eyes must look out of the physical boundaries of the city and grasp 
the ‘upwards, downwards and transversal links’ (Brenner, 2004). Additionally, those scalar fixes 
are just momentary. Rescaling occurs, which informs processes of transformations of hierarchy 
of authority, power and responsibility.  
Olivier Giraud (2012) proposes a methodology to compare public action at subnational level. In 
his methodology, he suggests that defining the social actors involved in the definition of the 
‘public issue’, and then involved in dealing with that issue contributes to the understanding of 
the politics of scales. By intervening, actors produce a scalar space, says Giraud (Ibid.). In the 
same issue of Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée (International Review for Comparative 
Politics in English), Julie Pollard and Pauline Prat compare subnational politics in a multilevel 
environment and assert: “the focus on actors, their trajectories, their strategies, their resources 
and their positioning in a multilevel environment, constitute a prolific means to grasp the 
articulation between levels”80 (Pollard & Prat, 2012). Through the example of local officials who 
are/were also national officials, they coin the concept of ‘ferrymen’ (passeurs in French) between 
levels.  
Through the mapping of actors, I will be able not only to identify the actors involved in the field 
of immigration and integration, but also their activities, the relations they fostered with other 
bodies, as well as the nature of such relations (funding, supervision, partnership…). The 
identification of actors involved in the immigration and integration policy domain, and the 
definition of the relations between them, even when not verbally expressed, reveal its fluid, 
unbounded, intertwined scalar nature.  
This first section has reasserted the methodological implications of a conceptual framework 
based on agency, place and scale. In a constructivist grounded theory perspective, each 
particular city will provide new avenues to challenge existing theory, and show the extent to 
which ‘ordinary cities’ are not only condemned to catch up, but, through their agents, actually 
produce and reproduce scales.  
2 Selection of case studies 
In every conference where I gave a paper, or even in interviews, when I presented the cities 
constituting my fieldwork, the inevitable question I was asked was: “Why did you choose those 
cities?” Not surprisingly, those scholars, urban planners and experts I met during fieldwork all 
suggested a different way to select the cities, according to the urban features they repeatedly 
                                                          
80 Translation of the author. 
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took into account in their work. For instance, I met with a well-established consulting company 
director. This company works with Israeli cities to try and improve their image, as well as 
provide strategic plans for local employment creation projects. At the time of our encounter, the 
director was involved in a tourism project with Arad, which is why I organised a meeting with 
him. When I presented my research work, he said:  
How many cities do you need? I would probably have done things differently. There is data on 
migration. You can see how many come. So you take 120 cities, Jewish — I guess you don’t study 
Arab migration — you look at them, Petah Tikva, Netanya, Hedera. You find out what the average 
[number of immigrants coming every year] is. Some cities receive less than the average, some 
more. […] What can we call high, or medium, or low? Ok? Look at the high ones: is there 
something that unites them? There could be a lot of reasons. We will talk about them later. And 
the low cases, where nothing happens, there are also reasons. Because sometimes the mayor says: 
I don’t want Olim. It could be. Now, I would have looked at the two ends of the scale, what is going 
on? And I would have compared it with the average to see what is going on. What is the role of the 
city or of these factors? That’s the first thing, I mean, if I am allowed to orient the work! (Interview 
17, 2014) 
The quest for success and the quest for the factors that lead to success are his obvious obsession. 
For this interviewee, it is clear that I should have gone about looking for ‘best practices’.  
What is important in this never-ending debate is to be aware of the elements which directed 
choices, to make them explicit, and to recognise the potential bias they might introduce in the 
research work, finding ways to engage with rigorous research and whenever possible overcome 
partiality.  
In December 2013, I visited 39 cities (31 municipalities, seven local councils and one regional 
council), located in the Haifa, North and South districts of Israel. In each authority, I asked for the 
director of the department of immigration and integration. Ten directors accepted to answer my 
questions. The rest of the data was completed using the official website of the towns as well as 
data available on the website of the Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel, retrieved in December 
2013. Collected data included:  
• General: type of local authority, district, population, socio-economic rank, 81 main 
economic activities;  
                                                          
81 The socio-economic rank is calculated for each city depending on the financial resources of the residents 
(from work, benefits, and other); Housing — density, quality, and other components of this aspect; Home 
appliances, e.g., air conditioners, personal computers, and VCRs; Motorization level — quantitative and 
qualitative; Schooling and education; Employment and unemployment profile; Various types of socio-
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• Local government: name of the mayor, political party he represents, development town 
(yes/no), local authority annual revenues (including extraordinary, as for 2011), thereof 
transfers from central government, thereof expenses of welfare department (regular 
programmes);  
• Immigration: population of immigrants (born abroad), population of Jewish immigrants 
who arrived after 1990, population of Jewish immigrants that arrived in 2009, 
represented ethnic groups;  
• Services: branch of MOIA (yes/no), municipal department for immigration and 
integration (yes/no), number of workers in the municipal department, subsidized 
Hebrew classes (yes/no), small and medium enterprises (SME) support system available, 
MOIA’s employment services (yes/no), other initiatives. 
 
On the basis of this survey, I selected four cities. My choice is the result of a multiple 
construction, at the crossroads of different variables that enable to compare immigration 
policies: the status of the city — in terms of size and regional position; its demographic 
characteristic; its economic characteristics; and its political orientation. It does not focus on 
success, as hinted by the interviewee I mentioned, but is rather a sample of quite diverse cities, 
within a usually-seen-as-singular category of mid-sized peripheral cities.   
2.1 The city in the urban hierarchy  
In the previous chapters, I have consistently called for a focus on small and mid-sized cities, 
remote from economic and political centres. I have argued that the study of these peripheral 
towns can bring new light to issues of identity, belonging and integration on the one hand, but 
also issues of statehood, power and autonomy on the other hand. I acknowledge the differences 
between main gateway cities, and cities that are located outside the core networks, or 
‘downscaled’ cities (Schiller & Çağlar, 2010), but I refuse to discard the latter on the basis of a 
vision of passivity. In order to understand the specific challenges met by these cities, I have 
opted for a comparative analysis of cities belonging to the same hierarchy.  
The first implication was geographical. Israel is divided into seven districts: the Tel Aviv district, 
the Jerusalem district, the central district, the Judea and Samaria district, which corresponds to 
the settlements located beyond the green line, in the occupied territories of Palestine, the Haifa 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
economic distress; and demographic characteristics. 1/10 indicates cities in distress while 10 /10 
indicates well-off cities (see the National Bureau of Statistics in Israel). It is of particular importance for 
local authorities and the Ministry of Interior. Indeed, budget, national transfers and staff decisions 
impacting local governments are taken by the Ministry of Interior based on this indicator.   
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district, the Northern district and the Southern district.  When I carried out the initial survey, I 
excluded Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and the central districts, considering that they made up the core 
(although I fully admit that in an archipelago-networked conception of the core, this could be 
disputed. Indeed, cities with large Palestinian-Israeli citizens could be considered peripheries 
within the core district, as their access to resources is lower. Similarly, several cities in the 
centre suffer from low economic status, such as Lod or Ramle). I have also excluded the Judea 
Samaria district, as the occupation of Palestinian land involved an ideological frame that has a 
great influence on new settlements. I therefore focused on the Haifa district (here again, one 
could argue that Haifa is not a periphery, but based on the fiscal advantages of cities in the Haifa 
district, I suggest that the administration treats it as a periphery), the northern district and the 
southern district.    
Second, I focused on cities governed by a similar type of council. I first identified cities with a 
municipality or city council, excluding towns governed by a local council, or settlements 
governed by a rural council. It implies that I excluded a type of settlement which, even though it 
is to be found in the periphery, is usually considered a core, in terms of its economy but also its 
access to political centres: the kibbutz. It also means that the cities I studied all host at least 
20,000 residents. Since I have shown that the overwhelming majority of new immigrants settle 
in those cities, I believe that their exclusion does not bear any impact on the results.  
Nevertheless, in order to ‘compare what is comparable’, I decided to look at cities that did not 
have a regional role. In that sense, I excluded Haifa or Beer Sheva. The four cities I selected have 
a number of residents ranging from 20 to 50,000. Even though it may appear as an important 
gap, their location means that they hold a rather similar regional position, which endows them 
with similar services and local ministry branches. All of them host a local branch of the MOIA 
and SME support systems. In fact, Kiryat Shmona and Arad are more remote and, although 
smaller in size, their isolated position sanctions them as service centres, whereas Kiryat Gat and 
Acre compete with neighbouring cities that can offer similar services within a thirty-minute 
drive.  
Two other important features should be mentioned: the role of these cities since the 
establishment of the State in immigration settlement. Acre is part of the older urban centres that 
absorbed immigrants, while Kiryat Shmona, Kiryat Gat and Arad were respectively funded as 
‘development towns’, with the main purpose of absorbing newcomers. The four cities also 
participated in securing the borders of the State: Acre is located at the Lebanon border, Arad 
close to Jordan, Kiryat Gat close to Gaza and Kiryat Shmona between the Lebanese and Syrian 
borders. 
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2.2 Demographic characteristics of the city 
A second important variable, often mentioned in the literature when it comes to justify the 
forming of immigration policy, is the composition of the population. More importantly, the 
proportion of immigrants and the intensity of their settlement in a city over time, can inform the 
politics of immigration and integration. For instance, Walker and Leitner (2011) show that anti-
immigrant resentment usually occurs in cities experiencing recent immigration peaks, rather 
than in cities with long-lasting immigrant settlement.  
As a legacy of the 1950 Sharon plan, the four cities host immigrant families and their children 
and grandchildren, mostly from North Africa and the Middle East (in fact, I mentioned in the 
previous chapter that European immigrants settled relatively less in these cities, and those who 
did remigrated to other cities more readily than African and Asian immigrants). Moreover, they 
host a high proportion of Russian-speaking populations, most of whom arrived in the 1990s 
from the former Soviet Union. Kiryat Shmona has the lowest share of new immigration from the 
1990s (16%), and Arad the highest (38%). Even though Acre is a mixed city, built around an 
Arab centre, it also started absorbing immigrant population as early as the 1950s, with a second 
substantial peak in the 1990s. Therefore, it holds similar demographic features like Arad, Kiryat 
Gat and Kiryat Shmona, with the notable difference of 25% Palestinian residents. 
Demographic variations are important at various levels: depending on their weight and status, 
each represented group can channel subsidies and public monies; they can draw political power; 
but they can also be used or neglected depending on the perception of the institutions in their 
contribution to the development of the city (Schiller & Çağlar, 2010).  
Indeed, the rights attributed to immigrants differ from country to country. The MOIA draws 
specific policies for the different groups. Special groups can be recognised as immigrants for a 
longer period, therefore extending their entitlements to welfare, education and more. They get 
allowances for a longer period — up to two years instead of six months. They can study Hebrew 
in subsidised courses for a longer period: ten instead of five months. Access to grants in high 
education is also extended from three to ten years, or even for life in the case of Ethiopian 
immigrants. Finally, Ethiopian immigrants also get access to subsidised property in specific 
government-defined neighbourhoods. Indeed, Edna, director of one the local branches of the 
Ministry explains:  
Me: When I talked to [the person in charge of integration at the municipality], he told me that apart 
from Ethiopians, Caucasus, Georgian and Bukhara Jews were also considered ‘special populations’.  
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Edna: After 1990, all these countries were still the Soviet Union. Immigration and the collapse [of 
the USSR] occurred in parallel, but actually, immigration was faster then the collapse. When I 
started working, I was writing “Tashkent, FSU”. It was still together. Only later, they started to 
define them as ‘Kavkaz’ (Caucasus/Mountain Jews) because they are weaker. Ethiopians get 10 
months of Hebrew classes and not 5. The entitlements to studies are different too. First, they 
identified only Ethiopians. Then, in 1996-1997, following the war in Chechnya, they started to 
define ‘Kavkaz’, and their sons will also get an extension. Indeed, regular immigrants who want to 
study get three years’ subsidies. But it’s 10 years for Caucasus and Bukhara Jews, while there is no 
limit for Ethiopians. Edna finds the procedure in her files. ‘Kavkaz’ entitlements are in a procedure 
dated 1997. Before that, Edna explained that the immigrant was listed as a FSU immigrant. Right 
after the war, they were refugees. They got residence in the integration centre. Then, they became 
‘special populations’. I asked how it is defined. Edna says that the main criterion is their residence 
(within the regions where Mountain Jews lived); that the immigrant ID should specify TAT or 
MOUNTAIN JEWS. Edna explained that their status can be updated up to 1/1/89 as the date of 
arrival in Israel. “A person can be in Israel for 10 years, arrived before the procedure existed and 
still get his rights”. (Interview 18, 2014)  
These ‘special populations’ also channel resources to the municipality. Indeed, welfare, 
education, employment or immigration and integration municipal departments can draw 
resources from the Ministries on the sole basis of the fact that they serve these populations. In 
Kiryat Gat, several municipal agents are hired to serve the Ethiopian population residing in the 
city. For instance, during the period of fieldwork, a unit for the integration of Ethiopians — 
Moked Klita — was created under the department of welfare. A director was appointed as well 
as workers. A building located in a neighbourhood with a higher concentration of Ethiopian 
immigrants was commandeered for this office. The creation of this unit followed the active 
lobbying of the two deputy mayors, Ayelet, herself Ethiopian-Israeli, and Alexander, a Caucasus 
Jewish immigrant, at the MOIA (Interview 38, 2015; Interview 45, 2015; Interview 46, 2015). 
Similarly, the presence of an important community from the Caucasus area in Acre caused the 
municipality to draw a large budget — 200,000 NIS yearly — and fund a position at the 
municipality for a ‘Integration of Caucasus Jews’ coordinator’ (Interview 20, 2015).  
Apart from channelling resources, those groups can also organise to elect representatives who 
will defend their interests in the local government. In Arad, FSU immigrants form almost half of 
the population, and had the power to elect an immigrant at the head of the city council. In the 
other cities, immigrant representatives usually negotiate with other candidates. Indeed, in an 
encounter at the municipality of Kiryat Shmona, the mayor describes his alliance with Abram, 
the local candidate of the Russian party Israel Beitenu, to win the local elections. Indeed, the 
mayor included Abram in his list because “he brings in the voters” (Interview 54, 2015).  
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2.3 Socioeconomic exclusion of the city 
The statistics I collected included the economic rank of the city, on a scale from 1 to 10, 1 
indicating economic distress and 10, wealth. As I presented in the footnotes, this indicator takes 
into account income, housing (including appliances), motorisation, education and employment 
features. I therefore chose to look at cities mainly characterised by the lower incomes of their 
residents, and their occupation in low and mid-tech industries. Arad and Kiryat Shmona rank 5, 
while Acre and Kiryat Gat rank 4. Even in Kiryat Gat, where the industrial park offers high tech 
employment, Kiryat Gat residents mainly include outsourcers, transport, maintenance and other 
low-skill jobs (Shachar et al., 2005; Gazzar, 2006; Interview 31, 2015).  
Their economic status entitles them to an equalizing grant from the Ministry of Interior as well 
as other advantages. Kiryat Shmona had the highest share of transfer, with 51.47% of its total 
budget being transferred from the central administration in 2011. Arad’s budget was made up of 
42.21% of transfers, as against a little under 34% for Kiryat Gat and Acre, (their larger 
population, and larger industrial parks meant that they also benefited from a municipal budget 
twice the size of Arad and Kiryat Shmona).  
The four cities I selected are located in areas with fiscal advantages for industrial activities (area 
A, as determined by the NOP 31). Nevertheless, Kiryat Gat is the only city that managed to 
leverage this fiscal advantage and can count on the presence of a consequent high technology 
sector.  
2.4 Political orientation of the city 
The literature also states the importance of political affiliation, and party politics, which can lead 
to more inclusive, or on the contrary more exclusionary, immigration policies. I have already 
mentioned the role of the Greens in the city of Frankfurt in the making of a multicultural policies 
(Friedmann & Lehrer, 1997), or the comparative study conducted in the US, showing that 
Republican vs. Democrat affiliations of local leaders lead to a differentiated landscape of politics 
of belonging (Walker & Leitner, 2011).  
In the case of Israel, the political orientation of peripheral mid-sized cities is quite alike. Mayors 
and their deputies are all affiliated with the right-wing Likud party, or the extreme right, Russian 
secular Israeli Beitenu party. Former or current affiliation with the religious-nationalist party is 
also common in the council. Mixed cities such as Acre are an exception with the presence of 
Palestinian-Israeli officials affiliated with the ‘Joint list’, that is Palestinian parties. The left-wing 
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parties are either marginal or non-existent. Opposition in councils is very low. Big coalitions are 
very common, reducing the odds that a decision may not be voted (Interview 1, 2014).  
Additionally, the leadership is rather stable. Most elected leaders are have been there for several 
terms already. Arad is the exception, as Tali gained mayorship in 2010 by default, as the 
previous mayor was having been dismissed. She finally stood for elections and won, but as she 
was elected to the parliament, she did not complete her term. 
Lastly, the city councils respect a quite balanced ethnic mix. Among the cities I selected, in Acre, 
Kiryat Gat and Kiryat Shmona, the mayor is a Sephardic Jew — of Moroccan and Yemenite 
descent — and his deputy mayors are Russian speakers. In Acre, another deputy mayor is 
Palestinian and Muslim. In Kiryat Gat, another deputy mayor is Ethiopian-Israeli. In Arad, at the 
time of fieldwork, the mayor was born in Moldova, in the Soviet Union.  
In sum, the selection of cities is the result of a complex construction, linking converging 
geographical, demographic, economic and political situations, with diverging characteristics that 
make each place unique. It is also the result of the assessment of immigration and integration 
policies based on the phone survey I conducted in December 2013, data collection and pre-field 
studies, which determined various levels of engagement: Kiryat Shmona quickly emerged as 
representative of the cities that are not proactive immigration policymakers, while Kiryat Gat, 
Arad and Acre represent various degrees of investments in immigration policymaking and 
different pathways to achieve so.  
3 Data collection and analysis  
In the theoretical chapter, I established that interventions that shape cities are the facts of 
actors. Policies that affect the territory of cities result from the interventions of multiple actors. 
Those actors are located at different scales, so that endogenous, exogenous and transitional 
actors cross the territory for which they intend to form policies. Those actors may be located in 
different governmental institutions (regional, department and city councils, but also other forms 
of regional authorities) or can be private actors (Di Meo, 2008, pp. 6–7).  
The first section will present those social actors I have encountered, within the municipality — 
local officials and municipal agents — but also exogenous and transitional actors. In the second 
section, I will detail the biographical method, which guided those sessions. Nevertheless, as 
participants in the research project knew of my interest for immigration matters, they also 
talked extensively about their city’s agenda and actions. Apart from narratives that are more 
personal and shaped by the individual, political and institutional discourses also formed a large 
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part of the data I collected. I will therefore explain in more detail the ways those discourses can 
be analysed.   
3.1 Social actors 
In the municipalities, I set up meetings with different actors, from the political to the technical 
levels including: mayors, municipal councillors in charge of immigration and integration, 
municipal spokespersons, directors of the following departments: immigration and integration, 
social affairs (more specifically community work), employment, municipal agents in those 
departments, specifically the ones in charge of new immigrants (e.g: community worker in 
charge of Caucasus Jewish community), director of the municipal economic 
corporation/industrial park, director of strategic planning, curator of municipal museum (Kiryat 
Shmona, Arad). In the local arena, and outside of the municipality, I set up interviews with: a 
representative of the MOIA’s local office, representatives of the Jewish Agency in integration 
centres (in Kiryat Gat and in Arad), immigration coordinators in Youth Centres (supervised by 
the Galilee and Negev development authority), representatives of NGOs cooperating with the 
municipality (e.g: Garin Ometz in Acre, which assisted in the integration of Bnei Menashe 
immigrants), experts and private consultants who assisted in the strategic planning of the cities 
(e.g: 2SH in Arad, Eshhar in Kiryat Shmona). Lastly, at national level, I set up meetings with a 
civil servant at the MOIA, the director of community work in the Ministry of Social Affairs, the 
director of immigration and integration affairs in the Union of Local Authorities in Israel, and 
directors of NGOs working on similar topics (e.g: Jerusalem Intercultural Centre).  
A first remark is that those actors are not all present in the four cities. Indeed, Kiryat Shmona 
does not have a department of immigration and integration. However it is the only city that 
created a position for strategic planning at the time of fieldwork. Even though Arad and Kiryat 
Gat have an absorption centre (a structure shared by the MOIA and the Jewish Agency For Israel 
to host Ethiopian immigrants the first two years upon immigration), it is not the case of Acre and 
Kiryat Shmona.   
Secondly, some of the actors I identified do not deal with immigration. The youth centre of 
Kiryat Shmona does set goals related to demographic growth but they aim at attracting Israeli 
families through internal migration. Whereas Acre, Arad and Kiryat Gat’s youth centres employ 
an immigration coordinator, dealing with the training, educational, housing and social needs of 
young immigrants. 
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3.1.1 Local officials and street-level bureaucrats in the municipality 
I started fieldwork with a list of actors whom I identified as possibly involved with immigration 
and integration issues in the city: political actors like the mayor and the city councillors in 
charge of immigration and integration; municipal agents in departments of strategic planning, 
economic development, immigration and integration and social affairs; municipal agents in the 
economic corporation (chevra kalkalit in Hebrew).  
I experienced one major change in the identification of actors: during the first months, I met with 
representatives of the economic corporation and the industrial parks, thinking it would lead to 
immigrant-oriented policies and programmes for employment and entrepreneurship. 
Nevertheless, I soon realised that the economic corporations of those municipalities, contrarily 
to bigger cities like Tel Aviv, Beer Sheva or Haifa, did not deal with economic development. They 
were mainly mobilised by the municipalities to deal with existing industries, or even more 
simply, municipalities devolve some of their responsibilities to their economic corporation, to 
shorten bureaucratic processes and deal with higher efficiency with profit-generating municipal 
activities. For instance, economic corporations deal with renting advertising space. Nevertheless, 
I was referred to another range of actors, mostly dealing with social and cultural services for 
immigrants, like the municipal library, or the cultural centres, which I did not identify at the 
beginning.  
3.1.2 Non-municipal stakeholders involved in city governance 
At the beginning of my research project in 2013, I decided to look at the municipality as an ‘entry 
point’ to enter the field. Even though the first research proposal I submitted to the doctoral 
school mentioned the variety of actors I identified and wished to interview in the local arena, as 
well as the national actors and transnational actors possibly involved, the only interaction I 
considered was partnership. As I started my first interviews, the research proposal I re-
submitted to the doctoral school also changed substantially. Indeed, in the proposal I submitted 
during summer 2014, I wrote: 
In this context, I choose to look at local authorities as an entry point to challenge the relevancy of 
the local scale in immigrant policymaking and policy implementation. I question the role of the 
municipality — not as a mere “zoom-in” or reduction of national government, but rather as an 
actor in its own right, operating in a multifold environment. 
And indeed, the better acquainted I got with the organisations dealing with immigration and 
integration in the four cities, the more I realised I was not looking at independent bodies. Three 
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of the four cities constituting my fieldwork had a municipal immigration and integration unit or 
department. However, those are financially highly dependent on MOIA subsidies. In Acre, the 
salaries of the six employees of the department are paid by the MOIA, with only a small 
contribution by the municipality. In Arad and Kiryat Gat, salaries are paid by the municipality, 
but the activities are highly subsidised by the Ministry. The principle on which such transfers are 
done is that of public bids. Municipalities must comply with criteria defined by the Ministry to 
obtain funding. Therefore, I met with the official of the MOIA who supervises the programme 
funding municipal agents in charge of immigration outreaching and integration.  
Another department that proved to be highly involved in immigrant integration is welfare 
services, and especially the unit dedicated to community work. Social community workers are 
directly related to the community work services of the Ministry of Welfare, which supervises 
their work, train them and provide a large amount of finances. The interview with the director of 
this unit at the Ministry showed a very different approach to immigrant integration, which is 
reflected at city level.  
Both those examples show the extent to which decentralisation is ‘unfinished’ (Giraud, 2012), 
and ‘partial, incomplete and contingent’ (Varsanyi, 2008, p. 882). 
Other actors located outside the municipality but with offices within the boundaries the city 
were tied to ministries, foundations, bigger NGOs or Diasporic philanthropic organisations. For 
instance, Ministry local branches, the youth centre (supervised by the Ministry for the 
Development of the Negev and Galilee), the centres for culture, youth and sport (or matnass, 
supervised by the Ministry of Education), local associations but also groups of residents like the 
religious groups Garin Torani, all were related to local, national and international bodies through 
funding, professional supervision, training and more.  
3.2 Methods for data collection and analysis 
The research project I carry out focuses on local policies formed for immigrant integration at 
present time. Therefore, it is almost impossible to assess the impacts of these policies on 
immigration in the cities. Nevertheless, I assume it is possible to start and understand the 
transformations of the State power through this policy domain. How can I define the local policy 
in a context of absence or obsolescence of written policies, relying only on the narratives and 
discourses of agents? Moreover, can I represent the scalar processes transforming this policy 
domain?  
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3.2.1 Absence or obsolescence of written policies 
To determine the local immigration and integration policy, very little written material is 
available.  
Websites can be a tool to find stabilised institutionalised discourse. However, the municipal 
websites and Facebook pages are usually edited by the spokesperson, and provide only very 
basic information. If I take the example of Acre’s webpage (http://www.akko.muni.il), the two 
main texts which provide a vision is “a word from the mayor” and “our city’s vision”. Only the 
latter mentions that Acre is a multicultural city, as well as the objective of the mayor to “bring 
strong populations” to the city.  
A second potential source of information on policies is the strategic plans that cities can write to 
guide their policies. Nevertheless, small and mid-sized cities in Israel seldom have such a 
document ready. In Acre, private consultants assisted the municipality and elaborated a 
strategic plan which concerns mainly tourism development, through a new branding “Acre the 
city of the Mediterranean cultures” — although focused on multiculturalism — but without 
much of a perspective on immigration. In Arad, a private agency was brought in to develop a 
tourism plan, at the time of fieldwork. In Kiryat Gat, the most important work realised over the 
past few years was done with a group of students from MIT, United States and Tel Aviv 
University’s school of geography (MIT department of urban studies and planning & TAU 
Laboratory for contemporary urban design, 2012). However, it was made clear by the mayor 
and the spokesperson that those reports were meant to stay ‘on the shelf’ (Interview 14, 2014; 
Interview 19, 2014). Finally, Kiryat Shmona also had a strategic plan drawn up by a private 
agency. Nevertheless, in 2015, the Ministry of Interior authorised the hiring of a strategic 
planner. The first steps toward an in-house strategic plan have included the compilation of 
demographic and socio-economic data of the city, as well as a global vision. However, apart from 
a Power Point presentation, there was no availability of a comprehensive policy document 
(Interview 55, 2015).   
When it comes to immigration and integration policies, none of the four cities have written 
documents with specific orientations or agendas. During an interview with a representative of 
the Union of Local Authorities in Israel (Interview 15, 2014), I was presented with a document 
issued by the MOIA for the attention of local governments, specifying the way to spend subsidies 
obtained from the Ministry (MOIA, 2011). However, when I mentioned this document to a 
director of immigration and integration, he admitted that he just used it to tailor-make the 
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project proposals a posteriori to enhance his chance to get the budget approved (Interview 16, 
2014). 
In that context, interviews were the primary source to identify the city’s policy toward 
immigration, as well as the understanding of integration at the local level. Through the 
identification of actors, of the activities and programmes they carry out, for whom and with 
whom, and of the relations of conflicts and cooperation with other actors, one can start defining 
the symbolic policies, as well as the direct actions of the city.  
3.2.2 The biographical method 
The collection of life stories and their analysis through the biographical method have been the 
basis of numerous empirical studies in social sciences, across disciplines, and across topics. 
Migration studies in particular have been a fertile ground and researchers have extensively 
engaged in biographical methods with immigrants. Nevertheless, reflecting on his research 
career, Ferrarotti (2003) challenges the collection of biographies not only as illustrative material 
but in its ‘subjective fullness of meaning’ (Ibid., p. 25). Indeed, collecting life stories involves 
communication, some sort of interaction between the narrator and the observer. Through the 
storytelling of their lives, the researcher witnesses a re-appropriation, a mediation, a 
retranslation of the social by the individuals (Ibid.). In fact:   
Every account of an action or a life is at the same time an act, the totalising synthesis of lived 
experiences and a social interaction. A biographical account is not at all a news report, it is a social 
action by means of which an individual synthetically retotalises his life (biography) and social 
interaction in progress (the interview) in the midst of an account-interaction. (Ibid., p. 28)   
Delory-Momberger similarly argues that narratives are a way to think and make sense of the 
world and of oneself in the world. Those narrative constructions through which one apprehends 
his life follow a particular syntax: it is organised around a beginning, a development and an end 
(Delory-Momberger, 2009). Ferrarotti correspondingly talks of ‘organised knowledge’ 
(Ferrarotti, 2003, p. 57). Selecting, organising, rendering and interpreting past experiences, 
understanding ‘what we do when we do it’ are part of a process of reflexivity. Unpacking 
reflexivity, Giddens lays out the relations between agency and language and asserts: “To be a 
human being is to be a purposive agent, who both has reasons for his or her activities and is able, 
if asked, to elaborate discursively upon those reasons (including lying about them)” (Giddens, 
1986, p. 3).  
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And this is precisely what I asked them: to discursively elaborate upon the reasons for their 
actions in politics. Through a range of guidelines, taking the shape of an interview guide, I asked 
social agents to engage in storytelling, from their immigration experience, their access to local 
politics up to the description of a regular day at the municipality or in their organisation. 
Therefore, for my sake, participants engaged in narrative constructions during our sessions.  
Indeed, when asked to speak freely about certain periods of their lives, interviewees selected 
certain events while discarding others. Some events were related in full detail while some were 
just briefly mentioned. More importantly, events were ‘romanticised’. This process is part of 
what Delory-Momberger calls biographic performativity, where individuals reassemble 
fragmented experiences via reflexivity and subjectivisation. Indeed, life experiences are made of 
psychosocial transitions: some typical situations being from school to university, from university 
to the labour market, from an active professional life to retirement (Delory-Momberger, 2009, p. 
61). Those transitions are even more crucial for an immigrant who settles in a new country. 
Indeed, immigrants find themselves in spaces of ‘in between’82 (‘entre-deux’ in French), more 
often cultural ‘in betweens’, where they navigate between different senses of the world (Ibid., p. 
70-71).   
Piecing together a narrative arch despite those fragmentations and transitions is even an 
injunction in a neoliberal society dominated by the discourse of self-realisation (Ibid., p. 109). 
Indeed, in our modern world, the subject is the central institution of society. Men are the 
entrepreneurs of their selves, argues Delory-Momberger. In that sense, she echoes the theories 
of Yasemin Soysal on ‘active citizenship’ (Soysal, 2012) or of Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas on 
deservingness (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2015). As individuals must be productive, the professional 
career serves as a matrix in the biographisation activity (Delory-Momberger, 2009, p. 83). 
Indeed, during our sessions, interviewees primarily mobilised professional events as milestones 
in their storytelling. Moreover, life stories are more and more told in the public sphere: we have 
all published part or whole of our resumes and activities on social networks such as LinkedIn, 
Academia or Facebook; we have attended workshops and training courses in order to ‘sell’ our 
life story to potential employers, donors or academic institutions. And we can also recognise that 
we are not all equal in those biographical performances. Delory-Momberger sheds light on the 
new inequalities which develop around the individual and collective capacity to tell the story of 
one’s own life (Ibid.).   
Some interviewees talk, and some do not. Asking personal questions regarding immigration 
experiences is often more sensitive than asking about working procedures. Depending on the 
                                                          
82 Translation of the author. 
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boundaries interviewees draw around their personal experiences, according to their availability, 
or even their interest in my project, interviews ranged from 45 minutes to three hours, and were 
not equally personal.  
Nevertheless, I believe those discursive interventions ‘make sense’ of particular issues raised in 
the public domain. In this sense, an actor involved in a particular public issue, whether he be a 
city councillor, the director of a department drawing a working procedure, the municipal agent 
in charge of operating this procedure and providing his director with feedback and monitoring, 
all will make sense of what he/she sees through his/her own experience, as well as through the 
context in which he/she is located (or from other contexts in which similar issues were met).  
3.2.3 Collective narratives 
Some social groups have been much more successful in constructing and diffusing a story 
justifying their social existence, their values, their norms and their views of the world. Yet, “there 
is no collective, no human community without a narrative, there is no social space without a 
narrative, there is no “territory” without a narrative”83 (Delory-Momberger, 2012, p. 172). Each 
group has funding narratives, myths, legends or national histories, Delory-Momberger argues. 
And individuals borrow from collective narratives’ patterns. Of course, each individual combines 
different memberships and belongings, different ‘social mediations’ (Ferrarotti, 2003, p. 37).  
Commenting on the following extract, from German philosopher Frederich Nietzsche’s Of the Use 
and Abuse of History for Life (1874), Ferrarotti says:  
This means that history is no longer conceived of restrictively as the noble sequence of great 
events, battles, treaties, dynastic marriages, and so forth, but rather as the cumulative result of the 
threads and networks of relations into which, day after day, human groups enter of necessity. 
(Ferrarotti, 2003, p. 8) 
 In that sense, Ferrarotti recognises the power of ‘little history’:  
What is little, worn out and decrepit acquires its own dignity and intangibility when the soul of 
antiquarian man, which protects and venerates, transmigrates into these things and there 
prepares a family next. The history of his city becomes for him the history of himself. He 
understands the walls, the gateway with its towers, the municipal statutes, the popular festivities 
like an illustrated diary of his youth, finding in all this himself, his powers, his activity, pleasure, 
judgment, madness, and discourteous habits. He tells himself that here one could live because 
here one could live. Here one will be able to go on living because we are stubborn, and it is not 
                                                          
83 Translation of the author.  
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possible to fall to bits in the space of one night. Thus, with this ’we’ he sees beyond the ephemeral, 
random individual life and feels himself the spirit of the house, lineage, and city. (Nietzsche in 
Ferrarotti, 2003, p. 8).  
Origin myths and history are not limited to nation-states: 84 cities also have their origin myths. 
Based on the claims I have made in the theoretical chapter of this volume, a city is an intensely 
human place. It takes shape through human activities and practices, and needs the very 
intention of a group of individuals to exist as a place, and not a mere crossing area. Places are 
given a set of symbols, social representations and narratives that can be associated with physical 
locales, but not only. The “threads and networks of relations” mentioned by Ferrarotti are 
therefore deeply connected to the places where they materialise. And the uniqueness of the 
relations in a time-space context makes a ‘sense of place’ possible. Of course, those symbols, 
representations and meanings are not fixed in time. They are the results of every layer that has 
given the place a value, but also of the power relations, of the struggle of one collective narrative 
against others.  
The power of certain actions and narratives to change the course of a city can be illustrated by 
the more recent activity of placemaking. In fact, under the requests for mandatory development 
and entrepreneurship made on cities to compete with one another, I have argued that cities 
engage in placemaking. In that context, the desire to change the image of the city can go hand in 
hand with the elaboration of new collective narratives. For instance, Kiryat Shmona was first a 
transit camp (maabara in Hebrew) for immigrants in the early 1950s. This has long been 
considered part of the forced establishment of immigrants at Israeli borders. However, in recent 
years, the city has engaged in a new project aiming at turning the city’s small museum into a 
national museum of the maabara, and a branch of the national museum of Israel, in an attempt 
to transform a discourse of oppression into a discourse of pride (Interview 55, 2015). 
                                                          
84 Usually, scholars exploring founding and origin myths belong to a field focused on the formation of the 
nation-states. Indeed, following Benedict Anderson’s definition of a nation as an imagined political 
community, and the parallel ‘national imaginings’ anchored in territory and time which allowed the 
identification and perpetuation of a ‘nation’ (Anderson, 1983), many other social scientists have studied 
collective narratives. Anthony Smith adds to his definition of a nation the importance of “common myths 
and historical memories” (A. D. Smith, 1996). Those myths are anchored in specific places and definite 
territories — which he calls ethnoscapes and historic homelands. They are backed up by ‘miraculous and 
sacred sites (Ibid.). Patrick J. Geary similarly studies the origin myths perpetuated in the different nations 
of Europe, working toward the deconstruction of those myths (Geary, 2013). In Israel, the most prominent 
work on collective narratives and myths is the one of Aharon Kellerman. Kellerman has written on 
settlement myths in Israel. For him, the elaboration of myth runs along three stages: an ideological loading 
of the landscape; its validation in collective memory — through collective narratives like arts, media or 
popular culture; and then in ‘civil religion’, that is in ceremonies and memorial days (Kellerman, 1996). 
For him, settlement myths in Israel are related to sites on the one hand, and to environment, society and 
security concerns on the other hand. Kellerman predicted a demythologisation as early as the 1980s. 
Nevertheless, those accounts concern the origin myths of nations, of large groups. 
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Another example is provided by Acre. Acre has been a successful tourist destination thanks to 
the old Arab city. However, in an attempt to incorporate other parts of the city in the image, the 
municipality implemented a tourist project, editing new tourist maps, a book and other texts 
which promote touristic sites in Acre mainly linked to the different Jewish groups represented 
like the Tunisian synagogue, the Caucasus synagogue… etc, considering the old Arab city as one 
destination among others (Interview 3, 2014; Interview 32, 2015).   
Those attempts to influence the narratives of the city strongly affect politics of identity and 
belonging. Indeed, they can inform the ‘imaginaries of community and place’ (Walker & Leitner, 
2011). Kiryat Shmona’s museum for instance aims at reintegrating the Mizrahi populations 
within the national narrative of state-building and pioneering. Acre’s tourism plan aims at 
leveraging Jewish heritage for economic purposes, lowering the share of the Arab old city in the 
total tourism supply in the process. Evidently, this last remark was never formulated out loud in 
Acre, a highly politicised field of research.   
3.2.4 Political discourses to account for absent policy papers 
Officials are very often called upon by the media as well as by local organisations, businesses and 
residents. They are requested to give weekly speeches at commemorations, celebrations, and 
opening ceremonies. They also give interviews for the television, on regional and local matters. 
Therefore, they get many opportunities to polish their performative repertoires.  
Similarly, the technical staff I interviewed — ministry agents, municipal agents, directors of local 
organisations and their staff — have multiple opportunities to smooth out their job descriptions. 
Through grant writing, editing of communication tools, conferences and meetings but also 
training sessions — organised by their organisation or by a supervising body —, they acquire a 
‘language’ and a lexicon that empowers them to report on their activities to external 
interlocutors.  
As I mentioned in the previous subsection, my main objective was to collect life stories. This to 
some extent allowed me to include a more emotional panel of descriptions in each interview. It 
provided a nice break, even for a few minutes, from the two main discourses I was up against: 
the political discourse and the institutional discourse. Nevertheless, this was not always the case. 
Indeed, for a politician or a department director in charge of immigration, telling his own 
immigration story does not fall under a repertoire of personal and family memories: it is first 
and foremost political. It is part of the legitimising attributes for them to get and do the job.  
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The municipality is a particular institution in the sense that it is not only technocratic. It does not 
only rely on bureaucratic work, and the expertise of its agents, but it is led by a mayor and a 
council who are elected — every five years in the case of Israel. It therefore takes part in 
‘politics’, that is the management of collective life, the regulation of the polis and its defence 
(Tournier & Bonnafous, 1995). Maurice Tournier and Simone Bonnafous are part of the research 
laboratory ‘Lexicométrie et textes politiques’ in Saint Cloud, France. They define politics as the art 
of governing a group of citizens, and therefore emphasise the power of politics to organise social 
life (Ibid.). For them, politics is a space of language, a space where we speak — in the sense of 
taking the floor (prendre la parole) and occupying communication channels; and in the sense of 
taking control over language (prendre la langue) to impose meanings, values, symbols and 
discursive rituals (Ibid.). This last part is essential as it relates to the gaining of power and 
hegemony. And indeed, Tournier and Bonnafous suggest that the researcher must analyse “the 
extent to which words spoken in the public space around power stakes reveal the symbolic 
appropriation or dispossession struggles taking place in the space of discussion” (Ibid., p. 69). As 
Patrick Charaudeau argues, “words and ideas […] materialise and produce meaning through 
enunciation” (Charaudeau, 2011, p. 105). The historical context, but also the moment when the 
story is told, are both crucial to analyse those words. 
To illustrate this idea, I do not lack examples. Indeed, the topics addressed during sessions are 
usually politically loaded: immigration, integration in the city, vision and policy choices for 
economic development… etc. One of the most sensitive fields was probably the city of Acre, as a 
quarter of the population is made of Palestinians holding Israeli citizenship. Therefore, the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict shaping Israeli politics since the establishment of the state finds a 
particular resonance in this local context. I transcribe here an extract from my field diary, 
following the encounter with Stan, spokesperson of the municipality of Acre, Christian, former 
coordinator of French immigration and now advisor to the mayor for French Affairs, and myself:   
The conversation heated up at that point. I think I pointed out that being an Arab city could be a 
niche to attract left-wing immigrants who looked for the “true Israel”. It led to a weird conversation. 
For S. D., it was very very important to explain that Acre is not an Arab city but a mixed city. 28% of 
Acre’s residents are Arabs. The deputy mayor is Arab. The communities co-exist. There are 
tensions, but they live together. Christian wanted to add that another message was possible: 
showing that Acre is in danger because of the presence of Arabs, and that Jews need to settle there 
to save the city. Stan got even more upset. He said that there was no way that the municipality 
would sell Acre like that. That this kind of message was spread by people like Rabbi Eichileksher. 
That Acre would be branded differently and that I could speak with [the person who gave me his 
contact, a consultant on city branding and tourism development] about it as their new brand was “A 
city of Mediterranean cultures”. Stan started to list initiatives illustrating this co-existence: the 
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Arab-Jewish Youth parliament for instance. He concluded that bringing immigration was a way for 
them to bring a strong population to a city which ranked 4 in terms of socio-economic situation, but 
in no way did the municipality want to judaise Acre. Christian indeed explained that he asked the 
mayor if [telling potential candidates to immigration that coming to Acre would permit increasing 
the Jewish population of the city, and therefore counter the Palestinian population,] was an option, 
and the mayor refused to answer. I asked him if he thinks this is the kind of message you can hear in 
France, among religious or community leaders for instance. Christian nodded. (Interview 3, 2014) 
This extract shows the confrontation between two protagonists defending two different ‘views 
of the world’. Stan is the spokesperson and needs to relay the mayor and the council’s meanings 
and values. He is concerned with defining Acre as a mixed and not a Palestinian city. However, 
he is also concerned with showing that peaceful coexistence is possible. He insists that 
immigration is for economic growth and does not participate in an attempt to increase the 
Jewish demography of the city. Christian is more concerned with French immigration and he 
relays discourses belonging to those who ‘organise’ immigration from France to Israel. They are 
less concerned with the legitimacy of mayors governing mixed cities and the next municipal 
elections to be held. Their concern is encouraging immigration to Israel, and in some cases, like 
Stan, directing it to cities they perceive as needing immigration.  
In this session, Christian destabilised the municipal discourse of peaceful coexistence, upsetting 
the spokesperson, who had to justify himself. This session has in fact unveiled the fine line most 
of the interviewees walk, between three main contradictory beliefs: Acre can capitalise on its 
Palestinian old city for tourism; a possible coexistence of Jewish Israelis and Palestinian Israelis 
is possible; but the city must remain Israeli and in majority Jewish.    
This issue cuts across Israeli politics since the establishment of the state, and across large fields 
of policymaking. However, other issues were more temporary, and still affected the narratives I 
collected. The events that punctuated the international, national and local lives of these cities 
were therefore commented. Discourses and topics addressed evolved with the micro-history of 
the cities, as described in the chronology I have inserted in the first section of this chapter.  
3.2.5 Dealing with institutional discourses  
Even though elected mayor and councillors direct the municipality, they share the power with 
municipal agents. Indeed, department directors and their employees are not dependent on 
election cycles. They keep their positions from one term to another. The content of their job 
descriptions therefore falls much more within bureaucratic work and decisions rely on their 
expertise rather than political stakes.  
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In this context, the municipality is an institution. Institution anthropologist Irène Bellier links 
institutions and discourses. She says: “The anthropologist is interested in the way that, from the 
practices and discourses of its representatives and agents, the institution builds its territory, 
performs activities, and depending on the ideas it generates, defines a political space” (Bellier, 
1997, p. 129). Bellier argues that a culture of institutions exists because within an institution, 
there are rules, norms, structures and common values. To analyse the culture of this institution, 
she recommends focusing on observations of individual and collective practices, examining 
discourses and texts produced by the institution, and treating those data relative to the 
institution’s environment, to the relations — whether dominating, subordinated or integrated — 
that link it to the rest of the world (Ibid.).  
Anchored in a Weberian tradition of bureaucratic analysis, Alice Krieg Planque and Claire Oger 
argue that there are two essential aspects of institutional discourses, both aiming at establishing 
legitimacy. First, discourses in institutions are stabilised — and this stabilisation can occur at a 
lexical level, by imposing a ‘language’, a way to designate issues or their treatment. In that sense, 
the term ‘absorption’ to talk about integration of Jewish immigrants in Israel refers to the 
bureaucratic work done by governmental agents to address the settlement and accommodation 
of new immigrants in Israel. The second aspect is the eradication of conflict to reach an 
‘authorised discourse’. Reducing dissonance aims at the “neutralisation of the opposition 
between the expert stance and the political positioning, the conciliation of interests between 
public and private partners, the denial of opinion divergences, or even the legitimacy of scientific 
discourse” (Krieg-Planque & Oger, 2010, p. 93). Obviously, this process of ‘depoliticisation’ does 
not mean that a political agenda becomes objective in the hands of agents. It is loaded with new 
subjectivities as it is translated into a working procedure, an activity or another type of 
practices.   
How can I then find an institutional discourse? Where does it stabilise? First of all, the interviews 
were the prime material I collected, which highlighted a certain regularity emerging around 
certain topics. When similar answers are given, using a specific lexicon, I believe that they are 
part of a stabilised discourse produced by the institution. The spokesperson is a central person 
in this external communication. It also mediates between political and institutional discourses. 
In both the cities that I categorised as more proactive with regards to immigration, the 
spokespersons were quite knowledgeable and knew many facts and figures on this subject.  
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Other spaces such as the website,85 but more importantly the official Facebook page, are 
important communication tools, legitimising the municipality. Handled by the spokesperson, it is 
updated very regularly according to the demands of the different departments, but mostly the 
mayor’s office. In Kiryat Gat in particular, a Russian-speaking page was set by the spokesperson, 
following a demand from the mayor, to relay municipal-funded activities to the Russian-
speaking residents (Interview 57, 2015). In Kiryat Shmona, the councillor in charge of 
immigration relayed information in Russian using his personal Facebook page. 
To summarise, I focused on two types of actors: institutions, and people hosted by those 
institutions. In that sense, there are two different kinds of analysis that will emerge. On the one 
hand, an analysis focusing on the culture and the discourses of the institution dealing with 
immigrant integration, whether it be the municipality, the MOIA, a youth centre and so on. It is 
possible to find an institutional discourse, as it will be the ‘authorised discourse’, stabilised and 
free of conflict, aiming at gaining legitimacy. This discourse might be recurrent among 
interviewees of a same institution, and it will be the one brought about by the institution 
spokesperson, or fixed in place in symbolic sub-institutions, like the website, the Facebook page, 
or the municipal museum. On the other hand, I believe that leaders and agents also operate 
outside the institutional framework and perform independently. Their ‘agency’ is crucial to 
shaping the social life of the city. Recognizing the agency of interviewees had a crucial 
methodological implication: I mainly use interviewing sessions and discarded quantitative tools. 
Sessions follow interview guidelines in which I remind myself to collect the following 
information: personal immigration story; professional experiences and current responsibilities 
and tasks; representation of the others, beliefs; career development and future stakes. The 
limited questions I ask the interviewees aim at unveiling their life stories. The result is therefore 
a narrative, which I analyse through the biographical method.   
Conclusions 
This chapter was the occasion to briefly define the principles of constructivist grounded theory. 
Grounded theory encourages the comparison of the data, but also between data collected in 
different places — the fields of enquiry being bounded in space (and not through ethno-national 
division, as is often the case in migration studies) —, and between the collected data and existing 
                                                          
85 Following decentralisation and a growing territorial competition, municipalities have gone into 
marketing, and increased their use of promotional tools. She studies mid-sized cities and shows that 
municipal websites are ‘political tools’ (‘outils du politique’ in French) which stage a territorial practice 
(Mainet, 2011, p. 75). Those websites integrate a promotional dimension, but they also integrate stakes, 
weaknesses, preoccupations of the local actors and more (Ibid.). For small and mid-sized towns, those 
digital tools are recent. There are usually handled by a few people within the municipality, without much 
resource and therefore are more makeshift jobs (Ibid.). 
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empirical and theoretical scholarship. The study of specific cases, at a methodological local scale, 
enables the emergence of specific threads for research, deepening knowledge, challenging 
theory and producing new paths of thinking.  
What do I look at in those places? First, the particular challenges inherent to their location out of 
core networks, but also the practices, everyday life, and finally the narratives that inform the 
collective representations of the place, its ‘little history’. To that extent, I chose four different 
frontier towns which, although they looked similar when taking into account geographical, 
demographic, socioeconomic and political dimensions, represented rather distinct positions 
toward immigration and integration issues.  
Evidently, those places need people to produce and reproduce them. People sit in places, I 
argued in the theoretical chapter. Among the residents, I identified social actors, whose 
interventions are meaningful. Their location in particular time-space contexts makes them 
significant agents of change (or of reproduction of the status quo). The municipality is the first 
door I knocked at, but as I assumed, numerous connections exist with other institutions in and 
outside the city. Those social actors I met participate in the production of the knowledge I 
accumulated during encounters, observations and more. Their participation can be seen from 
the script of the interview, where dialogue takes place. But moreover, this interview set the 
stage for a confrontation between two worlds: the municipality and the university, each side 
advocating, justifying, and proving something to the other.  
The discursive performance I could testify to during these encounters is a substantial part of the 
political life of the institutions I visited. Understanding who the actors are, what their resources 
are, what stories they tell, means that I can ultimately unveil their role in the production and 
reproduction of scales and in the transformations of statehood.  
The narratives I collected could fall into three categories: biographical account, where the 
participants tell about their personal and professional background, more particularly the 
experiences connected to immigration; political discourses, sometimes biographical, where the 
interviewees gave their opinion toward the organisation of the social life of the city; and 
institutional discourses which aimed at legitimising the institution as a relevant public actor for 
immigration and integration issues.   
Grounding the research in places, listening to the actors, accounting for scalar processes: as the 
title suggests: the upcoming chapters will follow the same pattern. The upcoming chapter will 
focus more particularly on the links between immigration, economic development and 
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placemaking. It will even more strongly connect people and territory, which have been designed 
as concomitant since statehood. Then, I will move on to the people in these places: the officials, 
the leaders that take the floor and control the official communication about immigration; but all 
social actors in the broader sense who participate in the public actions geared at immigrants. 
Their discourses and practices are interventions: they frame immigration and integration as 
issues, and as objects of public action. Lastly, those interventions produce scales. The last 
chapter therefore looks into this scalar space: the local governance of immigration and 
integration.  
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Part II: The emergence of local 
immigration policies: reconciling scale 
and agency 
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Chapter 5 ◊ Immigration as an opportunity: 
rescaling of the local economic development 
strategy 
In their introduction to Locating Migration: Rescaling Cities and Migrants, Glick Schiller and 
Caglar rightly point out that “When it comes to urban studies, the robust literature on the 
neoliberal remaking, reimagining, and competitive marketing of cities is strangely silent about 
migration” (Schiller & Çağlar, 2010). In their view, these two issues should be reframed together 
as “migrants respond to the differential opportunities provided by the positioning of cities. 
These opportunities include variations in regulatory regimes, local infrastructures and 
possibilities for entrepreneurial activities, employment, education, housing, and entrance into 
local political and cultural life” (Ibid.). However, might it also be possible that cities could look to 
immigration as a way of improving their situation? This hypothesis has been relayed by 
international organisations such as the Migration Policy Institute, which encourages local 
governments to appeal to immigrants, and take advantage of their ties with the Diaspora 
(Agunias & Newland, 2012; Papademetriou, 2014). Policymakers have also been fond of this 
approach, basing their assumption on Richard Florida’s ‘creative class’ (Hoekstra, 2014). I will 
focus more particularly on immigration and development in receiving cities, beyond the shallow 
assumption that ‘immigrants equal diversity equal economic development’.  
This chapter will explore the motives of Israeli peripheral local government when they elaborate 
local immigration policies. As mentioned in chapter two, I will explore the following specific 
questions: to what extent is immigration considered a possible lever for urban economic 
development and social change? Is there a positive correlation between cities that are engaged 
in actions aimed at rescaling their development strategy, and cities that proactively address 
immigration issues? Through this analysis, I hope to reach better understanding of the ways in 
which local governments scale their development strategy. I will thus attempt to fill the void 
between a neoliberal governance leading cities to create a positioning and market it, and to often 
associate this new positioning with immigration, on the basis of the shallow assumption that, 
“immigration is good for cities, it is good for the growth of our city”. While this void has been 
widely addressed by the scholarship in sending regions in the global South, there have been few 
studies on the links between immigration and development in the North. 
To this end, I base my analysis on scholarship concerned with new development strategies 
exerted by cities to gain access to more and more mobile resources (K. R. Cox, 1993; DeFilippis, 
1999; Young & Kaczmarek, 2000; Feser, 2014). Kristin Good has found a clear relation between 
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these new ‘urban regimes’ and immigration policies (Good, 2009). Nevertheless, her analysis 
does not explore the effect of the adoption of local policies on rescaling processes. I also appeal 
to contributions linked to the transformation of immigrants into ‘neoliberal subjects’ (Varsanyi, 
2008), showing that ‘active, participatory and productive citizens’ (Soysal, 2012) are perceived 
as ‘deserving’ (Chauvin & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012) and therefore more desirable for cities.  
The hypotheses are two-fold. Firstly, local governments engaging in ‘remaking, reimagining and 
marketing’ their cities will tend to consider immigration as a potential catalyst for development. 
They will therefore favour immigrants whom they perceive as having more to contribute. 
Secondly, their involvement in immigration will transform the hierarchy of governance: by 
designing immigration policies and reaching out to national organisations, and also to 
transnational organisations and Diasporic organisations, they rescale their development 
strategy, and reposition themselves on the national and Diasporic map. The motives which lead 
local government to consider immigration as a dimension of the city’s positioning in national 
and transnational political and socioeconomic networks are dominated by issues of ‘place’: 
bringing the city ‘closer’ to the centre, redeploying everyday life and the practices associated 
with it, and altering meanings and identities within those places. 
The results only partly confirm the hypotheses formulated at the beginning of my research 
project. On the one hand, there is some evidence that local governments which adopt the new 
‘rules of the game’ formulate more proactive immigration policies. These policies differ from 
national immigration policy — the Law of Return —, as they are more often associated with an 
active citizenship approach. Immigrants perceived as possessing higher human and social 
capital — English or Russian speaking immigrants for instance — are favoured in the activities 
carried out by the local governments. However, their settlement is not followed by any concrete 
action to take advantage of their perceived assets. There is no planned infrastructure. Indeed, a 
naïve belief in ‘in-place economy’ prevails. Nevertheless, cities also accept immigrants who are 
considered to provide less human and social capital (African and Asian immigrants). Accepting 
these groups makes it possible for local governments to obtain substantial budgets from the 
ministries as well as from third sector organisations. Local governments respond differently to 
the diversity of immigration situations. The result is a rescaling of the development strategy of 
local government but in a complex and varied way. Again, rescaling is not straightforward and 
leads to ‘mosaic’ (Brenner 2004) patterns of power and governance.  
The first sections present the results of the interviews. There is general consensus that 
immigration to the city represents a lever for development, traditionally linked to the pioneering 
and nation-building activities of the first immigrants to Palestine. More particularly, immigration 
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is often correlated with economic development, demographic strengthening, and political 
strength, but also to the fostering of a diverse population. However, this belief concerns Western 
and FSU immigrants in particular, who are stereotyped as highly skilled, cultured and 
hardworking. Two of the cities studied believe that the government will direct lower ‘quality’ 
immigrants to their cities, and therefore prefer to avoid encouraging immigrant settlement, an 
activity they perceive as relevant only for ‘strong cities’. The last section will therefore provide 
an analysis of these themes alongside theories of ‘active citizenship’ or ‘merit', and the existing 
literature on local/urban economic development.    
1 Consensus on the positive contribution of immigration in cities 
Israel encouraged settlement immigration even before the establishment of the state. The first 
groups of Jews who emigrated to Mandatory Palestine arrived in the second half of the 19th 
century. In order to establish a Jewish homeland in the area, immigrants were desired. This 
continues today, as immigration is one of the aspects of Jewish domination in this disputed area.  
In this context, I challenge the perception of immigration for the cities located far away from the 
centre. Indeed, historically, the four cities hosted ‘reluctant’ immigrants,86 the majority of whom 
in their majority did not choose to settle so far from employment centres. However, since first 
and second-generation immigrants populate these cities, I wonder if they have developed a 
collective imaginary of their home which is connected with their immigration experience, and 
therefore welcomes immigrants.  
The analysis of the interviews conducted in the four cities show a large consensus towards the 
benefits of immigration in Israel. These benefits are often envisaged at city level. First, Jewish 
immigration is associated with a quasi-biological metaphor of renewal, a source of life and 
blood. For the cities analysed, immigration is perceived as enabling ‘sick’ urban life to regenerate 
through a ‘trauma’, a ‘revolution’ or a ‘blood transfusion’. Second, Jewish immigration relates to 
various dimensions of development, from socioeconomic development, demographic changes, 
political strength, diversity enrichment to more straightforward financial benefit. This first 
section will explore these two sets of benefits.  
1.1 Aliyah as a process of Jewish regeneration 
Jewish immigration to Israel, and in particular to the four cities that are the focus of the analysis, 
is a phenomenon that triggers positive and emphatic descriptions. These descriptions are 
                                                          
86 See footnote in chapter 3 on the term ‘reluctant pioneers’, coined by Alex Weingrod (1966). 
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usually wide-ranging and include many elements related to the changes brought about by 
immigration. 
A first set of terms caught my attention, as they revealed the emotional power of Jewish 
immigration in Israel. Indeed, I isolated several quotes that link immigration to a ‘revolution, a 
‘trauma’; but also following a more biological image, to ‘new blood’, a ‘blood transfusion’ or ‘life 
and death’; or to put it more simply ‘new jobs’, ‘innovation’ and so on (Interview 1, 2014; 
Interview 8, 2014; Interview 16, 2014; Interview 20, 2015).  
The description of this trauma and revolution is present in the following quotes. In Arad, where 
the population almost doubled in two decades, the memory of the massive arrival of FSU 
immigrants in the city is described as a trauma by the city spokesperson:  
The second trauma is immigration. At the end of the 1980s, there were 10,000 residents in Arad, 
representing the population of Israel. When the USSR opened the gate for emigration, 10,000 new 
immigrants arrived in Arad doubling its population between 1990 and 1992. They brought very 
positive things: they are intelligent, educated people. But they arrived, and all of them needed jobs. 
All of a sudden, your city changes. Everybody speaks Russian: at the supermarket, at the health plan 
clinics (kupat cholim)… Plus, a lot of older people and single mothers arrived, which translated into 
a lot of social work. They had no money, no jobs and had to integrate in school. They also brought a 
new culture. The central government gave money but… as a resident I can tell: immigrants got more 
money that what we earned then. They could pay for higher rent. Owners understood that. Rents 
went up, as well as real estate. The old residents then could look at immigrants in a bad way. On the 
other side, you have to admire their courage: engineers came and cleaned the streets, doctors 
became cashiers. This wave of migration was a big crisis, but I think Arad got stronger. The 
Russians came with a lot of motivation. They came to learn, to work, to improve. They opened an 
evening class for Russians for their kids to excel. They took every job they could. As our critical 
mass increased, so did jobs, money. We got extra budget for education for instance. (Interview 1, 
2014) 
Similarly, the mayor of Arad, Tali, who has personally experienced this immigration, speaks of 
‘new blood’ and insists on the fresh start such a demographic change provides: 
Tali: Arad became a city thanks to the big Aliyah which came to it. To tell you… The former mayor, 
Betzalel Tabib, really wanted this Aliyah. I even know that he travelled several times to Russia to 
bring new immigrants, he travelled to Saint Petersburg to bring new immigrants. And really, the 
immigrants that came here were very educated. It’s people with a very high culture. And, and, um. I 
think he did a lot for it to happen. […]. I think… maybe I am convinced, maybe I just say that, but I 
hear a lot of people who are not new immigrants that understand the extent of Aliyah’s contribution 
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to the State of Israel. In different sectors, and also that the number of citizens grew up. I don’t even 
speak about sectors like medicine… like 
Me: High tech.  
Tali: High tech. True. And, those things… you know what, the next big thing I want to do in Arad is to 
bring 10,000 new immigrants. For the city. It strengthens the city. On the contrary. It does 
something new. New community. New blood. In fact it does. It can create new jobs. Everything is 
new. It gives a feeling of innovation. It’s something that does good to a community in any case. So, I 
tell again, I really want new immigrants. I already decided with the MOIA and also with the Jewish 
Agency. We are thinking of how to restore the relation frame that there is in Arad for outreaching 
(idud aliyah). Um. (Interview 8, 2014) 
In Kiryat Gat, the demographic jump was similar to Arad. The municipal agent in charge of 
integration issues mentions the sociocultural ‘revolution’ which took place, due to immigration, 
but also due to a municipal leadership that took advantage of the city’s demography:  
Moshe: True, true. I agree. There is a gap. For sure. But, let’s say, that Kiryat Gat, in the last 10 years, 
went through a revolution, really.  
Me: You feel that?  
Moshe: Of course, I feel that. I go around in the city. I am going to clubs, to this. Look, it’s important 
to highlight something that there is in Kiryat Gat. There are four choirs of immigrants. Really, 
immigrants. 100 % immigrants. There is the war veterans’ choir, who sings. It competes and got 
prices. And, we have, physics’ students who got first prize. We have boxers who compete in Europe. 
We have a European champion in the early childhood education, in Kiryat Gat. We have, we have 
why being proud let’s say. (Interview 16, 2014) 
With this new influx of Jewish ‘blood’, interviewees point out that their cities were ‘saved’. They 
say: “we can save a city with Aliyah”. Indeed, it brings a new population to those cities that 
experience out-migration, enabling new constructions for instance. But more importantly, at 
national level, “the more Jews in Israel, the stronger the country is” (Interview 14, 2014; 
Interview 30, 2015; Interview 34, 2015). And indeed, interviewees might look at immigrants as 
‘saviours’, therefore borrowing from myths originating in the Yishuv. Interviewees sometimes 
draw their analysis on a nation-wide understanding of the role of immigrants in nation building, 
For instance, the mayor of Kiryat Gat says: 
[You are in Israel] Four years… In… 40 years, I will ask you: How do you feel? An immigrant? 
Pioneer? That? Everything! The ones in the 1950s, they say they are pioneers. And the ones that got 
in the 1930s, also say that they are pioneers. And the ones that arrived in 1881, also say that they 
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are pioneers. Always pioneers. This country, is always… in the building. That’s all. For me… It’s the 
Jewish home. You understand? Everybody comes. (Interview 19, 2014) 
His spokesperson says: 
Malcha: Right that Israel is not a natural thing?  
Me: (laugh). True. There is a fantastic energy to advance things 
Malcha: Something that there is nowhere. This experience of a new country that was established 
from nothing. A people that experienced the biggest crisis of the modern history 
Me: Refugees 
Malcha: Suddenly, they established a country that today is one of the leaders in terms of technology. 
For me, it’s something.  
Me: You feel proud?  
Malcha: So proud. I am a believer. I think there is a process that is not, not natural, something 
special. (Interview 14, 2014) 
In Kiryat Shmona, one municipal agent Avichai, explains in greater detail, and at the level of the 
city, the demographic impact of immigration in the city from its establishment in 1949 onwards. 
According to him the city owes its existence and survival to immigration, compensating for the 
out-migration of the young workforce:  
Look, Kiryat Shmona is a city of immigrants. It was always a city of immigrants. It had, every time 
there was a wave of mass migration to Israel, it saved Kiryat Shmona. (We look at a PowerPoint 
presentation printed in a booklet, reproduced below) You can see that — Amir has it, and me too, 
I can send it to you — you can see in the 1950s. Who came to the city was the wave from Yemen, 
Morocco, Persia and Romania, there was period, they were sent there. It’s not that they decided, 
they were sent here, it was always the issue to send people here. There are many ways to send. In 
the 1950s, they sent them by bus, they drove them here. The State told them: you stay here. If you 
don’t stay here, you don’t get an absorption basket, you don’t get help. The ones who did not have 
the means, stayed. Which is the majority of Aliyah from the Arab countries. The ones who had 
means and relations and more, left. You can see it: Romanians, Poles, who lived here left. It left a 
population that was very very, hum, very very homogeneous in terms of its characteristics. That’s 
it. In the 1950s came a wave of mass migration. Then there was a period that there was here, in 
the mid-1950s, there was out-migration, people that understood that it was not good, there is no 
income, there is nothing. They left to the centre. The city got smaller. And what saved Kiryat 
Shmona again was the Aliyah from Morocco, that started in 1956, a wave of Aliyah from Morocco. 
And again, they sent here a lot of people. Until today, the community that came from Morocco is 
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very big. They sent a huge amount of immigrants, and when the city stabilized, 15,000 people left. 
That’s it. A big wave came until it stabilized. Until the 1980s, the 1970s, the 1980s, the city started 
to get older. People that were born here became adults and migrated out, again, the city entered a 
cycle of out-migration. What saved it again was the wave of Aliyah from Russia. Now, we have 
here, you can see (he flips in the booklet): those are the figures of migration. You can see that in 
the 1980s there was here out-migration, always around — 400. Even today, it came back to those 
numbers, — 400. You see that in the 1980s, young people left. In the 1990s, there was a huge 
jump. Then you see — for the ones who don’t know what goes on — the jump changed. Instead of 
having + 300 people, 1100 leave. People that get here, after a certain period, not even, after a year, 
two years, it does not take much time, they go away. Huh. So it really shaped, it shaped, the waves 
of migration, what it does, it increases, suddenly, you see a bigger volume of population. You see 
20,000 people. It’s also a lot of young people that increase the level of productivity and the natural 
growth of the city, and then the city grows. But in the 2000s, it comes back to the same situation it 
was in the 1980s. Again, we talk about a situation, the number of young people decreases, the 
birth rate decreases, and a big exit, a big exit of people. (Interview 55, 2015) 
 
Figure 5.1. Slide on internal migration in Kiryat Shmona. Source: municipality of Kiryat Shmona 
(2015).  
As I have briefly mentioned in the third chapter of this volume, the parallel with blood and life 
shows how much Jewish immigration is linked to renewal or regeneration, following a tradition 
established by early Zionists. The Zionist ideology aimed at finding a collective solution by 
gathering together the Jewish Diasporas in a Jewish national home. The regeneration of Jews 
therefore occurred through a national project, deeply connected to the territory, but also to 
labour and cultural renewal. In that sense, the participants in this research project reproduce 
ideological frameworks which existed even prior to Statehood. It is interesting to read that these 
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representatives of peripheral cities argue that immigrants are pioneers and agents of nation 
building. Indeed, the immigrants who settled in those areas are usually excluded from the 
pioneering elites (Jamous, 1982; Ram, 1995; Shafir & Peled, 2002). It is therefore part of their 
struggle to obtain this recognition. To illustrate this will for recognition, Kiryat Shmona leads a 
project of maabarot museum. Associated with Tel Hai academic college, a governmental office as 
well as the Museum of Israel, they are attempting to build a museum in Kiryat Shmona which 
will stage the role of these ‘reluctant pioneers’ who lived in transit camps before participating in 
the construction of cities like Kiryat Shmona (Interview 55, 2015). 
Therefore, the concept of Jewish regeneration through the territory persists, but it is reframed 
through more recent developments and challenges. As these cities experience permanent 
socioeconomic crisis and depression, immigration therefore makes it possible to cope 
temporarily with the crisis, as a new population comes in. The long quote from Y. E. in Kiryat 
Shmona illustrates the chronological coming and going of immigrants, and its parallel with the 
predicament of the city. He points out a virtual demographic growth of the city, where 
immigration figures hide the more problematic phenomenon of out-migration.87 
The terms ‘new blood’, ‘trauma’, ‘revolution’, usually refer to the mass migration from the 
former Soviet countries. They illustrate the belief that the FSU immigration in those four cities 
led to the destruction of the pre-immigration social structure of the city, and they laid out the 
ground for a possible fresh start. It is true that FSU immigration in the 1990s provided a 
demographic burst, and has dramatically increased the number of residents in small cities in the 
periphery. The following figures show that in the four cities I studied, the residential base grew 
drastically before and after the 1990s immigration. Nevertheless, in 2015, the Southern and the 
Northern districts still experience out-migration (CBS, 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
87 In fact, a substantial out-migration occurs in those cities (Sitton, 1962; Beenstock, 1996; Portnov, 1998; 
Beenstock, 1999).  
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 1983 1995 2015 
Acre 
36,400 45,100 47,700 
Arad 
12,400 20,900 24,400 
Kiryat Gat 
25,500 45,200 51,500 
Kiryat Shmona 
15,200 19,600 23,100 
Table 5.1. Evolution of the residents in Acre, Arad, Kiryat Gat and Kiryat Shmona. Source: 
Statistical Abstract of Israel (2016) 
The question that remains, and which I will address in the upcoming subsections, is whether this 
relative ‘regeneration’ has indeed brought a renewed economic, sociocultural and political 
dynamism.   
1.2 Beyond metaphor: the expected effects of immigration on cities 
Beyond the general idea that immigrants bring ‘new blood’ and ‘save’ cities that are affected by 
socioeconomic crises, their expected impacts on cities are often described in detail. These 
descriptions often include a range of areas, illustrated in this quote from the director of the 
economic corporation of Kiryat Shmona:  
Immigrants brought luck to the city. 10,000 immigrants from Russia arrived in the 1990s. And the 
quality of these immigrants was good. I don’t know why they came. Today, they are here for 
already 30 years. They integrated fantastically. They took the city ahead for culture, education, 
housing — like gardens and cleanness. All the teachers for maths, music, chemistry, physics are 
immigrants. They did something great to Kiryat Shmona. (Interview 23, 2015) 
Despite the fact that most accounts bring different elements together, as above, I will categorise, 
in the following subsection, the different areas in which immigrants’ contributions are praised 
for socioeconomic, demographic, political, cultural and governance reasons.  
1.2.1 Aliyah and socioeconomic development  
Jewish immigration to the cities is often correlated with socioeconomic development, 
particularly in Acre, Arad and Kiryat Gat.  
Acre adopted a strong discourse along this line, spreading the message that strong people will 
strengthen the city, particularly if their settlement is associated with mechanisms to lever their 
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potential. I emphasise the fact that this is widespread in Acre and part of the official discourse, 
because I heard this in every office I visited. Here, I insert some quotes from Elisa, deputy 
director (acting as director) of the municipal department of immigration and integration; Zion, 
deputy mayor and councillor in charge of immigration and integration issues in the municipality; 
and Shimon, mayor of Acre, whom I interviewed twice.   
Indeed, Elisa describes how immigrants can lead to the creation of new activities, new jobs and 
improve the attractiveness of the city: 
Of course. People with education, with children. This strengthens the city. A… piano teacher arrives. 
If he is professional, he can teach. He gives to born Israelis (zabarim) something about music. 
Everybody is like this. Yesterday, for instance, I met at the country a swimming coach. He has a very 
high level. He opened a school for swimming. I am sure he contributes. A city that has a tennis club, 
a swimming club, football school so… Tomorrow, someone will come and believe it’s good to live in 
this city. With these investments, it’s good for me to be here. If not, he will go to another place. The 
potential of new immigrants is… usable. One for instance, one can be… an expert from France, 
expert in maths, I don’t know, let’s find him a job to stay here. Tomorrow, he can teach at the 
college. The college will not need to bring someone from outside. How much the municipality gives 
to strengthen the immigrants… It gets it back. (Interview 5, 2014) 
Deputy mayor Zion believes that immigrants were more highly educated than local residents in 
the 1990s. Their arrival triggered a sense of competitiveness leading to more efforts from local 
residents to achieve better in education and at work — something that he experienced himself 
as he decided to get a degree as an adult. Moreover, immigrants introduced a new work ethic 
and a culture of hardworking that Zion thinks was not very developed in Acre: 
Zion: Listen. They gave. If you take Acre for instance. Once, someone that finished high school 
matriculation exams (bagrut) with two units, he was a star. It was a blood transfusion. We 
improved in every fields. Aesthetics, cleanness. Once, people would throw the trash in the street, 
they threw the bags from the window. See in the neighbourhoods the cleanness, the aesthetics, look 
at the education, look at the conservatorium. 50% of the professors are from the Former Soviet 
Union. They taught us what it is to come work, not to come to work. People use to come to work, 
just to be at work. They came work. They jumped on every job. They worked in everything to 
sustain. In the education, really, it was a revolution. What is five units? I’ll tell you the truth. I felt so, 
I felt so… I did not have a degree. I felt so… I was uncomfortable. I went to learn three years to get a 
degree, at age… as an adult. I would go four times a week in Afula, to the college to learn there.  
Me: What did you learn?  
Zion: […] Yes. You understand. The discomfort. What is being a doctor, an engineer? It’s natural. 
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What is it? Here, someone that managed to finish… 11 years of professional study was a 
professional. Now, you need to study 12 years and to finish five units. They made a general change 
in all our mind-set. The state got a million immigrants. Try to imagine how much it costs to bring up 
an engineer, a doctor. Millions, that from an early age. We got raw material… the best there is. We 
got engineers and, and doctors, whatever you want.  
Me: This morning, I attended a conference in Ruppin, and someone from the MOIA said to educate a 
doctor in Israel costs 500,000 shekels, while a doctor that comes from the Diaspora and needs to 
pass exams and internships costs 100,000 shekels.  
Zion: 20%. Yes. You understand. They also increased competition. People that want to work need to 
compete with these people. People came to work. Until today the factories. We opened employment. 
Everything everything. Until today, people called and still have people from the Former Soviet 
Union. I went there. To the factories. There was the Plada industries. Immigrants who worked in 
iron. You need to know that. Once we travelled with Elisa. We went to a city where there are 
factories like that. We looked for the Jews there. We told them, come and you’ll start working 
immediately. He is ready to absorb you, to enrol you in Hebrew classes (ulpan). You understand. 
People are ready to hire immigrants. They know they are serious. They come to work, not to the 
workplace. They come to work. If he needs to do extra hours, he will. He will not give up. Here those 
things were not obvious. (Interview 20, 2015) 
Mayor Shimon reiterates this belief in the potential contribution of immigrants to the 
socioeconomic development of the city. In his opinion, human capital is more important than 
financial investment to strengthen the economy of the city. This is a reason to invest extra 
resources in reaching out to Jewish candidates to immigration around the world, and in 
organising municipal activities to facilitate their settlement in the city: 
First of all, really, immigrants are on my daily priorities. It means that I see in immigrants a 
resource that can lead the city to social development, to economic development. This is how I see 
the immigrants. Not as them that we have to take care of, but as them, who with the right push, can 
then help the city to develop, to advance, and to be… a very important part of the city. And that’s 
why I travelled to Russia six times in 'remoooote' places, that nobody heard of in Russia. (Interview 
32, 2015) 
The city will grow from places that are equality breakers (shovrei shivion). This is the match point. 
The moment you know when to throw the ball to win the game, those ones win the game. Those are 
the points that win the game. Because your impact will be on all the city. And and and. You have 
those economics people that tell you, you want a strong economy, bring money. I say, you want a 
strong economy, build good people in, in your city. They will bring you a strong economy. It’s a 
question of approach, of worldview. (Interview 58, 2015) 
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The relations between economic growth and immigration are usually apprehended at the macro 
level: immigration is a catalyst and a consequence of the accelerated development of a global 
capitalist economy. However, here, it refers rather to what Brenner (2004) has termed urban 
locality competition. Investing in human capital is seen as a strategy to reposition the city, 
rescale its development, so that it becomes more attractive. The results of this perceived 
virtuous circle are obviously difficult to assess. In the context of the 1990s FSU immigration, 
Tzfadia (2006) has shown that cities that absorbed immigrants have suffered from an economic 
backlash. However, as I mention in the third chapter, those cities were already very dependent 
on national transfers, characterised by weak leadership. An overrepresentation of public 
housing drew an elderly population to the periphery who were generally less skilled than 
immigrants who settled in the centre (Ibid.). Skill-wise, FSU immigrants arrived in Israel with a 
significantly higher level of education that Israeli-born nationals, and were significantly more 
skilled than the inhabitants of peripheral small towns. If a large proportion of immigrants 
experienced downward mobility the first years after their arrival, they are believed to have 
entered all strata of the economy. However, up until today, they have still not closed the earnings 
gap (Lewin-Epstein et al., 2003; Y. Cohen & Haberfeld, 2007). But, Lipshitz has shown that there 
is a gap between FSU immigrants who settled in the periphery, and those who settled in the 
centres: the former groups are less educated and experience higher rates of unemployment 
(Lipshitz, 1998). However, it is possible that proactive local immigration policies have had an 
impact on those trends. Indeed, in terms of age at least, the next subsection shows that elderly 
immigrants are no longer overrepresented.  
Similarly, and in order to increase the city’s competitiveness, interviewees mention social 
development. For instance, the deputy mayor of Kiryat Gat also offers some views on 
immigration and social development:  
We needed to do something for culture in the city. When I came to Kiryat Gat, there were here 
three activities: basketball, football and tennis. That’s it. Now, there are 45-50 activities. Judo, 
gymnastics. First the students were 90% from FSU. Now 60% veterans, and 40% immigrants. 
(Interview 45, 2015) 
The influx of a large immigrant population therefore helped to increase the offer for 
sociocultural activities outside school. The deputy mayor cherishes this topic, as he started his 
first year in Kiryat Gat as a boxing coach. Later on, he established the sport association Kokhav 
David, which is still active today. Other interviewees in Kiryat Gat describe the contribution of 
immigrants, but they emphasise less the need for the city to activate this potential through 
specific mechanisms.  
 216
Interestingly enough, what these cities have in common is a new orientation towards ‘in-place 
economy’: that is the superiority of residents, rather than industrial investment, as a catalyst for 
development. It does not mean that Acre, Kiryat Gat or Arad do not try to attract more investors. 
However, in their discourse, they identify residents as a strong catalyst for development. The 
director of the renowned Kiryat Gat industrial park, who has himself been involved in industrial 
development in Kiryat Gat since the 1990s, affirms:  
It’s not a catastrophe if Kiryat Gat becomes a dormitory city. Ok? That they come, sleep here, and 
buy here. They will strengthen the city in terms of economy, social, culture. But they will not work 
in the city! What’s the catastrophe? (Interview 31, 2015) 
In this context, all municipal leaders find it of the utmost importance to be well connected to 
other cities offering jobs — Haifa for Acre, Beer Sheva for Arad, Tel Aviv and Beer Sheva for 
Kiryat Gat. Acre already benefits from a main road to Haifa. In Kiryat Gat, I was often told 
proudly that thanks to road 6, and to the train, Kiryat Gat can be reached in 35 minutes. And in 
Arad, the renovation of road 31 was perceived as a milestone in Arad’s future development. 
Kiryat Shmona is still rather disconnected from the Israeli transport grid, and is located far from 
large employment centres. The municipality has raised its voice through social networks and the 
media, blaming the government for keeping the city isolated. Municipalities focus on creating a 
welcoming residential environment, believing that residents will commute to the closest 
employment areas to work. Acre’s mayor argues: 
They want to travel to Tel Aviv, they can. It means that the story of staying here, and living here, 
and buying a flat here for a cheap price and doing things in the centre, once it was impossible, 
now it’s possible. That’s part of the story. More young people stay here, and more young people 
buy flats here. You see that depending on the amount of residents. The amount of residents… 
grows all the time. (Interview 32, 2015) 
This trend was encouraged from 1992 by the Israeli government, which adopted, through NOP 
31, a metropolitan approach to development. Rather than dealing with the economic depression 
encountered in peripheries, where factories were constantly closing down (see the chapter on 
the Israeli context), the NOP 31 and its metropolitan approach has effectively sanctioned mid-
sized cities in the periphery as residential areas, and emphasised the need to improve 
communication with the closest metropolitan areas — Beer Sheva or Haifa. The approach is not 
restricted to Israeli regional development. It has also be coined by French geographers 
Christophe Terrier and Laurent Davezies under the expression ‘économie présentielle’ or 
‘économie résidentielle’ which we could translate as ‘in-place economy’. As pointed out by 
Hélène Mainet: “This positioning towards inhabitants and tourists largely translates the turn 
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experienced by economic development and the place given to in-place economy, in comparison 
with productive economy”88 (Mainet, 2011). This approach implies focussing on the area's 
residents, who produce and consume, rather than on the industrial economy.  
1.2.2 Demographics 
In addition to socio-economic development, immigration is perceived as a way to counter out-
migration and to increase the size of the active population against an ageing population — a 
discourse which also widespread in Europe. Several interviewees in Acre argue that immigration 
has allowed to keep schools open (Interview 20, 2015; Interview 32, 2015). In Kiryat Shmona, 
the deputy mayor claims that the fact that there is no agenda in favour of immigration has led to 
schools closing (Interview 6, 2014). The person in charge of the ‘group Aliyah’ programme in the 
MOIA confirms that municipalities encouraging immigration to their cities do so to counter out-
migration, and ageing, and to keep schools and other public services open (Interview 9, 2014).  
Such statements are actually quite accurate. Demographic growth is maintained through 
immigration. Map 3.2 in chapter 3 showed the extent of immigration in the total population. 
Arad benefits the most from immigration, as 7.1% of its population in 2015 corresponds to the 
2059 immigrants who settled in the town from 2001 to 2015. The other cities rank quite high in 
absolute numbers: Acre received 2631 immigrants in 14 years, mostly from the FSU, for a 
population of 47,700 in 2016; Kiryat Gat received 2443 immigrants in 14 years, mostly from 
Ethiopia, and the FSU, for a population of 51,500 in 2016; Kiryat Shmona received 836 
immigrants in 14 years, mostly from the FSU, for a population of 23,100 in 2016.  
Moreover, immigration to the cities under scrutiny draws a rather young population, with the 
24-45 age group representing the largest proportion. The elderly, contrary to research findings 
from the 1990s, and contrary to popular belief, are not overrepresented in the cities. The 
following table compares the proportion of elderly immigrants in Acre, Arad and Kiryat Gat,89 as 
well as in Tel Aviv:  
 
                                                          
88 Translation of the author.  
89 Unfortunately, since Kiryat Shmona did not receive more than 10 immigrants per year between 2007 
and 2011, the table — which categorises newcomers by age — did not include new immigrants in Kiryat 
Shmona.  
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Immigrants 
(65 +) 
Total 
immigrants 
Immigrants (65 +) proportionally 
to total immigrants (in %) 
Acre 58 749 7.74 
Arad 48 555 8.65 
Kiryat Gat 43 410 10.49 
Tel Aviv 389 3486 11.16 
Table 5.2. Immigrants aged over 65, settling in Acre, Arad, Kiryat Gat and Tel Aviv, between 2007 
and 2011. Source: CBS (2012) 
Acre is also the city where Jewish immigration is perceived as a way to counter the demographic 
growth of Palestinian residents. It therefore follows the ideology of ‘judaisation’ of space 
promoted since early statehood. This discourse is not clearly announced. More specifically, the 
mayor goes to great effort to neutralise it, as ‘social harmony’ is at stake. Acre already 
experienced painful intercommunity riots, which the mayor considers a milestone under his 
leadership, and the trigger for a large range of activities to promote coexistence and mutual 
respect. The mayor takes pride in the endorsement he gets at each election from the Palestinian 
population: he reports that more than 90% of the Palestinian Israelis of the city vote for him, 
saying that he does not like to say it too loud; while at the same time assuring that Jewish 
immigration is a priority (Interview 32, 2015; Interview 58, 2015). Those rather contradictory 
statements are a constant in Acre. In fact, if the city has to position itself in face of the daily 
symptoms of the long-lasting conflict, and find practical solutions for a peaceful coexistence, 
those ‘practical steps’ are not accompanied by the production of new ideological frameworks. On 
the contrary, officials maintain the national ideology of Jewish superiority and control over the 
population and the land.   
As this paradox raises some debate, it leads to significant tension. During my first encounter 
with the spokesperson, at a meeting to which two other municipal agents dropped in, the topic 
was addressed and raised tensions. My field diary reports: 
Christian wanted to add that another message was possible: showing that Acre is in danger because 
of the presence of Arabs, and that Jews need to settle there to save the city. Stan got even more 
pissed off. He said that there was no way that the municipality would sell Acre like that. That this 
kind of message was spread by people like Rabbi Eichileksher… That Acre would be branded 
differently and that I could speak with Eran about it as their new brand was ‘A city of 
Mediterranean cultures’. Stan started to list initiatives illustrating this co-existence: the Arab-Jewish 
Youth parliament for instance. He concluded that bringing immigrants was a way for them to bring 
a strong population to a city which ranked 4 in terms of socio-economic situation, but in no way did 
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the municipality wanted to judaise Acre. Christian indeed explained that he asked the mayor if this 
was an option, and the mayor refused. I asked him if he thinks this is the kind of message you can 
hear in France, among religious or community leaders for instance. Christian said yes (Interview 3, 
2014)  
Less embarrassed by a politically-correct discourse, and the promotion of coexistence, the 
deputy mayor of the city states that encouraging immigration in Acre is a way to counter the 
settlement of rural Palestinian Israelis in Acre: 
Me: So, that’s my question — in a rough style —, why some municipalities took more 
responsibilities for Aliyah and absorption when there is a ministry? I see that some cities do a lot, 
Acre among them 
Zion: It’s life and death.  
Me: That’s what you feel.  
Zion: All the (Palestinian) villages will come to us. It’s forbidden. We have a mission. What did you 
think? There is a school called Weizmann here. If we don’t fill first grade, tomorrow they close the 
school. It’s life or death. Life or death. What did you think? They will take the school, they will. I tell 
you that. We, Aliyah integration, it’s blood, blood transfusion. (Interview 20, 2015) 
If local politicians and municipal agents are — more or less — careful about justifying their 
municipal agenda towards immigration through the demographic argument, it seems much less 
ambiguous when looking at MOIA’s transfers. In fact, they favour mixed cities: Acre, Nazareth 
Illit, Ramle etc. are all beneficiaries of the ‘group Aliyah’ programme, and moreover, benefit from 
the largest number of recruits (Interview 9, 2014).  
1.2.3 Cultural diversity: a marketing tool?  
Arising from the paradox mentioned above is the discourse of cultural diversity present in Acre.    
In fact, and to accommodate the different social groups present in Acre, the city has invested in a 
new strategic plan, its branding being “Acre, city of Mediterranean cultures”. It answers the 
pressing need to improve intercommunity relations, while at the same time bringing economic 
development. Indeed, the plan includes a vision to improve Palestinian-Israeli relations, as well 
as relations between the different Jewish groups in the city, whether they be old-timers or 
newcomers. Although it is not stated clearly on the municipal website, where the new branding 
is presented to the city residents, the mayor of Acre affirms that reaching out to Jewish 
communities abroad is part of this masterplan (Interview 32, 2015).  
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The plan also includes tourism promotion. Interestingly enough, the new goals of this tourism 
promotion are to include, more widely, the buildings, traditions and folklore of the various 
Jewish diasporas that settled in the city of Acre, and to give them a larger share in the tourism 
offer, thus reducing the attraction of the old Palestinian city centre (already suffering from a 
quasi-absence of Palestinian history, where the crusaders, the Ottoman and the Jewish 
occupation are much more emphasised (Shoval, 2013)). In that sense, the city branding aims at 
capitalising on the cultural heritage of the various groups that were present, and are still present 
today in the city, including Palestinian Israelis, but also, increasingly, the various immigrant 
groups; it also includes activities coordinated by the welfare department to reduce 
intercommunity conflicts. However, this ‘pragmatic’ approach is still affected by the national 
ideology, hence the tensions and contradictions between these initiatives and the activities of 
reaching out to Jewish immigration candidates abroad to contain the demographic balance of the 
city.    
In the three other cities that are predominantly Jewish, the term ‘diversity’ is used somewhat 
differently in interviews, although very present. In those cases, ‘diversity’ refers to the various 
countries of origin of the immigrants that settled in those towns from the 1950s on. In Kiryat 
Gat, the mayor, deputy mayor, and several interviewees all praise the cultural diversity of the 
city. They remind me of the presence of more than 40 different countries of origin — however 
94% of them are Jews (CBS 2016). Groups originating from these different areas have 
businesses, associations, clubs and choirs. The spokesperson declares that it is important to 
respect the various traditions of these former Diasporic groups: 
Some say, why do we need to speak about communities today? So, maybe we come from the 
anthropological point of view, the anthropological scholarship which says, why? Let’s preserve the 
culture. Keep the signs. It’s beautiful, it’s ugly, it’s the Israeli diaspora. The mayor here is very close 
to the tradition, he is a religious man. So, why not respect that. (Interview 14, 2014) 
The fact that the residents of Kiryat Gat have immigrated, or that their parents and grandparents 
immigrated, from 40 different countries to Israel is described as a source of sociocultural 
enrichment. Another interviewee who also grew up in Kiryat Gat describes his childhood in the 
town: 
Raz: The city was… I think that it was kind of smart, hum, kind of. Let’s say that, Kiryat Gat, in my 
opinion, at that time, was a development town. And, what makes Kiryat Gat special, along the years, 
back then it was even more, is that, in Kiryat Gat, I think there are over 40 different kinds of people 
from 40 different places in the world. Ok? It could be English speakers who came from South Africa, 
like Izhak A., ok? And of course from Morocco, from Algiers, from France or from the US, or from 
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Eastern Europe. And born Israelis (zabarim). My parents for example are zabarim that came, hum, 
from Hedera. Ok? They were born in Israel, in their case.  
Me: Both of them?  
Raz: Both of them. They came to develop the dream of Ben Gurion to develop the country. Ok? And I 
think this is what was mirrored. To do this integration (integrazia90) for everybody. I think it was a 
social experience. I think that as a kid, I think that my childhood was a childhood… interesting. And 
rich. (Interview 31, 2015) 
Multiculturalism is adopted by the interviewees in their discursive strategies, although they are 
sometimes generalising, simplifying and being a bit clumsy. They do not always use the term 
‘multiculturalism’. While the term 'multiculturalism' is more widely used in Acre, in other cities, 
other terms might be used. In Kiryat Gat, the term 'diversity' is more frequent. In Arad, one 
interviewee used the term ‘cosmopolitanism’:91 
I want that people from everywhere will come here. The world is more and more cosmopolitan. I 
think that cosmopolitanism can counter the extremism. If you play together, you run together… 
you will not fight. (Interview 21, 2015) 
Without analysing the lexicon adopted by the different municipalities in too much depth, it 
seems that immigration is perceived, not as a marketing tool like in Acre, but more simply as a 
channel for sociocultural enrichment and an access to various cultures worldwide.  
The first thing to be noted is the exclusionary character of this conception of diversity, 
multiculturalism or cosmopolitanism: in fact, it concerns only Jews. Moreover, the cultural 
contribution is usually perceived differently between Jewish groups. Indeed, and I will go into 
this in more detail further on, there is a general difference between the ‘traditional’ culture of 
Mizrahi immigrants, and a superior view of culture associated with FSU immigrants. As I have 
mentioned in a previous chapter, immigrants from Asia and Africa are not considered as having 
‘culture’ (tarbut in Hebrew), but heritage (moreshet in Hebrew) (Golden in Storper-Perez, 1998, 
pp. 222-223).   
                                                          
90 I highlighted the use of the term integrazia instead of klita here since the interviewee refers to bringing 
together immigrants, rather than absorbing them in Israeli society.  
91 Cosmopolitanism, a concept first developed by antique Greek Stoic philosophers, might refer to one 
aspect of stoic cosmopolitanism, that is the fact that men, as citizens of the world, can claim universalism, 
while retaining their specificities. However, it can also be understood through Ulrich Beck’s definition of 
cosmopolitanism, which quite bluntly, is rather interchangeable with the multiculturalism which has 
resulted from globalisation. 
 222
Secondly, it seems important to replace this discussion in a generational context. In fact, the 
participants in our research already had the opportunity to distance themselves from the ‘social 
experience’ of the ingathering of the exiles, and the formation of new modern Jews, from an 
assimilationist perspective. Recognising the importance of multiculturalism — as a societal ideal 
— stems from the cultural and religious renewal experienced by Israel, firstly through the 
Sephardic Jewish cultural and political movement that started in the 1980s, exemplified by the 
success of the political party Shas; and secondly through the mass immigration in the 1990s. 
Rethinking the development towns through multicultural, or diversity lenses, therefore strongly 
contrasts with the context at the establishment of those towns, and during the years in which 
most of the interviewees grew up. But place is a dynamic concept, and I have already argued that 
place is the meeting point of networks of social relations, at a certain moment, and is therefore 
built on numerous layers of social relations. The history of these social relations, their conflicts 
and their power relations, informs today’s relations. The redefinition of the demographic mosaic 
of Israel through more recent social concepts is definitely linked to new developments in the 
integration policy of Israel.  
However, it can also be analysed as a strategy. In a political context that forces local leaders to 
market their place, to engage in ‘placemaking’, and to reposition the city in its wider relations 
with other spaces, they can harness immigration and diversity in order to renegotiate its 
position within the national, and even transnational map, and therefore to become an attractive 
place for immigrants to settle. These place-making activities can include the construction of 
narratives of diversity, immigrant-friendly services, and their marketing. In that sense, diversity 
and multiculturalism become instrumental. The two following subsections will address this 
issue more specifically, through the political dimension of immigration, and its role in reaching 
out to public funding.     
1.2.4 Politics  
The fact that local politicians embrace cultural diversity can be analysed as a political strategy. If 
I look at the municipal councils, it seems that political representation of the different groups in 
the city helps to build political strength. Arad, the city with the largest share of new immigrants, 
has an immigrant mayor. In Acre, Kiryat Gat and Kiryat Shmona, at least one deputy mayor is an 
immigrant. In Kiryat Gat, the mayor takes pride in the representation of the Ethiopian and the 
Russian-speaking communities through his two deputy mayors. In a meeting at the municipality 
of Kiryat Shmona, the mayor describes his alliance with Abram, the local candidate of the 
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Russian party Israel Beitenu, to win the local elections. Indeed, the mayor states that he included 
Abram in his list because “he brings the voters” (Interview 54, 2015). 
The periphery has been the target of intense political activity for the political parties 
representing immigrants. As mentioned above, since the 1980s, political actions have become 
localised (Gradus, 1983). A municipal director in Acre explains this control of the periphery in 
the following terms:  
Mordechai: This is an example, what do I want to tell, this is an example of the capacity — it could 
be that the same mayor in Arad, in Tel Aviv would not have been a councillor. The capacity to 
advance in the periphery, if you look at the capacity of the population, the education, and similar 
things, so there is. See, you met Zion who is a deputy mayor. It’s his third term. And under him, 
immigrants. There are people, like in Karmiel, there is Rina G. who is very very strong. She was an 
immigrant. There is in Ma’alot, in Nahariya. There are immigrants that understood — as much as 
the guys of Shas understood — that they had power in the periphery. The immigrants here united 
and their party got forward, politically but also for jobs. And I am not sure that the same people in 
Tel Aviv or in Jerusalem or in Haifa, maybe yes, because there too, but it can be that the 
advancement of immigrants in periphery — this is the contrary of the assumption you made — can 
be more important.  
Me: So you have to choose between being the worst of the good, of the best of the worse. 
Mordechai: There is an expression of Pirkei Avot, you know it? ‘To be the tail of the lions rather than 
the head of the foxes’. (Interview 44, 2015) 
More importantly, the most emblematic parties for alternative identity politics, Shas — 
representing Sephardic Jews — and Israel Beitenu — representing Russian-speaking immigrants 
— are very much anchored in the periphery. A large proportion of their potential electorate 
resides in those cities. The following table shows the results of the March 2015 national 
elections for the four cities under scrutiny, in comparison with the national results. Kiryat 
Shmona is a striking example, where more than three quarters of the city population voted for 
right-wing parties such as Likud, Kulanu, HaBait HaYehudi, Shas and Israel Beitenu, whereas 
those parties represent only half of the current Knesset.  Note that the Knesset as of 2016 differs 
slightly from the results of March 2015, following coalition agreements.  
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Figure 5.2. Results of the national elections, March 2015, for the State as well as for Acre, Arad, 
Kiryat Gat and Kiryat Shmona. Sources: Haaretz news articles (2016). Realised by Amandine 
Desille. 
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The results show the relative advantage of Likud, Israel Beitenu and Shas in the periphery, 
compared to the national average. I have already discussed the success of Likud in chapter three. 
The success of Israel Beitenu or Shas is not only linked to the demography of the cities. It also 
reflects the influence of local party representatives. I had the opportunity to do some filming on 
the day of the elections in Kiryat Shmona, where I followed Abram, deputy mayor and local 
representative of Israel Beitenu. He made it very clear that his position at the municipality was a 
factor of votes. These local representatives also advocate welfare programs and entitlements for 
the groups they represent, with many beneficiaries residing in the periphery.   
A second aspect of the links between immigration and local politics is based on the positioning 
of the cities to gain access to resources. Being a welcoming municipality for immigrants brings a 
good reputation. Indeed, in Acre, the mayor and his staff are aware that providing good public 
services is at stake to attract additional resources. More explicitly, in Arad, the director of the 
municipal department for culture, immigration and integration, describes the efforts by the 
municipality at the time of the arrival of Soviet Jews in Arad, in the 1990s. She explains that the 
fact that the city was actively involved in their settlement helped them to be recognised as a 
model, the Minister at the head of MOIA often visiting them: 
Think, our brothers come. They can come. And really, by chance, arrived in Arad, people… with a 
very high level. Everybody with masters degrees, PhDs. Really. Everyone. I speak about the first 
masses that come. They were really quality people. From big cities. They did not come from towns 
or villages, but from big cities, important. Everybody came with a lot of will to come to Israel. 
Listen it was an extraordinary euphoria, one that was also viral. All the city was mobilized for this 
thing. There was not a person who did not open his house, their heart, their wallet. Beginning in 
the 1990s. It was, it was. Wow. There was a project to adopt families, which was coordinated by 
Nili Oz, spouse of Amos Oz, the famous writer. There were 300 families, veterans, who hosted 
immigrant families on a regular basis. 300. Understand. In the 1990s, we were 9500 residents. 
300 families who adopted families. They would invite them for Shabbat, they would write to them, 
they would help them find a job, they would learn the language together with them. It’s a huge 
project. We were a model in Israel for the integration of Aliyah. They came and learnt. There was 
not a Minister of Integration who did not visit, who did not share compliments. This thing was so 
so… It was high level but also euphoric. (Interview 7, 2014) 
Similarly, MOIA’s agent Rebecca affirms that depressed municipalities investing in immigrant 
integration earn a good reputation: 
Me: What makes the difference between Ramle, which is ready to encourage poorer Aliyah 
populations and other municipalities?  
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Rebecca: What I personally understand is that, at educational level, classes were closing. They 
needed to fill classes again with newcomers, new blood. Sincerely, selling Ramle to French or to 
Americans is not easy. They found an easiest way. For me, any immigrant from any country is an 
asset. At some point, the immigrant brings more than what he receives. Even in terms of their 
municipal reputation, Ramle earned a lot. They are recognized for what they do. The reputation of 
the municipality, its social level, the social policies… You can see if the city understood that the 
immigrant was an asset. Some things have their own logics in Aliyah. Some cities come and say, we 
want French or Americans. (Interview 9, 2014) 
This last remark leads us to the following section: investing in immigration can lever resources 
available at national level, for which distribution is conditioned on the capacity of local leaders 
to bring forward concrete proposals to spend those resources.  
1.2.5 Access to public funding 
The capacity to channel resources and to implement successful programs is certainly crucial to 
attract public funding, since transfers from the central administration have become more 
difficult to obtain. A large proportion of immigrants in a city provides a reason to draw public 
resources from MOIA, but also from the various ministries which dedicate part of their resources 
to immigrants — education, welfare, employment, construction, and the development of Galilee 
and Negev for instance. It must be borne in mind that the four cities are heavily dependent on 
national funding. Kiryat Shmona had the highest share of transfer, with 51.47% of its total 
budget being transferred from the central administration in 2011. Arad’s budget was composed 
of 42.21% of transfers, while Kiryat Gat and Acre, just under 34% (their larger population, and 
larger industrial parks meant that they also benefited from a municipal budget which was twice 
the size of Arad and Kiryat Shmona). 
For Gali, a senior at the Union of Local Authorities in Israel, this funding is the reason why some 
municipalities put immigration on their agenda, rather than the contrary: 
The municipality, in my opinion, looks at who can bring funding, and then they decide who they 
need. It’s not that they build a working programme based on the needs and then they go to the 
MOIA to ask for cooperation to finance this need. It’s the contrary. The Ministry brings, and I say: 
Ok, I have a budget of 50,000 NIS, let’s see who needs it the most and for what. And this is for a 
municipality that operates well. (Interview 15, 2014) 
And indeed, I came to realise that most municipalities involved in immigration outreaching were 
part of the programme ‘group Aliyah’. In Acre, salaries of the six employees of the department 
are paid by the MOIA, with a small contribution from the municipality. In Arad and Kiryat Gat, 
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salaries are paid by the municipality, but the activities are highly subsidised by the Ministry. 
Arad got in the ‘group Aliyah’ programme when I started fieldwork, and withdrew when I 
finished. However, the municipal workers have retained their positions and are funded by the 
municipality. When I asked a former beneficiary, Christian, what was the point of the 
municipality getting into the ‘group Aliyah’ programme for French immigrants, he argued that it 
was because his full salary was paid by MOIA (Interview 30, 2015). When MOIA decided to 
withdraw, as not enough French families settled in Acre, Christian lost his job.  
The settlement of immigrants who are considered ‘special populations’, such as Ethiopian 
immigrants or Indian immigrants from the Bnei Menashe community, also obtain additional 
budgets from the various ministries, as well as from foundations and immigration organisations 
(Interview 11, 2014; Interview 34, 2015). Indeed, welfare, education, employment, or municipal 
immigration and integration departments can draw resources from the Ministries on the basis 
that they serve these populations. In Kiryat Gat, several municipal agents are hired to serve the 
Ethiopian population residing in the city. For instance, during my fieldwork, a unit for the 
integration of Ethiopians — Moked Klita — was created under the department of welfare. A 
director was appointed as well as workers. A building located in a neighbourhood with a higher 
concentration of Ethiopian immigrants was seized for this office (Interview 38, 2015; Interview 
45, 2015; Interview 46, 2015). Similarly, the presence of an important community from the 
Caucasus area in Acre helped the municipality to obtain a large budget — 200,000 NIS yearly — 
and fund a position at the municipality for an ‘Integration of Caucasus Jews’ coordinator’ 
(Interview 20, 2015). The presence of a Palestinian population in Acre also helps to draw extra 
funding. Indeed, an interviewee states:  
You see in the job ads: wanted, social worker, individual counselling or community work. Always. In 
Lod and Ramle and Acre. They give them massive social help. (Interview 57, 2015) 
Apart from direct transfers from the different ministries, political parties provide channels to 
accessing programs. Israel Beitenu representatives in municipalities are aware of the fact that 
they can reach out to the ministries the party controls, MOIA being one of them. For instance, 
when we debated the use of municipal resources by the Palestinian Israeli deputy mayor of Acre 
municipality, deputy mayor and Israel Beitenu representative, Zion says: 
Zion: What I say is that I am Israel Beitenu. If I need something for tourism, I go to the Minister of 
Tourism. (The second deputy mayor) does not have that!  
Me: That’s what I meant to say. Israel Beitenu really helps  
Zion: Labour also helped. Labour helped. (Interview 20, 2015) 
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To sum up, immigrants, in general, are included in the collective imaginary of these places. 
Interviewees accept that immigrants will disrupt the course of their life, and for the most part, 
believe it to be for better. However, comparable to the Law of Return, this collective imaginary 
seems inclusive for Jewish immigrants, but excludes all other social groups.   
Jewish immigration is associated with five main dimensions of local development. The first, and 
most obvious, is the socioeconomic development aspect. However, this development is foreseen 
through in-place economy rather than a productive economy. Immigrants are not generally 
viewed as entrepreneurs or job creators. By their presence in the city, they increase the 
residential base, which is believed to translate into consumption, but also… municipal taxes! The 
demographic growth experienced by host cities also means that public services can be 
maintained or increased. And, following the national project of occupation of the land, it secures 
a Jewish majority in territories where Palestinian Israelis reside. In addition to assuring a Jewish 
majority, it can strengthen parties that mainly serve the population of the periphery, and 
immigrant representatives. The dimension of sociocultural diversity, an argument that has 
gained growing popularity among policymakers in gateway cities in Europe and in North 
America, also has its advocates in these mid-sized cities. However, this diversity is limited to the 
various Jewish immigrant groups that make up the city. Palestinian Israelis, or even non-Jewish 
immigrants, are not part of the discourses. Lastly, immigrants bring an indirect benefit: they can 
justify new transfers from the central administration and from the third sector.  
Based on these beliefs, municipalities sometimes adopt a proactive approach to immigration, 
encouraging immigration to their cities through marketing or outreaching on the one hand; and 
setting up immigrant-friendly public services' delivery on the other hand. It means that they 
dedicate resources, to travel out, to maintain municipal staff working directly with new 
immigrants, and to carry out programs. The following section will look in greater depth at these 
activities, and more importantly, whom they target.   
2 Outreaching to ‘active, participatory and productive individuals’ 
The impact of Jewish immigration on town’ development — socioeconomic, demographic, 
cultural, political and financial — are more strongly associated with particular groups of 
immigrants. In order to clarify this phenomenon, I have selected a quote, which brings together 
several elements of analysis:  
People who say that, say that because they don’t know. I’ll tell you what. Let’s think about what 
there was here before a million immigrants arrived. There is not a sector in the country, which did 
not generate profits, by 1000%, since Aliyah absorption. I'm talking about sciences, academia, 
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music, literature, cinema, technology. There is no sector that did not take a big step. You know 
what. Look at Arad. I look at the settlement we were raised in. We were a very, very, very quality 
village. The elite of the Negev. Ok? Population that lived here, before the immigrants, was a very 
educated population, everybody was employed. Let’s start with the fact that the settlement did 
not receive, there was a receiving committee, they did not receive a family without work. In the 
DNA of people, what stays is that residents work, they contribute. And then, boom, Aliyah arrived. 
Engineers arrived, music teachers arrived, maths teachers arrived, geologists arrived. Who did 
not come. People. Everybody found a job and worked. You know why? I speak about a high 
proportion. Why? This is their mentality. They don’t know how else. All right a family arrived with 
a child, a dog and a Grandma. The grandma gets welfare. It’s not that she came to the welfare 
authority but she got, she got from the State. It’s a grandma. If she comes with grandpa, so a 
couple gets allowance. But the parents, the parents worked. I don’t say that there were not some 
single mothers. I don’t say that. We see some in the welfare. Today some don’t work. But that’s not 
the majority. We can’t look at it this way. We need to look at the working, contributing mass. They 
give so much power to the state. Let’s not look at the things… ok there is. I will tell you something, 
when we go for outreaching, I interview families. We can sit for 15 minutes, 10 minutes, 
sometimes it can be as long as 30 minutes. To tell you that I can say if these people will come and 
will work, and be efficient, and contribute. I don’t know. Maybe he will not find himself. Maybe 
only she will work. But the children will serve in the army, and work. On this basis can we refuse a 
family? What’s that. Think of it. I can tell you that the ones that speak this way… because some 
talk like that. I hear them. It’s been years that I handle this conflict. Don’t look at things in a 
narrow way. Yes, some don’t find a job. (Interview 7, 2014) 
Miriam is the director of the municipal department for culture, immigration and integration. She 
grew up in Arad in the 1970s. She has worked for 25 years in the municipality, dealing with 
immigration issues. She describes Arad as an elite town, where a city committee existed in the 
first years of its establishment to select residents on the basis of their occupational potential in 
the city. Even though the committee is not anymore active, in the 1990s, Arad’s mayor 
proactively outreached to Soviet immigrants, travelling to the former Soviet republics. Miriam 
strongly believes that these immigrants, in their majority, are contributing citizens who work 
and participate in the economic growth of Israel. Their children serve in the armed forces, and 
will also be employed in the Israeli labour market.   
Her discourse can therefore be divided into two lines of analysis: firstly, the engagement of 
municipalities in designing outreaching policies to specific immigrants, conceived as having a 
higher probability to contribute to local economic development as well as to nation-wide 
growth; second, the stereotyping of western migrants — as opposed to migrants originating 
from developing countries — whose characteristics make them more desirable in the eyes of the 
hosting society.  
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2.1 Adopting a policy to outreach to specific immigrants 
At the moment of fieldwork, Acre and Arad (to a smaller extent) were actively engaged in 
immigrant outreaching — an activity MOIA and municipal agents in municipal departments of 
immigration and integration call Aliyah encouragement (Idud Aliyah). Kiryat Gat was not directly 
involved but it worked to retain Ethiopian immigrants who were first hosted in the Shoshana 
absorption centre, and it developed some pilot tools to encourage immigrants to buy housing 
units in the new Karmei Gat neighbourhood.  
Aliyah outreaching is translated into several activities: an on-going relation with the 
representatives of the Jewish Agency and Nefesh beNefesh abroad; regular contacts with 
candidates to immigration interested in settling in the city; and trips abroad, usually led by the 
mayor or the deputy mayor, to market the city and convince Jews abroad to immigrate to Israel 
and more particularly to the city they represent. Contacts are usually established with JAFI (or 
Nefesh beNefesh) representatives in Western countries and in the Former Soviet countries. 
Trips are also organised towards those destinations — Ukraine, Moldova, Russia, Canada, United 
States, France, Mexico… etc. As the cities I explored have small municipal budgets, those trips are 
limited to one or two visits annually. Why would municipalities organise such activities? Elisa, 
director of the municipal department of immigration and integration in Acre answers:  
The Jewish Agency cannot advertise for each city. The Jewish Agency wants people to come, that’s 
all. They don’t say go to Acre, go to Holon. They don’t choose where to go. It’s us that need to 
advertise. Why would the Jewish Agency need to sell Acre? We need to do it. It’s our objective, our 
interest. (Interview 5, 2014) 
Cities that carry out activities to outreach to immigrants take control over the populations they 
appeal to. In Acre in particular, they say they target young families with children (Interview 5, 
2014). They affirm they want to bring a strong population, who can contribute.  
Who is this strong population? When I asked interviewees to better define what they meant by 
strong, I was told that meant people who work and can buy a house (Interview 2, 2014), people 
who work, serve in the armed forces and pay taxes (Interview 7, 2014), even if they do not work 
in the city where they settle, or even if they do not create new jobs. 
As interviewees did not answer the question directly, I listed the terms that were associated 
with immigration on the one hand; and development, contribution or growth on the other hand. 
The following subsection focuses on the profile of the perceived ideal, desirable immigrants 
towards whom immigration outreaching policy is geared.  
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2.2 A requirement that fits FSU and Western immigrants’ reputation 
Throughout the analysis, I have shown that the active involvement of certain municipalities in 
outreaching to Jewish candidates to immigration is believed to allow those cities to gain control 
over the profile of those who settle in the city. In particular, and in order to contribute to the 
various aspects I have cited above — economic development, demographics, cultural diversity 
— immigrants targeted by those policies are expected to have a high level of education, to be of 
working age and to bring ‘culture’ (which implies the double meaning of Western liberal 
attitudes and knowledge of the arts — music, literature, theatre and more).   
Although there are huge differences among FSU immigrants, in terms of geographic origin — 
from Ukraine to Uzbekistan —, in education, in previous occupation etc. the ‘Russians’ fall into a 
fairly stereotyped profile: educated, consumers of cultural activities, hardworking, ‘people of the 
system’ with high representation in the politics of Israel etc. 
In short, the ‘Russians’ are idealised as ‘active, participatory and productive individuals’ (Soysal, 
2012). In a world that promotes lifelong education, employment at any cost, and self-
involvement in civil society (Ibid.), such individuals could ultimately replace the State where it 
has withdrawn.  
2.2.1 Educational excellence 
FSU immigration is highly correlated with educational credentials. Interviewees mention a wide 
array of topics in which FSU immigrants are believed to excel: sciences, academia, technology, 
also including maths, chemistry and physics. They are perceived as having higher numbers of 
trained individuals in the fields of medicine, computing and engineering (Interview 1, 2014; 
Interview 5, 2014; Interview 7, 2014; Interview 8, 2014; Interview 12, 2014; Interview 16, 2014; 
Interview 20, 2015; Interview 23, 2015; Interview 40, 2015; Interview 58, 2015).  
It is in fact true that FSU immigrants are relatively better educated. The Central Bureau of 
Statistics reports that 50% of FSU immigrants who arrived after 1990 hold academic degrees 
(CBS, 2013). Nevertheless, many degrees are not automatically recognised and their holders 
have to sit equivalent exams upon arrival in Israel, leading many of them to give up on their 
previous career. Similarly, some professions are absent from the Israeli labour market, such as 
several types of engineering, which were virtually non-existent in Israel. Altogether, it is 
estimated that only 34 % of newcomers work in the same profession as they occupied in their 
home countries (CBS, 2013).  
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Even though FSU immigrants’ education do not always allow for labour market integration, their 
high level of education has made it possible to introduce changes at various levels: Firstly, it 
means that there is increased competition within schools, helping to improve results in schools 
which register immigrants in the long run; secondly, it is associated with the availability of a 
pool of trained workers who need minor retraining to fit the labour market; and lastly, since 
these immigrants tend to place a premium on education, they set up alternative mechanisms to 
cope with what they perceive as a lower quality educational system in Israel. In Arad, for 
example, immigrants have set up an evening school for FSU immigrant children, hiring former 
Russian-speaking teachers, in order to provide extra classes.  
2.2.2 Culture 
The second dimension associated with FSU immigrants, and Western immigrants in general, is 
culture, including music — concerts, opera —, literature, cinema, or even sports (Interview 1, 
2014; Interview 3, 2014; Interview 5, 2014; Interview 7, 2014; Interview 8, 2014; Interview 12, 
2014; Interview 16, 2014; Interview 20, 2015; Interview 23, 2015; Interview 40, 2015; 
Interview 45, 2015; Interview 58, 2015). 
In the 1990s, FSU immigrants, particularly the intelligentsia (Storper-Perez, 1998), supported by 
State institutions, therefore invested considerable efforts in fostering a vibrant cultural 
environment, which was usually segregated and Russian speaking. Daniele Storper-Perez has 
documented these initiatives in Jerusalem — and while large cities were certainly hosting more 
of these initiatives that the small towns of the periphery — I have met members of the 
intelligentsia who have invested time and effort in activating their contacts with Russian-
speaking artists and recreating cultural life in Israel. In Arad, Natalia organised a weekly salon in 
the 1990s dedicated to poetry recitals, concerts and other cultural events.  
Nowadays, providing cultural activities in their native tongue to Russian speaking immigrants is 
one of the main tasks municipal departments for immigration and integration take upon 
themselves, and they can easily obtain MOIA funds to do so. In Kiryat Gat and Arad in particular, 
organising cultural activities targeting FSU immigrants is at the core of the departments’ 
activities. Arad’s municipal departments for culture, and for immigration and integration have 
merged. Municipalities are assisted in this endeavour by the district office of the MOIA, the 
community centres of the matnass network, the youth club, and other community centres, 
cultural infrastructures and associations.  
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As I demonstrated earlier, leaders express clear links between this crave for culture and the 
sociocultural development of their cities. A quote by the director of AMI, the association for 
French immigration in Israel, explains the connection:  
If we would say that each immigrant could live for half the price in Kiryat Gat, subsidising rents as 
much as 1500 shekels a month, for a year? It’s not a lot. But what an impact on the population! 
People leave Paris to come and live with us! When they arrive, they open a French bakery. In 
Ashkelon, when they opened the first French bakery… wow. Frenchmen have knowhow.92 
(Interview 34, 2015) 
Interviewees mention another area in which FSU immigrants have made a significant 
contribution: an urban culture of aesthetics and cleanliness (Interview 1, 2014; Interview 6, 
2014; Interview 20, 2015; Interview 23, 2015; Interview 27, 2015). In two drivalong interviews 
I conducted in Arad and Kiryat Gat, both my interlocutors insisted on showing me the 
improvements that immigrants had made to houses built in the 1990s. Among a series of similar 
houses, each one had added extensions and changed colours and architectural styles, leading to 
a quarter of the houses becoming personalised (Interview 1, 2014; Interview 27, 2015).  
As described above, Russian-speaking urbanites, and French immigrants, are considered to have 
made the most contribution to culture. This reveals the persistence of a discriminatory vision 
that believes in the superiority of Western immigrants over Easterners. This is accentuated by 
the monopolistic position of FSU immigrants in the MOIA and in local institutions dealing with 
immigration integration.  
2.2.3 Work ethics 
Closely concomitant to the injunction on individuals to be productive, the ability to participate in 
the workforce is highly considered by interviewees. FSU immigrants are considered to possess 
such attributes: hard workers, with a work ethics, who do not mind the downward mobility 
often experienced by immigrants on arrival (Interview 1, 2014; Interview 7, 2014; Interview 14, 
2014; Interview 15, 2014; Interview 23, 2015; Interview 40, 2015, 2015). Most descriptions do 
not concern entrepreneurship. FSU immigrants are perceived as individuals who primarily look 
for jobs as employees or in the public sector (Interview 12, 2014).  
It is true that FSU immigrants have lower rates of self-employment than the Israeli population. 
Although several national mechanisms which were established in the 1990s to encourage 
                                                          
92 Translation of the author.  
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entrepreneurship were designed for FSU immigrants, they are primarily exploited by Israelis 
(Razin, 1990). FSU immigrants’ self-employment is half the average of Israeli self-employment.  
What do the multiple statements linked to the labour market integration of FSU immigrants, 
perceived or real, induce? A first issue which I will explore in more depth in chapters 6 and 7, is 
the centrality of economic participation in present day Israel. In a previous chapter I have 
already described how values linked to individualism and financial autonomy are predominant 
in Israel today, hence the success of the label ‘start-up nation’ (Senor & Singer, 2011). Senor and 
Singer devoted a large section of their book (on the contribution of FSU immigrants) to the 
development of the high tech sector in Israel. This feeds quite directly into new frames of 
‘deservingness’. Immigrants who are perceived as autonomous and productive are praised in 
liberal discourse.  
Nevertheless, the capacity of FSU immigrants to enter the labour market — compared to 
previous waves of immigration — seems to be concomitant to the accession of Israel in the circle 
of industrialised countries. The Israeli economy of the 1990s was better able to support the 
integration of a large number of immigrants than the fragile economy of the 1950s. Secondly, 
FSU immigrants benefited from the direct absorption policy, where they could, at least in theory, 
choose where to live and move closer to economic centres. Thirdly, the family structure is also a 
factor, as FSU immigrants belonged to smaller, usually multigenerational, families in which the 
elderly could take care of the children, providing more possibilities for parents to integrate the 
labour market (Lipshitz, 1998; Lewin-Epstein et al., 2003; Tzfadia, 2006).   
2.3 About other immigrants 
Immigrants from different countries are not perceived as making equal contributions. In 
particular, immigrants from developing countries, or even Soviet Jews originating from Central 
Asia — Azerbaijan or Georgia for instance — are considered as a welfare population who costs 
more to public agencies than they contribute.  
For instance, an Arad interviewee explains:  
Although in Arad, the Aliyah was rather ‘easy’. Immigrants from Russian came. Not from 
Kazakhstan for instance, who are considered ‘difficult migrants’. Good families. But with a 
different mentality. (Interview 21, 2015) 
She continues: 
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Immigrants are usually perceived as weakening the city. Although Arad did not host many 
Ethiopians. (Ibid.) 
In Kiryat Shmona, many consider that immigrants who settled and stayed in the city are 
primarily there out of choice, or ‘trapped’. In fact:  
The only thing you can do is to bring the same trapped populations from developing countries, 
from India, and I don’t know where we have some left. Places where the culture is different, and 
you have to invest in them. And you need a period to absorb them, deal with economic problems. 
(Interview 55, 2015) 
What is interesting though, is that in Acre there are measured statements when it comes to 
immigrants from developing countries. The mayor is proud of the achievements of the 
population of Mountain Jews — who in other cities usually fall into the category of undesirable 
immigrants. He assures that the mechanisms set up to facilitate their participation in the various 
city institutions have worked: pupils excel in schools, adults participate in the workforce etc. 
(Interview 32, 2015).  
Kiryat Gat also works hard to eliminate prejudice towards immigrants from developing 
countries. A population of several thousand Ethiopian immigrants, and their offspring, reside in 
the city, as well as immigrants from central Asia, India and elsewhere. Even though several 
interviewees have demonstrated prejudiced discourse, the mayor, the deputy mayors and the 
spokesperson have attempted to offset such discriminatory discourse during our meetings. For 
instance, the spokesperson affirms Ethiopians make a considerable contribution significantly to 
the community (Interview 57, 2015). Kiryat Gat mayor Aviram explains that those who are 
usually blamed for their lack of participation are not necessarily the ones who should take the 
blame:   
Yes. And by the way, it’s not the Ethiopians and the narco. I have here 3000 families from the FSU, who 
are retirees. They don’t pay at all. They don’t pay at all. It means, sometimes there are stereotypes: it’s 
him, or him. No no my brother, it’s you! I don’t know if you know, but it’s you. I don’t know if you 
know, but it’s your father. They shout: we give! The Haredim don’t serve in the army! This one does 
not do that! This one… Wait wait. Do you know the proportion of people serving in the army? What 
are you talking about? Everybody pays municipal taxes among the Haredim. I wish everybody would 
pay municipal taxes like the Haredim. Why? Those ones don’t pay at all. The Russians. So (Interview 
19, 2014) 
Here, I want to show that, even though there is a large consensus over the Law of Return, this 
immigration policy has been eroded at city level. The local reinterpretation of the Law of Return 
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follows a Not In My Backyard (NIMBY) logic. It is limited to certain individuals and groups who 
are expected to easily participate in the main institutions of the country — schools, the armed 
forces, the labour market, culture and politics. This involves a resemblance with the dominant 
Israeli groups, which FSU immigrants in particular are perceived to present. This logic 
consequently partly excludes other immigrants, who fit into present day institutions less well.  
However, it only partly excludes them. At least, immigrants who are not perceived as productive 
individuals, but as vulnerable groups, benefit from the moral obligation of Israel to support 
Jewish immigrants. In return, municipalities are granted extra resources, therefore accessing 
new funding channels. Additionally, these cities contain a heritage of marginalisation, exploited 
by political parties such as the Sephardic Shas party or the Israel Beitenu immigrant party. In this 
context, they gain some pride from tolerating, or even celebrating, otherness. 
This heritage also has an impact on the perception of the potential contribution of immigration. 
This next section will focus on the interviewees who do not believe it is the city's role to 
elaborate an immigration policy.  
3 Breaks and resistances 
The various interview extracts I have transcribed in the two previous sections stage four cities 
located across different places in a spectrum: from Acre, which has a very proactive immigration 
policy; to Arad which recently reintegrated an immigration outreaching programme; Kiryat Gat 
which puts some effort in retaining the current immigrant population, without specific efforts to 
reach out to newcomers; and Kiryat Shmona, which has adopted a no policy approach. These 
attitudes need to compared with the city’s reactions to decentralisation, and its capacity to cope 
with its new responsibilities. 
Kiryat Shmona’s attitude is not isolated. Indeed, in the 1990s, scholars started to measure the 
relative ‘autonomy’ of cities. They have documented the reactions of city leaders requested to 
host newcomers, and show that, through a mix of bargaining and appeals to the public opinion, 
many mayors have refused to receive newcomers (see for instance Auerbach (2001, 2011)). 
They did not refuse Jewish immigration to Israel, but rather followed a NIMBY logic. However, at 
the time, this reaction demonstrated their capacity to bargain with the government. Nowadays, 
although some municipalities have very clearly engaged in encouraging immigration, some cities 
still refuse. The latter are the ones perceived to have a lower capacity for decentralisation.  
Different factors explain this refusal: first of all, immigration is still perceived by some as 
generating more expenses than resources. Since the State assists in settlement, cities must have 
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housing available as well as various services, from language learning to schooling assistance at 
etc. Secondly, cities located in the periphery believe that immigrants who settle in their areas are 
usually more prone to unemployment, or are older, than those who choose to settle in the 
centre. Most importantly, these cities refuse to take responsibility for a public issue they believe 
is still the responsibility of the State.   
3.1 Costs of immigration 
The opponents of the settlement of new immigrants in their city raise the issue of public 
expenses, more notably the welfare dependency of new immigrants. This political discourse can 
only be too familiar, independently of the geographical context. Immigrants are usually 
portrayed as taking advantage of public expenses. If I have exposed the multiple accounts of 
interviewees who strongly support immigration as catalyst for development, there are still 
people who believe that their contribution does not pay back the expenses they generated both 
during their settlement and afterwards.  
In the case of the cities I have studied, this feeling is usually connected with a bitter history of 
immigrant settlement in the periphery (see chapter 3). As one interviewee in Kiryat Shmona 
expresses, it is “the same trapped populations” who are “brought” to the city:  
And it’s rare to see development towns that deal in immigrant integration policymaking. Also, in 
immigrant integration there are many risks. You can get populations who are welfare populations, 
and then you increase the economic weight for the local authority. The welfare, so you 
understand, although it’s from the State, it’s matching. Everything you, every new service, you pay 
at least a quarter of the cost, a quarter. And the budgets don’t get bigger. Huh, that’s why, it’s a bit 
of a problem, I tell you again, there is no massive migration from France and from US. I speak of 
developed countries. And policies to attract them are almost failing. The only thing you can do is 
to bring the same trapped populations from developing countries, from India, and I don’t know 
where we have some left. Places where the culture is different, and you have to invest in them. 
And you need a period to absorb them, deal with economic problems. (Interview 55, 2015) 
Sometimes, these immigrants, although they have cost money, particularly in the first years 
following their settlement, when they benefit from the absorption basket but also from various 
other entitlements, decide to remigrate from Israel, back to their country of origin or to a third 
country:  
See, Latin Americans for instance, a lot of them came because of a disastrous economic situation. 
They… The last mayor brought 40 families to Kiryat Gat, from Argentina. You know how many 
stayed? Maybe four, five. Part of them went back to Argentina, part of them went to Kibbutzim. 
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Some people got an absorption basket, opened a business, closed it and left debts behind. 
(Interview 16, 2014) 
Out-migration of immigrants is not an isolated phenomenon, nor is the out-migration of 
residents. However, several interviewees associate immigration with the departure of the upper 
socioeconomic layers of the population to more dynamic areas. Indeed, the same interviewee in 
Kiryat Shmona speaks of the balancing movements of immigration and departure of what he 
calls ‘quality individuals’ or ‘socioeconomic locomotives’:  
Apart from people that, the way of their lives took them to a place where they don’t have a choice, 
they stay here. It’s people that don’t have an education, or did not go to obtain a degree. Workers 
in factories and people like that, that. The ones who leave and don’t come back, and we have a 
problem in planning, are the quality guys, let’s say, the same economic, social locomotives. That 
we need to come back, to take the reins and drive the city forward. It has always been like this in 
Kiryat Shmona, it always suffered from this, it always expelled quality human resources out, to the 
centre. What balanced those out-migrations are the waves of massive Aliyah. But unfortunately, 
there will not be massive migrations in the upcoming years. (Interview 55, 2015) 
In another city, one interviewee, who asked to remain anonymous, also links immigration with 
the decrease of the attractiveness of the city, and the subsequent out-migration of ‘strong 
populations’: 
Over the years, strong populations left. I don’t want to be named now, because if I say something 
like… Immigrants’ came and pulled the population down, and the strong ones left, those are things 
that I don’t want to sign with my name.  
In a city like Kiryat Shmona, immigration is mostly experienced as imposed from above, a result 
of a national public housing policy (Interview 44, 2015). The availability of housing prevails in 
the decision to ‘send’ immigrants, without any overall strategy to provide public services and 
employment in the long run. This is again related to immigrant settlement policies in the 1950s 
and 1960s, and again in the 1990s. In each case, municipalities were largely dependent on 
central transfers and had little room to negotiate with the government and decide on a number 
of immigrants that they could reasonably host in their cities. Strong municipalities refused the 
quotas and housing construction, while deprived municipalities found themselves with high 
numbers of immigrants, despite the lack of economic perspectives for residents and immigrants 
(Auerbach, 2001, 2011). Today, Kiryat Shmona experiences this situation even more strongly 
since public funding is shrinking: 
Abram: The Government does not give, does not give. As if we were in a good situation. But there 
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are elements here in Kiryat Shmona. If you look at the situation of social affairs, we have 2,700 or 
2,500 families out of 7,000 families. Can we say that our situation is good? Our children go away, 
when they finish studying, they go away. So. People get old. I told to someone from the parliament 
who came to Kiryat Shmona: Thank you very much, thank you Government of Israel for having 
transformed Kiryat Shmona into a large retirement home. Ok. We need caregivers and social 
workers. That's not new. There is no new industry that could bring a stronger population, to 
balance things. Even for municipal taxes. 96% pay municipal taxes. But each year, we give 7 million 
NIS tax reduction.  
Me: You mean that you manage to raise taxes, but then many benefit from tax reductions.  
Abram: Reductions for the elderly for instance. Or people who live off social welfare. Most of the 
reductions are decided by law. But we give more reductions. There is a committee for tax 
reductions. The committee gives more because people find themselves in socio-economic 
conditions that are very difficult, so they ask for more. So these 7 million instead of taking them and 
redistributing them for the good of our residents, we give it away.  
Me: So how did you get to rank 5 in this situation?  
Abram: We don’t understand either. We are trying, checking what we can do to get back to 4 at 
least, because 4 would mean extra millions in funding. From 2004, the trend started and ten years 
later, nothing got out. Our tail is not out of it so I don’t even speak of our entire body. So let’s talk 
about integration in Kiryat Shmona There was massive absorption. There was a great absorption in 
1989/90. They sent people because there were apartments. People arrived here, got flats. The 
government was happy. They did not think of what would happen in one year, two years, three, 
what about the children. The State also provided funding through the MOIA, through all kinds of 
loans, the State gave something to live on and find a job, all kinds of Hebrew classes. Today there 
are no Hebrew class in Kiryat Shmona despite the fact that there are immigrants. (Interview 6, 
2014) 
This municipal attitude is quite criticised, which shows that municipalities who refuse the new 
rules of the decentralisation game are blamed and held responsible:  
Kiryat Shmona never misses the opportunity to miss an opportunity. It comes from a basic culture 
of poverty and inferiority. Kiryat Shmona always wanted someone else to do the job for them. 
There is no ‘Kiryat Shmona for Kiryat Shmona’. (Interview 2015) 
Kiryat Shmona is the least involved in immigration policymaking. It does not have a municipal 
unit, or department for immigration and integration. It does not organise outreaching activities. 
The activities targeted at the resident immigrant population are limited, and generally concern 
culture. The above mentioned extracts show that this policy comes from a general belief that 
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immigrants settling in Kiryat Shmona are a welfare population, notably elderly people, 
transforming the city into a ‘retirement home’. Secondly, the responsibility to care for this 
welfare population falls too heavily on the shoulders of the local authority, which realises it 
cannot provide the necessary funds. Lately, the NGO Shavei Israel and the MOIA have decided 
that a group of Bnei Menashe immigrants from India are to settle in the city. The municipality 
has refused to become involved in the programme.   
3.2 Refusal to be take responsibility in place of central administration  
Acre’s municipality affirms that it is their job to outreach to potential candidates to immigration. 
For the city, the Jewish Agency is an intermediary for future immigrants to Israel, but it is by no 
mean obliged to recommend settlement areas to the newcomers.  
In Arad, reaching out to certain groups of Jews in the Diaspora was a strong policy in the 1990s. 
Arad has withdrawn from outreaching programs since 2003. The city reintegrated these 
programmes for just one year, in 2015, but withdrew again in 2016.   
Kiryat Gat and Kiryat Shmona take the view that encouraging Jewish immigration is the 
responsibility of the State, and not theirs. Kiryat Shmona, whose attitude firmly opposes 
decentralisation, once again calls upon the State to fulfil its responsibility: 
The ones who decide that they bring Aliyah, and they don’t impose on the local authority to finance, 
there will be Aliyah. That’s our obstacle. When you have to give a matching of 10%, 15, 20%. Now 
comes the community of Bnei Menashe. They are arriving now. From the beginning, we said that we 
can’t deal with anything. (Interview 54, 2015) 
Kiryat Gat does engage in activities for immigrants already living in the city but does not 
encourage immigration. The deputy mayor argues: 
We want. We want to separate. We will help him to go to work. We will help him to get to his school. 
We will help. That’s our policy. Within the framework of education. But not. We don’t want to be a 
branch of the MOIA. This, no. (Interview 57, 2015) 
Resistance to decentralisation processes is particularly strong in those towns that have 
difficulties raising a municipal budget through local taxes. Even if they could reach central 
budgets, the weight of necessary funds is too large. In this context, they claim that the 
government is to blame for the establishment of cities in areas that are not connected with 
economic networks. This historical responsibility of the State in their marginalisation is, 
however, hardly linked to Marxist or post-colonialist political claims. It focuses essentially on 
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perceptions related to equitable resource distribution.  
3.3 Need for cooperation  
Expecting the State to take responsibility for immigration settlement, and the delivery of the 
required public services which necessarily follow on from such settlement, is not extraordinary 
for these peripheral cities that still obtain extra budgets and equalising grants to balance their 
meagre finances. Nevertheless, most transfers now come at a price: matching funds. In Kiryat 
Shmona in particular, interviewees blame the matching fund mechanism for privileging 
municipalities that have the means to match, while Kiryat Shmona stays out of development 
circles:  
If the MOIA gives 110,000 NIS per year, they will ask Kiryat Shmona to put up more, 11000 shekels. 
That’s matching. For Kiryat Shmona, I hope that all the ministries will do the same. In Kiryat 
Shmona. For instance, in social affairs, if we want a, a project there, we can’t. We need to put up a 
matching 25%. For big cities, which have the money, it’s not a problem to do the matching, so they 
take the projects and develop them. It's not a problem for them to put up 25% and give it to social 
affairs, to improve the situation of children. And we stay in the same situation. (Interview 5, 2014)  
Even if the matching is made possible, as in Kiryat Gat, it does not immediately translate into 
adopting immigration policies. The director of Kiryat Gat local MOIA office regrets that the city 
does not reach out to immigrants. However, she also explains that it would require cooperation 
between different bodies, to cater to all the immigrants’ needs:  
Me: Also, in Kiryat Gat, they don’t encourage Aliyah.  
Edna: Indeed, in Ashkelon, Ashdod, they do ‘Aliyah encouragement’. The municipality must 
participate and put up a budget. As a resident of Kiryat Gat, I feel very sad. We need this population. 
I see people in Hebrew classes: they are an investment. The municipality needs that. Y. A. does 
absorption in the community. To encourage Aliyah is not simply to bring the Grandma and the 
cousin of an existing resident. It requires cooperation. If a municipality encourages Aliyah, it 
commits to the newcomers. In exchange, the newcomers must stay for a year in the settlement, and 
they obtain extra money. On top of the standards, I will give you 3,000 shekels extra. And if you stay 
9 months, I will give you another 3,000. You don’t sign up for a year at least, but you know that 
every quarter there will be money. Anyway, in Kiryat Gat, there is no group Aliyah except from 
Ethiopia. Two years ago, there was a big Aliyah from Ethiopia. 200 immigrants came to Kiryat Gat, 
and 150 were Ethiopians. They have Hebrew classes in their absorption centre. The fifty 
immigrants left were of different ages. I could not open a class… I need 25 people at least to open a 
class. At the time, they had to go study outside the city. If you encourage Aliyah, the city must open a 
Hebrew class in Kiryat Gat. It must provide employment, housing… and the MOIA will give money. 
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(Interview 18, 2014) 
Description of successful immigration policies involves cooperation with the ministries, the 
municipality, other public and third sector agencies on local levels, and very often, the residents 
themselves who offer assistance, open their homes, and help their new neighbours in their daily 
lives.  
To conclude, taking responsibility for immigration issues is one of the many new responsibilities 
that have fallen on local government over the last decades. As economic development 
increasingly becomes a prerogative of the city, those who do not have the resources and the 
tools to follow this injunction find themselves cyclically jeopardised. For those cities, every cost 
seems unbearable. Interviewees often qualify their management as ‘survival’ management. In 
this context, immigration is not on their agenda. In their short-term vision, they cannot foresee 
the possible gains of immigration, and they focus on the impossibility to match funds available at 
the central level. Immigration is a responsibility of the State, not an engine of development.  
4 Towards a rescaling of immigration policymaking? 
Improving the city’s attractiveness for immigrants is not the privilege of world-cities. These 
cases show that mid-sized peripheral cities can also engage in immigration outreaching.  
The discourse of these mid-sized cities, located far from the economic and political centres of the 
country — the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv axis — is anchored in a new approach towards urban 
governance. These cities wish to take control over their residents, whom they want to choose, 
and over their socioeconomic development. Immigration is one aspect of this shift. Although it is 
the prerogative of the State, some cities voluntarily take over and affirm that it is their role to 
‘market’ their territory as a potential area of settlement. Realistic when it comes to the low 
industrial and business potential of their city, they would rather emphasise their connectivity 
with larger employment areas — Tel Aviv, Haifa or Beer Sheva. Newcomers can quickly access 
those areas, while benefiting from a rural/urban lifestyle in a quiet town of the periphery.93 
To justify their proactive policy towards new immigrants, leaders borrow from Zionist ideology 
of Jewish occupation of the land, and its regenerative effect on the territory. They also borrow 
from more global and liberal discourses of diversity and socioeconomic development. This 
diversity is limited to Jewish immigration (or at least to beneficiaries of the Law of Return, if not 
Jewish within the definition of the Orthodox religious authorities). Furthermore, it is often 
                                                          
93 The urban/rural lifestyle of mid-sized towns is a common topos in the positioning, marketing and 
branding of these cities. In France, see for instance (Mainet, 2011). 
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limited to those immigrants who resemble the majority — white, Western Jewish immigrants. 
Nevertheless, partly because of their immigration history, some also reaffirm their will to cater 
for immigrants from developing countries. The main benefit perceived is the resources local 
authorities can obtain when they accept to take part in the settlement and integration of these 
groups — Ethiopian immigrants, Caucasus immigrants or Indian immigrants in the case of Acre 
and Kiryat Gat.    
Unsurprisingly, local politicians whose approach opposes decentralization reforms do not 
encourage immigration. Kiryat Shmona, in particular, endlessly calls upon the State to take 
responsibility for a periphery it created, a frontier town, a shield that has suffered the 
consequences of the tensions and wars between Israel and Lebanon since the 1970s. 
Permanently confronted with its past, Kiryat Shmona looks at the consequences of immigration 
on its population, who they perceive as being low skilled, welfare dependent and aging. Lastly, 
Kiryat Shmona does not benefit from a close employment area. Its geographic isolation 
reinforces the feeling of deprivation.  
We shall now focus on the three cities which convey an immigrant-friendly discourse: Acre, 
which proactively reaches out to potential immigrants; Arad, which has some mechanisms in 
place to outreach; and Kiryat Gat, which, if it does not have human resources targeted at 
outreaching, does recognise the potential contribution of immigrants and tries to retain 
currently residing immigrants, including Ethiopian immigrants benefiting from the absorption 
centre programme.  
Statements collected among policy makers and executive staffs in these cities show an 
increasing role of the city in immigration affairs. I will argue that the rescaling of the only policy 
regulating immigration to Israel — the Law of Return — includes a redefinition of the Law itself. 
Indeed, decision makers at city level redraw the boundaries of the law to favour beneficiaries 
they consider as contributors. Although they agree with the ethno-nationalist immigration 
policy, they adopt a NIMBY approach, avoiding taking responsibility for immigrants they believe 
will immediately fall into welfare, and preferring immigrants they believe will quickly become 
net contributors.  
However, the contribution of the newcomers is measured in terms of their residential 
contribution. As residents, they are expected to buy a property, pay local taxes, consume at local 
stores, and use public services (the latter helping to maintain services and secure central 
funding).  
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This last point in particular is worth highlighting: since the State of Israel supports Jewish 
immigration, and many ministries adopt an annual budget which includes funds for immigrant 
integration — in education, welfare, employment and so on —, hosting a large proportion of 
immigrants results in transfers of funding to the city. Additionally, these funds are even more 
important if the new residents originate from developing countries or countries where the 
Jewish community is in danger. In such cases, extra funding is released for these ‘special 
populations’ as defined by the ministries.  
4.1 An attempt to outreach to active, productive, participative individuals 
Immigration policies usually favour two types of immigrants: either labour immigrants who can 
join the large mass of malleable unskilled workers of the globalised economy, or high-skilled 
immigrants, usually portrayed as doctors, engineers or start-up funders. Even though family 
reunification is a much more common reason to enter another country legally, policies put more 
emphasis on the professional background of the potential immigrants, and the possible niches 
they can occupy to boost the economy.  
Israeli immigration policy, however, is usually viewed from an ethno-nationalist angle. The 
policy is at one and the same time inclusive and exclusive: it is very inclusive in that it applies to 
all Jews of the Diaspora, but it is also very exclusive as its beneficiaries are Jews, and Jews only. 
Nevertheless, fieldwork in the four cities I chose to explore as well as secondary material on 
other cities show that this law is not as inclusive as it seems. Indeed, the interviewees express 
the desire to select and control entries, limiting them to those they call ‘contributing individuals’ 
or ‘a strong population’. The immigrants' professional background and age is a factor included in 
policy formation, even though theorists have often neglected. 94 
In this sense, policy formation can be related to frames of "active, participatory and productive 
individuals” (Soysal, 2012) or of ‘deservingness’ (Chauvin & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012; Garcés-
Mascareñas, 2015). Indeed, Soysal shows that the new European social project focuses on 
individual responsibility to achieve a higher position in the labour market and active citizenship 
(Soysal, 2012). For Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas, deserving foreigners are assessed along 
                                                          
94 As I mentioned in chapter three the first waves of Jewish immigration to Ottoman Palestinewhich were 
managed by Zionist organisations in charge of encouraging and assisting their settlement, prevented 
‘penniless’ Jews from immigrating to Israel (Shilo, 1994). Candidates for immigration had to be 
independent, to rely on their own resources and to contribute to the economic development of the Yishuv. 
After the establishment of the State, because resources were insufficient, the Jewish Agency decided to 
focus its efforts on countries where there was an immediate threat to the Jewish communities. In other 
cases, priority was given to young workers under age of 35 — who were to represent 80% of immigrants.  
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three dimensions: their place of residence, which provides access to rights; their performance, 
that is to say their economic reliability and their cultural integration; and their vulnerability, that 
has to be proved and accompanied by a lack of agency, as being an asylum-seeker must mean 
having no migratory project (Chauvin & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012). 
Findings fit these frames, in the sense that interviewees expect the newcomers to work, to take 
part in the sociocultural activities of the city, in political life, as well as in the main institutions of 
the country, like the armed forces.  
Even immigrants from developing countries can be identified as ‘deserving’. Indeed, although 
they are believed to adapt less easily to the demands of the Israeli labour market (in terms of 
human capital for instance) or to the standards and language of the institutions, they are 
legitimate immigrants because of their very vulnerability. The State has a responsibility towards 
them. Their vulnerability is linked with their origins, or their parents’ origins. As a group, they 
deserve life-long assistance, and therefore life-long identification as ‘new immigrants’. In the 
following chapters I will analyse in greater depth the type of integration activities designed for 
these immigrants. 
4.2 Belief in in-place economy 
What do local governments’ officials expect from these contributing individuals? By carrying out 
outreaching activities that favour the settlement of Western or FSU immigrants, who are 
expected to be educated and to have high work ethics, is local government hoping for a future 
layer of businessmen and entrepreneurs? Or are they hoping for a cheap and malleable 
workforce?  
Indeed, in the theoretical framework of this study, I have drawn from the work of Glick-Schiller 
and Çağlar. They believe that cities respond to the relations between immigration and economic 
growth. On the one hand, cities develop opportunities to attract immigrants, “These 
opportunities include variations in regulatory regimes, local infrastructures and possibilities for 
entrepreneurial activities, employment, education, housing, and entrance into local political and 
cultural life” (Schiller & Çağlar, 2010, p. 3). On the other hand, they are expected to become 
“active agents in the neoliberal transformations of the cities: (1) as part of the labour force upon 
which cities build their competitiveness; […]; (3) as agents of neoliberal urban restructuring 
who contribute to or contest the changing status and positioning of neighbourhoods and cities; 
(4) by facilitating privatisation and neoliberal subjectivities […]” (Ibid., p. 12).  
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Other more recent works have shown that some cities have started to use diversity — a vague 
term referring to the presence of non-White and foreign-born immigrants in the city as a brand 
(Hoekstra, 2014, 2015; Sanders, 2015; Goode in Schiller & Çağlar, 2010, pp. 143–165). Kristin 
Good’s work on Toronto and Vancouver metropolitan areas in Canada shows a relatively 
frequent use of the relations between immigration and economic growth: more specifically, 
Vancouver’s greater responsiveness to immigrants is clearly identified with a ‘proactive 
economic-development regime’ (Good, 2009, p. 144). However, since 2015, the CityDiv project at 
the Max Planck Institute in Germany has collected data in large French and German cities to 
analyse their understanding of diversity and its impact on economic development, and 
preliminary results show that while the benefits are recognised, measures are still very limited 
(Tandé, 2015).  
In the context of the Israeli periphery, I have shown that one argument is particularly true. As 
argued by Glick-Schiller and Çağlar, immigrants are perceived by the participants in this 
research “as agents of neoliberal urban restructuring who contribute to or contest the changing 
status and positioning of neighbourhoods and cities”. Indeed, following a logic of ‘in-place 
economy’, the settlement of immigrants means that they are new residents in the territory, who 
produce and consume, who buy properties and sustain a need for commerce, businesses, public 
services or cultural activities (Mainet, 2011). Helga Leitner has studied immigration in small 
cities in America. She argues similarly that “migrants may prove to be active agents of the 
reconstitution of urban life” (Leitner, 2012, p. 211). Decayed city centres find a new function 
through the settlement of immigrants. New shops open. Public services witness a pick-up of 
demand and can therefore argue for their continuance.  
Nevertheless, a large incoming of immigrants in depressed towns can also contribute to the 
city’s decline (Schiller & Çağlar, 2010, pp. 191–192). In Israel, Erez Tzfadia has shown that the 
mass migration of the 1990s involved very high social costs for towns whose economies could 
not accommodate both old timers and newcomers (Tzfadia, 2006). Although there is no longer 
any mass migration to Israel, the memory of the 1990s migration may impact cities like Kiryat 
Shmona and explain their reluctance to receive more immigrants.   
4.3 Immigration brings public funding 
While exploring the reasons why local governments design local immigration policies, one 
finding is definitely paradoxical: the rescaling of immigration policies is a strategy to access 
resources from central administration!  
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Indeed, local governments formulate a simple demographic equation: the more immigrants 
there are in their cities, the greater access they can obtain to certain budgets targeted at 
immigrants, or more precisely, to services designed for immigrants. If there is already an 
immigrant group in the city there may be a ‘critical mass’ which helps provide a change in status. 
For instance, in the 1990s, cities that hosted a large number of immigrants managed to change 
their status from local councils to city councils, which was believed to grant them further 
independence and benefits. At present, ministries transfer budgets for education or welfare 
depending on the size of the immigrant population.  
‘Special populations’ benefit from extra budgets for education, welfare, employment, culture, 
Jewish education (non-formal education) and Jewish tradition, and community development. In 
2015, these special populations were deemed to be Ethiopian immigrants, Bnei Menashe 
immigrants from India, immigrants from the central Asian Republics (Georgia, Azerbaijan and 
Bukhara), and Ukrainian and Yemenite immigrants (due to current unrest).95 
The MOIA has various cooperation programs with local government. They provide that most 
expenses will be borne by the Ministry itself. These programs are the ‘integration in the 
community’ programme, which mainly transfers funds for sociocultural activities, and the ‘group 
Aliyah’ programme, which pays for the salaries of local municipal coordinators called 
proyektorim. They help the municipality to hire municipal agents with minimal risks. These 
agents work for the municipality, following the municipal agenda, and encourage immigration, 
as well as organising integration activities.   
Good shows that municipalities find it easier to raise funds from foundations for clear 
immigration/economic growth initiatives (Good, 2009, p. 144). This does not exactly correspond 
to the correlation I found in Israel. Economic growth initiatives are very marginal, and most 
efforts are directed towards cultural and social activities.  
Conclusions: rescaling towards the local level?  
In the introduction, I mentioned the following hypothesis: local governments’ involvement in 
immigration will transform the hierarchy of governance. By designing immigration policies and 
reaching out to national organisations, and also transnational organisations and Diasporic 
organisations, they rescale their development strategy, and reposition themselves on the 
national and the Diasporic map. 
                                                          
95See 
http://www.moia.gov.il/Hebrew/Subjects/ImmigrantAbsorption/Documents/NohalRashuyot_2015.pdf 
p. 13. 
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In fact, the creation of municipal units or departments that encourage new immigration has 
become more widespread over the last decade. If Arad seems to have addressed this issue for 
some time, Acre has reinforced this sector of activity since its mayor was elected. These units 
and departments have established direct contact with transnational organisations in charge of 
Jewish immigration, such as the Jewish Agency, Nefesh beNefesh or Shave Israel. By engaging in 
daily interactions with them, they hope to increase the flow of newcomers to their city.  
One of the principal motives for these municipalities to increase their effort towards this end is a 
localisation of socioeconomic development strategies. Since the mid-1980s, the State has 
withdrawn from peripheral towns. Industries are less and less subsidised and are leaving these 
areas. Municipal budgets are increasingly based on local incomes, which are also diminishing 
with the retraction of industries and businesses. Some municipalities have therefore proactively 
looked for new development perspectives — usually in parallel with claims directed at the 
central administration to support them. A focus on immigration policies — among others — 
show a turn in this local development approach which favours less a productive economy, and is 
more and more based on an ‘in-place economy’. As attracting important industrial project is 
challenging (or in the case of Kiryat Gat, the industrial area does not absorb enough local 
manpower), residents are the new engines of development.    
Investing in (international or internal) immigration provides another advantage: public 
subsidies are available and can be levered to hire municipal agents, to organise numerous 
sociocultural activities and to deliver public services. What I have assumed to be primarily a new 
local policy relies greatly on transfers from central administration. The following chapters will 
therefore have to determine if these transfers of funding come with transfers of ideas. I have 
shown that local immigration policies seem to differ to a certain degree from the national 
immigration policy, the law of return, by limiting its beneficiaries to productive individuals. This 
first set of findings will be explored in more depth.   
This chapter is aimed at addressing the rescaling of the development strategy of the local 
government which occurs in a complex and varied way. As I demonstrated in the chapter two, 
rescaling is not straightforward and leads to ‘mosaic’ (Brenner, 2004) patterns of power and 
governance. Here, the fact that the local governments of these four cities adopt different 
positions towards the potential of immigration in city development, is mostly grounded in place. 
The next chapter will therefore explore the role of the agents, the people that sit in those places, 
in associating immigration and development, and therefore pushing forward a proactive policy 
for immigration and integration.  
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Chapter 6 ◊ Meaningful interventions: local 
immigrant politicians produce scales 
To be a human being is to be a purposive agent, who both has reasons for his or her activities and 
is able, if asked, to elaborate discursively upon those reasons (including lying about them). 
(Giddens, 1986, p. 3)     
This quote extracted from Anthony Giddens’s The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of 
Structuration (Giddens, 1986) highlights the relations between people's social engagement with 
their world, their capacity to critically evaluate their actions, and their ability to express — 
through language — an opinion on these actions. Since the 1970s and the humanistic renewal in 
geography, relations between agency, reflexivity and language are central to many studies, and 
an even larger number of studies have analysed politics and discursive performances in politics. 
In fact, in addition to special issues regularly published in various places, several scientific 
journals are specifically dedicated to this topic — international reviews like Language in Society, 
Research on Language and Social Interaction and Linguistic Anthropology; or Francophone 
reviews such as Le sujet dans la cité, Mots : les languages du politique and Langage et Sociétés.  
In this rich theoretical, methodological and empirical context, and although narratives of 
immigrants have become a more frequent object of investigation, I have never come across any 
articles exploring the relations between immigrant politicians — whom, as politicians, produce 
and control the political discourse on immigration — and the way their narratives frame politics 
and policies, and more particularly those related to immigration issues.  
 Among the numerous analyses published over the three last decades on immigration policies, 
several works acknowledge that a person in government can lead a new immigration policy. For 
instance, Frankfurt’s immigrant policy in the 1990s was led by former councillor Daniel Cohn 
Bendit (Friedmann & Lehrer, 1997). In her work in Canada, Good recognises the importance of 
political agency and micropolitics in the formulation of immigration policies (Good, 2009, p. 22). 
Her research was based on interviews with local politicians, to understand their power and 
influence on the adoption of municipal multicultural policies. Another example is the pro-
immigrant policy adopted by the American city of Philadelphia, and usually associated with the 
city's Afro-American mayor (Sanders, 2015). In Israel, Auerbach (2001; 2011), Razin (2001) and 
Tzfadia (2005) demonstrate the increasing influence of mayoral activities in Israel. However, 
Auerbach in particular has shown that when it comes to immigration, mayoral activities focus 
more on adopting a no-policy attitude (Auerbach, 2001, 2011).  
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In fact, the politicians who control the framing of immigration policies have rarely experienced 
immigration themselves. As Penninx (2004) indicates, immigration and integration policies are 
usually formed through a negotiation between members of the ‘majority’, whereas immigrants 
targeted by those policies are hardly invited to the deliberations with politicians.    
This is the reason why Israel can provide concrete cases to measure the differentiated results of 
a negotiation between nationals and newcomers. In fact, Jewish immigrants benefitting from the 
Law of Return have immediate access to Israel citizenship, and can therefore vote and be elected 
even though they have just settled in the country. This access to citizenship, combined with the 
centrality of immigration in the Israeli national project and the weight of the immigrant 
population, are factors that have stimulated the emergence of an immigrant electorate and of 
immigrant representatives in national and local elections for political parties whose proposals 
are often linked with difficulties encountered by immigrants. The crystallisation of the religious 
Sephardic movement into the Shas party in the 1980s, or the establishment of nationalist 
Russian-speaking immigrant parties such as Israel BeAliyah and Israel Beitenu after the 1990s 
immigration from the former USSR, that I have mentioned in the previous chapters, illustrate the 
strength of immigrant politics in redefining a Jewish identity in Israel, outside the dominant 
Ashkenazi Jewish identity (see for instance, Shafir & Peled (2002), Berthomière (2004)).  
Scholars and journalists have studied the life stories of these political parties' leaders — Aryeh 
Deri for Shas, or Avigdor Lieberman for Israel Beitenu —, but what about the life stories of their 
local representatives? Indeed, these parties are very active in city councils, especially in areas 
with large immigrant populations. This is precisely what the present chapter will explore: 
through the analysis of the relations between the personal and professional experiences of local 
immigrant officials and the way they tell those stories, I argue that the language of immigrants 
— through the ‘politisation’ of their life stories —, reveals to a certain extent the local 
institutional framing of immigration and integration in Israel. Immigrant politicians I have met 
in Israel engage actively in ‘biographisation’ (Delory-Momberger, 2009), reconstituting their 
immigration story and staging it on multiple occasions — for the media and for researchers, and 
for their voters. The narratives and discourses of these politicians are meaningful events 
through which these officials engage with their social world, impacting the stakes of the groups 
they represent.  
This chapter will focus more particularly on three local officials, who immigrated to Israel in the 
1980s and 1990s. I will first describe the themes that emerge from their stories and the way 
they tell their stories. To this end, I have analysed the transcripts of our meetings, following a 
thematic analysis method. I then compared the three analyses to identify any recurrent themes. 
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As they are closely related, I have chosen to present the three major themes that are found in the 
three transcripts: the process of integration, their role of representation, and their function of 
mediation. Secondly, I will focus more particularly on the extent to which their ‘biographical 
performance’ constitutes a meaningful intervention, impacting immigration and integration 
policies, and the scales at which they are defined. This part will more specifically highlight 
discursive strategy, rather than only the themes that emerge from analysis. Lastly, I will analyse 
in more depth the impact of these interventions.    
1 Meeting with immigrant local officials 
I chose to present three local officials who experienced immigration from their country of origin 
to Israel. The three officials were strongly involved with immigration and integration policies 
formed in the cities. Numerous interviewees mentioned them during our encounters and 
encouraged me to meet them. Secondly, when we met, their immigration story was central to 
our discussion. Lastly, I had the opportunity to meet them several times, and to establish a 
relation beyond the official character of our first encounter.  
Tali is the mayor of Arad. She was born in Beltz in Moldova. She has a degree in psychology. She 
immigrated in 1991 with her husband and her two children. This immigration was the result of a 
long-lasting migratory project, the family’s first attempt to immigrate to Israel being in 1978. 
Tali grew up with the future of Israel in her mind. She already spoke Hebrew when she arrived 
in Arad. Tali does not elaborate on her professional experience in Moldova: she says that her 
story starts when she arrived in Israel, what happened before does not matter (Interview 8, 
2014). She first worked as a chambermaid at a hotel, in the Dead Sea hotel compound. Then she 
worked in another small service firm, before being hired by a bank in Arad, where she worked 
for 16 years. In 2003, she became a member of Arad city council, under the ultranationalist and 
Russian-speaking party Israel Beitenu. She replaced the evicted mayor in 2010, becoming the 
first 1990s immigrant mayor. In 2015, while I was doing my fieldwork, she was elected and 
became a Member of Parliament, 6th on the Kulanu list, a centre-right party led by Moshe 
Kachlon. She therefore had to leave the municipality. In June 2015, local elections took place, 
leaving her natural replacement far behind the Yesh Atid candidate.  
Abram comes from Ekaterinburg in central Russia. This is where he married and worked as a 
doctor. He also tells me that his first (failed) attempt to immigrate was in the 1980s. Eventually, 
as he felt he could not be promoted at the hospital he was working in due to his Jewish identity, 
he followed his sister who had already settled in Israel and arrived with his wife and son in 
1993, in Kibbutz Mayan Baruch in Galilee, a few kilometres from Kiryat Shmona. Later to 
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become mayor of Arad, Abram’s first job was as a cleaning agent, which allowed him to support 
his family while he studied to obtain Israeli medical qualifications. He passed the exams and 
opened his own small clinic. Finally, he became a doctor at Kiryat Shmona’s emergency room in 
1997, a position which helped him to get to know many of the city's residents. In 1996, he was 
contacted by a local representative of the local branch of Israel BeAliyah, refuznik Nathan 
Sharansky’s party. When Israel BeAliyah disbanded, he joined Israel Beitenu. As a member of this 
party, he was elected to the municipal council in 2003, 2008 and 2013. He is the deputy mayor in 
Kiryat Shmona.    
Ayelet was born in Ethiopia. With her family, she crossed Sudan before arriving in Israel. She 
was four and a half when her family settled in Ashkelon in Israel. She remembers a visit of 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who came to visit the immigrants’ neighbourhood of 
her childhood. She was designated to bring her a present. Some years later, her parents 
purchased a property in Kiryat Gat. Ayelet has a bachelor's degree in administration and public 
policies from Sapir Academic Centre. She works as a community worker. Finally, she joined the 
current mayor’s local list. They won the local elections in 2008, and again in 2013. She is a 
deputy mayor. Ayelet is a religious and observant woman. 
While each story is personal and unique, three themes emerge from the analysis of my meetings 
with these three officials: a liberal understanding of integration, and of their integration in 
particular, which is dependent on the immigrant’s capacity; a function of representative, more 
linked to public service rather than politics; and a position of mediation, between the different 
groups in the city, but also between the various levels of governance.  
1.1 The process of integration 
The first theme emerging from the textual analysis of these encounters is the process of their 
‘integration’. I insist on the term ‘process’ as integration is conceived as the realisation of these 
individuals’ ambitions over time. I will show that immigration first means a fresh start, usually 
associated with professional downgrading. This downward mobility is seen as temporary. 
Steadfast individual efforts allowed the three participants to achieve their integration into the 
State’s main institutions — in this case education, the labour market and the political and 
religious institutions.   
The arrival in Israel was a new beginning, in particular for Tali and Abram who arrived when 
they were adults. The mayor of Arad tells me: 
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[…] I mean, we arrived and we knew that we were starting from scratch. That’s why, today, when 
someone requires my resume, I start with a sentence “I came to Israel in 1991”. I mean, 
everything that was before, took place, but it does not influence what I do today. (Interview 8, 
2014) 
The fact that prior experiences no longer count to enter the labour market results in immediate 
downward mobility. The three interviewees describe their first job as cleaning agents (although 
for Ayelet, it was more a student job for an Israeli youth, rather than a result of her 
immigration). Abram talks about his experience with humour:   
Me: So you feel that you did not obtain a better position because you were a Jew. Weren’t you 
worried that here, they would not let you be a manager because you are an immigrant?  
Abram: I was not afraid. We arrived here. You know where I worked. I worked in Mayan Baruch, 
in the shopping centre. I cleaned. Even during ulpan (Hebrew course), I was a cleaner. After some 
time, thanks to my connections, I got my wife to work there too. (Laugh). The two of us worked 
there. In Mayan Baruch shopping centre. My wife worked in Burger Ranch. Every time she got a 
free meal, she would bring me a burger. I was so happy. (Interview 6, 2014) 
Tali understands that, after immigration, she would need to make some sacrifices and accept 
whatever job she could find. She tries to show that she felt no frustration or resentment for her 
professional downgrading:   
I remember the day that I was offered a job as a chambermaid in a hotel in the Dead Sea. I was the 
happiest person in the world. I took the job. Although, as you understood, although I have a 
degree in psychology and although I could do a lot of different things. (Interview 8, 2014) 
Later on during our encounter, she reflects on this experience: 
Look, maybe I am not a good example, I don’t know. When we wanted to come, everybody told us 
that Aliyah is very hard. “Be ready, it’s hard, you will have a lot of difficulties and problems”. When 
we celebrated a year in Israel, my husband and I sat and we asked ourselves: ‘When will it be 
difficult?’ Everything depends on how you see things, as a person, The moment when you don’t 
think of ‘How hard it is! How miserable I am!’. Think of that. ‘Now, I go clean rooms, I clean toilet 
seats! Me! With my master's degree! In psychology’. You understand. I wasn't thinking that. But I 
believe that some did, some thought like that. And I believe that the ones who thought like that 
did not succeed. I think that you have to accept what... what life offers you and go for it. That’s 
what we did. We went with the flow. It’s our country, we need to find ourselves here. (Ibid.)  
After this period of acceptation, the process of integration starts, and upward mobility occurs at 
a slow but sure pace. This self-realisation is due to a small-step strategy, as employed by Abram 
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thanks to his perseverance, Abram’s medical degree was recognised in Israel and he could 
practice again, first as a self-employed doctor, and then as an employee at the ER. Abram and I 
spent some time discussing during several encounters. He always provided detailed accounts of 
events, illustrating them with figures and statistics. Even when it came to his life story, he gave 
detailed accounts of his arrival, of his daily schedule when he studied medical jargon Hebrew in 
Haifa. To become the well-known local emergency doctor he is, he describes in detail the various 
jobs he accepted before being hired in the emergency unit four years after his arrival.  
He also explained his step-by-step introduction into local politics: the intermediary who 
introduced him to the party and his first conference with the other members. During another 
meeting, I came to understand the alliance strategies which allowed the mayor to retain his 
position in the municipality. Indeed, while the Russian-speaking residents of the city usually 
support a candidate who represents them — like Abram, but others have also occupied his 
position before him —, they do not form a majority. However, they are sufficiently numerous to 
make a difference between two close candidates:  
Nissim: We lost those elections. And, then, I tried another time. And the second time, we won. And, 
and I became mayor  
Abram: in 2008.  
Nissim: And now, again, for this term  
Abram: Again with my help  
Nissim: With your help. Also at that time with your help, and  
Me: What does that mean with his help? He brought the votes  
Nissim: He brought the voters, yes. That’s it.  
Me (to Abram): You have power, for negotiation. (Interview 22, 2015)  
I also had the opportunity to see him at work during the elections. Indeed, on 23 March 2015, 
there were national elections for the Israeli parliament. As a local representative of Israel 
Beitenu, Abram led the local campaign for the party. I followed him with a wireless microphone 
and a camera from 8 am to 10 pm that day, and witnessed the preparation of what Abram later 
describes as a ‘military operation’.   
All the usual supporters of the party were listed, and a car pooling system was set up to ensure 
that people with limited mobility could reach their polling station on the day of the elections. 
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Staffs were recruited for election day to monitor their arrival at the polling station, and to ensure 
that all of them came to vote. If not, another recruit located in a small office used as local 
headquarters phoned the missing voters to entice them to go to their polling station. We spent 
the entire day driving from poll to poll to make sure everything went smoothly.  
Tali thinks that integration depends on the individual’s mind-set. Someone who is optimistic, 
flexible and self-reliable can integrate. Tali tells a story of success: following her immigration, 
she quickly found a job — despite the “very, very big immigration” and the fact that it was “very, 
very hard to find a job”. For her first job in Israel, as well as her job at the bank, she explains her 
ascension through very simple reasons: the fact that she spoke Hebrew, or that she simply dared 
to ask. On several times, she used the term personality, character or temper:   
But, it seems that success depends on ones’ character. I am a really optimistic person. And, at the 
moment when you see the light at the end of the tunnel, and not the dark, you go towards that, 
you always know the direction. (Interview 8, 2014) 
Or: 
I never felt, again I need to say that, I never felt that because I am a new immigrant, um, I get 
different treatment. Not me. Maybe it’s because I never let people make me feel that way. I am the 
kind of person... if something bothers me I put it on the table. I don’t go and cry on the side. And, it 
seems that people see that. They also protect the weak. The strong ones are always... strong. I am 
happy today to say all I just said and to feel that I went through everything... yes. I was really 
strong. Again, not everything was smooth, not everything was easy. Everything was. But I don’t 
try. If now I stop to remember “oh how difficult it was, how miserable I was, what did I do”. No, I 
won't go there. It happened, I did it. It’s one of the things that a person must accept, immigration 
or no immigration. It’s character. Because a new immigrant, I repeat myself and will say it again, if 
you come to a new state, try and be part of it. Don’t try to get the state be like you, you try to be 
like the state. You will feel much better much faster. (Ibid.) 
And when talking about the results of the municipal elections:  
Well, of course, we were all in heaven. In heaven from being so happy. I could not think it could be 
different. (Laugh) Again, because I’m that kind of person. Of course, retrospectively, if I think 
about it I could have not been elected. (Ibid.)  
Similarly, Ayelet insists on the balance between her religious observance, and the “inner fire” 
that pushes her forward.  Ayelet is a believer and observes the rules of Judaism. She says that she 
grew up in a religious family. She uses the term Haredi, therefore indicating she practices ultra-
orthodoxy. She also started her story by saying she is divorced and is raising her child, thus 
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affirming she is a ‘modern’ woman. At several moments during our meeting, she talks about her 
own religious practice and how she translates religious values into her work ethics. She 
mentions her refusal to lie, her respect and integrity. Later in the interview, she mentions the 
biblical prophet Moses — “a humble man who took on responsibilities” —, and her desire to 
work towards this ideal. She also regularly mentions the guidance she receives from God when 
she encounters specific challenges at work. When we finish the interview, I ask her about her 
plans for the future. She starts by answering that she prays every day. Here are three extracts of 
the transcription of our encounter: 
I asked how her relatives and friends reacted to her election. Ayelet answered that it was not a 
surprise! “I am very religious. I come from an orthodox (Haredit) family. I am very religious but I 
have fire inside. I am a warrior. I use Jewish religious concepts like refusing to lie, respect... it 
helps me a lot. I hate journalism or politics. I just do it out of obligation. That’s why I don’t like 
interviews (Ayelet did not let me record our conversation. I had to take notes). I don’t want 
publicity”. I told her that I think those are qualities: being honest, transparent, accountable, isn't 
that what led to her second re-election? “I think people are smart enough, much more than the 
media would have us believe. The way I work, I feel I am a woman of integrity, at peace with 
myself”. You can go to sleep at night, I laughed. “I am not completely relaxed: some people are still 
hungry”. (Interview 2, 2014) 
Ayelet mentioned ‘Father Moses’, and explained that he was a humble man who took 
responsibilities. “I don’t compare myself to Moses, God forbid, but I shoulder responsibilities. 
When there are people, there is no need for me. I go where there is no-one, or at least no-one who 
can take on the responsibility”. (Ibid.) 
“I pray every day for the Messiah to come, and for peace in the world. I am religious. Today is Rosh 
haHodesh (the first day of the month, following the Jewish calendar), it has this particular energy”. 
(Ibid.) 
She contrasts her religious observance with the fact that she has ‘fire inside’ and she is a 
‘warrior’. She explains that she started to work early, at 14, to get some pocket money. Then she 
dreamt of being a model, a lawyer, a judge, a teacher and a prime minister like Margaret 
Thatcher.  
When I say that a Black woman in a senior position in Israel is uncommon, she assures me she 
cannot think this each time she deals with her White Ashkenazi counterparts at the municipality. 
She assures me she does not reject her Blackness or her gender. These are important matters to 
her, and she dedicates part of her efforts to advance the condition of women and of Ethiopian 
immigrants in the city.  
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[…] I don’t instrumentalise the fact that I am black or a woman. I try to influence things. (Ibid.) 
Nevertheless, she does not see race or gender as structural issues. She aspires to normalisation. 
In that sense, she concurs with the liberal integration approach promoted by Tali, where 
individual efforts are more important for successful integration than removing structural 
obstacles.   
To be truthful, the role of institutions is not entirely dismissed in these discourses. Tali does 
deny the support she received during the first years following her arrival:  
Me: I have a lot more questions, but I will fast forward as we have little time left. As a local 
resident, what do you expect from your municipality? What do you expect the municipality to do 
to help immigrants?  
Tali: I will tell you what, I will tell you what. This question is not for me, and I will tell you why. In 
life I never ask for anything. I did not come with the idea that someone needs to help me, someone 
needs to give to me, someone needs to take care of me. I was not in that place. Therefore, I never 
turned to the municipality or to anybody to ask for something. Until today, when I see people, I 
tell them, folks, if you want something in life, do it yourself. Don’t expect help or support from 
anyone else. I need to tell you that as a new immigrant, I can’t remember turning to the 
municipality. The first time I came into this office, I was already a candidate for deputy mayor. I 
don’t know. Someone who works, who succeeded, his children are part of the education system: 
what do they need from the municipality! My house is in the neighbourhood, it was always nice 
there, there were no, no reasons to go and request something from the municipality. I never got a 
shekel from the State, I never got a discount from the municipality. Someone needs to... (Interview 
8, 2014) 
Obviously, Tali and her family did obtain access to subsidies to learn Hebrew, to buy property or 
to enrol their children in school, as those schemes are available to any immigrant, regardless of 
his or her situation. The ‘self-made man’ discourse is very strong among the interviewees. It 
defines integration outside the State agencies, even though these interviewees represent those 
agencies, and more particularly advocate towards a more proactive role of agencies towards 
immigration integration. Indeed, the municipality of Arad funds activities to outreach to 
immigrants as well as to accompany the newcomers in their first steps in Arad. Tali denies this 
help, but she also recognises that the immigration absorption system in Israel has permitted her 
to access politics.  
The narratives of the three representatives are therefore constantly navigating between these 
fine lines: on the one hand, they adopt a liberal discourse of self-realisation, their success being 
concomitant to their personality and efforts; on the other hand, their integration story is also 
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their life story, and legitimates their presence in government, and their role of community 
representatives, advancing the interests of their community. This is the second theme — 
representation — which I will now explore.  
1.2 Representation  
The second emerging theme is the representation function played by the three officials. This role 
of representation is described as accidental: they affirm they were asked to join the city council, 
rather than having stepped forward to join local politics. Second, they closely link Israeli 
immigration policy with their election — a policy which helps newcomers to be elected, but also 
a political representation of immigrants through immigrant political parties. Lastly, rather than 
politics, they describe their function as public service. Among the tasks they carry out, part of 
them concern the whole city, while other tasks are more closely related to the immigrant 
residents of the city.  
In fact, both Abram and Tali explain that members of Israel Beitenu contacted them — or before 
that of Israel beAliyah — who were looking for local representatives. It could be that the rather 
public function of both Abram and Tali had a role to play: one worked in the ER while the other 
worked at a local bank. They had already met many residents and their names were known.   
Abram: In 1996, Nathan Sharansky, today head of the Jewish agency, Sharansky established his 
party. Professor Nuddleman, one of the MPs of Israel beAliyah came to me, and asked me to come 
to politics. That’s how I got in. I was at the first party conference in Jerusalem. Afterwards, I 
became head of the party here. In 1999, when the party dissolved, when Sharansky joined Likud, 
the party dissolved so I joined Israel Beitenu […]. (Interview 6, 2014) 
Tali: It’s the opposite. I entered politics in 2003. I was not a member of Israel Beitenu, I was not in 
any party (laugh). I was... with everyone. And then, they found me. They integrated me— I 
performed somewhere I can’t remember, so they invited me to a meeting and asked me to join 
them. Then they told me what the party was. And, and I need to tell you, that now, retrospectively, 
if Likud had invited me, I think I would have gone with Likud. I mean. To tell you that I really 
understood what it meant... I don’t think so. I did not understand much about politics then. But, it 
was Israel Beitenu, so I joined Israeli Beitenu. We have been together for many years and they help 
and guide. It’s important. When there is political back-up from the government it’s... very 
important. (Interview 8, 2014) 
Ayelet was asked to join a local list twice, first by the previous mayor in function, which she 
refused, and second by the current mayor Aviram, whose offer she accepted. They won the local 
elections, endorsing her as the deputy mayor.  
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First of all, there is an intention from Israel Beitenu or from a local list such as the one led by 
Aviram to recruit immigrant representatives. Secondly, their accession to local politics was 
made possible through Israeli immigration policy. Although Tali's discourse is very much that of 
the self-made woman, she does believe her election was made possible thanks to the immigrant 
incorporation policy of Israel. She considers Israel offers a “platform” for immigrants who want 
to succeed: “I think that a State that gives an opportunity in such a short time, start with nothing 
and reach such a senior position. I think it’s very special. I am not sure there are many countries 
in the world which give a platform like this” (Ibid.). Later she says: “Think of it, an immigrant... I 
can’t explain it, but this is not natural. It’s not natural that a new immigrant who came to Israel 
20 years ago should become a mayor” (Ibid.).  
Nevertheless, this ‘platform’ is first available for Jewish immigrants. In the national view, the 
strangeness of new immigrants is only temporary, as they are part of one people, the Jewish 
people. Secondly, it is open to those who contribute, those who believe they can give something 
to the country. I have already quoted Tali saying: “Because a new immigrant, I will repeat myself 
and say it again, if you come to a new country, try and be part of it. Don’t try to get the state to be 
like you, try to be like the state” (Ibid.). At the end of the interview, Tali talks about the fact she 
cannot help all residents and fulfil all their requests.  
Tali: Many times, inside of me, I want to tell people “if what you have here is not good, leave, 
because you must appreciate what there is here”. Understand,  
Me: But you cannot tell them that.  
Tali: Of course I can’t. Inside of me, inside of me I think “You can’t always ask what the 
government does for you. Let’s see what you did for this country!”. (Ibid.) 
If Tali considers herself a politician, Abram and Ayelet insist that they are elected civil servants, 
rather than politicians. A semantic difference that, it seems, allows them to market themselves as 
close contacts for the residents they represent.  
Ayelet does not see herself as a politician but someone who helps, facilitates and mediates; she 
needs to represent the interests of the city, but also of the Ethiopian community. Ayelet has a BA 
in administration and public policy.  
I remember that Margaret Thatcher came to Ashkelon with the Israeli Prime Minister of the time. 
I got selected to hand something to her during the ceremony. She was an impressive woman. After 
that, I wanted to be her. I was doing a lot, but when I had to choose to study, it was natural for me 
to study public services. (Interview 2, 2014) 
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She worked for some years as a community worker before being elected. She was asked by A. D. 
to chair a steering committee and that is how they became acquainted and ran as members of 
the same independent list. She sees herself as a civil servant, chosen by the public, and she does 
not refer to a political party.  
I am not a politician. I am a civil servant, chosen by the public. I had to go through elections, yes. 
[…](Ibid.)   
Ayelet’s office is always open to enquiries. When describing her day, she says that contractors 
and residents come to her to solve issues they have with the various institutions. She is also a 
representative of her community and chairs a committee on issues related to the Ethiopian 
communities. I learnt a bit later that a forum is organised with all (not only municipal) city 
actors involved with Ethiopian residents, which she chairs. She is also the chair of the municipal 
committee for the status of women. And she states that she tries to help women and Ethiopian 
immigrants reach key positions.  
Ayelet is the less talkative when it comes to her immigration story. She is also the only one who 
grew up in Israel. However, her relative silence about her Blackness says something about the 
kind of message she wants to spread. Like other Ethiopian representatives I have met in Kiryat 
Gat, this discourse focusing on normativity is rather common. Ayelet affirms that she did not 
succeed because, or despite the fact, she is a Black woman in Israel. She succeeded because of 
who she is: thanks to her work ethics and her “inner fire”. 
Abram in turn, wants to ‘heal’ the city. I remember sharing my findings and impressions after 
fieldwork in Kiryat Shmona with a colleague of mine. I told her about Abram and his work at the 
municipality. She told me: “it seems that he is approaching local politics as if he were still in his 
practice, making a diagnosis and preparing a prescription to heal his 'sick' town”. Even if the 
metaphor seems a bit simplistic, Abram does have an almost clinical way of looking at the 
different issues he is in charge of.  
First of all, he does see his work with immigrants as providing tailor-made solutions for each 
individual. Mostly, he believes he has a role of mediation to improve relations between 
neighbours and between communities — even if it is a simple neighbouring conflict. Secondly, 
he is in charge of monitoring the budget spent by the regional branch of the MOIA, notably the 
cultural activities they fund.  
During our first meeting, he says:  
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Abram: No I don’t really feel like a politician. My job is to help people, find a solution to their 
problem. On the one hand. And on the other hand, use my capacity to advance the city. I don’t feel 
like a politician.  
[…]  
Me: What did your family say when you started to become involved in politics, first in Israel 
beAliyah, then in Israel Beitenu?  
Abram: My wife is not happy. No. Why? She does not see me. Time-wise, it’s a job that demands 
time. She also works shifts. We can meet after 9 p.m. She is not satisfied but she supports me. She 
does not have a choice.  
Me: What about other relatives and friends?  
Abram: First of all, it does not annoy anyone. They know that Aliyah, immigrants, need a 
representative. After 25 years, as today we are in 2014, they need representatives in 
Municipalities, in the Knesset, especially for a big Aliyah, since 1,200,000 arrived here from the 
1970s, from 1989.  
Me: Last week, I talked with a friend from Kiryat Shmona. We talked about my PhD and the fact I 
will work on Kiryat Shmona. He asked me if I had met Abram. I told him “no. What about him?” He 
said he knew you. He said that’s good they have a representative. The Moroccans have the mayor, 
and we have Abram. That’s what he said.  
Abram: Nice.   
Me: You feel like this?  
Abram: I can’t say that I represent the immigrants in Kiryat Shmona. I represent the whole city. 
But it's true that immigrants have their own problems, with social security... But also relations 
between them. The culture they ask for.  
[…]  
Abram: When I started in politics  
Me: Now you are a politician!  
Abram: I am not a politician. The motive was to help people, immigrants. They were confused; 
they had no experience, nothing. The idea was to help, orient, talk, explain. Where. How should we 
start life. And the retired people. In every kupat holim (health care services), there is not always a 
person speaking Russian. A person get there, he is blind. Only with your hands you can explain. 
Although Israelis try, they want to understand what people want. That's it really. Relations. There 
is warmth. My friends who live today in Canada or other places tell me that they miss the 
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attention they use to get [in Israel]. (Interview 6, 2014)  
A year later, while we watch the documentary I shot with the mayor, Abram says:  
In the movie, and when you went around with me, you saw that we integrated in the city, the 
Russian speakers, and the new immigrants. The new immigrants, the new Israelis, we integrated 
and we have good relations with everyone. Everyone talks to everyone. If there is a fight between 
neighbours I try to calm things down, it’s also in a good way. (Interview 54, 2015) 
The extracts show that the main activities Abram engages with are accompanying the new 
immigrants in accessing their rights, sometimes translating and explaining in their language; 
facilitating the organisation of cultural activities for immigrants, including the commemoration 
of the Second World War peace agreement on May 9; and intercommunity and inter-neighbour 
relations’ mediation.  
Nevertheless, Abram finds that this system has its limits. He often contrasts the individualistic 
character of his solutions for immigrants’ issues to what he perceives as the ‘tribal’ system of his 
fellow residents who immigrated in the 1950s and 1960s. He refers to them as ‘families’ (or the 
Hebrew term for extended families ‘hamulot’), highlighting their solidarity but also the control 
they manage to obtain over municipal resources.  
Abram: The water company: it’s in cooperation with some municipalities. Today, there is a 
Russian speaker, from 2014, at the reception. We have, in the department, an engineer speaking 
Russian. Some in the municipalities speak Russian. I tried to make sure they would not get fired.  
Me: You laugh. It’s a war.  
Abram: It’s not a war. I try to explain. Who stayed really made it. […] there is a glass ceiling, 
people can’t pass it. We try to break it. In Kiryat Shmona it’s really hard. It’s a small city. There are 
families, there are hamulot. Hamulot very close and they don’t let us in. So we could say it’s a war. 
But we try or not. We win or we lose. (Interview 6, 2014) 
While watching the documentary together in August 2015, I take notes of his comments. My field 
diary mentions:  
He believes that Russians suffer from discrimination here. He said that Moroccans always help 
each other get jobs... A kind of solidarity lacking among Russians. Abram pushes them to send 
their application when there is a tender, but no one tries. They give up saying that it is not an open 
tender, that it is ”tailored”. In a place where some families control it all. (Interview 49, 2015) 
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The various extracts reveal conflicting interests. The representative function of the three 
officials is sometimes linked to their immigration background, their political affiliation and the 
fact that their electorate are immigrants. But they are also local officials, and therefore must 
represent the interests of all the residents of the city. Their work therefore oscillates between 
the departments they supervise — engineering or finance for Ayelet, or welfare for Abram — 
and tasks related to orientation, conflict-solving and lobbying for immigrant groups’ interests. 
Lastly, there are also conflicts between the interests of the political party they are members of, 
and the city interests. This remark leads me to the next theme: mediation or brokerage. 
1.3 Mediation  
These representatives function as mediators. Located at the intersections of multiple social 
spaces, they can assume various identities, channel information from one group to another, 
advocate for the interests of one group to another, or on the contrary, take on the role of 
gatekeepers, making themselves essential for communication between groups.  
Tali was born and grew up in Moldova. She gave birth to both her children there. Her family, 
professional and political careers in Israel are therefore part of her adulthood. And they are still 
very much connected to her previous experiences in the FSU. Indeed, she was elected as a 
member of the Russian immigrant party Israel Beitenu. She benefited from a large group of 
Russian-speaking voters — 40% of the residents being FSU immigrants. And her narrative 
reflects the various identities she mobilises at different time.  
First of all, she often speaks of herself and her unique experience. She affirms that “maybe [she 
is] not an example”, that she is different. Second, she affirms her Jewish roots very early in the 
interview. Indeed, her project to come to Israel was elaborated long before the actual 
immigration, and was linked to the family’s connection with Israel. She also often refers to 
herself as a new immigrant, and includes herself in a larger group of new immigrants, whom she 
represents. This larger group congratulated her when she was elected and saw in her the 
success of a much larger community. Before her election, she also remembers:   
A large number of Arad’s residents remember me as the first person that welcomed them in the 
State of Israel. When they arrived as new immigrants, they came to me to open a bank account. 
Without understanding how it goes in this country, without understanding where to start from. 
And I, as I experienced it, I used this meeting to talk about other things. I did not talk only about 
the bank. I talked about a lot of other things: To which medical house to go, where to rent a flat. 
The moment when you... I think that was the good thing. We were all together. We supported each 
other. We... were not afraid of sharing experiences... even when the experiences where not nice, 
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yes. (Interview 8, 2014) 
When she got elected, all doubts about her Israeli identity were swept away. She became part of 
“They, the Israelis”, up to questioning who were these “they” her fellow residents talked about.  
Me: When you became a mayor, what did your husband and your children think?  
Tali: Well, of course, we were all in heaven. In heaven from being happy. I could not think it could 
be different. (Laugh) Again, because I’m this kind of person. Of course, retrospectively, if I think of 
it I could have not been elected. But. You know what. I remember a sentence that new immigrants 
told me, when I talked to them. They told me: “They will not let you be a mayor”. I asked them 
“Who, they?”. So they told me “Israelis”. And then, I told them, folks, it is not Russia where 
someone decided who would be elected. Here, you chose, here, you vote, not anyone else. And, 
and, it really took time, especially for the elderly who came from another country, other policies, 
another reality. When we, when I was elected, I felt that they were all proud. I talk about the 
immigrants. I remember that I got millions of phone calls, from other cities, to show me their 
pride. “We are so proud that you succeeded!” Because, I am the first of the 1990s Aliyah, yes. 
There were one or two from the 1970s’ Aliyah. But not, from the 1990s Aliyah. I really felt, in all 
places where I spoke, in places where they invited me, I really felt that... it was something special. 
(Ibid.) 
However, sometimes, she still fails to be Israeli, her accent or her grammar mistakes betraying 
her.   
And really, the speech, that they would not think that I am a new immigrant, that I do mistakes. 
Although I know that I do mistakes. We are all humans. So people live here 40 years and still 
speak with an accent. I am not ashamed of my accent. Yes. What to do. I am a new immigrant, and 
I proud of it, and I am proud of what I went through, that’s why, people need to accept me the way 
I am. That’s me. With the good things and the bad. (Ibid.)  
Ayelet got involved in local politics when she was 26, and the soon to become mayor asked her 
to chair a local steering committee to determine the municipal actions for the Ethiopian 
community in Kiryat Gat. Ayelet remembers feeling impressed by the stakeholders invited to sit 
at the committee, as she was young and “a bit afraid”. However, she also remembers that at the 
moment when every stakeholder called her to try and influence her assessment report, she 
understood she had a role to play and she could contribute.  
Israel does not have the reputation of fostering equal representation and expression among its 
different groups. In particular, in May 2015, Israel experienced intense protests and debate 
around the recognition of Ethiopians as full citizens, three decades after their settlement in 
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Israel.96 In this context, I ask Ayelet if she experienced difficulties, as a Black woman, carrying 
out her functions:    
I cannot stop on that. Being black, being a woman... As a deputy mayor, I manage the CFO, the 
person in charge of culture, of engineering... They are all men, white, Ashkenazim. I can’t be 
impressed. When I was elected, I was 32. I had to sit with the CFO who is here for 30 years. But I 
am a human being, and I am the manager. I say, he does. Of course, there is discrimination, racism. 
There is. I am also here because I represent my community. When I arrived, I put women in key 
positions. I gave power to Ethiopians, to women. I established a committee. My title... whatever. 
[…]. (Ibid.) 
Ayelet has become a model in Kiryat Gat. The director of the absorption centre for Ethiopian 
immigrants tells me that Ayelet is not only the deputy director because she has voters. He says 
that only 1,500 Ethiopian Israelis in Kiryat Gat are of voting age, and that’s not enough to make a 
difference. “She is in her position because she is good” (Interview 28, 2015). The director of the 
Moked Klita — a unit of the municipal welfare department in charge of integration for Ethiopian 
immigrants — refers to Ayelet as a “model” in the Ethiopian community (Interview 46, 2015). 
Similarly, the director of community work in the municipality recalls that Ayelet changed her 
career, and the way she approached community work. Ayelet also revived community work 
service, after it had been marginalised for years. She often uses mapping and reports done by 
community workers to advocate at ministry level (Interview 38, 2015).  
The interviews show that interviewees constantly circulate between 'I', 'we' and 'they'. We are 
sometimes newcomers to Israel, only FSU immigrants, only the city’s immigrants or simply the 
family members. 'They’ are often the Israelis, but also sometimes the immigrants — when the 
official feels she/he is already part of the Israelis, and not a newcomer anymore. This negotiation 
between several groups of belonging is permanent for those officials who represent the interests 
of the city’s residents on the one hand; and the interests of the group that elected them, on the 
other hand.  
To sum up, the themes emerging from the analysis, linked to the officials’ own experiences but 
also to their understanding of immigration integration issues in Israel and in their city, were 
three-fold. First, a large part of the stories they tell are linked to the process of integration, and 
more specifically to their integration in Israel. They describe a process that takes time, where 
hard work, patience and optimism are central to their personal and professional resilience. 
Compared to other interviews in the four cities (where the institutions are described as 
                                                          
96 For articles in Hebrew, see for instance (Allouche-Lebron & Yivraken, 2015; Hasson, 2015b; Kashti, 
2015b, 2015c; Lior, 2015a; Lior & Kovovitz, 2015; Spigel & Kovovitz, 2015; Tzfarir & Kovovitz, 2015).    
 266
fundamental to successful integration), here there is a great emphasis on the self-made man 
discourse. Nevertheless, the interviewees do acknowledge that their immigration to Israel, and 
their belonging to the Jewish people, facilitates the integration process, offers more political 
opportunities — as newcomers can vote, be elected, and have political parties representing their 
interests.  
Representation is a second emerging theme, as they all understand their accession to local 
politics as being due to their status of community representatives. They were approached by 
immigrant parties, or by individuals who clearly stated their need to foster a municipal list that 
demographically represented the city. During their mandate, they participate in a differentiated 
delivery of public services, where the immigrant groups can reach out to the municipality in 
their mother tongue. These three local politicians therefore answer individual demands, but also 
deal with group advocacy or intercommunity conflicts. From their elections onwards, they are 
torn between two sets of interests: those of the immigrants who voted for them, and those of the 
city’s residents who they represent.  
These multiple belongings, inherent to their identity, and as conflicting as they might be, also 
help them to act as mediators. In fact, drawing on Laub Coser, Emirbayer and Mische suggest: 
“Actors who are positioned at the intersection of multiple temporal-relational contexts can 
develop greater capacities for creative and critical intervention” (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 
1007). The three officials are located between multiple groups of belonging, but also different 
scales — the party they are members of, the administration, the groups they represent 
themselves.  
Before I turn to the influence of these narratives on the political frames of immigration 
integration, I want to add another layer of analysis: the discursive strategies present in these 
encounters.  
2 Biographisation, biographic performance and meaningful 
interventions   
Beyond the themes that converge in these three life stories — integration, representation and 
mediation —, the stories also borrow from a mode of narration adapted to public discourse.  
2.1 Biographical performance 
For the three immigrant officials, telling the story of their immigration experience and the years 
that followed their arrival in Israel, until they accessed politics, is an almost routinely activity. 
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First of all, they live in a society in which people constantly tell their stories — through social 
networks, job interviewees, participation in social activities etc. But through their public 
position, this injunction to tell their life story is even stronger and more frequent. An example 
that particularly struck me is the extent to which Arad’s mayor stages her life story. Tali has 
adopted a narrative style to describe her migratory experience and political ascension with a 
rhythm and images which are repeated to all the curious journalists and researchers — 
including myself. I have transcribed below two extracts from local Jewish media newspapers’ 
articles in the US, and an extract from our meeting at the city hall in August 2014.  
Here in the New Jersey Jewish News, in an article posted in November 2011: 
Even without the gender aspect, her story is a triumphant one. Born and brought up in Moldova in 
the former Soviet Union, she arrived in Israel 20 years ago at the age of 28 with her husband, two 
children aged seven and two, “and $10 in my pocket.” With just minimal Hebrew and unable to 
use her degree in psychology, she got a job as a chambermaid in a Dead Sea hotel. Within three 
days, she had been put in charge of the cleaning staff. She related how, when she told her family 
back in Moldova about this, they asked how long it would take her to become president. “We came 
expecting to face a lot of struggle,” she said, “but everything went so well. After two years, I asked, 
‘Where’s the hardship?’”. Her husband, now a supervisor in a factory, has been very supportive. 
She said, “Without his help, I couldn’t have done what I have.” [Tali] said she had no special 
interest in politics, but got involved back in 2003 to help get Brill elected. “I was just interested in 
learning more about how things work,” she said. Thrust into office mid-term after he was forced 
out, she is now looking forward to running for a full five-year term when this one ends in three 
years. Given that the town has a complex population mix, with 40 percent immigrants, and a 
history of economic struggle, it isn’t a job many would envy, but [Tali] said she is passionate about 
the town and the position. Children are her priority. It’s a source of pride to her that, while her 
son has moved elsewhere, her daughter, now 22, has chosen to stay in Arad; she would like to 
make other young people want to stay, and to attract more. (Durbach, 2011) 
Then in the Jewish Telegraph in 2012: 
When she arrived as a Russian immigrant in 1991 (“with a husband, two boys and $10”), the 
population was half of what it is today, and decreasing. [Tali]  had a masters degree in psychology 
but her first job was as a chambermaid in a Dead Sea hotel before becoming housekeeper within 
three days. “I told my family in Russia I would be prime minister,” she said. “I knew even then 
what people needed to come here. I put other people in my place. I understood that they needed 
education for their children, security, culture and work. “These are the things I work on now — 
and people stay.” Forty per cent of the population are immigrants from Russia, 15% are ultra-
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Orthodox and others who arrived from kibbutzim and moshavim to help build the city. (Harris, 
2012) 
And lastly, five minutes after the beginning of our meeting, she explains:  
When we arrived in 1991. I want to tell you that we arrived with two suitcases, two children (the 
secretary comes in). Um. So, my two children, two suitcases, and 10 dollars in pocket. That’s all. I 
mean, we arrived and we knew that we were starting from scratch. That’s why, today, when 
someone requires my resume, I start with a sentence “I came to Israel in 1991”. I mean, 
everything that was before, existed, but it does not influence what I do today. Everything changed. 
Everything. Um. So when we arrived here… it was the beginning of the 1990s. There was a very, 
very big immigration. It was very, very hard to find a job. I remember the day that I was offered a 
job as a chambermaid in a hotel in the Dead Sea. I was the happiest in the world. I took this job. 
Although, as you understood, although I have a degree in psychology and although I could do a lot 
of different things. But… I did not think of it. First of all, I need to provide for my family, provide 
for my children. That’s why, I started to work there. What I did not tell you, and it is very 
important, is that I studied Hebrew before I came. And I spoke the language… Let’s say that I did 
not speak a high level of Hebrew, but I could talk. I understood everything people said. When I 
started to work in a hotel, I found two groups of people. One group of new immigrants, 
chambermaids. None of them spoke Hebrew. And the group of hotel managers who spoke only 
Hebrew. So, when I arrived, I could communicate — as I spoke the language — between the two 
groups. That’s why, after three days, I got advancement promotion and I became a team manager. 
My parents were still in Moldova. I wrote them a letter, I wrote, “Abale, until you arrive, at this 
rate, I will become prime Minister”. (Interview 8, 2014)  
In 2011, 2012 and 2014, Tali mobilises the same narrative arch and the same elements: her 
immigration triggered a fresh start in Israel, without financial resources and without many 
professional prospects; but she had the human capital to quickly find a job and be promoted, 
which she sees as a first stone on her path to government. The narrative of her life story, also 
found among other officials I have met, participates in what Delory-Momberger has called 
‘biographisation’. As I mentioned in a prior chapter, she argues: “We never stop biographying, 
that is to fit our experience in orientated time schemes which organise mentally our moves, our 
behaviour, our actions, following a narrative logic. This biographisation activity could be defined 
as a dimension of human thinking and acting which, in the form of practical hermeneutics, 
enables individuals, in the conditions of their socio-historical settings, to integrate, to structure, 
to interpret situations and events they experience”97 (Delory-Momberger, 2009, p. 30). The 
                                                          
97 Translation of the author. 
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following subsection will therefore focus more particularly on the structuration of the events 
experienced by the participants in this research work.  
Secondly, Tali’s discursive performance has to be included in the collective story of the 
immigrant group she came with. Indeed, while the interviewees want to put on display their 
individual story, and a story of success and self-realisation, they also expect me to be familiar 
with the collective narratives of their group, with the bureaucratic process of absorption which 
they went through with specific contextual aspects of immigration in Israel. For instance, saying 
that the 1990s witnessed a “very, very big immigration”, or saying “I came in 1983 through 
Sudan” are statements that underline very specific conditions of immigration, that a policymaker 
would expect a scholar to know.  
Lastly, the last subsection of this reflexion on the biographic performance has to do with the fact 
that I — as a researcher, who came to their offices to collect stories — suggest or even impose an 
oral storytelling activity for the interviewees. Facing me, they follow an injunction to tell their 
story, and as I am a student in social sciences, they also activate a specific set of stories which 
they believe will interest me. Here, the narration is the result of an interaction with the 
researcher (Charmaz, 2001, p. 366; Ferrarotti, 2003, p. 53). 
2.2 Telling a story: from fragmentation to continuity 
As described in the previous extracts, Tali starts her story with her immigration. Each time, she 
tells her interlocutor about the material dispossession she and her family experienced. Despite 
her degree, she proudly says that she quickly found a job as a chambermaid. Her rapid 
promotion at the hotel triggers an announcement to her family back in Moldova: she will soon be 
a minister. This sentence in particular recreates continuity in her narrative. As Delory-
Momberger has argued, immigrants in particular reconstitute their stories because they 
experience fragmentation and transition. Through a process of reflexivity and subjectification, 
they make sense of their own story and recover continuity (Delory-Momberger, 2009, pp. 61-
62).  
Tali, Abram and Ayelet immigrated in the 1980s and early 1990s, so they tell a story that 
occurred three decades ago. In the case of Ayelet, immigration dates from her childhood, and a 
lot of the memories linked to it are probably reconstituted from her family’s storytelling. The 
events they remember and choose to describe during our encounters are therefore part of a 
decision-making process, the date of immigration, the process of obtaining a first job — 
sometimes through specific training —, and their access to local politics. None of them describe 
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the first days of their immigration — although this is common in interviews with immigrants 
from the 1950s and 1960s.  They choose to give detailed accounts of certain events — usually 
the ones linked to their first job, or to certain milestones in their career. Sometimes, those 
detailed accounts are given because I specifically asked them to describe a ‘turning point’ in 
their life. All three choose to adopt a certain rhythm to their storytelling, omitting some events, 
while describing others extensively.  
2.3 Collective and individual narratives 
Tali’s story takes place within collective narrative patterns. In fact, “the individual storytelling is 
a place of tension, negotiation and transaction between a set of collective stories, those of groups 
and social inscription or collective belonging, and a singular individual trajectory, a unique 
feeling of oneself and one’s existence”98 (Delory-Momberger, 2012). In the extracts I quoted, Tali 
also tells the story of the “very, very large immigration”, of the Soviet Jews who were able to 
leave the former Soviet Union from the end of the 1980s onwards. This simple sentence means 
that I have to understand the context of her immigration, with 850,000 new immigrants arriving 
in Israel in one decade. These newcomers were gathered in certain sectors of the economy and 
created Russian-speaking networks. Many of them experienced downward professional 
mobility.  
Similarly, Ayelet briefly describes her experience of immigration to Israel. She probably has little 
direct memory, since she was very young, but has managed to reconstitute the story through 
stories heard at home or outside.  
I asked her where she comes from: “Ethiopia”. You were born there, I asked. “Yes. I arrived when I 
was four and a half, in 1983. My family came through Sudan. We lost my sister on the way. We 
settled in Ashkelon for 12 years. We got public housing. Then, my parents bought a house in 
Kiryat Gat. I did my national service, then started a BA in public services in Sapir [college]. I had a 
child, she is 14 now, and got a divorce”. (Interview 2, 2014) 
When she describes her arrival from Ethiopia through Sudan, she refers to the first wave of 
immigration of Jews from Ethiopia, the most famous event being Operation Solomon, in which 
thousands of Ethiopian Jews were flown to Israel in 1984. Immigrants from this period usually 
distinguish themselves from the later 1991 immigration, and also from more recent 
immigration. Immigrants were hosted in absorption centres and then given public housing in 
specific areas of Israel. Therefore, there is a lot of information contained in one simple sentence.      
                                                          
98 Translation of the author. 
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An explanation for these particular features is that individuals usually fit their stories into larger 
collective narratives, and in our case, into immigration narratives. For instance, when Ayelet 
says she immigrated with her family in 1983 through Sudan, or when Tali and B. B. say they 
immigrated in 1991 and 1993, respectively, it means certain things for them. First, they expect 
me to understand the conditions of their arrival based on the collective story I am expected to 
know: the high number of arrivals during the same period, the difficulty finding accommodation 
and an occupation, the perception of their immigration by the rest of the Israeli population and 
so on. Secondly, they reveal elements of their Jewishness, since those collective narratives are 
linked to Aliyah, and not, for instance, to individual economic-driven migration. They also 
highlight the elements that are stereotypical for their group. In the case of Tali and B. B., they 
showcase stories of downward mobility, hard work and determination to climb back up the 
social ladder. 
2.4 Biographisation is a socially meaningful event 
So far I have focused on the impact of their storytelling and discursive strategies during our 
encounters. However, their discourse has an impact beyond our encounter. Indeed, individuals 
do not structure the elements of their social world merely for themselves, and for the researcher 
holding a recording microphone in front of them. Instead they engage in their social world, they 
“try to live society instead of being passively lived by it” (Ferrarotti, 2003, p. 3). As I have 
explained above, they “make history”. As Giddens has argued, the reflexivity processes of agents, 
generally translated through language, are the reasons why men “make history” (Giddens, 1986, 
p. 202), or why we can see “history in the making” (Ferrarotti, 2003, p. xxix). And in particular, 
these officials, located at the heart of decision-making in the cities they inhabit, can make the 
history of those cities.  
The mayor of Arad, or the deputy mayors of Kiryat Gat and Kiryat Shmona, even though they 
claim they are serving the public, rather than engaging in politics, are in fact, involved in politics 
— in the sense that politics is the art of governing a group of citizens, managing collective life, 
regulating and defending the polis (Tournier & Bonnafous, 1995). From this definition, Maurice 
Tournier and Simone Bonnafous highlight the importance of language in the political space. For 
them politics is a space of language, a space where we speak — in the sense of taking the floor 
(prendre la parole) and occupying communication channels; and in the sense of taking control 
over speech (prendre la langue) to impose meanings, values, symbols and discursive rituals 
(Ibid.). The last element is essential as it relates to gaining power and hegemony. And indeed, 
Tournier and Bonnafous suggest that the researcher must analyse “the extent to which words 
spoken in the public space around power stakes divulge the symbolic appropriation or 
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dispossession struggles taking place in the space of discussion” (Ibid., p. 69). In the case of 
immigration and integration policies, those actors who participate in decision-making define a 
local issue that will become the object of public action. The language they use is therefore 
essential to the understanding of the motives behind this normative process of policymaking.  
The main hypothesis is that they intervene through language, they take the floor and they take 
control over speech, and impose their own story of immigration in the public space. Being 
immigrants and politicians, they are the authority at the council. Their stories are the ones that 
occupy the political debate, and not the stories of ‘voiceless’ residents, who do not know, or 
cannot themselves express their experiences and biography in those spaces.  
Moreover, the stories of these politicians is their curriculum vitae: they claim to be the legitimate 
representatives of other individuals who experienced immigration, as they themselves 
experienced it, and moreover, because they overcame obstacles thanks to their tenacity and 
their personal abilities. Nevertheless, their privileged position brings them further — even 
before their election — from the majority of immigrants who populate those cities.  
This language intervention results in three transformations: they redefine the scale of 
integration, with the individual himself becoming solely responsible for the success or the failure 
of his integration in Israeli institutions; they redefine the scale of representation, travelling 
between the different social groups that they believe they legitimately represent; and they 
justify their mediation function between these groups, but also between the various scales of 
governance.   
3 Results of these interventions 
The narrative analysis of the transcripts of the various meetings with these three local 
politicians reveals the emergence of three major themes: integration, representation and 
mediation. Here, I will return to these themes, to provide a better understanding of the effects of 
these discursive interventions in the public sphere. In fact, what occurs is a dual movement of 
reproduction, and production, of the role of immigrants in the city and the nation at large.  
When it comes to integration, local immigrant politicians reproduce national frames of 
integration, where their Jewishness is emphasised, as well as their contribution to the nation — 
mimicking the pioneer movement and sacrificing self-interest for the greater good. Nevertheless, 
they also introduce variations to the national ideology. A more accommodating aspect is the fact 
that they encourage the preservation of immigrants’ sociocultural practices. However, they also 
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adopt a stronger self-made man discourse, where the responsibility of integration trickles down 
to the immigrants themselves.  
The second theme, representation, also reveals the tensions in the discourses: on the one hand, 
immigration is a ‘visiting card’ for those immigrants who emphasise their own immigration 
experience as a guarantee that they represent other immigrants; on the other hand, they value 
their belonging to the Israeli nation, and their ability to represent the interests of immigrants in 
an eminently Israeli political sphere.  
Lastly, in this in-between situation, they negotiate a role of mediators and brokers, whereby they 
make themselves essential in establishing relations between old-timer residents, immigrants, 
local and national institutions.  
Their interventions participate in the definition of the hierarchy of power and responsibility on 
an axis going from the individual to transnational organisations —in a way which is nonetheless 
unbounded.  
3.1 Integration 
The life story of each of the three officials provides a portrait of a legitimate immigrant. First, he 
acquires legitimacy since he belongs to a larger national political project — the permanent and 
often threatened construction of a Jewish home in Israel. Although both FSU immigrants and 
Ethiopian immigrants often see their Jewishness as being ‘doubted’ or questioned, they 
participate in reinforcing their differences by emphasising their belonging to the Jewish people. 
Tali talks about her Jewish education, her family’s attachment to Israel before immigration, her 
belonging to the people of Israel.  Abram explains his immigration because of anti-Semitism in 
Russia. Ayelet defines herself as a religious woman and refers to God’s guidance in her personal 
and professional life.   
But beyond the Jewish identity which make them immediate members of the nation, the 
immigrants who become a legitimate object of local public action have to make the effort to 
participate. They renounce their former status to integrate the labour market at all costs, and, 
thanks to personal efforts, acquire professional training, and innate optimism are able to climb 
back up the social ladder. The three politicians promote self-responsibility, hard work and 
personal efforts to perform in Israeli society. All three of them mention that their first jobs in 
Israel were cleaning, and they take pride in their ability to start back from scratch, to bear the 
feeling of downward mobility to make their way back to success. Tali considers that an 
immigrant must be open, flexible and optimistic to accept the difficulties and integrate. He must 
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contribute to the country before asking the country that welcomed him to support him. Abram 
shows that constant efforts pay off, in what I have called a step-by-step strategy. Ayelet defines 
herself as a warrior, with fire inside. She refuses to put forward her blackness or the fact that she 
is a woman, and instead requests normativity. Here, the three characters all borrow from the 
Zionist ideology of pioneering and sacrifice of self-interest for the ‘greater good’: the building of 
the nation (Ram, 1995) 
Similarly, by making the effort to understand the functioning and norms of local and national 
public institutions, they may pretend to represent their peers in their political functions. The 
self-made immigrant is therefore a significant character. When I ask Tali why she always tells 
the story of her arrival in Israel in a similar manner, she argues that she wants to give hope to 
newcomers that everything is possible. While she acknowledges on several occasions that the 
State’s absorption system is a ‘platform’, where immigrants obtain the necessary recognition for 
their personal and professional development, the ultimate responsibility for their success is in 
the hands of the newcomers themselves. However, the three of them also believe in preserving 
their mother tongue, the cultural belonging to their group of origin, which provides their 
legitimacy as local representatives. 
Their biographical performance therefore has an impact on the scales of integration, that is, the 
understanding of ‘who is responsible for what’. Through a selective series of experiences relayed 
at individual, local, national and transnational level, interviewees can impact the scale on which 
different dimensions of integration are viewed.  
The political dimension of integration, or one could say, the way citizenship is practiced, is 
viewed on a national and local scale. On the one hand, Tali and Abram are members of the 
nationalist party Israel Beitenu. They underline the importance of representation for FSU 
immigrants to be able to defend their rights. They perceive themselves as local representatives 
of this larger group. Ayelet takes a different view, since she belongs to a local municipal list, and 
wants to make changes from within. But her discourse may also be deliberate, in order to 
deconstruct the immigrant figure towards normativity.  
In terms of the socio-cultural dimension, their positions differs somewhat. Tali makes a 
distinction between herself and her husband, between those who are now Israelis and those 
who have a ‘FSU mentality’. However, her municipality does provide extensive cultural services 
in Russian for Russian-speaking residents. Abram believes that Russian-speaking immigrants 
should have access to services in Russian. His friends, supporters and voters are Russian-
speakers and he makes a clearer distinction between ‘them’ and ‘us’.  Ayelet tries to counter the 
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discrimination that Ethiopian immigrants experience by increasing their representation and 
participation in institutions. None of them argue for an assimilationist approach which would 
respect socio-cultural diversity. However, they do not advocate multiculturalism per se. It seems 
that they are more concerned with bringing their community to normativity. They do not 
request segregated committees or specific treatment and programmes to deal with the social 
challenges met by their peers. However, they wish to make changes within the system, as they 
are part of “we, the Israelis”. Perhaps, the local scale allows for provision of community-friendly 
socio-cultural services, and it is understood that social networks at local level will be mostly 
intra-community. But on the national scale, their recognition as full Israelis is required.    
Economic integration is the most ‘individual’ scale of integration. Promoting the model of the 
self-made man, immigrants must rely on their own efforts and abilities to achieve economic 
integration and perform like Israelis. The role of the State is minor. Tali assures us that she never 
entered the municipality building before she was deputy mayor. Abram, although he expresses 
some resentment when it comes to the topic of the recognition of medical studies carried out 
abroad, he identifies himself as someone who passed exams and practiced. Even when talking 
about his son, who was unemployed for a long period and obliged to relocate after finding a job, 
he does not provide State-led solutions to facilitate economic development in the Galilee region. 
Lastly, Ayelet believes that the city of Kiryat Gat should not request help from the State but 
should foster a climate favouring economic development, by adding lands for development.  
To sum up, the biographical performance of these three immigrants impacts the framing of 
immigration and integration as an object of public action by the local administration. If they are 
not the only ones to provide a frame, it is one of the possible frames on which local policies are 
designed. In their narratives, a discourse of self-responsibility is prominent, where the 
immigrant must rely on his own capacity to integrate and contribute to the country. Political 
representation is necessary for their communities, but it is also linked to a desire to become part 
of a larger Israeli nation. Lastly, socio-cultural integration is rather left up to personal 
interpretation, where the community scale is seen as the scale where social networks and 
activities are set up.   
3.2 Representation  
The understanding of immigrant politicians’ representative roles also appears in the themes, 
which emerge. The first clear element is the fact that their personal immigration storytelling is a 
public performance, aimed at legitimising their presence in local politics. However, their roles as 
community representatives are not shared with others — there is no other existing platform for 
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immigrant representation at the municipality level. Lastly, if they enter local politics based on 
their immigration experience, and through the votes of their peer residents, they also hold 
responsibilities which affect the whole city. They constantly navigate between being community 
representatives and city officials.  
For many interviewees I met during fieldwork, holding responsibilities linked to immigration 
and integration was seen as a result of their natural authority on the topic: Their immigration 
experience is part of their job description and legitimates their function. They tell their own 
story, and the story of their immigrant peers, in order to demonstrate that they belong to those 
large-scale waves of immigration to Israel. Their immigration experience is part of the 
ingathering of exiles and the building of Israel. But at the individual level, it is one stage of their 
personal life and their career, through which they have gained a new experience. Tali recalls that 
while she worked at the bank, she took advantage of her encounters with new residents, who 
came to open a bank account, to help them out with other aspects of their settlement in the city 
— she says:  
And I, as I experienced it, I used this meeting to talk about other things. I did not talk only about 
the bank. I talked about a lot of other things: To which medical house to go, where to rent a flat. 
(Interview 8, 2014)  
By telling their own immigration story, they show that they have gone through a similar 
transition, so they know what they are talking about. They speak of the uprooting and the need 
to start from scratch, studying and accepting work in a job that does not correspond to their 
previously acquired skills. They also speak of recreating a feeling of home. And they speak of 
their engagement with the community, with the city and with their new country in general. 
Apart from Ayelet who studied public administration, Tali and B. B. — and numerous municipal 
agents in charge of immigration-linked programmes — have no education and training related 
to public administration and management. Their immigration experience is their visiting card.  
Their engagement with the community is made more obvious when they refuse to be called 
politicians. All of them claim they entered local politics to help and to serve. Moreover, they were 
‘chosen’, by the Israel Beitenu party, by the former Israel beAliyah party, or by the former mayor, 
who asked them to become formal representatives. They explain their access to local politics 
almost by accident, but also because of their personality: Tali regularly uses sentences to show 
that she has a strong character, including optimism, hard work and flexibility; Abram’s 
descriptive accounts of his upward mobility underlines hard work and perseverance; and Ayelet 
explains her ascension by her ‘inner fire’, her being a ‘warrior’.  
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The fact that they have engaged and become representatives of their groups in local politics does 
not necessarily mean that they are not in competition to retain their titles as representatives. 
This does not feature in the biographies I collected, but it should be mentioned here: they were 
elected and entered the municipal council, and they seem to find it a sufficient channel of 
expression for their immigrant peers. At no point during fieldwork was the participation of a 
larger group of immigrants  (through a committee, forum or other means of participative 
democracy) considered. Indeed, when we followed him during the documentary filming Abram 
demonstrated that he deployed considerable efforts to filter and reinterpret demands from 
immigrant residents, reinforcing his role as ‘gatekeeper’.    
Immigrant representatives face a dilemma: elected mostly by other immigrants in the city, they 
are regularly solicited by the municipality, and by their voters, to deal with specific immigration-
linked issues; nevertheless, they also hold other responsibilities for public issues which concern 
all the residents of the city. Tali is the mayor of Arad, and as such, she deals with any local issues. 
However, she is a member of the traditionally immigrant Israel Beitenu party, she speaks 
Russian and her success is largely due to the large Russian community of Arad — 40% of the 
population. Abram is in charge of welfare for the municipality. However, he knows he gained his 
seat because the current mayor understood Abram could be a strategic ally.  
Because Abram is an immigrant, and although another councillor is in charge of immigration and 
integration, he organises immigrant-targeted activities for the municipality. Immigrants 
regularly come to his office to ask for help, translation and other shortcuts into the local 
administration. Similarly, Ayelet is not the councillor in charge of immigration and integration. 
Alexander, an immigrant from Russia’s Caucasus area, fills this position. Nevertheless, as she 
was born in Ethiopia, Ethiopian immigrants and municipal agents dealing with immigrants 
usually turn to her rather than to Alexander. On top of these more or less informal activities, she 
is in charge of the municipal departments of finances, engineering and planning.   
The three officials represent the interests of various groups: their supporters, the residents of 
the city, the immigrants residing in the city, or even immigrants in Israel as a whole. They have 
multiple affiliations: as members of a national political party, Tali and Abram can intervene at 
the national and local level. They are not only mayors or councillors, but also municipal agents. 
Indeed, Ayelet or Abram both receive a salary from the municipality and are expected to serve 
residents directly. They receive residents in their office and deal with issues as diverse as 
entitlements, allowances, job hunting, business creation etc. They are located between groups 
and interests, and the mobilisation of various identities and discourses during our encounters 
translates the tensions and negotiations of these opposing interests. The scale of representation 
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therefore varies between the communities they belong to — a belonging largely defined by a 
common language — at the city level and at national level, to the residents of the city at large.  
3.3 Mediation  
The final hierarchy of power that is affected and influenced through the agency of these 
immigrants’ concerns their intervention per se. I have just mentioned two important elements of 
power: the ability of these immigrant politicians to steer between the groups they represent and 
all the residents of the city on the one hand; and the absence of other means of representation 
for immigrants residing in the city, on the other hand. And indeed, they act as mediators, 
facilitators, brokers or ‘ferrymen’ (Pollard & Prat, 2012) between the different groups, but also 
between various levels of governance.  
During a conversation with Deborah Golden, the Israeli anthropologist described to me her 
perception of the role of mediators99 played by the immigrants arriving in the early phases of 
massive waves of immigration. Those who arrived early arrivals had time to become acquainted 
with their settlement society, time to learn Hebrew, to understand the norms and codes, and to 
develop a social network. When later arrivals immigrated from their countries of origin, they 
played the role of an interface between two worlds. In the 1990s, Russian-speakers who had 
immigrated in the 1970s or early arrivals in the 1990s became such interfaces. A similar 
phenomenon may be observed among Ethiopian immigrants of 1984 who were able to play the 
role of mediator for those who arrived in 1991.  
In our case, Tali, Abram and Ayelet play this role for present day immigration, and with current 
immigrant residents who — although they immigrated years ago — do not have sufficient 
command of Hebrew, or who are unable to deal with Israeli administration alone. In Tali’s 
discourse, this notion of mediation between groups is expressed quite bluntly. Tali steers 
between her own self, her belonging to a larger Jewish community, to FSU immigrants in Israel, 
but also to the FSU immigrants in her city. She is also the mayor of the city, therefore bridging 
the gap between city residents and national institutions.  
In the activities in which Abram is involved, I have shown that he acts as a mediator between 
immigrants and local institutions, explaining and translating, as well as creating shortcuts. He 
also mediates between the needs of immigrant groups and the municipality, prioritising certain 
activities over others, in a context of financial constraints. Lastly, he deals with intercommunity 
                                                          
99 The role of mediator I mention here is different from the professional mediators (in Hebrew megasher) 
usually hired by the welfare department to handle conflicts between residents.   
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mediation and inter-neighbour relations. I saw him ‘in action’ while filming during the 9 May 
commemoration in 2015. This mediation activity is certainly not limited to translation. Abram 
filters, chooses what to translate and what not to translate, adds contexts and explains. This 
control over what is said and done helps him to increase his power inside and outside the 
community. More than a mediator, he is a gatekeeper. Similarly, I participated in meetings with 
the mayor, and sometimes with heads of non-profit organisations. Abram moderated our 
interventions, translated and explained subtleties of language and/or of institutional culture to 
all parties during those meetings. Again, he did not translate everything and he filtered 
information depending on what he perceived as being important or necessary. 
Ayelet also engages in mediation. I have shown that she dedicates part of her power to advance 
the condition of women and of Ethiopian immigrants in the city. She chairs a committee and a 
forum dedicated to issues related to the Ethiopian communities. This activity of mediation aims 
at bringing people within the system.  
Even more than cultural mediators, the three immigrant politicians play a wider role as brokers 
between different levels of governance — the municipality, the ministries, the political parties, 
or other organisations in the city that participate in immigration activities. This could be 
attached to the concept of ‘ferrymen’ (in French: passeurs) developed by Julie Pollard and 
Pauline Prat when they address the methodology to compare subnational policies. In their 
opinion, certain politicians use their positioning at different levels of governance to enhance 
communication and coordination between those levels (Pollard & Prat, 2012). Instead of 
‘ferrymen’, I prefer the term ‘brokers’, and I argue that these brokers produce new scales of 
power.  
Indeed, Tali, Abram and Ayelet not only mediate between old timers and newcomers, between 
veteran Israelis and immigrants. They also mediate between the various institutions located at 
different levels. In a context of urban governance, local politics also includes actors located at 
different scales. They deal with issues between individuals. In small cities, residents do not 
hesitate to knock on their doors and express individual requests to the mayor or to the deputy 
mayor whom they consider indebted to their electorate. At a more intermediate level, immigrant 
politicians mediate between communities, and between communities and the municipality. But 
they also deal, on a daily basis, with institutions such as the MOIA or the Jewish Agency on the 
national and even Diasporic levels.  
These activities of mediation and brokerage are involved in the rescaling of power. The multiple 
belongings of immigrant politicians allow them to access different groups and different levels of 
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governance — they are elected officials, they are also members of national political parties, they 
are immigrants and perceived as formal representatives, each of these ‘hats’ opening a different 
door. By bypassing, bridging and sometimes acting as gatekeepers, they produce and reproduce 
new hierarchies of power and authority. I will expand this argument in the following chapters, 
notably when I will address the morphology of the governance of immigration and integration. 
What is clear at this stage of our analysis is that the officials I have met assist in the creation of 
new channels between the municipality and the MOIA, through their belonging to Israel Beitenu.  
Conclusions 
This chapter aims to present the stories of Jewish immigration to Israel, as told by local officials 
who themselves experienced immigration. The main argument is that the stories built and 
performed by these officials in the public space, via other institutional actors, journalists or 
researchers for instance, participate in the definition of the frames of immigration and 
integration policies, at least in those cities where I conducted my research.  
They convey a discourse of integration centred on the immigrants’ individual capacity to 
overcome the difficulties inherent to immigration. The stories therefore express continuity after 
immigration to Israel, implying a fresh start, and the small successes that act as the milestones of 
the personal and professional development of these immigrants, until they reach the ultimate 
success of their integration: being elected to a political position in Israel, despite the fact they 
had been foreigners some years earlier.  
I have shown that the personal immigration stories told to researchers, journalists, peer 
councillors and residents, act as a legitimising act: their immigration experience is their 
curriculum vitae which enabled them to develop the necessary skills for their job. However, 
these officials also struggle to balance between their role as community representatives, and 
their role as councillors. They have to constantly steer between the interests of their voters and 
those of the city residents they represent.   
While we can attribute their professional success to the fact they were ‘sought out' by national 
or local political parties, their position as resource-persons in the local social space and their 
status as community representatives even before their election. Tali worked at the bank for 
sixteen years and therefore knew many Arad residents; Abram was the ER doctor and treated 
thousands; and Ayelet was a community worker, also in contact with many residents, At least, it 
is their situation of ‘in-between’ (Delory-Momberger, 2009, p. 70), at the intersection between 
several social spaces, which allows them to be seen as resource-persons and representatives.  
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Their social resources are also mobilised to operate as brokers and to mediate between groups 
and between levels of governance. In that sense, they participate in the transformation and the 
production of new scales of power. Their meaningful interventions have an impact beyond 
immigration and integration issues.  
In the introduction, I mentioned the possibility to view immigrant participation in politics as a 
way to co-construct values and norms — such as integration — and therefore escape from the 
imbalance induced when immigration and integration issues are defined by the majority (who 
are usually not immigrants). However, these examples demonstrate that immigrants themselves 
can be intransigent. They support their peers and believe in maintaining their own sociocultural 
world. But, their discourses also emphasise the self-made man image and the capacity of 
immigrants to take advantage of the infrastructures that the State and cities build for new 
immigrants.  
The participation — as conceived by the American philosopher Nancy Fraser as a co-
construction of the world, cultural values, norms and more of the political community 
(Ferrarese, 2015, p. 7) — of immigrant officials is not power-free, and symbolic struggles do take 
place. Immigrant officials do participate in the production of a local scale of integration and 
representation, that better accommodate sociocultural diversity, but at the same time, they 
participate in the limitation of the national immigration policy to an even more restricted 
number of immigrants who they perceive as legitimate and more deserving than others.  
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Part III: Immigrant integration policies: 
from symbolic policies to 
implementation of policies 
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Chapter 7 ◊ A grounded-theory of integration: is 
there a local interpretation of immigrant 
integration? 
Academic literature has widely contributed to critical thinking on integration, as embedded in 
national politics of belonging, therefore going beyond a simplistic definition of immigrant 
integration relatively to a benchmark (usually the performance of an average national). Most of 
these new accounts come from political science and sociology, both deeply concerned with the 
social construction of the concept of integration. What then can research in social geography 
bring to this debate? 
In this particular project, I aimed at analysing the rescaling of State responsibility towards 
immigrant integration issues. This required focusing essentially on the governance of 
integration, that is to say how immigrant integration is defined as an object of public action by 
State actors, as well as other actors involved, located at various scales. From a constructivist 
perspective, I emphasise the voices of these actors, grounded in the places I carried out my 
research. By anchoring the enquiry in places, and acknowledging the agency of the participants 
to my research, I hope to provide a grounded-theory of immigrant integration. I therefore offer a 
critical perspective of the process of immigrant ‘absorption’, the term usually adopted when 
addressing the policies directed at new immigrants to Israel after their settlement. The concept 
of ‘absorption’, as described in chapter 3, was a fundamental aspect of nation-building after the 
establishment of the state: “To each aliya is assigned a specific functional contribution in the 
nation building process and a consequent location on the centre periphery continuum” (Ram, 
1995, p. 31). Public agencies have targeted resources at newcomers' acculturation in modern 
Jewish society (Ram, 1995; Shafir & Peled, 2002), the core of which was European Jewry, 
whereas the periphery had a ‘marginal’ role in nation-building: they were meant to be 
assimilated within the core culture in order to create a ‘unified and homogeneous nation’ 
(Frankenstein, cited by Ram, 1995, p. 38).  
While my analysis focuses on the role of institutions — as ‘absorption’ implies —, I want to 
address more specifically the variations of this ‘national project’, since Israeli society is being 
transformed and faces new challenges, and more particularly, the various interpretations that 
occur at the city level. In previous chapters, I have mentioned several elements that characterise 
the cities I became acquainted with during this doctoral project. For this chapter in particular, I 
want to insist on the elements that were crucial to formulating my hypotheses and research 
questions. These elements inform the tensions that appear at city level between: 
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• cities that have benefited from more autonomy since the 1980s; 
• a State that intervenes in peripheral cities with less capacity for autonomy; 
• immigrant residents who have had an important influence on transforming the original 
Zionist national project into a neo-Zionist ideology which is conservative, religious, 
nationalistic and which has a hawkish attitude towards the conflict (Ram, 2000).  
The first set of elements concerns the historical development of these cities, even though their 
history is rather short. In fact, these cities are immigrant cities, established (or expanded in the 
case of Acre) at the frontiers of the country. From the 1970s on, they represent the second Israel 
— or Israel hashnia — against the Ashkenazi establishment. Political movements that emerged 
from that moment on have largely contributed to create an alternative identity that takes into 
account the large groups of immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East — even though 
these alternatives do not address issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict any differently, 
and involve contrasting strategies of reaching out to the establishment, while at the same time 
contesting it. Nowadays, what is the heritage of this alternative identity discourse on current 
immigration? Similarly, the large wave of immigration from the former Soviet Union has 
reinforced a more pluralist attitude in which immigrants’ cultural practices are more widely 
accepted. Since many agents I met during fieldwork belong to this large group, do they also 
participate in producing a more pluralist understanding of integration?    
A second set of elements regards the specific challenges met by these frontier towns, viewed 
through more politico-administrative and economic lenses. In a context of de facto 
decentralisation, cities excluded from economic and political core networks already experience 
tremendous difficulties to raise the necessary resources to run the local public administration, 
and can barely afford the long-term investments needed to foster the local environment for 
social and economic development. Nevertheless, their newly acquired independence can also 
mean that they develop innovative actions for their cities. In any case, their marginalisation 
should not sanction them as powerless, and scholars have a responsibility to unveil the active 
role of the actors of these cities in producing new governance patterns, notably when it comes to 
addressing immigration settlement in their communities. One cannot be too naïve, and it may be 
that the discourses framing policies are more influenced by local conservatism than liberal 
progressivism. In fact, in an earlier chapter, I have shown that right-wing conservative parties 
are disproportionally represented in those areas.  
A last element that may run counter to this statement is the large presence of immigrants in local 
politics, as well as in the municipal departments and other local organisations that deal with 
immigrant integration in the four cities. In fact, these towns provide an opportunity to look at 
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narratives and discourses produced by immigrants who are not only beneficiaries of 
institutional policies, programmes and activities, but also decision-makers.  
This chapter aims to explore the meanings of integration put forward by local officials, by the 
municipal department for immigration and integration in particular, and by other municipal 
departments and other stakeholders involved in this policy domain. Confronting the various 
definitions found with definitions of immigrant integration found in the literature (see also 
annex 3 on integration) may shed some light on the production of meaning and consequently on 
possible interventions at city level, and the impact of these transformations of immigrant 
integration at large. What exactly is the immigrant-integration-narrative framing which is at 
work and how do these narratives impact the formulation of immigration integration as an issue 
of public action? How are the logics of the State, the city and immigrants neutralised at local 
level, and translated into coherent policies?  
The analysis I provide here is based on the interviews I conducted in the four cities and in 
national governmental institutions. In each interview, I have extracted all the sentences that deal 
with the relations between new immigrants and the host society — in the widest sense possible. 
Many terms synonymous with integration were found, but rather than looking into the lexicon, I 
have looked for ‘stories’, for narratives of success and failure characterising this relationship 
between the immigrants and the host society.  
Unsurprisingly, these stories are very much connected with the professional tasks of the 
interviewees. In the first section of this chapter, I will focus on the agents working at the 
municipal department for immigration and integration. Their understanding of integration is 
very much linked to their job description, and involves the significant responsibility of State 
institutions in immigrant integration. I will then move on to the other municipal councillors and 
agents I met, and compare their approaches to integration with those found among workers for 
the department for immigration and integration. The third section will attempt to provide a 
grounded definition of integration. Lastly, from these local interpretations of immigrant 
integration, I will show that new scales of integration processes and responsibilities are 
produced, between the self, the local and the national.  
1 The municipal department of immigration and integration 
This first section sheds light on a rather recent institutional development in city government: the 
setting up of independent departments for immigration and integration within municipalities. 
Research funded by the Union for Local Authorities in Israel has identified these departments, 
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and shown that many municipalities have an institutional setting of some sort that deals directly 
with new immigrants (Yehuda Abramson, 2013). Municipal departments are the most 
autonomous form, together with non-governmental entities — Haifa municipality, for instance, 
has created a separate organisation for immigrant integration issues (Mesch, 2002; Yehuda 
Abramson, 2013). But it is also common to find units under the municipal welfare department, 
the municipal department of culture, or, in one case under the municipal department of 
education.   
Among the four cities under scrutiny, different institutional arrangements may be found: Acre 
has a municipal department for immigration and integration, Arad has a municipal department 
for culture, immigration and integration, while in Kiryat Gat, the unit for immigration and 
integration is under the control of the municipal welfare department. Lastly, Kiryat Shmona does 
not have an independent unit. In this town, two municipal councillors are in charge at the 
municipality, while most activities are organised through the district and the local offices of the 
MOIA.  
Through the analysis of interviews with the municipal agents in these departments and units, 
and the local politicians that supervise their work, I have identified three different views of 
immigrant integration, which are not exclusive but rather complimentary: the first is the view of 
integration as the bureaucratic process of ‘absorption’ (klita in Hebrew); the second view 
involves personal guidance towards the progressive settlement of immigrants, and their 
inclusion in the various institutions of the city — including school and employment; the third 
view involves providing socio-cultural activities to immigrants, part of them targeted at 
becoming acquainted with the host society, but a larger part leading to a segregated socio-
cultural landscape. The efforts deployed by officials to help immigrants settle, find an 
occupation, and obtain their entitlements, are justified by the need to foster a feeling of pride 
and self-confidence among newcomers who have just experienced a traumatic rupture through 
immigration.  
1.1 Absorption as a bureaucratic process 
Absorption (klita in Hebrew) is the most common term used to refer to the activities taking 
place after immigrants’ settlement in Israel. This is the official term, which appears in the name 
of the Ministry which deals with to Jewish immigration matters, as well as the names of the 
municipal departments I contacted.  
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As mentioned in chapter 3, social theorist Eisenstadt, who studied the absorption policy of Israel 
in the 1950s, envisaged three aspects of successful absorption of ‘traditional’ immigrants to 
‘modern Jews’:  
Acculturation — learning of the various norms, roles, and customs of the absorbing society; 
personal adjustment — strengthening the mental makeup of the immigrants, building confidence 
and satisfaction in them; and institutional dispersion — the proportional dispersion of 
immigrants in the various institutional spheres, residential locations, and so forth (S. N. 
Eisenstadt, 1954a:10 15). ‘Absorption’ was designated in terms of the "diffusion" of values, norms, 
and roles, from the modern absorbing society to the traditional immigrants, until they were 
entirely immersed. (Ibid., p. 38)  
In this context, “State agencies were thus advised to view ‘absorption’ as a process analogous to 
‘adult socialization’ […]” (Ibid., p. 40), and to create personal contacts with immigrants, in order 
to create identification and participation (Ibid.).  
Today, absorption mainly refers to the bureaucratic process of immigrant settlement — from the 
entitlements from which new immigrants benefit, access to housing and schooling (for children 
and teenagers), Hebrew classes, professional training and retraining, access to employment, 
national insurance, and retirement allowances for the elderly.  
When they arrive at the airport, new immigrants are given an immigrant card and their new 
identity card, as well as a voucher for the taxi bringing them to the address of their choice. 
Immigrants coming to settle in Acre are offered two nights at a hotel in the city. In Arad, 
absorption flats are available at the youth centre to accommodate them during the first few days. 
Following their arrival in the city, the coordinators meet with them and take them to open a 
bank account, to obtain their ‘absorption basket’ and to register at the Interior Ministry. The 
extract below is one of the many descriptions of the work done by the coordinators during the 
first days following arrival: 
Elisa: At the airport, we welcome the immigrants. They are given an immigrant card and an ID. I am 
in contact with them before they come. I am in contact with them 6 months, a year before. I answer 
their questions. I understand it is very important that they get answers to all their questions. When 
they arrive at the airport, they know they will come to Acre. The municipality books two nights at a 
hotel, and the municipality pays for it. So straight after the airport, they come here. This is also 
absorption. That somebody has thought of them. They don’t have to look for a place to sleep for the 
first night. The municipality… thought of that. At the airport, they know that in Acre there is a hotel. 
They bring them to the hotel. The Jewish agency knows at the airport. I meet with them in the 
morning. Sometimes they call me in the middle of the night. It gives them confidence. That’s OK if I 
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have to wake up. People are in a worse situation than I am. It’s harder for them. I see them first. 
They feel they know me. Because you talked over the phone, exchanged mails. It’s easier for them, 
they are more confident, they know me. And then it’s the start. First, a flat, all the documents, a 
bank, health, ministry of interior, ministry of integration 
Me: So what do they have to do with the ministry of integration?  
Elisa: They need to register with the ministry of integration. They need to bring the details of their 
bank account to get the money they deserve, the absorption basket. A person who comes does not 
know where to go, but we know it’s important that they register as soon as possible at the Ministry 
of Integration, that way they will get the money as early as possible. Put the children in school, 
kindergarten, everything” (Interview 5, 2014). 
Subsidised Hebrew classes are made available for beginners, usually in the city, or in the case of 
Kiryat Shmona, where very few immigrants arrive every year, in a neighbouring city or village. 
Professional training, or Hebrew entrepreneurship support and counselling are also made 
available. Employers can obtain employment vouchers so that part of the immigrant’s salary is 
paid by the State, if the employer promises to hire him/her for a two-year contract. Under 
certain conditions, immigrants also have access to public housing, which they need to apply for 
through the MOIA 
The MOIA and its local offices’ agents — the yoatsim — are traditionally in charge of the 
absorption of new immigrants. However, the development of new municipal departments, or the 
expansion of municipal departments, usually corresponds to the implementation of the MOIA 
programme of ‘group Aliyah’100. The ‘group Aliyah’ programme is a partnership between the 
MOIA, JAFI and the municipality. The main objective is to assure continuity from the moment an 
individual contacts the JAFI office in his country of origin, to his immigration and settlement. In 
fact, the administrative fragmentation between the JAFI, the MOIA and the municipality of the 
city where the newcomer settles, has led the MOIA to establish a new position, a proyektor, who 
is in touch with the candidate for immigration, and accompanies him until the agents decide he 
has achieved absorption. A relationship is built up and the coordinators feel that, when 
newcomers arrive in the city, they are already ‘family’ (Interview 7, 2014; Interview 48, 2015). 
The MOIA transfers funds to the selected municipalities to pay for the salaries of the 
proyektorim, while the municipality must provide funding to travel abroad and outreach to 
potential candidates for immigration.  
                                                          
100http://www.moia.gov.il/English/ImmingrantToIsrael/FirstStepsList/Pages/Group-Aliyah-and-
Absorption.aspx 
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Looking at the proyektor’s function in a wider perspective, several remarks are to be made. First, 
it corresponds to shifts in immigration patterns in Israel where, on the one hand, there is no 
longer any expectation that there will be massive immigration from one country of origin, and 
immigrants arrive in small families, rather than together with large groups;101 and on the other 
hand, the government has adopted a direct absorption policy where individuals obtain direct 
entitlements (see chapter 3). The proyektor of group Aliyah, or the municipal agent in the unit 
for immigration and integration, are therefore in charge of creating a relationship between 
immigrants and the local community, that has been disrupted and is no longer planned at State 
level. In that sense, it offers some continuity to the ‘personal contacts’ between State agents and 
newcomers which were encouraged the first years after the establishment of the state.  
Second, it obliges the municipalities to determine their agenda towards immigration and to 
proactively submit a proposal to the public bid of the MOIA. The proposal must include the 
potential for future immigration, housing options available, the types of subventions and 
privileges new immigrants can benefit from at the municipal level, out of the entitlements 
provided by the MOIA… etc. In this context, the MOIA budget is transferred to municipalities 
who can prove they have the will and capacity to engage in immigration outreaching and 
absorption. It also obliges the municipalities to save a matching budget and take ownership and 
responsibility for this policy.    
At the time of fieldwork, both Acre and Arad were beneficiaries of the ‘group Aliyah’ programme. 
Acre benefited from the largest staff — the MOIA provides that a maximum of 3.5 officers can be 
paid by the programme. Arad in turn, had just joined when I met the director, and the mayor 
planned her first trip to Moldova to outreach to candidates for immigration. However, their 
participation stopped in 2015. They did maintain a Russian-speaking staff dedicated to 
immigration and integration before and after fieldwork. In Kiryat Gat where there is no such 
programme, the local Kiryat Gat MOIA branch plays this role of welcoming and guiding 
newcomers through the first administrative steps. However, the local yoetset explains that she 
does not ‘babysit’ newcomers as much. She works office hours, and does not accompany them 
personally to the bank or to look for a flat (Interview 18, 2014). Similarly, in Kiryat Shmona, the 
MOIA organises a fair where newcomers have the opportunity to become acquainted with all the 
services they will be able to access as new immigrants (Interview 50, 2015). Both of the Russian-
speaking municipal councillors of Kiryat Shmona may intervene in the first days, but there is not 
                                                          
101 There are exceptions. Immigrants from India or Ethiopia, who come in larger groups, are directed to 
absorption centres and do not therefore come into contact with proyektorim. Another exception is the 
immigration organised from France and the United States with several families towards  same settlement, 
but here again, the coordinator for these groups is usually a private agent, and acts as an intermediary 
between the group, and the settlement’s administration as well as other institutions.   
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a municipal agent whose job it is to welcome newcomers.   
1.2 Personal or community accompaniment 
One crucial difference between yoatsim employed by the MOIA and working in MOIA local 
offices, and the proyektorim in the municipal department for immigration and integration, lies in 
the personal accompaniment tasks of the latter.  
In fact, proyektorim deal with a range of activities that go well beyond bureaucratic absorption 
and activation of rights and entitlements. They accompany newcomers to find a flat to rent, to 
select a school and register their children, to subscribe to a phone company, and they even 
participate in helping newcomers move into their flat, find second hand furniture, electric 
appliances or linen. Municipal agents also reported going to the pharmacy to get newcomers’ 
usual medication or to buy baby provisions. They translate at the bank, and in local shops. They 
can even assist in case of burials or looking for foster families for orphans etc. (Interview 5, 
2014; Interview 7, 2014; Interview 26, 2015). Coordinators are responsible for presenting the 
various options available, and they act as translators and intermediaries after newcomers take 
their decision.  
This personal accompaniment is possible because proyektorim usually speak the language of the 
majority of newcomers. In fact, their recruitment is based on the immigrant population. In the 
case of the cities I explored, a large majority of immigrants were Russian-speaking — apart from 
an Ethiopian group in Kiryat Gat, which I will focus on in the next paragraph.   
Accompaniment of immigrants from developing countries — such as the Indian Bnei Menashe 
immigrants who settled in Acre, or the Ethiopian immigrants in Kiryat Gat — is organised in a 
distinctive manner. In fact, instead of a personal or family accompaniment, face to face, in the 
proyektor’s office, efforts and resources are deployed at the group level. For instance, when the 
Shavei Israel102 organisation and Acre municipality agreed on the settlement of several families 
from the Bnei Menashe community, the municipal departments met for a planning meeting. 
Firstly, the newcomers went through six months of conversion to Orthodox Judaism — a request 
from the religious authority, who do not recognise Bnei Menashe practice of Judaism —, this 
conversion conditioning their obtaining Israeli citizenship. Secondly, the municipal team 
mapped the skills of the future residents in order to plan relevant professional training. Some of 
                                                          
102 Shavei Israel is a Jewish organisation based in Israel, whose objective is to support ‘forgotten’ Jewish 
communities (Bnei Menashe in India, Kaifeng Jews in China, Marranos in Spain and Latin America etc.) in 
their efforts to reconnect with the Jewish people and Israel, through immigration to Israel.  
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the newcomers were thus trained — as planned before their arrival — to become semi-skilled 
workers in an industry which was recruiting in the area (Interview 29, 2015).  
We can therefore already distinguish the types of missions the municipal department for 
immigration and integration takes upon itself when it comes to FSU immigrants, or English-
speaking immigrants (in Acre), and the type of missions defined for Ethiopian or Indian 
immigrants. In the first case, the proyektor acts as a consultant and leads the immigrants, whose 
ultimate decisions regarding housing, employment, education etc. remain in their own hands. 
Whereas immigrants who are under the ‘special populations’ category at the MOIA are dealt 
with at group level, following a much more assimilationist and paternalist agenda.  
1.3 A segregated sociocultural landscape 
More surprising are the many statements I came across to the effect that the department for 
immigration and integration's main mission is to organise segregated cultural activities in 
Russian, English, or Amharic.  
In fact, a substantial part of the resources — human and financial — for immigration and 
integration actually flows into segregated sociocultural activities. The local branch of the MOIA, 
the municipal immigration and integration department, the youth centres, cultural centres, 
community clubs and the matnass network, all offer a range of concerts, plays, lectures and 
workshops in Russian or in Amharic. They all claim to advertise in Hebrew in the local 
newspapers and encourage the participation of all. However, I have attended several activities in 
Acre, Arad and Kiryat Gat, which were all organised in Russian, making it impossible for non-
Russian speakers to understand.  
The channelling of public resources and more particularly of resources intended for immigrant 
integration, in the production of a segregated sociocultural space in cities, is to be understood in 
the rather recent context of multiculturalism inherited from the Russian immigration of the 
1990s. The case of Kiryat Gat is enlightening. Indeed, various groups of Russian-speaking 
immigrants organise and participate in the conception of the socio-cultural programme initiated 
by the municipality,103 and funded by the MOIA:  
                                                          
103 This type of participative programme design is particularly interesting for a department that usually 
hires municipal agents without a professional background in psychology, social work or education. 
Municipal agents in the municipal department or unit for immigration and integration are hired on the 
basis of their knowledge of the language or their previous immigration experience. They do not have 
compulsory training unlike welfare workers who are expected to attend regular trainings — on which 
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Ruti: There are people. They decide. There is a committee. One person manages the finances, 
another organizes this. They are Russians, organized.  
Moshe: Intelligent. It’s not just people.  
Ruti: Intelligent people that know how to work. In the past they were managers in big factories. For 
instance, V. who was here, he was the main architect of the city of Donetsk. Donetsk is like Israel. 
You understand? And he was the city architect. So they have knowledge and capacity and 
determination, which are the best best best. What Moshe did, was to fight over the programmes. 
They brought programmes and we always tried to make it better. Moshe was writing in a way that 
you would think that they wrote it so well. You understand. At the end, it was ours. For instance, 
there was a project on women's empowerment. Empowerment, as if they were empowered. There 
was a period when it was just about empowerment, empowerment, empowerment.  
Moshe: Also in welfare, there was a period, the first years I worked there, where it was all about 
women's empowerment, women's workshops, parents’ workshops.  
Ruti: But empowerment, it was just…  
Moshe: Once I sat in a meeting and they asked me: Tell me, in Kiryat Gat, they are all powerful? With 
all the empowerment all the time!  
Ruti: But, when I talked to the girls, this was not what they needed: there are problems in families, 
there were problems there. There is not a lot of work in Kiryat Gat. And sometimes, there were a lot 
of cases where the woman works and her husband does not… work. You know what it is? Conflict 
and the children leave the house and all those things. A woman, all of a sudden, a woman, as if it was 
not enough that she was working the whole day, and sitting at school, and at home, she has to care 
about her husband, who, poor him, could not find a job, that’s not that he does not want one: he is 
not a doctor, not a teacher, they closed the factory and fired him. So now he sits. He sits and he does 
not help. He is depressed. With everything she must deal with, she also must deal with him. There is 
no help. She will not go to a social worker. Even if she goes, what will she tell her? I talked to Moshe 
and I told him: do it the way you want. Write what you want, all the words you want. What do we 
really do? A group of women, with psychologists that we worked with, who will bring material and 
all, to show the woman that she is not responsible for what happens, because this is often what she 
feels, that he is not responsible either in what happened, and how do we get out of that? If women 
sit together and my story and her story are similar, I see that I am not the worst in the world and 
you tell me that also at yours, those things happen, and a third person sits and says: girls, let’s think 
of what we can do. And everyone does their homework and a week after, one says I did that, I said 
that, I smiled this way, and two, three weeks later, we hear that the husband found a job, it’s a huge 
success. Moshe was the one who closed the deal. He had to stand in front of the MOIA. They want 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
their promotion is conditioned —, notably, in the case of the workers I have met that have daily activities 
with immigrants, training in intercultural skills etc..  
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empowerment. That’s what they want. But, suddenly they want Judaism. OK. We do Judaism. But 
the way we want. (Interview 16, 2014)  
This sociocultural segregation is generally positively perceived by Israeli born people who 
consider the Russian-speaking ‘commune’ (Interview 36, 2015) a very efficient support group. 
FSU immigrants working in the institutions themselves consider it perfectly legitimate their 
belonging to both worlds: their belonging to Israel where they work, where they belong as Jews, 
and as supporters of the political project of perpetuating a Jewish home; and their belonging to a 
large group of Russian-speaking immigrants, generally portrayed as highly skilled, educated and 
fond of culture — art, performing arts and literature. This generalisation is sustained by the 
interviewees themselves, who, at least in my presence, failed to mention the great fragmentation 
of this immigration, in terms of immigration periods and regions of origin, but also in terms of 
levels of religiosity, class and level of education (Goldberg & Bram, 2007). Intra-community 
racism is never debated in the meetings. 
Nevertheless, it is crucial to understand that FSU immigrants, but also English, French and 
Spanish speaking immigrants, have the privilege to retain their language and to have access to 
segregated sociocultural activities. In that sense, those who reproduce their practices can be 
defined as dominant groups who resemble the white European Jewish elite of Israel. 
Multiculturalism, as promoted by the local politicians I have met, and by municipal agents, is 
idealised, and is rather exclusive. It draws a clear distinction between the Palestinian population 
of the region, and with other immigrant groups in Israel.  
Indeed, pressure to convert, to learn Hebrew, to give up on previous standards and norms, is 
much greater for other immigrant groups. These groups are usually targeted by the MOIA, and 
by other institutions dealing with immigration and integration under the category ‘special 
populations’. Special populations include Ethiopian immigrants, Indian immigrants, but also 
Georgian, Bukhara and Caucasus immigrants from central Asia. The extra resources allocated to 
these groups at national and local levels are justified in the name of affirmative action. However, 
the special treatments they enjoy are also perceived as a strategy to perpetually exclude the 
immigrants from the rest of society. Israelis born from Ethiopian immigrant parents are 
therefore still labelled as immigrants. This extract is enlightening:  
Michael remembers that while working in Neve Yakov, he saw how different the FSU immigrants 
from the 1970s and 1990s were: “they don’t get together”. He mentions the Bukhara Jews and the 
fact that Caucasus Jews were also named “Bukhara” until we found out they were distinct groups. 
He talks to me about his colleague Abram who could not say if he was a Bukhara or a Caucasus 
Jew… Michael tells the story of Slas, in Sderot, whose wife is an engineer. After failing to find a job, 
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he told her to change her family name on her CV. She got five interviews. “There are gaps here. 
The MOIA does not talk about that. Why are rights for French, US or Ethiopian immigrants 
different, the latest group going to an absorption centre? Those are in-built discriminations which 
increase stigma. If we don’t deal with that, it will explode in our face”. (Interview 11, 2014) 
Special treatment and extra resources are also coupled with a paternalist attitude towards these 
groups. Stories related to the settlement of Bnei Menashe immigrants, or the settlement of 
Ethiopian immigrants were largely tinted with romanticised elements of their life in their 
country of origin, even orientalist and racist narratives. Below is an extract from a long 
conversation, which revolved around the working culture of Ethiopian immigrants:  
But, slowly, slowly, we educate them. Look, at the beginning, I also had problems with Ethiopians. 
Listen guys, the bus is not for free. You will pay 10 shekels. No way, no way, no way. [The deputy 
mayor] told me ‘Moshe, give them for free’. For free, the bus will never be full! Never be full! For 
free, you know what, when you pay 10 shekels, you feel that you must come. Even if it’s only 10 
shekels. If it’s for free, he does not feel like waking up in the morning, he does not come. And they 
have a problem. Among the Russians there was never a problem. Russians leave with full buses. 
With them, I ordered a bus, it left with 20 people. (Interview 16, 2014)   
The injunction to assimilate — ‘we educate them’ — is therefore much stronger for groups who 
benefit from special status on the national level and receive more State resources. Can it be that 
when the local administration obtains fewer resources from the central government, it has a 
wider margin to implement a multicultural agenda? The more the MOIA is involved, the more 
the feeling that it is a local protector of the State. The figure of the yoatsim in particular seems to 
act as the guarantor.   
1.4 A commitment to create ‘pride’ and ‘self-confidence’ 
All the interviewees acknowledge that newcomers in Israel go through deep personal and family 
crises. As they experience a loss of control over their new environment — impossibility to 
communicate in Hebrew, encounters with a new administrative system, difficulty to find their 
way around their new home, lack of occupation etc. —, new immigrants are compared to 
‘children’ or ‘naked people’ (see for instance interview 32 (2015)). In this context, the MOIA and 
the municipality usually join forces to accompany the immigrants the first few days after their 
arrival.  
The resources invested in absorption, personal and community accompaniment, and the 
organisation of activities with MOIA and municipal budgets, among other sources, are justified 
by the local leadership to create ‘pride’ and ‘self-confidence’. In fact, a further understanding of 
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integration follows an ideal of personal success and accomplishment of one’s ambitions. 
Interviews insist on the institutions' responsibilities to provide an environment that fosters 
confidence, protection and empowerment among immigrants, in order for them to avoid crises 
associated with their immigration experience, or to recover after those crises.   
The mayor of Acre, for instance, affirms that the feeling of trust and perceived equality suffices 
to transform individuals into active citizens. As regards Palestinian Israelis residing in the city, 
he argues: 
[Palestinian Israeli residents] voted for me in the last elections, a year ago, 93%. Why? Why would a 
person vote in such a… craze? Because they saw that they got everything, they felt equal, they felt 
part of the community, they felt that they were trusted, they felt that they were not marginalized, 
and when a person feels he is not marginalised, he wants, he votes, he wants, so… (Interview 32, 
2015) 
During our second meeting, he addresses a similar issue, regarding immigrants:  
What defines an immigrant in his essence, in his orientation, is his opening to the Israeli society, 
and his achievements. You can be an immigrant for many years. You did not learn the language as 
needed, you were not absorbed as needed, they did not take care of you as needed, the children are 
not in the proper institutions. They did not deal properly with your potential. So you remained an 
immigrant. You did not get anywhere, so you remained immigrant. And there are some who can be 
immigrants for 30 to 40 years. They are immigrants, mentally they are immigrants. They did not 
move anywhere. They stayed in the same place where they were on the first day. The same 
neighbourhood, the same house, the same misery, the same failure, the same everything. So what 
defines absorption? When the ministry of absorption decides that it is from 2014? What the hell? 
Those that arrived earlier, you already dealt with? This is what I tell you, there is no time. Because 
of that, I tell you, the policy of the municipality is much more advanced than the government. 
Because this thing of being an immigrant or not an immigrant. You are a resident of the city, we 
must deal with you. We must. It’s in our soul. (Interview 58, 2015) 
Kiryat Gat’s mayor equally justifies the municipality's proactive policy:  
Me: That’s my question: what did they miss in other cities?  
Aviram: I will tell you what. You know what makes the mix? Empowering every colour […]. Each 
community and community. I empower him. I tell him: you are a Bukhara Jew, wow, you are a 
Bukhara Jew. Bring your culture. You will have a community. Bring your old people. Yeah, 
handahanda. Ethiopian, Ethiopian. Russian. Moshe, bring them, bring them.  
Me: I even heard that you sometimes open a ceremony with some words in Russian, in Amharic 
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Aviram: Yes, yes. I believe in that. Strengthen them. The moment the person becomes strong, he will 
open up. He is not scared. He is strong, he knows he is worth something, he has… Who comes and 
hugs you? One that has confidence. Confidence. The one that looks and is scared: open him. Give 
him. (Interview 19, 2014) 
The extracts of the interviews with the mayors of Kiryat Gat and Acre demonstrate for the 
importance they attach to self-confidence, inner strength and feeling of pride and equality 
among populations who usually suffer from a discriminatory national narrative. Although they 
themselves adopt a rather paternalist discourse, and do not completely abandon the national 
framework that provided the ‘adult socialisation’ of immigrants, they justify communicative 
action aimed at improving the general position of marginalised groups through psychological 
levers. How does this subjective idea translate into activities and programmes?  
We cooperated with the MOIA on a programme called “massad klita” with funding from the Joint, 
the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Housing.104 The idea was to work on long-term 
integration. This project led to the creation of bridging centres. Another project was born from the 
first programme: Contribution to the integration of immigrants (Mitram shiluv olim or Mishol). 
(Interview 11, 2014)  
The Mishol centre in Acre takes action in accordance with the principles dictated by community 
services: foster leadership among residents, facilitate dialogue between different groups — new 
and old-timer immigrants, immigrants and Israeli-born, Jewish, Christian and Muslim etc. 
Different activities are carried out: a weekly ‘café’ for new immigrants, a community theatre, a 
multi-religious women's group and so on. I participated in a ‘café’, and met the residents and the 
coordinator. The main purpose, in the words of the coordinator, was for them to meet and show 
what they were worth, outside the low-skilled jobs they occupy, or the poor decayed 
neighbourhood they live in. Three Russian-speaking women brought jewellery, bags and clothes 
they designed themselves to show their new creations to their friends. They also brought food 
and some drinks. They went to the local community garden. The coordinator brought her guitar 
and they sang Hebrew songs connected with the holiday celebrated the same week in Israel.  
Another example is given by Kiryat Gat’s deputy mayor, when she talks of the community centre 
which was recently renovated for Ethiopian immigrants residing in the city.  
Ayelet: And we say that there should not be special programmes for Ethiopians. On the other hand, I 
have the club for Ethiopians, that protect culture, for the elderly. Because we don’t want. On the one 
                                                          
104 See 
http://www.molsa.gov.il/SiteCollectionDocuments/MisradHarevacha/עולים/קהילה/cover%20report-
nivi.pdf  
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hand, we help them to conserve their culture, but on the other hand we give them so they run, go to 
school, go to study, go to work, go to the army, become officers, what we understand to integrate in 
the society. But there is a cultural centre, the matnass, the community club, that protects their 
identity. In the evening, they go with their families to all their things. They have their identity, the 
place they find 
Me: So would you say that the recipe when it comes to identity is people's self-confidence  
Ayelet: you need it 
Me: And on the other hand, integration in institutions, schools… It means, at home we are proud of 
who we are.  
Ayelet: Exactly 
Me: But in institutions, we don’t want special treatment, to feel side-lined.  
Ayelet: True. It’s important. If you don’t do that, strengthening their identity, you. You miss the 
point. (Interview 57, 2015) 
Here, the focus is mainly on protecting and praising the cultural dimension of Ethiopian 
immigrants. Participation in the main institutions — school, the armed forces, employment — is 
still expected to help integration.  
These issues of identity linked with pride and confidence are also relevant for immigrants who 
settled in Kiryat Shmona in the 1950s and 1960s, and their Israeli born offspring. Indeed, Tel Hai 
academic centre and the municipality both work on a maabarot museum, in memory of the 
transit camp that Kiryat Shmona once was. The project’s objectives are described as freeing 
people from the feeling of being an ‘underdog’, a feeling resented by those early immigrants, and 
re-establishing a connection with the history of the place: 
Avichai: The project was very labial, you know. It has a lot of challenges, a lot of difficulties but it, 
we need to deal with all the history, with the period of the Aliyah to Israel, how its story is 
presented and, and also the story of Kiryat Shmona. Because the story of Kiryat Shmona, until today 
it’s not a story of heroism. It’s a story of Aliyah, they came, they were thrown here but, they live 
their lives. Although it’s really not true. It’s an Aliyah that made this place, built a city, built a 
community, they were a partner in all the national factories of Emek hahula. So, we do, you know, 
we make the historical correction in the story. Huh.  
Me: To brand the city anew, and take out the tragedy and the oppression story?  
Avichai: “Yes, I think branding… heritage is, in my opinion, a very important player, in the present, 
but also in the future. Your historical story. Cause you can’t, you can’t live in a country, in a region 
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that has such an amazing story, and not have any relation with it, or a place, a place in the script. 
And that’s how the young people grow up here. They don’t grow up with the impression that 
grandpa and grandma did something special. They grow up with ‘we got to the city, it seems that we 
cooperated in the building of the area’. They also look at them differently on the regional level: 
those are arsim,105 they are. All kinds of stigma that refer to things in the past. And this produces a 
feeling of being an 'underdog'. And when you feel like an underdog, you don’t feel that you 
succeeded thanks to, thanks to the fact you are here; but because you are from here, I mean, 
although I am from here, I succeeded. And that’s an approach that we try to change. Stop saying 
although I am from here, but thanks to the fact I am from here, thanks to the community, thanks to 
the values I was taught, I succeeded in life. And lastly, to encourage people to come back home. 
Because, branding, again I told you, it relates a lot to the historical context, the things you did.  
Me: Yes, it’s like local patriotism, or local pride, let’s say.  
Avichai: Absolutely.  
Me: That is missing here.  
Avichai: It is absolutely missing. (Interview 55, 2015)  
The rehabilitation of non-Ashkenazi immigrants in the local public discourses, through 
‘communicative action’, concrete programmes, cultural centres or even museums aimed at 
writing an alternative history of proud pioneering, is believed to emancipate immigrants from a 
feeling of marginalisation. However, this rehabilitation adopts similar patterns to the elite. 
Rather than proposing an alternative, they aim at reaching out to established narratives and 
include outsiders in these narratives.   
The attempt of FSU immigrants to create an alternative path of integration has been much more 
successful, when compared with other initiatives to rehabilitate immigration within the nation-
building project, such as the one described by Avichai. Through political representation, 
demographic strength and inclusive narratives — even partially — in the Ashkenazi core, they 
have gained increasing control of the institutions that regulate immigrant absorption, as well as 
political power in other spheres of public action.   
2 The municipal department of immigration and integration in its 
institutional environment 
In the previous section, I have highlighted part of a definition of integration, that focuses 
essentially on the Israeli conception of immigrant absorption — a bureaucratic process and 
                                                          
105 Ars or Arsim (plural) is, as described in a Wikipedia article a “Hebrew slang term for the Israeli 
stereotype of a low-class young man of Mizrahi origin”. 
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accompaniment of immigrants to Israel, that aims to facilitate their settlement in the city and 
their access to rights and entitlements. I have also shown that absorption has been extended at 
the city level to include a rather recent institutional setting, which involves a close relationship 
with newcomers, and is justified through the understanding that psychological well-being 
enhances the chances of newcomers successfully becoming a part in the host society.  
This second section focuses more particularly on greater expectations that immigrants will 
access the main institutions — in the larger sense of the term — that is to say the social, 
economic and political institutions of the country. Here again, the role of the municipality and 
other local stakeholders in achieving successful access is highlighted, but more as a facilitator, 
the ultimate responsibility of being an active, productive and participative resident being left to 
the immigrants themselves.    
2.1 Integration defined as the equal access to Israeli institutions 
Israeli geographer Tovi Fenster argues: “issues of ethnicity and citizenship have been de-
emphasized in immigration policies, since the sense of ethnicity is defined by the Jewish religion 
and the overriding emotional issue of return from 2,000 years of exile” (Fenster in Gradus and 
Lipshitz 1996). In fact, interviewees often mention the fact that immigrants immediately belong 
to the Jewish people, as the ‘return to the homeland’ amidst their Jewish peers should enhance 
accession to the Israeli nation. The following extracts mobilise the Zionist narrative of the return 
to Eretz Israel after 2,000 years of exile:   
For instance, the coordinators who work with me today, I always tell them the objective is to help. 
The girl here was an immigrant, I absorbed her. Some years after, she gives service, she helps. This 
is how it works. We are one people. (Interview 5, 2014) 
We are all together. We are citizens of Israel. We… think the same. We… Maybe, we are different, as 
we are individuals. But as citizens, we are one people. That’s why I always say: stop dividing us in 
groups. The moment we came here, we became part of this country. (Interview 8, 2014)  
But, we grew up with what we call the love of Eretz Israel, and also the understanding that we are 
all immigrants, it does not matter from where. Although this is our land. We are — more correctly 
— returning citizens. OK? Our fathers were exiled from here. And we came back. All the time. We 
are the only people who have been saying “next year in Jerusalem” for 2,000 years. […]. In… 40 
years, I will ask you: How do you feel? Like an immigrant? A pioneer? That? Everything! The ones 
from the 1950s, they say they are pioneers. And the ones who arrived in 1930, also say that they are 
pioneers. And the ones who arrived in 1881, also say that they are pioneers. Always pioneers. This 
country, is always… in the building. That’s all. For me… It’s the Jewish home. You understand? 
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Everybody comes. (Interview 19, 2014) 
These statements obviously put forward the Jewish identity of the newcomers, who are 
perceived as ‘returning citizens’ rather than immigrants.  
Therefore, and particularly when this religious belonging is put in doubt, a usual first step in the 
country is to reinforce this religious belonging, through workshops on Judaism, or even through 
conversions. Those conversions are suggested, more or less strongly, in the case of immigration 
from Western countries. In the department for immigration and integration of Acre, numerous 
posters, in Russian, are hanging from the wall. They offer conversion courses, Torah classes but 
they also offer advice to find ways to prove one’s Judaism when certificates are lacking. 
However, certain Ethiopian immigrants or Bnei Menashe immigrants from India must convert as 
a precondition to acquiring citizenship, therefore being targeted by a much more coercive policy.  
Once the religious aspect has been ‘corrected’ (see for instance Djerrahian (2015)), I have shown 
that respondents envisage a segregated cultural and social life for new immigrants. Integration 
is mainly conceived as being into the main institutions, while allowing them to retain their 
language or cultural practices. This is what is usually described as an ‘intercultural attitude’ 
(Alexander 2003; Penninx et al. 2004; Crul, Schneider, and Lelie 2013; Schnell 2013), where 
immigrants are expected to share a common ground with nationals, through institutions such as 
education, labour, etc, while retaining their specific identities. This stance supposedly reconciles 
both the perceived failing assimilationist and multicultural approaches of integration (Ibid.). 
Those institutions, mentioned regularly by interviewees, include religion, but also education, the 
armed forces and the labour market. Regarding this last point in particular, the economic 
performance of newcomers is often mentioned. In the previous chapters, I have already 
mentioned the importance of the immigrants’ capacity to support their family and contribute 
positively to the local economy instead of being net beneficiaries, even if it involves important 
downward mobility. For instance, Arad’s mayor says:  
Someone who works, who succeeded, his children are part of the education system: what do they 
have to do in the municipality! My house is in the neighbourhood (shchuna), it was always nice 
there, there were no, no reasons to go and request something from the municipality. I never got a 
shekel from the State, I never got a discount from the municipality. (Interview 8, 2014) 
The capacity to accept downward mobility, to work at any job and climb back up the social 
ladder is also mentioned in an interview with a representative of the Union for Local Authorities 
in Israel:  
 301
Gali: At the moment when he is black, Ethiopian, he is an immigrant. Even if his parents were born 
in Israel. But even for his needs, he acts like an immigrant. This weakness is very strong among the 
Ethiopian population. Russians are different. There is a woman here, her name is Clara. She was a 
biochemist abroad. She works here in cleaning, she brings coffee. She decided to work in whatever. 
You see the differences between different groups. One had the tools to lift herself up. Even though 
they gave up on their salaries, their career, working in their professional field, only to earn money 
and work. But the Ethiopian population don’t manage to lift themselves up. They pass this 
weakness on to their children. […] The father is not relevant: he does not know how to read, to 
write, he does not know anything. The mother relied on the things she knew as a mother. What 
does a mother know? To keep her house clean, to raise her kids. The woman knew how to integrate 
through skills she had. […] If I would have taken care of a job for a father. What does the child want? 
His credit card! That his iPhone works! You can give money… You don’t agree?  
Me: It’s really…  
Gali: It’s extreme! Of course, there is more than that. But if you tell your kid you can’t give them a 
shekel, they respect you less. Because we live in a consumer society! Of groceries, shopping, going 
out and having fun: “Mum I want a yogurt, I want to go to the movies…” Who can provide that? 
(Interview 15, 2014)  
Some of the ethnic stratification elements mentioned in this quote were already mentioned in 
the previous chapters, reinforcing the common stereotype that FSU immigrants are more 
productive. In this extract, the impossibility to provide in a society where consumption is an 
instrument of belonging, and a measure of success, makes you an ‘immigrant’, a status that you 
pass on to your children, even if they were born in Israel. Socioeconomic status is ethnically 
marked.  
Here, Ethiopian immigrants are said to pass on their 'immigrant’ status to their children, as if it 
was a genetic condition. This situation is envisaged as long-term failure. In fact, more usually, 
immigrants are seen as ‘the lost generation’, while their offspring are, without a doubt, Israelis. 
The mayor of Arad states:  
My son works for Elbit factory. He represents Israel in many countries abroad, as he is a very good 
professional. My daughter is an economist, she works for Hot. She also finished studying. They 
succeeded! They got married. I am already a grandma. Which is… something additional. They 
really are Israelis. There is no doubt. (Interview 8, 2014) 
Their Israeli identity is even stronger when they marry outside their group:  
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My wife’s family is from Yemen. They arrived in the 1950s. She was born here. She is part of a 
society that is different from mine. Our children today are in a different reality. It would have been 
different if she married a Yemenite. […]. Although I am Israeli, I like eastern music but also Jazz. 
My wife learnt to like jazz. We need to orient this and make it a social fact. (Interview 11, 2014) 
I said, for the next elections, there will not be divisions between Moroccans and Russians. My 
youngest son has a Moroccan girlfriend. My older son has a girlfriend from Ethiopia. (Interview 
45, 2015)   
Intermarriage is defined as a social fact, and a basis to understand the integration of the various 
groups, who form Israeli society.  
Lastly, political stances are also of importance. Becoming Israeli implies relying less on 
immigrant parties like Israel Beitenu. Kiryat Gat’s deputy mayor, a member of Israeli Beitenu, 
says:  
I have a niece in Kiryat Gat: She voted for Lapid. Now, young people go somewhere else. They are 
already Israeli. They don’t feel Russian anymore. There are Israeli in society. They think it’s better 
to vote for young parties like Lapid or Kachlon. (Interview 45, 2015) 
Or Kiryat Gat’s spokesperson: 
In one of the mayor’s biggest achievements, for the first elections that he organised, 5,000 
immigrants from FSU elected a black politician with a kippa. (She laughs). But maybe it shows 
something about the very specific composition of Kiryat Gat. (Interview 57, 2015)  
This last remark brings me to the following subsection, where integration is also defined as the 
immigrants' access to political and decisional institutions.  
2.2 Participating in decisions related to integration: immigrants’ access to 
political and decisional institutions 
2.2.1 Representation 
The election of immigrant representatives in the municipal council plays an important role in 
the definition of an immigration and integration agenda. In the case of the four cities studied, 
those councillors have two main channels through which they have reached the municipal 
council: the nationalist immigrant party Israel Beitenu, which offered them support during the 
campaign and once elected; and/or being on a local independent list, which was the case for 
Ayelet, deputy mayor of Kiryat Gat and number 2 on the local list led by the current mayor.  
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The interviewed mayors clearly express their will to run in the elections in alliance with 
immigrant representatives. In Acre, the mayor stated that his two deputy mayors represented 
two important groups in the city: the Palestinian Israelis on the one hand, and the FSU 
immigrants, on the other hand. In Arad, the mayor herself, Tali, is an immigrant, in a city where 
40% of residents are immigrants. New elections on 2 June 2015 demonstrated that this was not 
decisive since the immigrant candidate defined as Tali's natural replacement lost to his 
adversary, a non-immigrant candidate. In Kiryat Gat, the mayor also affirms that it was essential 
for him to have two deputy mayors representing FSU and Ethiopian immigrant groups in the 
city. Lastly, the mayor of Kiryat Shmona was reminded in an interview that his alliance with the 
immigrant representative was a key to his victory at the local elections.  
Immigrant councillors are therefore representatives of the immigrant communities residing in 
the city. On the council they are usually in charge of immigration and integration. They supervise 
the work of the immigration and integration department if there is one, and supervise activities 
in other departments that target immigrants, such as in welfare, education or employment. In 
Kiryat Gat, deputy mayor Ayelet even chairs a forum where the main municipal agents and local 
actors involved with Ethiopian Israelis in the city meet. Less intensively, in Acre, deputy mayor 
Zion organises an annual forum to discuss immigration issues with municipal agents.  
But more importantly, they are the main interlocutors of the immigrant residents in the city. 
Although they are not technicians but politicians, they are expected to keep their door open and 
act as intermediaries between immigrant residents and municipal services. As a ‘one-stop-shop’, 
they must be knowledgeable on all immigrants' rights of in Israel. In Kiryat Gat, deputy mayor 
Ayelet estimates that around 600 to 700 people stop by her office for various requests every 
month (Interview 57, 2015). Acre’s deputy mayor Zion describes immigrant residents' demands 
as ranging from getting help for food, to dealing with issues of harassment (Interview 20, 2015). 
As I visited the Kiryat Shmona deputy mayor’s office quite often, I witnessed some of the 
meetings held in his office: representatives of Second World War veterans reaching out to 
municipal resources to organise the yearly commemoration, or a Ukrainian immigrant asking for 
help to obtain a visa to visit her family in the eastern part of Ukraine which is under Russian 
control.  
These officials are not only considered as their main contact in the municipality by immigrant 
residents, but also by municipal services. In Kiryat Gat, the unit for immigration and integration 
deals directly with FSU immigrants organising activities in the city. However, when it comes to 
activities organised for Ethiopian immigrants, the coordinator admits his preference for 
requests channelled through the office of the deputy mayor, who he prefers to negotiate with, 
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rather than negotiating directly with the beneficiaries (Interview 16, 2014).  
The following extract illustrates how the mayor envisages the role of his deputies in Kiryat Gat:  
[I introduce myself to Aviram. He immediately starts by saying that there is no more diverse place 
than Kiryat Gat, and that is reflected in the local leadership: his deputy mayors are from the FSU and 
from Ethiopia. I remember that I have to ask authorization to record. Aviram tells me that I can.] 
Me: So one of your deputies is from the FSU, and one from Ethiopia.  
Aviram: Yes. They are deputies with a salary, it means that they are deputies with ‘full time jobs’. It 
means that… it means that we are focused on giving services to the immigrant in a participative 
way. It means not… “go to the Absorption department and they will talk to you”… But… hum… here 
here, in the municipality.  
Me: It’s included in the services of the municipality.  
Aviram: All the services… all the service of the service, come, come, come here. The mayor and his 
deputy at your service. You… don’t speak Hebrew, you speak Russian? FSU mentality? Here is the 
deputy. You are from there, here! They also know them, their needs, their problems, on top of this. 
And like this, instead, or additionally, that the system will be available, yes, until you do this 
procedure and you get to the last of the departments, the last of the units, yes? You have… from the 
head, and then it trickles down. It does not matter to which department, it goes down. Hum, hum 
People understand, appreciate, and know that this is unique. This, this, this is what is important. 
(Interview 19, 2014) 
It also shows that political representation is not enough, and that the municipality also arranges 
for immigrant residents to access municipal services in their mother tongue.   
2.2.2 Multilingual service delivery   
I mentioned earlier that municipalities acknowledge the fact that immigrants do not always 
master Hebrew, even after several years in the country. Being able to fully function in one’s own 
language is seen as a right. Some interviewees have shown resistance and consider that, in the 
long run, Hebrew should be learnt. But elderly people are usually exempted from this 
expectation. A coordinator shares the story of his family's immigration to Israel and talks about 
his grandfather:  
For [my grandpa], he got everything he needed in life. He had his beach, his medical house, 
everything he needed, his supermarket. Everyone is Russian. Everybody speaks Russian. And he 
does not need Hebrew. And it's a small city. And he does not have a problem to live. (Interview 26, 
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2015) 
In this context, municipal agents organise activities to fit this situation. An Arad community 
worker explains:  
If you want to attract more immigrants, you organize lectures that are not in Hebrew. Most of the 
immigrants here are FSU immigrants, from Russia, who are Russian speakers. If you want to 
attract them, you need something in their language. Among all those immigrants, there are many 
elderly people who don’t even speak Hebrew. They speak only Russian. So for the Golden Age 
month, we organize activities that target this population. (Interview 42, 2015) 
She also considers that this is made possible because Russian-speakers represent a large part of 
the population. When it comes to the small Ethiopian community hosted in the Orly absorption 
centre, she thinks that it does not make much sense to organise costly cultural events for a small 
number of families (Ibid.).  
Apart from organising activities in Russian, Amharic or English, being able to turn to a municipal 
agent who speaks one of these languages, and who can address the issue without a translator is 
also seen as important:  
Elisa: In Welfare, it is written in the tender: preference for a Russian speaker. That’s how. There are 
some Russian speakers in Welfare, but also in education, engineering, finance. In every department.  
Me: Is it because there are more Russian residents?  
Elisa: The municipality provides services to the city, so they have to take into account that a part of 
the residents speak Russian. I don’t know who decides. In every department there are people.  
Me: So, everything here is in Arabic, Hebrew and Russian.  
Elisa: Arab and Hebrew are the country’s official languages. If a quarter of the residents speak 
Russian, they need to provide services. I think that’s why. I don’t know. If someone comes to the city 
hall, they need to get a service. (Interview 5, 2014)  
In an interview in Kiryat Shmona: 
Me: Do you try, if there is a tender for a social worker, do you try to find a Russian speaker?  
Abram: I try to promote it among the people I know.  
Me: You tell people you know, there is a tender, send your application.  
Abram:  You have to try at least to get in. I can’t make it happen. But of course, I try. Sometimes, also 
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in agreements, the company Tanur 
Me: What is it?  
Abram: The water company: it’s in cooperation with some municipalities. Today, there is a Russian 
speaker from 2014 at the reception. We have, in the department, an engineer speaking Russian. 
Some in the municipalities speak Russian. I tried that they will not get fired.  
Me: You laugh. It’s a war. (Interview 6, 2014)  
Having representatives ‘within the system’ enhances accessibility. It is also perceived as 
important to address proximity and feedback. The welfare services in municipalities put extra 
effort into mapping the needs of new and older immigrants and in closing the gaps. On top of 
mapping, they also see the importance of bringing the municipality into the neighbourhoods. For 
instance, several municipal services are decentralised and have their buildings in 
neighbourhoods with a high concentration of immigrants. The physical closeness is perceived to 
reduce the fear and ‘threat’ of entering a larger institution. Mishol and the Centre for Mediation 
and Dialogue in the Community — both welfare department programmes, community services, 
for the integration of immigrants — are located in the middle of two neighbourhoods in Acre. 
The new integration centre for Ethiopian immigrants, the Moked Klita, implemented in Kiryat 
Gat, is also in a neighbourhood north of the city. Their workers all confirmed it was less 
threatening and made wider participation of residents possible (Interview 36, 2015; Interview 
39, 2015; Interview 44, 2015; Interview 46, 2015). Participation can also be ensured through 
bottom-up programme design, such as integration programs funded by the municipality of 
Kiryat Gat (Interview 16, 2014).   
2.3 Redefining ‘absorption’?  
If immigrant integration, or more specifically ‘immigration absorption’ is a widespread term 
used by municipal and local services targeting immigrants in their daily work, the welfare 
departments and, more specifically, the community service unit, supervised by the community 
service located in the ministry of Welfare, is attempting to get rid of the concept of absorption to 
develop the concept of ‘intercultural community development’. The director of the community 
service provides the following explanation:  
First of all, Michael tells me that they don’t talk about immigrants. They did in the past. Now, the 
new concept is ‘intercultural community development’. Immigrants are just one aspect. Conflicts 
are usually common between the different groups. “I am more interested in the social integration 
and the relations between communities”. […]. Michael insists on the importance of strong 
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communities instead of conflict. […]. “The strength comes from the fact we live together. […]. 
[Mayors] don’t understand that a strong city comes from the relations between the groups. […]. 
Ethiopians get a different treatment than the rest. I understand that people want to live close to 
people who resemble them, but you need to find spaces for interaction. (Interview 11, 2014). 
Community workers in the municipalities convey the same message:  
Huh, you cannot only look at the Individual. You need to see the individual in his environment. I 
think that there is something is going on there. They really try to get more projects, they really try 
to make the individual, not only to look at his problems, but to integrate in the community. Try 
maybe, if you are alone, and you don’t have anyone, come and try to participate in one of the 
community activities there are. (Interview 42, 2015) 
This new orientation applies to policies implemented by the municipal welfare department. 
Projects like Mishol or the Centre for Mediation and Dialogue in the Community, which I 
mentioned in the previous subsection, are part of the new policy. However, this discourse is not 
relayed by the municipal department or unit in charge of immigration and integration. It is found 
to some extent in the discourse of Shimon, mayor of Acre, himself certainly more accustomed to 
this language, as he was the director of Acre community centres (matnass) for many years. He 
talks of connecting people in institutions, talking, fostering mutual respect and tolerance:  
Shimon: The third thing was the story of the riots on Yom Kippur. There were riots in Akko seven 
years ago. We could have crashed from this, but instead, we moved on. We took the story of the 
Jews/Arabs (relations) as a lever. People hide the multiculturalism. We took this multiculturalism 
and we made it a priority everywhere of every place. Schools, kindergartens, community, 
politicians, religious people tatata we connected, connections with all and all. At every moment we 
connected people. And that was, instead of sinking, we rose with this story. That was a really, really 
difficult story.  
Me: The centre for mediation and dialogue in the community is a result of this story?  
Shimon: Yes. It was established right after. We got to the conclusion that we, as a mixed city,cannot 
let things like that happen. The fact that it happens here and it happens there, it happens 
everywhere. But that something that dramatic happens, it’s forbidden. And for it not to happen, let’s 
leverage it. Instead of hiding it, let’s talk about it. All the time. Talk, meet, organize common events. 
For instance there was the holidays festival… a month ago. There was Christmas and and Hanukah 
and we organized an event in Hof hatmarim hotel and it was… atomic. Jews, Moslems, Christians, 
there was a big event. Those are things that we did not do once. Naaaah, why do we need to 
highlight that? Yes. We need to highlight it. Multiculturalism is a central issue in the life of people, in 
the life of the city. If you are not tolerant, if you don’t know how to live with people around, you 
(inaudible). If you love me or you don’t love me? Don’t love me! But respect me. That’s the approach 
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that we work with. You watch Al Jazeera, you see that they shoot in Gaza, fine, don’t love me. You go 
with me in the street, respect me. Say hi, wait in line like a man, treat each other with respect. If you 
also love me, that’s bonus. (Interview 32, 2015) 
Acre’s multicultural policy, also relayed on its Website, is unique among the four cities under 
scrutiny. Nevertheless, the local production of a multicultural model, especially in a city like 
Acre, which comprises a large group of Palestinian-Israelis, is extremely complex and very often 
contradictory. Here again, I witnessed the difficulty to produce an alternative discourse in a 
strong national ideological framework, where social stratification is deeply embedded in 
everyday life, as much as in politics. The multiculturalism imagined by the mayor is one that is 
built on a status quo, and does not rebel against the superiority of the Jewish establishment. 
Moreover, the informal discussions I have had with Acre’s residents often led to statements such 
as “Arab-Israelis in Acre prefer to have a Jewish mayor, since it ensures them better access to 
funds available in the central administration”. This type of declaration suggests the quasi-
impossibility for Palestinian-Israeli leaders to lever resources.   
Apart from the activities promoted by the community service, two other indicators serve the 
officials who address — or partly address — the issue of living together: the spatial integration 
of the different groups, in the neighbourhood and even the level of individual buildings; and the 
resolution of intercommunity conflicts.  
In Acre, the Centre for Mediation and Dialogue in the Community aims to produce a dialogue 
between the different communities. One of the most important activities is mediation between 
neighbours. Indeed, having residents from different religious and national backgrounds in the 
same building leads to tension and conflict, which are often translated into wider national issues 
— a simple fight between neighbours becoming the source of larger demonstrations linked to 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Interview 36, 2015). The director of the centre gives examples 
related to housing culture. But also, she expresses her worries regarding the forced conversions 
experienced by the newly established Bnei Menashe in Acre.  
On another level, Mishol, which organises the ‘café’ every Wednesday, Hebrew learning, a 
community garden, a community theatre and a multi-religious women's group, aims to foster 
leadership, encouraging immigrants to take on responsibilities, to lower dependence on welfare, 
but also to ‘learn from one another’.  
Other activities are organised in this spirit in other municipalities, but they are not 
institutionalised. For instance, the early childhood centre of Kiryat Gat has organised support 
groups for immigrant parents to learn about Israeli parenting culture. Kiryat Shmona’s deputy 
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mayor also lists the reduction of neighbourhood conflicts as being part of his responsibilities.  
To sum up, the municipal departments or units for immigration and integration act at the 
crossroads of a large range of social institutions — understood as established conventions or 
structures for social order — and institutions — understood as an organisation founded for a 
public purpose — to facilitate immigrant integration. Firstly, they facilitate the access of 
immigrants to education, the armed forces and employment, and they act towards increase their 
sense of belonging to a wider Jewish community. Secondly, those departments are established to 
become a mechanism among others, following a political resolve to include immigrants in 
decision-making — for demographic, strategic and political reasons. Lastly, they compete or 
cooperate — depending on the cities — with other municipal departments, the most direct 
competitor being the welfare department. In Acre, conflicts were rather open between both 
departments, the welfare department supervising two important immigrant integration 
organisations — Mishol, and the Centre for Mediation and Dialogue in the Community — as well 
as employing community and social workers directly appointed to work with immigrants. In 
Kiryat Gat, the welfare department directly supervises the various units dedicated to 
immigration — the unit for immigration and integration, but also the Moked Klita, which serve 
Ethiopian-Israeli individuals — therefore leading to better cooperation.  
Before I turn to the next section I wish to briefly mention the differences that emerge from the 
four different towns where I conducted fieldwork.   
In these two sections, Acre stands out as a distinct place. When it comes to immigration issues, it 
illustrates itself as being more proactive, with a dense institutional fabric (that I will describe in 
the next chapter) and affirmed resolute public agenda regarding multiculturalism. However, the 
coexistence of a Jewish population side by side with a Palestinian-Israeli population adds layers 
of complexity. Immigration has contributed to the growth of the city. However, interviewees not 
only mention Jewish immigration, but also rural-urban migration from neighbouring 
Palestinian-Israeli villages. The latter is perceived as a threat, and seems to partly drive the 
Jewish immigration agenda. In every conversation, in every encounter, there is always a fine line 
(sometimes not so subtle) between a desire to achieve peaceful co-existence, and the reluctance 
to create alternate discourses of inclusion. In fact, a pragmatic coexistence is not envisaged out 
of a nation-wide nationalist narrative that affirms the superiority of Jewish settlement over 
Palestinians in this disputed region. Moreover, within the Jewish population itself, I have 
identified incessant contradictions between a proactive policy, resulting in extra resources, to 
invest in the Caucasus Jewish community and the Bnei Menashe community, both experiencing 
higher levels of poverty in Israel; but the discourses justifying these initiatives is anchored in 
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paternalism and orientalism.  
In Kiryat Gat, I have came across a similar issue of promoting pluralism while there are 
difficulties in moving away from paternalistic and somewhat racist discourse directed primarily 
towards Ethiopian immigrants and Ethiopian-Israelis. Even pluralism is described in terms that 
rely more on an out-dated vision of culture, rather than the potential to achieve a significant 
transformation of the society as a collective. Nevertheless, Kiryat Gat has successfully set up 
mechanisms of inclusion, notably in terms of the participation of the immigrant residents 
themselves in defining their activities, and a more bottom-up approach. This is at least visible 
when it comes to designing sociocultural activities. Similarly, the institutional set-up leads to 
less competition and therefore better cooperation between the different stakeholders, with 
much less conflict than in Acre.  
Arad, as I have often heard, is a place where a minority became a majority. The high proportion 
of Russian immigrants has had the effect of rendering other groups virtually absent from public 
discourse, despite the diversity of immigrant groups who reside there— English and Spanish 
speaking immigrants, Black Hebrews, Ethiopian immigrants, asylum-seekers from various 
countries in Africa, but also numerous Bedouin residents in the area who come regularly to Arad 
for services. The interviewees tune the visibility of those many social groups down. Similarly, the 
department for culture, immigration and integration deals quite exclusively with Russian-
speaking immigrants from the Former Soviet space. In the welfare department, there seem to be 
more contacts with a diversity of groups, but still, the lower participation of Ethiopian 
immigrants for instance, is understood along ethnic terms. The most visible minority after FSU 
immigrants is the growing ultra-orthodox Jewish community, most of them belonging to the Gur 
Hassidism, who are perceived by residents, local politicians and municipal agents I have met as 
an unstoppable threat to Arad’s rather secular lifestyle, and as a growing social burden for the 
social services (a threat that I, like my informants, have failed to back up with statistics).  
In Kiryat Shmona, I witnessed a much lower degree of intervention by public agencies. 
Segregated sociocultural activities exist. Altogether, it seems that there is a more significant 
presence of residents in the implementation of municipal activities. Indeed, I was invited to sit in 
during various meetings between the mayor, the deputy mayor and heads of various local 
branches of associations such as the associations of Ukrainians, the organisation for Holocaust 
survivors, the federation of FSU immigrants… who work with the deputy mayor and the 
councillor to operate activities.  
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3 A grounded-theory of integration 
Based on the analysis of the in-depth encounters in Acre, Arad, Kiryat Gat and Kiryat Shmona’s 
municipalities, immigrant integration is defined by the main actors as a process, supported by 
the State and its representatives, which allows equal access to the educational, professional, 
social and political institutions of the country. Municipal action is viewed as the pursuance of 
Israel's immigrant absorption policy, as it was conceived from the first waves of immigration to 
Israel onwards.  
This process varies in time, and if equal opportunities to access institutions are not ensured, 
policies provide for differentiated treatment, targeting individuals perceived as being subject to 
structural obstacles due to their age, family situation, lack of knowledge of the norms and rules 
of institutions, education and so forth. In these cases, State agencies affirm they have a role in 
defining and implementing mechanisms whose objectives are to reduce these obstacles, notably 
through affirmative action. Access to political institutions, in particular, is perceived as an 
important element to help include immigrants in decision-making, and therefore providing 
better services — for instance municipal services — to the plurality of residents in the city.     
In addition to government action that aims to enhance openness of institutions for immigrants, 
and support mechanisms, municipalities insist that personalised guidance should be available to 
improve the pride and self-confidence of immigrants. In fact, the psychological well-being of 
newcomers is considered fundamental to avoid family and social crises, (inherent to the loss 
experienced during immigration), and to enhance integration and personal accomplishment.   
Nevertheless, ultimate responsibility is left up to immigrants themselves. Public actors can 
implement mechanisms to reduce risks and levers, but newcomers must organise themselves in 
order to have political representatives defending their interests, in order to become involved in 
professional retraining and hence acquire skills which fit the needs of the Israeli labour market, 
and to actively participate in their community’s development. 
I will detail this definition in the following section.  
3.1 Facilitating access to institutions, but ultimately leaving responsibility 
for access up to immigrants themselves 
In accordance with the various fields of action mentioned by Michael Alexander, but also by 
Rinus Penninx (Penninx et al., 2004; Heelsum & Mascareñas, 2013), action can be taken to 
improve the legal-political, socio-economic, and cultural-religious dimensions, as well as the 
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spatial dimension of integration. Here again, this is consistent with the findings presented above, 
although some distinctions must be underlined.   
In my analysis, I have split the legal-political dimension of integration, as defined by Penninx, 
into two different categories of activities. On the one hand, I have isolated accompaniment and 
advocacy activities linked to access to immigrant entitlements, and sometimes their expansion 
beyond the legal period of time as defined by the central administration. On the other hand, I 
have analysed, more extensively, the right to represent citizens or to be represented as citizens 
in government institutions. As mentioned in the first part of this thesis project, new immigrants 
in Israel may acquire citizenship immediately, and therefore have the right to vote and to be 
voted for. While there are programmes at national level and in big cities, to encourage the 
political participation of groups who are underrepresented, I have not encountered such 
programmes in the four cities I have studied. The political representation of the various 
immigrant communities is the result of different trends: a dense fabric of community groups and 
associations among FSU immigrants, actions deployed by political parties such as Israel Beitenu 
to headhunt for representatives and train them, but also strategic alliances imagined by 
candidates with potential representatives of immigrant groups, especially when the community 
vote is significant for success.  
The socio-economic dimension of integration mentioned by Penninx is important when it comes 
to the second set of activities I have identified; that is to say activities aimed at facilitating access 
to the country's socio-economic institutions: education, vocational training, job placement and 
participation in armed forces.   
The cultural-religious dimension is more ambiguous. Indeed, the Law of Return provides that 
Jews abroad can immigrate to Israel. Interviewees considered this criterion to constitute proof 
of immigrants’ belonging to the Israeli nation. The ethno-religious nature of Jewish immigration 
to Israel made it unique, in their opinion, and facilitated integration. Nevertheless, countless 
examples of the non-Jewishness of immigrants were mentioned in interviews. For instance, the 
Indian Bnei Menashe families settling in Acre had to go through a six-month conversion course 
in order to obtain full entitlements, their practice of Judaism being cast into double by the 
orthodox authority in Israel. However, non-Jewish FSU immigrants who did not fulfil the 
requirements of the orthodox authority did not experience any problems in obtaining their 
immigrant' entitlements. However, they face issues when it comes to marriage or burials, both 
falling under the authority of the religious authorities. And they might face social pressure to 
convert from clerks and peers. But, contrarily to certain Jewish groups immigrating from 
developing countries, access to rights is not correlated with the observance of Orthodox Judaism. 
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The cultural dimension corresponds to a more pluralist view, and is much more segregated. 
Immigrants are granted the right to access publicly funded sociocultural activities in their 
mother tongue.  
Penninx et al’s model includes the participation of the collective, apart from government 
institutions. However, results show that civil society plays a small part in the cities I studied. In 
Acre, mention of some charity organisations was accompanied by facts about the government 
funding they obtain. The Garin Ometz is an important citizens' association in charge of 
accompanying Bnei Menashe immigrants in the first years of their life in Israel. However, an 
interview with its representative, the coordinator of the programme for the Garin Ometz, whose 
position is funded by the NGO Shavei Israel, uncovered a paternalist approach, already 
appearing in interviews with municipal agents. In Arad, a school set up by immigrants to provide 
evening lessons for Russian speaking pupils was mentioned.   
Nevertheless, if the role of the residents was rarely mentioned in sessions, the responsibility of 
immigrants for grasping opportunities provided by the institutions is fundamental. Similarly to 
other analyses of development programmes around the world, the government — at any scale 
— is responsible for reducing risks, offering levers and allowing access, but the immigrants are 
left with the sole responsible of building their abilities, organising representation and training to 
acquire skills which fit the labour market etc.  
3.2 The central administration’s persistent role 
When exploring the motives which encouraged local governments to form immigration and 
integration policies, as well as the different sectors those policies address, I assumed that 
integration was a function of the State. As Favell argues, “sociologically speaking, we can, of 
course, conceive of integration taking place without the structure-imposing involvement of the 
state. Immigrants can be ‘integrated’ into the local labour market as employees or service 
providers, or they can be ‘integrated’ into complex inter-community relations at, say, city or 
district level. […]. Multiculturalism as a descriptive state-of-affairs, in this sense, could be the 
product of something that never had anything to do with the ‘multicultural’ policies or 
institutions of the state” (Favell (2003) reprinted in Martiniello & Rath, 2010, pp. 373–374).  
Since integration is deeply related to citizenship and building the nation-state, “Integration is 
thus not only an ideal goal for society; it is also something a government sets out to achieve” 
(Ibid., p. 373). In this context, Favell conceives of “[…] integration as a collective societal goal 
which can be achieved through the systematic intervention of collective political agency […]” 
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(Ibid., p. 374). A year later, Rinus Penninx, Karen Kraal, Marco Martiniello and Steven Vertovec 
begin their edited volume Citizenship in European Cities with their definition of integration: a 
“process of becoming part of the society” (Penninx et al. 2004). They argue that the process 
occurs at three levels: individual, collective (e.g: immigrants’ associations) and institutions 
(Ibid.). Again, government institutions or agencies are considered central to integration.   
The findings coincide with these definitions of integration as a goal set by the government, a 
process, requiring the systematic intervention of collective political agency. Indeed, if the 
interviews stage various activities — linked to rights entitlements, access to educational, 
economic, social and political institutions, or to fostering an environment of mutual respect — 
organised by the State — at different scales —, they highlight the determining role of public 
action.   
When I started the project, I drew the hypothesis that local governments would play a more 
important role, following decentralisation, in this process. However, the findings reveal that 
responsibilities are far from simply transferred from the central to the local administrations. 
Actors along different scales cooperate, sometimes overlap, or even direct responsibilities back 
to each other, leading a void in certain situations. As I have argued in the preceding chapters, 
unfinished decentralisation leads to fragmented governance. 
The central administration, particularly the MOIA, but also the Ministry of Welfare, the Ministry 
of Education (funding the network of matnass), the Ministry of Economy (funding the 
employment service), the Ministry of Development of the Negev and Galilee (funding the Youth 
Centres), is the main source of funding. They all require matching funds from the municipality, 
as well as proactive steps to ‘earn’ transfers of funding. These funds are more important for 
‘special populations’, that is immigrants from Ethiopia and Latin America, and from Georgian, 
Bukharan and Caucasus Jews from the Former Soviet Union.    
In this context, the municipality is expected to be a creative force in order to access those 
budgets. It also finds allies in the city: the matnass and the youth centres are an example, since 
they are not part of the municipalities, but they cooperate and deliver sociocultural services, as 
well as individual and group counselling to young immigrants. It is also expected to raise funds 
to match the government’s transfers. Those funds correspond to between 10% and 25% of 
transferred funding, depending on the ministry.   
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If we consider integration as a goal set by the government, involving a range of actors, located at 
different scales, with members of elected bodies, but also of administrative bodies, public or 
private, I suggest we use the words ‘governance of integration’.  
I will develop this last point in the following subsection. However, it seems that the more the 
central administration is involved in defining activities to address integration, the more an 
assimilationist approach prevails. On the contrary, when funding is less important, municipal 
agents display a more pluralist or multicultural approach to integration.  
3.3 Variations and occurrences between municipalities: the weight of the 
national 
As I isolate interpretations of the concept of integration given by the interviewees in the four 
cities, some occurrences materialise, mostly concentrated around the bureaucratic process of 
absorption. These similarities show that this understanding derives from a national frame. They 
mainly consist in viewing absorption — an administrative accompaniment of immigrants 
associated with a set of rights and entitlements — as a core element of integration. In this 
context, the local administration concentrates its efforts on multiplying the work of the MOIA 
and other ministries involved. Even the very personal accompaniment offered by municipalities, 
while often the result of a municipality-led proposal to the MOIA, is mostly funded by the MOIA 
‘group Aliyah’ programme.  
Two findings balance what seems to be a quite straightforward devolution of responsibility to 
the local level: first, there is no provision in the municipal reform which obliges the 
decentralisation of immigrant integration functions to the local level. Municipalities decide 
voluntarily to become involved, and obtaining the budget is conditioned by the quality of their 
proposal. Kiryat Shmona applied for funding but was refused as recent immigration intake was 
low, and they did not have facilities to accommodate the immigrants following their arrival. 
Secondly, the cities sometimes challenge the criteria that determine the entitlements of 
immigrants. Being a ‘new immigrant’ is not a matter of years in Israel, local politicians argue, but 
a matter of their situation. They advocate individual assessment and longer accompaniment if 
needed.    
This last point is linked to the second understanding of integration, a more classical account of 
integration as ‘becoming a part of society’ (Penninx et al., 2004; Penninx, 2013). Here, 
interviewees consider integration effective if the newcomers successfully participate in what 
they consider to be the main institutions of the country: education, the armed forces, the work 
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force and religion. In that sense, it follows that what Michael Alexander or Nando Sigona have 
termed ‘interculturalism’ (Alexander, 2003), that is to say a model of integration reconciling the 
assimilationist and the multicultural model, by consenting to the pursuance of sociocultural 
practices as long as integration in the main institutions is achieved. This is particularly true for 
individuals going through direct absorption. Apart from one interviewee who remarked that he 
would not learn Russian because immigrants should learn Hebrew (Interview 16, 2014), there is 
a consensus that services in Russian should be provided in cities where a certain proportion of 
the population is Russian-speaking. In addition, spending on socio-cultural activities conducted 
in Russian accounts for a significant proportion of the municipality' budget for integration 
activities. This marks a clear change from the assimilationist ideology which characterised the 
Israeli integration model up to the 1990s.  
Nevertheless, Jewish immigrants from developing countries who are qualified by the MOIA 
‘special populations’ are treated differently. Learning Hebrew is considered a priority. Indeed, 
street-level bureaucrats dealing with Ethiopian immigrants, for instance, are not themselves 
Ethiopians. They believe that newcomers should learn Hebrew. One such bureaucrat states that 
after a while, she no longer wants the translator to be present, as immigrants should be able to 
understand her. However, she does speak Russian with FSU immigrants who use her office’s 
services, regardless of the number of years they have lived in Israel. Jewish immigrants from 
developing countries also experience doubts regarding their religious practices. Forced 
conversions, which occurred in the 1980s among Ethiopian immigrants, were widely criticised. 
However, conversions are still common practice. Indeed, Bnei Menashe immigrants, from India, 
undergo a six month conversion course before they obtaining full entitlements (Interview 26, 
2015). In fact, the more resources the State puts in, the more it controls the socio-cultural 
integration of individuals, conversion to Orthodox Judaism being the most coercive aspect in this 
respect.  
In order to ensure that immigrants become part of society, at least at the city level, interviewees 
encourage their participation in political and technical positions in the municipality. While we 
may be tempted to see this as an indicator of municipality pressure, several other aspects must 
be taken into account. Among national political parties, political activities have been more and 
more locally anchored. This phenomenon was described in the 1980s (Gradus, 1983), and the 
analysis of the local politics of the four cities reveal that it has continued up to now. Israel 
Beitenu, more specifically, has systematised potential candidates’ headhunting in municipalities. 
Moreover, mayors view alliances with immigrant representatives as a successful strategy to win 
over electorates. It is in the interest of political parties and individual candidates to bring 
immigrants into local politics, beyond the stated goal of supporting integration.    
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Lastly, the more rarely acknowledged understanding of integration as the fostering of a 
community of tolerance, respect and dialogue, is not a purely bottom-up approach either. While 
it is not promoted by the MOIA, an interview with the director of the community service at the 
Ministry of Welfare in Jerusalem shows that community work promotes the use of intercultural 
community development as a replacement of immigrant integration. The idea lying behind this 
is the promotion of dialogue between different social groups, and the fact that its members 
constantly redefine society. Unsurprisingly, policymakers with a background in social and 
community work are more acquainted with this lexicon and mention this approach in 
interviews.  
To sum up, if the differences between the four cities seem to show that there is a local 
governance of integration, this apparent freedom of interpretation should be qualified by 
various factors. First, the process of absorption is very much defined by the State, and mostly 
funded by central administration. Second, what seems to be the adoption of a more multicultural 
model at local level applies to certain groups only (i.e. Groups which are considered closer to the 
mainstream Israeli population) and therefore in lesser need of sociocultural incorporation into 
Israeli society. However, the fact that these groups receive less public funding than immigrants 
from developing countries confirms that, when untied from central administration, local 
authorities show greater tolerance for expression of identity. Lastly, integration policies are 
mostly cantoned to administrative accompaniment or the organisation of sociocultural activities. 
The promotion of integration as living together is at a very preliminary stage.  
4 Scales of integration  
In this grounded definition of integration, the role of public agencies is being brought forward, 
but also, to a certain extent, the role of the immigrant himself/herself and his/her community. 
Public agencies range from the central administration (its ministries and the district and local 
representations of those ministries), to the municipality, composed of an elected body, the 
municipal council, but also of technical staff. The municipality is not the only local actor. It works 
alongside youth centres, cultural organisations funded by State funding — the matnass being the 
most important network of community centres, and funded by the Ministry of Education. But it 
also works with diaspora organisations such as the Joint or the Jewish Agency, NGOs such as 
Shavei Israel, or community groups. In addition, immigrants themselves are considered as 
responsible for their integration. They can proactively access local government, but can also 
decide on the type of activities offered by the municipality as described in Kiryat Gat, and they 
are the ones ultimately responsible for levering their own capacity to contribute to the city, as 
revealed by leadership programmes led by the welfare department.  
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In this constellation, responsibilities in immigrant integration are fragmented, although the 
State, at central and local levels, is a crucial actor. The multiscalar character of immigrant 
integration governance will be discussed in more depth in the upcoming chapter. Nevertheless, I 
wish to draw some preliminary remarks on this topic.  
Indeed, in the previous chapter, I have suggested that one of the frameworks directing 
policymaking was provided by the experiences of policymakers. Policymakers produce scales, 
and, more specifically, they produce specific scales of integration. In terms of access to political 
institutions, they highlight the importance of national and local democratic bodies. The 
sociocultural activities are mostly described at community-level, and it might go beyond city 
boundaries. However, when it comes to questions of economic performance, policymakers were 
more inclined to believe that immigrants should rely on their own capacity to achieve economic 
results similar to citizens born in Israel in the long run. In this analysis that encompasses more 
actors than the previous chapter, new frames complement the previous findings. Notably, the 
terms determining sociocultural integration differ depending on the immigrant group 
considered — cultural segregation being considered acceptable for immigrants from developing 
countries for the elderly but only a temporary cultural segregation is envisaged for young adults 
and adults. Ethiopian or Indian immigrants are expected to eventually participate in mainstream 
Israeli cultural organisations. Additionally, when it comes to economic integration, the 
institutions are more tolerant than policymakers. They argue for facilitating access to the labour 
market, understanding that skills, norms and rules on the Israeli labour market differ from the 
immigrants’ previous experiences. 
What are the scales of integration endorsed by the interviewees, and what scales emerge?    
4.1 The national scale: ‘special populations’ must integrate 
The central government, through the different ministries, is still very present when it comes to 
immigrant integration in Israel. First of all, and even if there is a consensus in Israel that 
decentralisation has been taking place since the 1980s, Israel is still characterised by centralised 
administration. More particularly, when it comes to immigrant integration, municipal reform 
does not make it obligatory for municipalities to take an active role and devote a municipal 
budget to this topic (Razin, 2003). Therefore, adapting the municipal structure to the city’s 
demography does very much depend on the willingness of the municipality to engage in this 
topic and invest extra resources. For the municipalities of depressed towns like the ones I have 
studies, mobilising these resources would be challenging. 
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In fact most of the municipal budget intended to support immigrant integration   comes from 
national funding from the MOIA, the Ministry of Welfare, the Ministry of Education and the 
Ministry of Economy. Despite the fact that municipalities have to put together projects and show 
central government their will and capacity to invest in immigrant integration activities, they are 
not the majority funders of these activities. Usually, the MOIA requests a 10% matching from the 
municipality, while other ministries require 25%. Although this is a small proportion, certain 
interviewees still believe it is an excessive burden for their budget. Local officials in Kiryat 
Shmona, for instance, have argued that this system favours municipalities with solid finances. 
Indeed, if a bid is available, Kiryat Shmona, whose municipality is tutored by the Ministry of 
Interior following several years of bad governance, does not have the financial resources to 
provide 25% of the budget. They therefore feel constantly excluded from these exceptional 
budgets. 
The fact that the ministries transfer funding to the municipalities does not systematically 
translate into direct supervision. Results show that there are tensions between the 
assimilationist national scale, and a more accommodating and pluralist local scale. This tension 
is to the advantage of the local level in the cases of direct absorption, that is when immigrants 
decide to settle in the city and do not benefit from access to absorption centres, and to extra 
funding as ‘special populations’. This increased flexibility seems to be the result of: lower 
funding; of better representation within the local institutions, since Russian-speaking veteran 
immigrants make up a huge proportion of the municipal agents serving immigrants; and maybe, 
of the cultural proximity of the FSU immigrants with the mainstream Israeli society.  
However, ‘special populations’ who benefit from a higher funding also receive a clearer 
injunction to assimilate from the national level. Their entitlements are often conditional on 
implementation of practices of Judaism which comply with the standards set by the orthodox 
Jewish authorities. They benefit from longer periods of Hebrew learning, based on their national 
belonging rather than on individual assessment of language acquirements. Many of the 
interviewees working with Ethiopian or Indian immigrants did not speak the immigrants' 
mother tongue, while one of the hiring criteria is to be able to speak Russian. After some years in 
Israel, ‘special populations’, more particularly younger adults, are expected to interact with 
municipal staff in Hebrew whereas FSU immigrants are not accused of integration failure if they 
continue all their activities in Russian, even thirty years after immigration. The remarks are 
often, although not always, coupled with racist affirmations of the superiority of Israelis and 
Western immigrants over Jewish immigrants from developing countries.  
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4.2 A local scale enabling multiculturalism  
Social theorists have raised doubts over the assumption that local level government is more 
accommodating — in the sense of promoting a more pluralist approach to integration — than 
central government. Among them, Hans Mahnig shows that in Swiss cities, “local conservatism 
prevails” (Penninx et al., 2004). Nevertheless, other studies have demonstrated that many cities 
have initiated multicultural policies against a rather assimilationist national approach 
(Friedmann & Lehrer, 1997; Alexander, 2003).  
In this study, it seems that the local scale makes a more pluralist approach to integration 
possible, at least when it comes to immigrants benefiting from the Law of Return. I have shown 
in the previous subsection that three factors seem to explain the adoption of a multicultural 
policy: the lack of supervision over the spending of funds transferred to municipalities to hire 
municipal agents in charge of immigrant integration; the monopolistic position of FSU 
immigrants in these positions in the municipality and in other positions dealing with immigrant 
integration in the city; and the perceived proximity of Jewish immigrants from the Former Soviet 
Union, and from other Western countries, with the mainstream Israeli population.  
This translates into the use of a public budget targeting immigrant integration in the 
organisation and implementation of segregated sociocultural activities that benefit the 
immigrant population only. Having attended several of these events in the cities, my command of 
the Hebrew language was of absolutely no help in understanding the activities during these 
events, entirely conducted in Russian. For me, this constituted a substantial paradox, where 
integration was conceived of providing services outside what is perceived ‘Israeli’.  
The justification for spending public funds on concerts, lectures or other performances in 
Russian was the confidence and well-being procured for immigrants through the promotion of 
these activities. Showing them they were welcomed and they ought to be proud of their culture 
was perceived as a fundamental empowerment tool to avoid a potential feeling of being the 
‘underdog’, to avoid social crises, and to increase the success of their settlement in Israel, and the 
immigrant retention rate of the city.   
4.3 The immigrant and his capacity  
In this multiscalar environment, the role of the immigrants themselves also increases. Indeed, 
the theoretical model I described at the beginning of this dissertation links to recent 
developments in migration policy studies around frames of ‘active, participatory and productive 
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individuals’ (Soysal, 2012) or of ‘deservingness’ (Chauvin & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012; Garcés-
Mascareñas, 2015). Indeed, Soysal demonstrates that the new European social project focuses 
on individual responsibility in achieving a higher position in the labour market and active 
citizenship (Soysal, 2012). For Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas, deserving foreigners are 
evaluated along three dimensions: their place of residence, which provides access to rights; their 
performance (that is their economic reliability and their cultural integration); and their 
vulnerability, that has to be proved and accompanied by a denial of will and agency, as being an 
asylum-seeker requires the lack of a migratory project (Chauvin & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012). 
This last account, in particular, is enlightening. Indeed, the connection between the place of 
residence and the treatment immigrants receive is very present. Immigrants are quasi 
‘investments’ and securing their access to institutions should translate, in a near future, into 
their socio-economic contribution to the city. Secondly, this participation in the institutions is 
the main measure of immigrants’ integration in Israel. Having their children in educational 
frameworks, and then in the armed forces, working, taking part in the political life of the city, 
volunteering, all these reinforce the rightfulness of the municipal agenda. Public action aims at 
fostering an enabling environment, removing obstacles to access institutions, but the 
immigrants are ultimately responsible for using their rights, taking advantage of them and 
eventually, contributing to the development of the city and the State.  
Lastly, vulnerable immigrants are usually not treated as individuals, with personal 
accompaniment like other immigrants. They are seen as a group, a ‘special population’ with 
particular entitlements and measures of affirmative action aiming at correcting their 
vulnerability. Immigrants from developing countries are labelled vulnerable from the moment 
they arrive in Israel. Thus, they follow a specific integration path, where they are hosted, as a 
group, in absorption centres such as the ones operating in Arad and in Kiryat Gat. Their religious 
practices are corrected, and schemes for vocational training are designed even before their 
actual settlement in the city. Mapping is carried out in order to design the best programme for 
their needs. If some questions are raised, doubts are not always shared. For instance, a welfare 
worker in Acre explains that the forced conversion of Bnei Menashe immigrants and their 
settlement in religious communities may raise issues and create youthful rebellion in the long 
run. When I shared this comment with a high up member of the religious community, he asked 
me to repeat, arguing he did not understand my question, as the immigrants came to Israel to 
live as observant Jews, and there was no reason for them to question that now (Interview 36, 
2015; Interview 47, 2015). 
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Conclusions 
This chapter focuses essentially on the rescaling of State responsibility towards immigrant 
integration. Starting with the main municipal service in charge of immigration and immigrant 
integration, and expanding to its close institutional environment, I have analysed the local 
interpretation of immigrant integration, and its definition as a legitimate object of public action.  
Immigrant integration is conceived as a process over time, in which public agencies are 
responsible for fostering a favourable environment for immigrants to quickly access the 
country’s main institutions: religion, education, the armed forces and employment. In that 
framework, the bureaucratic process of absorption, partly decentralised to the municipality, is 
associated with personal accompaniment, immigrant-friendly public service delivery and local 
political representation. In that sense, it displays continuity with the national conception of 
absorption, as defined by the State since its very inception.  
This continuity can be seen on two levels: first, the virtual absence of an alternative discourse 
that would get rid of the social stratification of Israeli society, which I could very roughly define 
as such: a core established group of Ashkenazi European Jews, followed by a peripheral 
heterogeneous group including immigrants from Africa and Asia and their Israeli-born offspring, 
as well as FSU immigrants, and lastly, a parallel marginalised group including Palestinian 
Israelis, and other Muslim and Christian groups. The assumption that an inherited discourse 
from the ‘second Israel’ would lead to a more progressive view of integration is not very 
relevant. In fact, the stories I collected are geared towards the inclusion of this ‘second Israel’ in 
the mainstream discourse of pioneering and nation-building, and the proximity of Arab Jews 
with Palestinians is in not at all accepted in the conversations.   
Second, the weight of public funding in the design of a local policy sanctions the municipality as 
the executor, while the central administration still finds ways to impose its conception of 
integration by transferring funds. This is particularly true for ‘special populations’ who 
experience a much more coercive policy of assimilation than their Western and FSU 
counterparts. The delegation of responsibilities is not at all straightforward and negotiation is 
permanent. 
Nevertheless, local discourses do introduce several breaks in the understanding of integration. A 
first one concerns the pluralist attitude adopted by municipalities, particularly for immigrants 
going through ‘direct absorption’. Here, integration policies even include the idea of supporting 
one’s prior cultural practices. In that sense, public funding targeting immigrant integration in 
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fact participates in the formation of a segregated socio-cultural landscape. This first step 
towards multiculturalism must be understood in the context of the massive immigration from 
the former USSR, and the formidable monopoly, on immigration and integration matters, 
exercised by Russian-speaking politicians, organisations and agents. But it has its limitations, 
and is still the privilege of several groups.  
A second important break concerns the responsibility of immigrants in their integration process. 
In the previous chapters, I have already introduced the concept of active citizenship as well as 
that of deservingness, in order to better understand the limitations that local governments 
provide for the Law of Return. Here again, a more neoliberal conception of integration prevails. 
The introduction of a public function aiming at reinforcing the pride and confidence and 
newcomers, or in other words, to empower them, exists in a new context where immigrants 
come alone, as isolated households. If the absorption centres, the Garin or those infrastructures 
put in place for certain groups defined as ‘special populations’ virtually create new communities, 
individuals coming through direct absorption now rely on the proyektorim to obtain the 
necessary support during the first months following their arrival. The emphasis on their 
psychological well-being consists in providing them with the tools necessary to access the 
institutions. It is a mechanism which is intended to create a favourable environment for the 
immigrants’ potential to be realised. This support corresponds to an idea that the immigrants 
deserve help at first, but will then become net contributors to the local economy and to the 
social development of the city.  
This final remark leads to the following chapter. In one discussion with my supervisor, 
geographer William Berthomière, he asked me the following question: is this not the success of 
Israel’s adoption of neoliberalism? The ability to make people believe that the Welfare state is 
still alive, and to transfer responsibilities to communities, without eliciting any protest, and 
without any major disruption in the way immigrants are welcomed in the country? I will attempt 
to answer this question, by examining the organisational characteristics of immigrant 
integration.   
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Chapter 8 ◊ Multiscalar and fragmented governance 
of immigration and integration   
The last chapter of this analysis relates more directly to the governance of immigration and 
integration. Here, governance relates to the transformation of the state's role and of the political 
regulation modes that are associated with that role. As described in the chapter two, through 
governance, the emphasis is on interaction with other actors, interdependency, regularity and 
rules of interaction and exchange linked to decision taking (Galès, 2011).  
The assumption is that we are currently witnessing a multiscalar, polycentric, non-isomorphic 
type of city governance, a result of what Olivier Giraud (2012) has called ‘unfinished 
decentralisation’,106 or what Monica Varsanyi (2008) describes as ‘fragmented, incomplete, 
contingent devolution’ of responsibilities. Decentralisation is not a straightforward devolution of 
power and responsibilities. The many actors in this multiscalar environment are involved in a 
constant bargaining process to gain, retain, or regain power and resources. This process does 
not necessarily lead to more ‘coherent’ policies (Vanier, 2015).  
I have explored the question: “how to isolate local cases in a context of multiple 
interdependences?”107 (Pollard & Prat, 2012). My proposal lay in methodologically isolating the 
local scale, as this provided a frame of observation; but when it comes to analysis, I adopted a 
fluid and unrestrained 'levels' approach in order to assess the socio-political space. As I have 
argued, the analysis therefore focuses on apprehending the “upwards, downwards and 
transversals links” (Brenner, 2004, p. 10),  and identifying the endogenous, exogenous and 
transitional actors who inhabit the places for which they intend to form policies (Di Meo, 2008), 
more particularly immigration and integration policies.  
In the specific context of small and mid-sized cities located outside core networks, I decided to 
try to apprehend the rescaling of governance in those areas less equipped to adapt to the 
devolution of responsibilities and the pressure for economic development. While this pressure is 
usually applied in Manichaean fashion, where towns either adopt the rules of the (neoliberal) 
game, or barely survive at the margins, I argue that the processes are more complex and I 
believe that a deeper understanding of immigration and integration policies in mid-sized cities, 
located away from large economic centres, may help us to better understand power rescaling 
processes.   
                                                          
106 Translation of the author. 
107 Translation of the author. 
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This chapter therefore aims to answer the following question: how do the strategies deployed by 
social actors involved in immigration and integration policy formulation and implementation 
transform the governance that specifically targets this policy domain into a multiscalar and 
fragmented political space?     
The main objective was therefore to map the actors associated with immigration and integration 
issues in each city. The charts I produced aim to draw attention to immigration and integration 
governance. Indeed, each institution hosts various actors, and each one of them may interact 
with the other. In doing so, they create and terminate relations, they facilitate cooperation or 
they initiate conflicts. Sometimes, their work overlaps, while some issues fall in between. The 
frameworks and logic applied when formulating policies, programmes and activities, may 
emerge locally, may be the products of negotiation or be adopted from central administration. 
Attempts to describe these relations therefore allow us to at least partially address the question: 
Who governs immigration and integration issues? 
The first section presents the charts and the associated descriptions of each morphology. 
Secondly, I provide an analysis of the different institutional organisations, and the underlying 
logic of local governance. Lastly, I show that peripheral mid-sized cities, while they engage in 
immigration policymaking and produce a new socio-political space, are generally trapped in a 
neoliberal ‘game’ which favours interlocality competition to gain access to central resources. The 
State is defined as absent, but is in fact ever present, imposing new rules that make protest quite 
difficult. Innovation occurs but serves certain interests, the production of new scales 
contributing to the sustainability of neoliberal public affairs’ management.   
1 Four cities with four immigrant integration institutional 
morphologies 
Over the last three decades, new conceptual tools have been invented to analyse urban/local 
policies. Subnational spaces are not governed by local government anymore but by urban/local 
‘governance’. French sociologist and political scientist Patrick Le Galès argues that governance is 
also related to politics, but includes public and private actors who participate in public action 
(Galès, 2011) Those actors form networks, are interdependent, and follow interactional rules 
and constraints (Ibid.). Governance did not replace government, claims Le Galès, but addressing 
local issues through a governance lens allows us to formulate new questions and to study policy 
formulation differently (Ibid.).    
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Other concepts were harnessed to describe the transformations of scales of power. Political 
scientist Clarence Stone coins the term ‘urban regime’, which refers to “informal arrangements 
by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to take and 
carry out governing decisions” (Stone [1989] quoted by Good, 2009, p. 18). Stone argues that 
this mode of governance emphasises economic development and growth. Kristin Good also 
draws on Barbara Ferman’s ‘arenas’ (1996). For Ferman, actors, their identities and interests are 
represented through four arenas — economic, civic, intergovernmental and electoral (Ibid., p. 
34). Ferman’s analytical frame is quite close to anthropologist Jean Pierre Olivier de Sardan's 
definition of the arena as “(…) a site of concrete confrontations of social actors interacting 
around common stakes. It (the arena) is a ‘local’ space”108 (Olivier de Sardan, 2010).  
Concepts of governance — or arena — account for the fragmentation of responsibilities between 
cities, central administration, supranational institutions, transnational networks, civil society or 
the private sector. Descaling does not mean ‘zooming in’, but addresses the Deleuze-like 
character of these superimposed and polymorphic scales (Herod, 2011). The displacement of 
scales in immigration policies in the United States and Europe (see Alexander, Mahnig and 
Garbaye in Penninx et al, 2004 ; Varsanyi, 2008 ; Walker &Leitner, 2011 ; or  Jørgensen, 2012) 
has been documented and proves that scales of decision are socially constructed as well as being 
continuously negotiated. In a context of ‘unfinished decentralisation’ (Giraud, 2012), the transfer 
of responsibilities towards the local scale is analysed as ‘partial, incomplete and contingent’ 
(Varsanyi, 2008). Indeed, immigration is shared at the very least between the State and cities, 
but also with transnational actors, resulting in an extremely diverse urban governance typology, 
from ‘sanctuary cities’ to ‘exclusionary cities’.  
Following this conceptual framework, I have described the network of institutions or actors 
involved in immigration and integration issues in each city. To do so, I have started with 
interviews within the municipalities with the first person being identified by external actors as 
knowing about immigration in the city. From their testimony, I have described the first links 
with other actors, and the second, and the third links, using a snowball effect.  
In this section, I try to describe the immigrant integration governance in each city, starting with 
the least dense institutional fabric — Kiryat Shmona — and finishing with the city having the 
richest institutional fabric — Acre. For each, I present a first ‘flat’ presentation of their 
organisations, and a second mapping, resolutely multiscalar, which shows in a quasi-
physiological fashion the interdependent relations of the multiple actors involved in this 
governance. 
                                                          
108 Translation of the author.  
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1.1 Kiryat Shmona 
 
8.1. ‘Flat’ representation of the organisations dealing with immigration and integration in Kiryat 
Shmona. Realised by Amandine Desille (2017). 
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Figure 8.1. Multiscalar governance of immigration and integration in Kiryat Shmona. Realised by 
Amandine Desille (2017). 
In December 2013, I conducted a pre-fieldwork survey to select the cities I would work on. On 
Kiryat Shmona municipality’s Website, the number for immigration and integration issues led 
me straight to the local branch of the MOIA. There, the MOIA local coordinator suggested I get in 
touch with the deputy mayor of the city, whom she identified as the relevant contact person for 
immigration issues in the municipality. Kiryat Shmona’s council includes two municipal 
councillors: Abram, the deputy mayor, and another councillor, both representing Israel Beitenu. I 
spent several hours with Abram: I contacted him by phone first and then met him for an 
interview, which turned into a drive along interview in the city. He was also present when I 
Personnel interviewed 
Governmental actors 
Non-governmental 
actors 
Business actors 
Organisations physically present 
in the city 
Relations of supervision, 
cooperation and funding 
Note: the size of circles is arbitrary and not 
proportionnal to budget/staff… etc.  
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interviewed the mayor of the city. I shot a documentary movie in which he is the main character: 
I spent national election day with him, as well as two days dedicated to the 70th anniversary of 
the Allies victory over the Axis powers during the Second World War. Lastly, we met again to 
watch the movie together, once with the presence of his assistant, and on a second viewing 
together with the mayor.   
Abram is involved in all immigration-related issues in the city. Russian-speaking Kiryat Shmona 
residents contact him for any issues related to health benefits, visas or organisation of events. In 
that sense, he needs to be knowledgeable in numerous areas of immigrant entitlements. He also 
describes neighbourhood conflicts in which he acts as mediator. Similarly, municipal agents turn 
to him when they need an intermediary. Lastly, he and the other councillor supervise the MOIA 
budget in the city and write up proposals for programmes. Through his active role in Israel 
Beitenu, Abram also has direct access to Israel Beitenu representatives in the government, and 
claims to have privileged relations with the Minister of the MOIA, as well as other members.  
Despite what he describes as close relations, Abram never managed to access the MOIA ‘group 
Aliyah’ programme. Today, Kiryat Shmona does not host a unit, let alone a department, for 
immigration and integration. Apart from the two councillors, the local branch of the MOIA is the 
main office which immigrants turn to upon arrival in Kiryat Shmona. The local office has an 
administrative role. However, the MOIA district office, operating in the Galilee area, organises 
sociocultural activities — ranging from lectures on Judaism, meetings to learn about 
entitlements, concerts and trips around Israel. A monthly list of activities is published at the 
MOIA local office. Kiryat Shmona only welcomes a handful of newcomers each year. The local 
office also deals with arrivals in surrounding villages. Its activities are limited, however.  
The main department dealing with immigrants in the municipality is the welfare department, 
which Abram is in charge of at council level. Nevertheless, Kiryat Shmona immigrant residents 
have access to sociocultural activities in Russian. Abram mentions the club for elderly residents 
as a meeting place. The matnass also organises activities. Lastly, the city hosts several local 
associations — often derived from national networks — for Holocaust survivors, Second World 
War veterans, Russian speakers, Ukrainian immigrants, etc.  
Another project mentioned by the deputy mayor, but also by the person in charge of strategic 
planning in the city, and by other residents I met during fieldwork, is the renovation of the 
municipal museum and its transformation into the Museum of Maabarot. Tel Hai College, located 
outside the city, together with the municipality, is pushing for recognition of transit camp’ 
residents contribution to the construction of the Israeli nation. The project includes the 
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transformation of the modest museum (currently located in an old mosque), into a national 
museum as part of the Israel museum network. However, it also included a series of conferences 
in the city, with residents, led by historian Amir Goldstein. Interestingly enough, Abram 
advocates adding former USSR Second World War veterans' stories to the exhibition. So far, this 
request has not been accepted.   
The matnass, (a network of community centres funded by the Ministry of Education), supervises 
a higher than average number of activities in Kiryat Shmona, and benefits from a high 
reputation. Notably, it supervises the Youth Centre, itself funded by the Ministry for the 
Development of the Negev and Galilee. The Youth Centre has been recently reorganised. 
Together with the municipal agent in charge of strategic planning, and other municipal 
councillors and agents, they engaged in issues related to demographic growth. Part of their work 
addresses the lack of lands for residential building. At the time of the interviews, they were 
working on the transfer of lands to the city (from Kfar Yuval and Kfar Gladi kibbutz), for future 
development. In 2016, Yuvalim (Kfar Yuval lands), were eventually transferred. However, this 
demographic growth project does not directly address immigration. The director of the Youth 
Centre only showed me a brochure of the Ministry for the Development of the Negev and Galilee 
and its project ‘Go North’ which encourages immigrants to settle in northern cities, with 
financial incentives. However, he is not directly working on this project at the moment. Some 
discussions took place in the municipality when a public debate arose regarding the settlement 
of French Jewish immigrants. It was, however, decided not to pursue this question.  
Indeed, the municipality has avoided becoming involved in projects related to new immigration 
settlements. For instance, Shavei Israel approached the municipality to settle a group of new 
Indian Bnei Menashe immigrants. The municipality refused to become involved. However, the 
families have settled without this participation in 2016, and their integration is supported by a 
group of religious families constituting a Garin in Kiryat Shmona. 
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1.2 Arad 
 
Map 8.2. ‘Flat’ representation of the organisations dealing with immigration and integration in 
Arad. Realised by Amandine Desille (2017). 
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Figure 8.2. Multiscalar governance of immigration and integration in Arad. Realised by Amandine 
Desille (2017). 
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herself an immigrant from Moldova — in her words the first person elected from the 1990 FSU 
immigration. After her election, the mayor took over immigration and integration issues.  
Nevertheless, the operation of immigration-linked programmes is in the hands of a municipal 
department dedicated to immigration, integration and culture. Its director, Miriam, has dealt 
with this particular issue, in the municipality, since the 1990s. During the early years of her 
career, Arad was still very much involved in outreaching to Jewish immigrants around the world, 
and more particularly in the former USSR. Miriam recalls the preparation work, including 
employment and schools mapping, listing the steps following settlement in Arad, and so on. 
However, she explains that immigration outreaching was brought to an end when a new mayor 
was elected. For years, Miriam worked mainly on accompanying newcomers during the first 
months of their arrival, and on providing cultural activities in Russian for the large group of 
Russian speakers residing in the city. The election of an immigrant mayor raised her hopes back 
up. And indeed, Arad reintegrated the State programme for outreaching, notably the MOIA 
‘group Aliyah’ programme. But her hope was short-lived: after a short space of time the mayor 
ran for the national elections and became a Member of Parliament. The city elected a new mayor. 
And when I met Miriam some months later, she informed me that outreaching was over once 
again.  
Due to the demographic composition of the city, the education and welfare departments also 
receive budgets specifically targeted at immigrant children or welfare beneficiaries. I met the 
person in charge of community work in the welfare services. Despite its ‘welfare’ connotation, 
the community worker Elena tries to reach out to a wide section of the population and organises 
activities around leadership, but also lectures, trips, cultural activities etc. She finds that elderly 
Russian-speaking people play an important role in the activities organised, especially those in 
Russian. Elena is one of the few people who mention the presence of other groups apart from 
FSU immigrants. Notably, she talks about the Ethiopian immigrants hosted by the Orly 
absorption centre, a population she finds reluctant to participate in activities organised by the 
municipality. She is the only person to mention a councillor representing them. And she also 
mentions the asylum-seekers living in the city. Indeed, a group of around 300 asylum-seekers, 
mainly from Sudan and Eritrea, reside in Arad. However, at the time of the interview, the 
municipality had just started mapping the needs of this group and thinking of ways to get 
involved.  
Another municipal service mentioned during interviews is the municipal library. Apart from 
having several sections with foreign books — in Russian, but also in English, Spanish and French, 
the municipal library also organises cultural events, such as lectures or concerts, for the city's 
 334
immigrant residents, To this end the municipality transfers an MOIA budget to the municipal 
library.  
The municipality closely cooperates with another body, located outside the local authority: the 
Youth Centre, supervised by the Ministry for the Development of the Negev and Galilee. The 
Youth Centre occupies a large building, and the availability of small flats makes it possible for the 
municipality to offer ‘absorption flats’ to newcomers for the first few days following their arrival 
in the city. The Youth Centre has immigration-linked activities of its own. First of all, it employs 
an immigration coordinator, whose position is funded by the MOIA, the Jewish Agency as well as 
Nefesh beNefesh. At the moment of the meeting with the director, the coordinator coordinated a 
programme for Russian-speaking immigrants learning massage therapy. They were hosted in 
Arad and interned in hotels’ spas located near the Dead Sea. Other groups of English-speaking 
and Spanish-speaking youngsters were mentioned. The ultimate goal of these activities was the 
settlement in Arad of some of the programmes’ participants.  
As in all the municipalities, the matnass is also widely involved in providing sociocultural 
activities in Russian. I met Natalia, who has worked at the matnass since the 1990s. Her wall is 
decorated with hundreds of signatures of Russian-speaking artists from the former Soviet Union. 
A member of the Russian intelligentsia, she has dedicated all her efforts to reconstituting in Arad 
a cultural life similar to her home experience. Using her networks, she first started to establish 
cultural salons in Arad. Nowadays, she organises concerts, poetry readings, lectures and health 
tourism excursions to the Dead Sea, etc. 
The city also hosts numerous associations, clubs and local branches of organisations for 
holocaust survivors, second World War veterans, etc. FSU immigrants have also established a 
private evening school for Russian-speaking pupils to cope with what they perceive as an 
inferior educational programme in mainstream schools.  
Two institutions play a role for immigration in the city. The local branch of the MOIA deals with 
the administration of the settlement of newcomers. However, I never managed to meet the local 
coordinator, and we only exchanged emails. Lastly, Arad hosts an absorption centre for 
Ethiopian immigrants. The Orly absorption centre changed place several times, from a hotel 
located on the outskirt of the city, with a view of the Dead Sea, to the present Youth Centre and 
now, to a north-west neighbourhood with a high concentration of ultra-orthodox Jews. The Orly 
absorption centre reaches out to the city, and does not work in isolation, despite the rare 
occasions it was mentioned in interviews with officials and municipal agents. Indeed, the 
coordinator in charge of social affairs described the involvement with schools, with sport 
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programmes, and even with the local police. However, the domination of the Russian-speaking 
immigrant groups tends to hide other groups.  
1.3 Kiryat Gat 
 
Map 8.3. ‘Flat’ representation of the organisations dealing with immigration and integration in 
Kiryat Gat. Realised by Amandine Desille (2017). 
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Figure 8.3. Multiscalar governance of immigration and integration in Kiryat Gat. Realised by 
Amandine Desille (2017). 
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After having selected Kiryat Gat as one of the field cities, I was given the telephone number of 
the deputy mayor. An Ethiopian immigrant who arrived with her family as a child, Ayelet is often 
perceived as the representative of Kiryat Gat’s Ethiopian community, and therefore as the 
official dealing closely with immigration and integration issues. It is true that she takes an active 
role in representing her community, acting as an intermediary, advocating for their rights, and 
even chairing a municipal forum on Ethiopian integration in Kiryat Gat — an informal forum, 
which allows for better cooperation between the various stakeholders in the city, within 
municipal departments but also with the Youth Centre. But, it is the second deputy mayor, 
himself an immigrant from Russia and the representative of Israel Beitenu, who is officially in 
charge of immigration and integration issues for the council. The fact that both deputy mayors 
are immigrants is a source of pride for the city mayor who believes it is a symbol of the pluralist 
policy he has adopted. Given the political representation of immigrants and the multilingual 
municipal services, he believes Kiryat Gat is a model of immigrant integration.   
When it comes to municipal services, the welfare department concentrates the largest part of 
municipal activities on immigrants. It supervises three units: the immigration and integration 
unit, the integration centre for Ethiopian immigrants (which I call by its Hebrew designation 
Moked Klita), and community work service. The first is located in the commercial mall where the 
municipal offices are, while the community work unit is ten-minutes walking distance from the 
city hall in a former avant-garde architectural building. The latter is located in the northern 
district of the city, where a large number of Ethiopian immigrants reside. In addition to these 
three units, the welfare department also coordinates with neighbourhood workers and social 
workers dealing with immigrants.   
The immigration and integration unit of the municipality employs a municipal agent, with 
municipal funding. However, its main role is the optimal use of the annual MOIA budget it 
receives for activities. At the end of the year, Moshe receives a message with the amount of 
available budget MOIA could potentially transfer to Kiryat Gat. He needs to quickly submit a 
range of ideas for programmes and activities’ in order to spend the budget. The budget is divided 
into spending categories, some of them related to the type of activities, and some to the 
population benefiting from these activities. Moshe does not come up with the ideas alone. He 
receives proposals from the various organisations dealing with implementing sociocultural 
programmes and activities in the city — the Youth Centre, the matnass networks, other 
community centres and clubs, choirs and resident associations. He selects the proposals that will 
most likely be implemented, based on his experience with the various organisations he works 
with, and he often rewrites the proposals in order to improve their chance of being accepted by 
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MOIA.109 After the proposals are accepted and the budget transferred, he is in charge of assisting 
the transfer of the budget, or of executing the budget from the municipality. Moshe does not 
engage in immigration outreaching, nor does he provide accompaniment for the settlement of 
new immigrants. The MOIA local branch coordinator deals with this task.  
Nevertheless, when it comes to Ethiopian immigrants, the municipality does not limit its role to 
sociocultural activities. The newly funded Moked Klita, a result of both deputy mayors’ advocacy 
work for the MOIA, accompanies immigrants in accessing administration, vocational training 
and more.  
The community work service also engages in activities with immigrants, particularly mapping 
their needs, transforming social phenomena into actual programmes etc.  
Kiryat Gat does not participate extensively in outreaching to immigrants. Nevertheless, the 
massive construction project taking place north of the city — Karmei Gat — was a topic of 
discussion throughout the interviews. Karmei Gat corresponds to the construction of 8,000 units 
north of the city. The municipality cooperates with the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of 
Housing and numerous private constructors. It has been advertised extensively on the radio, in 
newspapers, and on giant banners along the main Tel Aviv road for some time. Afterwards, the 
political campaigns for the 2015 elections put Karmei Gat in the spotlight, and the project was a 
topic of intense debate between two candidates, both putting the housing crisis at the top of 
their concerns. At first, I was told that this extension project, which should lead to doubling the 
population of the city, was not targeting immigrants. Families looking to access property in a city 
well connected to the central region of Israel were the main targets of this construction project. 
Nevertheless, after the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris in January 2015, I found out that the 
Ministry for the Development of the Negev and Galilee encouraged mayors of peripheral cities to 
reach out to French Jews. Kiryat Gat organised a delegation aiming principally at marketing 
Karmei Gat to French Jews who were thinking of migrating to Israel. This delegation did not 
include representatives of the immigration and integration unit, but it did include the civil 
engineer. When I talked about this event to Ayelet and Malcha, I was told that there was indeed 
an attempt, but that it was marginal. This was not the only attempt as the municipality 
translated marketing material into English for a group of American immigrants represented by 
Nefesh benefesh who would like to organise a small community in Karmei Gat. However, they 
consider it also marginal.  
                                                          
109 The criteria for MOIA budget’s spending at municipal level are updated and consigned in a booklet, 
available to all municipalities and to the public. The most recent version is available here: 
http://www.moia.gov.il/Hebrew/Subjects/ImmigrantAbsorption/Pages/nohalAvodaShiltonMekomi.aspx  
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Apart from the municipality, the Youth Centre, which is in the neighbouring office of the 
immigration and integration unit, also employs an immigration coordinator, as well as a 
coordinator for Ethiopian Israeli youngsters. They provide training and leadership activities for 
young people, mainly from Ethiopian families. They do not deal with outreaching. The 
institutional 'file' is quite sophisticated. Indeed, the immigration coordinator was hired by the 
Youth Centre and administered by the Ministry for the Development of the Negev and Galilee, 
but her salary was paid by the NGO Kolei negev, while activities were usually funded by MOIA 
and JAFI. She receives training and professional supervision from the Joint. 
The matnass network, funded by the Ministry of Education, also plays an active role in delivering 
sociocultural activities matching the needs of the population. Together with the community 
centres and other clubs, the municipality argues that the city is served by a grid of community 
centres, matching the residential composition of each neighbourhood.  
Another important actor is the Shoshana absorption centre, which, like the Orly absorption 
centre in Arad, hosts Ethiopian immigrants during the first years of their settlement in Israel. 
Nevertheless, the municipality has advocated for the absorption centre’s residents to stay in 
Kiryat Gat and obtained benefits to access property in the city, although Kiryat Gat is not enlisted 
by the government for access to property for Ethiopian immigrants. Indeed, officials believe it 
would mean a second ‘immigration’ for these newcomers whose children study in local schools, 
and who often work in the city. The settlement of Ethiopian immigrants is therefore not 
considered transient but is anticipated in the long run. The Shoshana centre is funded by the 
MOIA and JAFI.  
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1.4 Acre 
 
Map 8.4. ‘Flat’ representation of the organisations dealing with immigration and integration in 
Acre. Realised by Amandine Desille (2017). 
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Figure 8.4. Multiscalar governance of immigration and integration in Acre. Realised by Amandine 
Desille (2017). 
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Acre holds a specific position among the four cities chosen for fieldwork. Indeed, unlike Arad 
which was built on empty land, or Kiryat Gat and Kiryat Shmona which were built on the ruins of 
Palestinian villages, Acre expanded around the old Palestinian walled city. Up until today, a large 
number of Palestinian Israelis reside in the city, on both sides of the walls, accounting for a 
quarter of the population. In this context, numerous existing mechanisms to encourage 
cohabitation of Palestinian and Jewish Israelis could be extended and adapted to immigrants.  
Acre is the only city in the sample which engaged in a new city brand encompassing the diversity 
of its population. The ‘Acre city of Mediterranean cultures’ vision is part of a larger effort to 
address tourism issues, but the mayor believes it also directs attention to collective goals of 
living together in mutual respect. Efforts are made to restore pride among the Palestinian 
Israelis, but also among the numerous Jewish groups in the city, whether they immigrated from 
Tunisia, Morocco, Yemen, Russian or Azerbaijan.   
The mayor also argues that the municipal council reflects these efforts. Indeed, one of his 
deputies is a Palestinian Israeli affiliated with the Islamic Movement, while the second, Zion, an 
immigrant from Ukraine, is affiliated with Israel Beitenu. Zion is in charge of immigration and 
integration issues in the municipality. He supervises the municipal department for immigration 
and integration and he chairs a forum every year to define the annual agenda of the department. 
Additionally, like other local officials, his door is always open for consultation. He recalls dealing 
with family issues as well as employment and administrative issues for immigrant residents, 
who believe that, as they voted for him, they are entitled to request help directly from him, 
bypassing municipal departments.  
The immigration and integration department of the city is located in the anti-missile shelter of 
the municipality. It is accessible from a back door, on the main street, where a large sign, which 
has lost most of its colours, says ‘Immigrants Club’ (Moadon le’Olim). It is the largest department 
in the four cities. It employs the deputy director, Elisa, two Russian-speaking advisers, and an 
advisor officially hired for his English speaking skills but also born in the FSU. Another agent was 
hired through a programme targeting the integration of Caucasus Jews — most of them having 
emigrated from Azerbaijan. Apart from this last agent, all of the agents' salaries are funded by 
the MOIA “group Aliyah” programme. Their work includes outreaching to Jewish candidates to 
immigration, in order to attract them to Acre. Russian-speaking workers do so through the 
numerous JAFI representations in countries of origin. The person in charge of English-speaking 
immigrants works with Nefesh BeNefesh on the one hand — the organisation has added to its 
pre-immigration trip the city of Acre —, and Shavei Israel on the other hand, for the immigration 
of Indian Bnei Menashe immigrants. The mayor, the deputy mayor and the deputy director 
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regularly travel to reach out to remote communities and to present the city of Acre to them. 
Their work also includes activities linked to the settlement of immigrants, from the moment they 
arrive at the hotel in Acre, to accompaniment to various administrations, flat hunting, Hebrew 
learning and the organisation of sociocultural activities in Russian. Until 2006 another person 
used to work with French immigrants, under the ‘group Aliyah’ programme. Today, he works 
part-time as the mayor's advisor on French affairs. Part of his work still involves outreaching 
and immigration issues, but he has no ties with the immigration and integration department, 
and is directly supervised by the mayor.  
During my numerous encounters with the immigration and integration department’s agents, I 
often asked if they could help identify other actors. However, I was faced with very defensive 
answers, and was assured that no one else could do their job. One of my interviewees in 
Jerusalem suggested I meet with the person in charge of the Centre for Mediation and Dialogue 
in the Community (Merkaz leGishur veDialog beKeila). This centre is located in a northern 
neighbourhood of the city, known for high levels of cohabitation between Palestinian Israelis, 
old timers and new immigrants. It is supervised by the community work service in Jerusalem 
and in Acre. In Acre, community work is part of the Welfare department. This centre focuses 
mostly on conflict resolutions among tenants in the same buildings. It relies on welfare and 
community workers in the municipality, but also on volunteers in the community, who act as 
mediators. Immigrant workers and volunteers play an important role when this mediation 
concerns immigrant residents. The director mentioned another centre supervised by the 
community work service: Mishol.  
Mishol is the acronym for Centre for the Integration of Immigrants (Merkaz leIshtalvut leOlim). 
First created by the Joint, it has been adopted by the community work service. In Acre, it is 
located in an Eastern neighbourhood of the city, with a high concentration of immigrants. Mishol 
organises a weekly café for immigrants, a community theatre where Palestinians, old timers and 
immigrants meet (the Western Galilee College is a partner to this project), as well as a group of 
women from all backgrounds. It also hosts a community garden funded by the Jewish National 
Fund. Their goal is to empower the residents who are in difficult social situations through 
fostering leadership and peer support.   
The immigration and integration department is openly dismissive of the Welfare department as 
an actor in immigrant integration, although large human and financial resources are invested to 
this end. However, they cooperate with the education department as well as the human capital 
development department, accompanying new immigrants to those departments and helping 
them to enrol their children at school and to find a job. Those departments also obtain specific 
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budgets for immigrants. For instance, the human capital development department, which 
obtains most of its budget from, and is supervised by, the employment authority of the Ministry 
of Economy, obtains an MOIA budget for Caucasus Jews. It was also widely involved in mapping 
the skills of the newly settled Bnei Menashe immigrants, finding a budget from the Ministry of 
Economy for vocational training and supporting job placement in Acre.    
Another organisation involved in immigrant integration which is mentioned by municipal actors 
is the Youth Centre. As in other cities, the Youth Centre was established by the Joint and is now 
supervised by the Ministry for the Development of the Negev and Galilee. It employs an 
immigration coordinator, with MOIA funds which transit through the Garin Ometz association. 
The immigration coordinator deals with immigrants between the ages of 18 and 45 -
approximately. She helps mostly with Hebrew learning, access to education, vocational training, 
access to employment. But she also mentions activities linked to conversion to Judaism and 
cultural activities.     
As in other cities, Acre counts on a MOIA local office, mainly dealing with administrative issues 
— entitlements, vouchers for Hebrew learning and vocational training etc. The same district 
office which provides activities for immigrants in Kiryat Shmona also issues a monthly list of 
activities available at the local office. The matnass also offers sociocultural activities adapted to 
the different groups in the city.  
Lastly, when it comes to the third sector, the Garin Ometz, a religious group of families which 
aims at contributing to the development of Acre, has an important role in the settlement of 
Indian Bnei Menashe immigrants. Shavei Israel hires a coordinator within the Garin Ometz. He, 
as well as other volunteers in the community, helps out the families, from their accommodation 
needs, to the organisation of religious events and holidays.  
There are many associations in the city, such as the association for Holocaust survivors and the 
association for Second World War veterans, but also charity organisations providing food, 
clothing or furniture to immigrants in need. The municipality affirms that they support those 
organisations by providing offices or funding.  
Through these descriptions, I have presented the various actors involved in immigration and 
integration issues in these cities, as well as the cooperation and conflict patterns appearing 
during the analysis. I acknowledge that I may have missed some people or organisations as some 
were discovered after several months of fieldwork. Mapping the actors and understanding their 
role compared to others is rather complicated when the ground is often reshaped through 
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elections, budget issues, the agenda etc. However, I do believe it illustrates the state of the 
immigrant integration institutional system at the time of my fieldwork.  
2 What do the charts tell us?  
In the following subsection, I will try to describe the convergences and divergences between 
these four charts, starting with involved actors. Actors rank from politicians to technical actors 
in the municipality, but also other local stakeholders, affiliated with nation-wide organisations, 
with transnational or local organisations. Through supervision, funding, training and other 
cooperation schemes, these actors, whose offices are located in the city, have relations with 
actors at national or transnational levels, or with other local actors. These descriptions reinforce 
the assumption that immigration and integration governance is multiscalar, and characterised 
by superimposed and polymorphic scales, themselves constantly reshaped in an on-going 
process of rescaling.  
The second point aims to shed light on the reasoning at work in the four cities. Indeed, the set of 
cooperating actors provided me with some ideas regarding the orientation of these governance 
schemes.  
2.1 Mapping the actors 
Contrarily to the four ‘flat’ representations, the four diagrams make it possible to identify at a 
glance all the actors involved. The municipality has an important role, and can be divided 
between local officials, the politicians who are elected by residents; the municipal agents, the 
department directors and their workers, themselves divided into departments and units. Among 
municipal agents, some work at the city hall while others work in offices spread throughout the 
city, or in community centres, like Mishol or the Moked Klita’s workers.  
Other expected actors are the MOIA employees working in the local offices of MOIA, as well as 
MOIA employees working in the two absorption centres I was able to visit: the Orly centre in 
Arad and the Shoshana centre in Kiryat Gat.  
The matnass network, or the Youth Centre, also plays an important role in immigration and 
integration issues, hiring multilingual staff, opening a position for an immigration coordinator 
and organising specific activities targeting immigrants in the city.   
These institutions have ties with supervising bodies. Even within the municipalities, the welfare 
department, the education department, or the human capital development department, find 
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themselves much more closely supervised by their respective ministries than by the municipal 
councillors in charge of their field. Much of their budget comes from the ministries, with a 
matching fund from the municipality. Training is organised through the ministries. The involved 
ministries are numerous: MOIA, the Ministry of Welfare (more particularly the community work 
service), the Ministry of Education (more particularly for the matnass, and the education 
department), the Ministry of the Economy (the employment authority), the Ministry of the 
Interior (in charge of municipal boundaries, of municipal budget supervision and of granting an 
equity grant), the Ministry for the Development of Negev and Galilee (Youth Centre) and even 
the Ministry for Housing (Karmei Gat project). In addition to the ministries appearing in the 
diagrams, other bodies are also involved, such as the JAFI or the Joint, two transnational 
Diaspora organisations which are very active in Israel when it comes to immigration issues.  
Additionally, other local, non-governmental actors play an active role, from immigrant 
associations representing specific groups of immigrants, to religious communities like Garinim 
Toraniim, which, subsequent to their mission to alleviate poverty and encourage community 
economic and social development in distressed towns, also engage in immigration issues.  
Representing the actors/institutions dynamics requires avoiding a simplistic division between 
transnational, national and local scales. The local actors identified are not isolated from the 
national institutions, although they are entrusted to decide upon the activities they implement. 
Budgets, analytical models and specific lexicons flow between these actors. Complicated 
financial arrangements lead to situations where an agent is obliged to account for his activities 
to multiple actors located at various levels of government, and also, sometimes, to non-
governmental and private actors. In the following subsection, I will focus on the description of 
these multi-actor' dynamics.   
2.1.1 Local political activity 
The literature has shown that processes of administrative and political decentralisation have 
forced local leaders to take upon themselves new responsibilities, a significant one being urban 
economic development. In this context, and from the 1980s onwards, scholars witnessed a 
localisation of political parties' activities (see for example, in France Gaxie (1994), and in Israel 
Elazar (1988)). This trend has continued and it is clear that local politics has borrowed 
significantly from national politics, following a party system, adapting political programmes to 
the city’s circumstances and using statistical tools.  
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In this context, Israel Beitenu positions itself in Israeli cities and affirms its place as the 
immigration party. The party headhunts representatives in the cities. Russian-speaking 
immigrants accessing local politics seem to be approached by the party, invited to the 
conferences and workshops. In general, the party offers support to understand public 
administration and politics in Israel, and offers shortcuts. Local officials who belong to Israel 
Beitenu claim they have better access to politicians and funds. More particularly, as the MOIA is 
Israel Beitenu’s ‘preserve’, local officials who are members of the party, and in charge of 
immigration and integration issues, benefit from a direct channel. All of them claim that they 
know the Minister, Sofa Landver, very well, and hang photos on their walls where they appear 
alongside either Minister Avigdor Lieberman or Minister Sofa Landver.  
Apart from Arad, mayors are not members of Israel Beitenu. In Kiryat Shmona, the mayor is 
affiliated with the Likud party — here again, in his interview, he explains that he accessed 
politics “to be close to the tap” (Interview 22, 2015), and that he changed parties when he was 
offered better opportunities, a move he might repeat if one of the right-wing parties offer him a 
position on their lists that might allow him access to Parliament. In Kiryat Gat and Acre, both the 
mayors set up independent lists, but were active in the past as members of Likud.  
Their alliance with Israel Beitenu members, since in each of the cities, one of two deputy mayors 
is an Israel Beitenu member, is often seen as strategic. During the first years of the massive 
immigration from the FSU, immigrants voted en masse for former Prime Minister Izhak Rabin 
(Jones, 1996), but their votes shifted to the Right a long time ago, to immigrant parties such as 
the former Israel Be’Aliyah or Israel Beitenu. By taking advantage of the immigrant votes in the 
city, they ensure their seat at the municipality. Contrary to Arad, were FSU immigrants account 
for almost half of the population, in other cities the immigrant candidate cannot hope to run 
alone, and can only add his voters’ voices to the majority.  
2.1.2 Municipal departments 
The immigration and integration department, or unit, in the municipality, thus demonstrates 
loyalty to the councillor in charge of immigration and integration — who is in all four cases, an 
Israel Beitenu member. The department represents his operative arm. Being deprived of this is 
difficult, as expressed by Kiryat Shmona deputy mayor. However, this unit does not enjoy the 
same status in each municipality. This is one element for consideration in the analysis. Indeed, as 
Gali, from the Union of Local Authorities in Israel argues:   
I think that the location of the integration coordinator in the hierarchy, and where he sits in the 
municipality, says a lot about how he is considered in the municipality. Is he a department 
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manager? Does he belong to the social affairs department, as a coordinator? Does he belong to the 
education department? In that case, the emphasis is on children, as in Ramat Gan. It depends. 
Sometimes, it is even an independent unit, an economic corporation. In Haifa, it’s an economic 
corporation. There are advantages, there are disadvantages. Is it integrated? I deal with 
integration but I don’t look at education, welfare, culture, sport. I don’t leverage all the partners in 
order to help the immigrant population, in all sectors. What is my mandate as an integration 
manager? Do I deal with employment? What is my role? How is my role perceived? Is it broad? 
Limited? To what extent does the MOIA give me tools. […]. If you ask me, the bottom line, 
everyone does what they can. There is not exactly cooperation. Even with the third sector. They 
work in parallel lines. The Ministry does not provide a budget for the local authority which will 
transfer to NGOs. It funds the NGOs. It might be that in a city, NGOs work with immigrants and I, 
the local authority, do not even know. (Interview 15, 2014) 
In Acre, immigration and integration is dealt with by an independent department, with five 
workers. However, in Kiryat Gat, both the immigration and integration unit and the Moked Klita, 
are under the supervision of the welfare department. In Arad, the department is independent, 
but merged with culture. In those two cases, the emphasis is more on sociocultural activities for 
already settled immigrants, and they have not developed activities related to outreaching, and 
little is done to accompany new immigrants (especially in the immigration and integration unit 
of Kiryat Gat). Lastly, there is no department or unit in Kiryat Shmona.  
Another element which needs to be mentioned is the fact that the immigration and integration 
department or unit is not a ‘professional’ department, in the sense that recruitment is not based 
on an educational background linked with immigration and immigrant settlement. Workers 
come from various backgrounds and are hired based on their linguistic knowledge — although 
this is not systematic — and their motivation. They do not have much supervision apart from an 
annual conference, and they are not requested to attend regular training.  
On the contrary, the Ministry of Welfare supervises the welfare department, which also deals 
with immigration. The department hires multilingual social workers, psychologists, and 
community workers for its community work service. They undergo regular training, which 
conditions their advancement within the department. For instance, I met one community worker 
in Acre who manages the Mishol centre. She was on her way back to Acre after a day at the social 
workers' school in Tel Aviv, which she attends once a week. She told me that she took classes 
there intended to help those who work with immigrants to acquire intercultural skills.  
Their educational background, training and close cooperation with the Ministry result in 
workers also adopting a lexicon and an approach designed in Jerusalem. When I met the director 
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of community work in Jerusalem, at the Ministry, he explained that the word 'integration' was 
being replaced by ‘intercultural community development’. The programmes developed aim to 
foster community leadership, providing a space for peer support, and in short, to encourage 
residents to take active role in city development. The differences struck me when I attended 
activities developed by Mishol for instance, where, rather than being told to be retrained to 
acquire skills fitting the Israeli market, they were asked to bring with them their crafts, food and 
drinks they had at home, and to show what they already knew, rather than doing what they were 
expected to do. One cannot be too naïve and power relations do also exist in these contexts. I 
have already identified, on several occasions, the idea of the higher deservingness of an 
immigrant considered as participative, and there are clearly types of activities encouraged to 
make residents responsible for themselves and for the city. At the same time, it also encourages 
dialogue and contact with other residents, whereas the immigration and integration department 
encourages sociocultural segregation.  
Other municipal departments involved are the departments of culture, education and 
employment (called ‘human capital development’ in Acre) as they often obtain a specific budget 
to be spent on activities targeting immigrants living in the city. These departments, unlike the 
welfare department, elicit less animosity and represent less of a threat for the immigration and 
integration department, and they collaborate closely.  
The coordination of all these workers, without even mentioning actors located outside the 
municipality but who are nevertheless active in the city, is not an easy task. Each of the actors 
must defend their unique character in order to obtain funding and to retain their employees. The 
delegation of responsibilities to local levels leads to conflict and overlapping as much as 
institutional vacuum. Financial applications reveal these overlaps.  
However, some attempts at cooperation were described during interviews. In Acre, the conflict 
between immigration and integration, and welfare, is easier to identify. However, I was told that 
deputy mayor Zion organises an annual meeting to define the agenda within the municipality. 
Similarly, actors can meet when a group arrives and must be dealt with rapidly. For instance, all 
interviewees have described the settlement of Bnei Menashe immigrants as a successful 
experience in cooperation. All the municipal agents involved met to map needs, to define 
programmes and implement them. Other attempts have been made by agents to organise a 
forum, but so far there is no successful institutionalised forum. In Kiryat Gat, there is a forum 
chaired by Ayelet for the integration of Ethiopian immigrants. Workers from different 
departments of the municipality, as well as from the youth centre meet, and chat, using social 
networks to better guide immigrants through the administrative maze. In Arad and Kiryat 
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Shmona, I did not hear of any initiative to cooperate with the various actors involved. It may be 
that the smaller size of the municipalities facilitates informal meetings and helps information 
flow more quickly.     
2.1.3 Actors of the periphery 
The diagrams display other actors outside the municipality, which I will qualify as typical actors 
of the periphery.  
Indeed, the MOIA ‘group Aliyah’ programme, which the municipality benefits from, mostly funds 
immigration and integration agents in municipalities of the periphery.  
Similarly, the Ministry for the Development for the Negev and Galilee is, as its name indicates, 
dedicated to activities implemented in the peripheral districts of the country. It adopted the 
Youth Centres, which, in three of the four cities under scrutiny, have an employee dealing with 
young immigrants.  
Diaspora organisations such as the Joint, JAFI — through the partnership2gether programme, 
for instance, — and Nefesh beNefesh — through its ‘Go North’ programme—, are also present. 
They deal with issues related to immigration and community development, and they have 
designed programmes and organisations aiming at attracting immigrants to regions suffering 
from out-migration. Their programmes focus on raising awareness, offering incentives and 
personal guidance. However, these programmes mostly benefit rural villages located in these 
regions. For instance, around Kiryat Gat, villages receive an increasing number of English 
speaking immigrants.  
The religious Garinim, in Acre or in Kiryat Shmona, both deal with the settlement of Bnei 
Menashe immigrants. Garinim Toraniim are typically present in peripheral towns to participate 
in community social and economic development.  
This subsection sets out the characteristics of the various actors involved in immigration and 
integration issues. Each of these actors is involved in a range of activities and takes decision 
based on their fields of expertise and action. What do certain combinations of actors reveal 
about the reasoning which underlies policies? What are the motives these charts illustrate?   
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2.2 Distinct reasoning which defines immigration policies 
The diversity of actors involved in immigrant integration in the four cities corresponds to 
different orientations and reasoning. A predominance of a certain mix of actors might mean that 
a certain logic prevails, but it seems that in general, these logics coexist. In policymaking, logics 
refer to “broader cultural rules and beliefs that structure cognitive ideas and guide decision-
making as well as the behaviour of actors in the policy field” (Jørgensen, 2012). 
Analysing the charts and descriptions of the immigrant integration urban governance in the four 
cities, it seems that three main ‘logics’ define immigration policies. First, immigration policies 
are identified with housing availability. Immigrants can settle if there are housing units to rent 
and to sell. Here, two different kinds of housing are involved, either state housing usually for 
retirees, or new cottage-style constructions. Secondly, these housing strategies are linked to 
logics of demographic growth. The four cities under study were planned to host a much larger 
population than they have ever reached. Being remote from employment centres, they were not 
attractive to the Israeli population, and immigrants who were offered housing and entitlements 
there left as soon as possible. Therefore those cities are characterised by out-migration and an 
ageing population. There are vacant flats, and empty schools. These reasons are evoked to 
encourage demographic growth through new mechanisms. Lastly, there is also a logic of 
maintaining the well-being of the current population. In this case, the actors involved with 
delivery of sociocultural activities are more prominent.  
2.2.1 Urban development  
As mentioned in previous chapters, housing policy has always been a cornerstone of Israeli 
immigration policy (Berthomière, 2002). However, times of mass construction are long gone, 
and today, erections of new neighbourhoods are somewhat rarer. Nevertheless, local officials 
still strongly associate availability of housing with immigration policies. If there is no 
construction, they argue, there is no possibility for the city’s sons and daughters, or for 
outsiders, to settle in the city. Building work is also associated with economic revival and 
dynamism.  
The mayor of Acre’s affirms that new housing is being built at a much faster pace than when he 
started working in Acre. Similarly, his spokesperson argues that Acre is now considered a safe 
city for investment. When I met the deputy mayor, he invited his assistant to explain where she 
bought a house and the current value of this house, in order to illustrate that housing was a good 
investment in Acre.  
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However, the pace of housing construction in Acre is nothing compared to Kiryat Gat’s colossal 
Karmei Gat, project, a housing complex in the north of the city which aims at hosting 8,000 units: 
‘a Zionist move’, in the words of its mayor, aiming at supporting the State to solve the housing 
crisis. Although it is not directly marketed at immigrants — apart from the various initiatives I 
mentioned in the previous sections which are aimed at French Jews and American immigrants 
—, it does appeal to many families in the central area of Israel who cannot access property in the 
centre due to high real estate prices, and who agree to move away from the centre. It is worth 
mentioning here that, although the national marketing campaign reached out to Israeli 
households, the local campaign was much more based on the population diversity of Kiryat Gat. 
Huge banners in the city displayed Ethiopian immigrants, traditional religious Israelis etc, 
informing them that affordable housing units would also be available in the Karmei Gat quarter.  
At a much more humble scale, Kiryat Shmona has been struggling with the ministries to obtain 
new construction lands in the northern areas of Bimat Tel Hai and Yuvalim. In 2016, Yuvalim 
lots were transferred and marketing began. However, they mostly target Kiryat Shmona’s 
inhabitants and Israeli families who wish to move into the area. The Youth Centre has been very 
much involved, along with the municipality, as their goals include demographic growth. 
Construction means that they can better position themselves and retain the new generation in 
Kiryat Shmona.  
In Arad, a new neighbourhood is also being planned, close to the Dead Sea. This area will offer 
building sites for individuals who have a development plan that includes a tourism project, such 
as a unit for country lodging, or a small business.  
References to new housing in the city do not always imply villas and nice apartment buildings. 
Most of these cities are the target of public housing schemes. In this context, immigrants 
represent a significant proportion of the beneficiaries. All four cities criticise the fact that their 
city hosts a disproportionate amount of public housing, leading to a vicious circle: the more 
public housing available, the more beneficiaries there are in their city, and therefore, the more 
social charges the city has to pay for.   
These urban developments, whether targeting the poor or middle-class households, are very 
much concomitant to national decisions, particularly at the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry 
of Housing. Nevertheless, municipalities have become important advocates and are involved in 
numerous claims for construction lands. Geographer Eran Razin has documented this 
phenomenon in many cities in Israel. The cities argue that the rural councils surrounding them 
take most of the available lands, preventing cities from developing and keeping them in 
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situations of underdevelopment. The professionalisation of Israeli mayors and a mix of actions 
towards the High Court, ministries, media and public opinion have led to a greater success rate 
for such claims.  
Immigrants are considered as one group of potential beneficiaries of these new developments, 
but not only.  
2.2.2 Demographic growth 
Urban development is often coupled with demographic growth policies. However, demographic 
growth policies also exist based on currently available housing.  
Indeed, the cities under scrutiny have suffered, since their establishment, from waves of out-
migration that often strongly countered the large groups of immigrants settling at each period of 
mass migration to Israel. After the first years following settlement, many families who could 
afford to leave and look for better professional perspectives in the centre did so. And each new 
wave of immigration provided a temporary fix to counter out-migration.  
It has been 25 years since the last large wave of immigration, and no one foresees a new large 
immigration movement, even from France (even if increased flows of migration have been 
registered, numbers do not exceed 7,000 immigrants per annum). Therefore, municipalities in 
the periphery are once again witnessing the consequences of out-migration, large availability of 
state housing and an ageing population. Schools have emptied and some have already closed. 
Raising municipal taxes is becoming difficult.  
In addition to urban developments, cities invest in ‘demographic growth’ (Tzmicha demografit). 
To this end, three main mechanisms are used. Programme officers in the municipal immigration 
and integration departments/units funded by MOIA participate in actions aiming at encouraging 
immigration to their cities. Local leaders also take part and travel around the world to appeal to 
Jewish communities abroad. Secondly, MOIA provides incentives to those immigrants who 
accept to settle in peripheral areas. Monetary incentives are conditioned by a minimum stay in 
the city. Nefesh BeNefesh also participates and encourages English speaking immigrants to settle 
in the peripheries, for instance through the ‘Go North’ programme. Thirdly, Youth Centres, under 
the supervision of the Ministry for the Development of the Negev and Galilee, are responsible for 
retaining current residents in the city, for bringing back former residents who have left the city 
but still have a family and affective attachment, and to attract new residents to the city. This is 
done through personal accompaniment of young families, training and support to access jobs 
etc. Youth Centres are also involved in local economic development projects. For instance, in 
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Kiryat Shmona, the Youth Centre works with the municipality and an NGO focusing on economic 
development to create ‘quality’ jobs — whereas in Kiryat Shmona, factories are still the main 
employers — for an educated middle-class population which has trouble settling in the present 
job market.  
2.2.3 Quality municipal service delivery 
Following the Youth Centres’ mission of ‘retaining current residents’, municipalities concerned 
about losing present inhabitants invest in activities to maintain their population. In this case, 
other actors are more important, such as schools or community centres.  
In terms of education, providing good quality education is an argument put forward by all 
interviewees. When asked how they positioned themselves with regard to other cities, to retain 
or attract new residents, they all claimed that they made significant investments in order to 
provide an excellent education system.  
Apart from formal education, extracurricular activities are an important aspect. The mayor of 
Acre, for instance, insists that a mayor should ensure that children have the possibility to attend 
physical or artistic activities after school for their development, but also, to be busy and avoid 
being left alone in the streets. Similarly, Kiryat Gat’s mayor handed me a full calendar of 
activities and assured me that having so many free activities was an asset.  
Cultural services are significant. FSU immigrants in particular are expected to be great cultural 
consumers, and municipalities put great efforts in providing the population with lectures, 
workshops, concerts, performances and trips to the countryside. In this context, actors such as 
the matnass network, community centres, but also an immigration and integration unit that 
organises sociocultural activities for immigrants, are essential.   
The four municipalities have adopted, to some extent, these three types of orientation, but at 
different scales. Kiryat Gat does not usually encourage immigration to its city. Nevertheless, it 
has engaged significantly in reaching out to market the Karmei Gat neighbourhood. Acre has 
more widely engaged in issues related to demographic growth, with tremendous emphasis on 
immigrants. The presence of a large Palestinian group is very probably a lever to access funds. 
Indeed, among the beneficiaries of the MOIA ‘group Aliyah’ programme, mixed cities such as 
Acre, Nazareth Illit or Ramle rank very highly and hire more municipal agents (Interview 9, 
2014). All cities invest public funding in providing immigrants with sociocultural activities in 
their language, more especially the city of Arad.  
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3 Between claimed autonomy and constrained autonomy 
By identifying actors involved in such public issues as immigration and integration, I have tried 
to understand the extent to which these marginalised cities gained autonomy. Indeed, the 
transformations of power that have occurred since the 1980s in Israel have proved to have 
effectively favoured cities located in the central district of the country. De facto decentralisation 
benefits cities which already had the means to finance their own development, leaving behind 
many cities and towns in the northern and southern districts. Beside Tel Aviv, there is no city 
that is considered ‘autonomous’ and able to break free from the national framework.  
Nevertheless, I have witnessed increased attempts by local governments in the periphery to gain 
autonomy, first by claiming, and then by trying to design, local policies. Those attempts are 
usually mixed with strategies to access subsidies and budgets available for peripheral and 
underdeveloped regions. In this sense, local governments play a double game, claiming their 
autonomy on the one hand, while relying on programmes that confirm their dependence to the 
central administration, on the other hand. 
Immigration and integration programmes follow this pattern. Indeed, some cities proactively 
design immigration policies and invest in activities to ‘integrate’ immigrants. Nevertheless, the 
institutional diagrams show that resources essentially come from central administration.   
In this context, various questions are raised: does the adoption of an immigration agenda 
facilitate access to national resources? Do municipalities design an agenda on the understanding 
that it will bring them public funding? Or do they seek funding after having determined 
municipal priorities? Findings show that both these strategies seem to collide, local officials 
playing the role of brokers, creating articulations between scales.  
3.1 Claiming or rejecting the periphery label 
When I began this research project, I formulated the hypothesis that political and administrative 
decentralisation gave local governments the opportunity to benefit from greater autonomy and 
therefore to control their future. Indeed, cities located in the periphery were long abandoned to 
the whims of central administration, from immigrant settlement and housing plans to industrial 
development. Following the emancipation from central administration, I argued, municipalities 
hoped that they could adopt new approaches like city branding, strategic planning or local 
economic development, to free their communities from the negative connotations they have 
endured and to gain new residents and new investments.  
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This hypothesis was quickly confirmed in the second interview I conducted with the deputy 
mayor in the city of Kiryat Gat when she justified Kiryat Gat’s Karmei Gat urban development 
project:  
Being a periphery, it’s good because you get extra budgets. But actually, we want to distance 
ourselves from the peripheral approach. We want a different perspective. In the periphery, 
residents are seen as weaker. The socio-economic dimension is more difficult. But it’s the egg and 
chicken story. Our idea is to operate a shift in thought. […]. Kiryat Gat decided to fight differently: 
Give us lands and we will develop them! Yoav, Shafir and Lachish have lands, they cultivate them 
less than before, so give them to us! (Interview 2, 2014) 
However, this type of declaration is not as common as I at first expected. Indeed, Kiryat Shmona 
follows what can be viewed as a rather counter-intuitive approach. The mayor of Kiryat Shmona 
has run his campaign with the (roughly translated) slogan “Nissim knows how to bring State 
money to the city”. My first interview in the city, with deputy mayor Abram, confirmed this 
trend. Indeed, he explains how they have been struggling to degrade the ranking of the city:  
Abram: First you have to look at the socio-economic situation. If you look at the socio-economic 
situation here, we rank 5. We are like Karmiel, Ma’alot, or other cities which have a good ranking, 
economically speaking. Because of that we miss a lot of money. Someone decided that we were 5. 
Because of that, we don’t get money to balance that.  
[…]. 
Me: So how did you get to rank 5 in this situation?  
Abram: We don’t understand either. We are trying, checking what we can do to get back to 4, at 
least, because 4 would give us millions more. In 2004, the procedure started and ten years later, 
nothing got out. Our tail is not out of it so I don’t even speak of our entire body. (Interview 6, 
2014)  
For Abram, and this was confirmed in other interviews with the mayor, and also with other 
municipal agents, the matching funds required to obtain State money are impossible to secure 
for a small poor municipality. Struggling to survive, strategies of impoverishment are assessed 
as potentially more rewarding than any attempts to attract businesses and industries.   
Those two stances represent the two ends of a wide spectrum. Indeed, Arad engages in bringing 
new taxes to the municipality, through land claims, but also through a new tourism masterplan, 
or attracting new residents through the displacement of military bases. However, at the same 
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time, the closing of several factories in the city during fieldwork was followed by public 
declarations reminding the government of its responsibilities to the peripheries it itself created.  
Arad’s apparently contradictory claims are more probably part of a strategy adopted by other 
cities to exploit their situation — the need for the welfare of their population, the need for 
infrastructures — and argue that support from central administration will put an end to their 
predicament. For instance, the mayor of Acre, whom I met a second time at the end of my 
fieldwork to expose my findings, told me that there are budgets available for cities, even though 
direct transfers have been drastically reduced. Knowing how and when to access these funds is 
key:  
Me: But, to answer the question ‘are municipalities independent policymakers’, I think local 
authorities can succeed if they are good brokers, which means that they know where to find the 
resources and to leverage them 
Shimon: To leverage them. There is money in the country. There is money in the country. You 
need to know how to access it. We know how to access it. We built cultural institutions here. That 
they will not build in 1,000 years in other settlements. Centres for music, for culture, youth at risk, 
matnass in the old city. There are maybe 30 to 40 centres, social centres. In sport, in culture, in… 
(Interview 58, 2015). 
3.2 Immigration programmes: funding strategy 
With this strategy in mind, having a clear immigration encouragement agenda can be a lever to 
obtain extra municipal funds. Funds transferred from the MOIA are not substantial. However, 
they usually require a low matching fund of 10% of transferred funds. Additionally, they provide 
funds in the long term:  
Indeed, departments receiving funds related to the immigrant population, such as education or 
welfare, viewed those funds as structural for quite long period of time. Immigrants were 
considered as such for twenty years after their arrival, even though they could obtain citizenship 
immediately after immigration. Some municipalities have negotiated for elderly immigrants, 
who arrived in Israel longer than twenty years ago, to continue to benefit from discounts, 
entitlements etc. for a longer period.  
Secondly, funds such as the ‘group Aliyah’ programme provide 100% of salaries for municipal 
agents for several years, up to 3.5 positions can be funded. Other funds under this programme 
require 25% matching for the first year of the programme. Considering that salaries are a high 
burden for municipal budgets, this is a considerable help. It also creates jobs in these cities.  
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The MOIA also transfers funds for the organisation of activities, such as described by the person 
in charge of immigration and integration issues in Kiryat Gat. This budget is retransferred to 
many local community centres and associations, multiplying its effects in the community.  
The sum of the various transfers is a small but very reliable source of public funding.  
3.3 The local government as a development broker 
Among the various actors congregating in the governance arena, the municipality takes on a 
central position. Indeed, despite the predicament in which these cities find themselves, they 
negotiate their role. In a multiscalar governance of immigration and integration, municipalities 
assume responsibilities in designing an agenda geared towards immigration, and in 
implementing activities related to this agenda. A substantial part of their job consists in reaching 
out to various bodies for funding. Nevertheless, from the moment these institutions come into 
the picture, they have a voice in municipal policy.  
As I have outlined in my theoretical model, the mapping or defining of the social actors involved 
in the definition of the ‘public issue’ — immigration and integration —, and then involved in the 
treatment of this issue enables us to understand the politics of scales. By intervening, actors 
produce a scalar space (Giraud, 2012). In this case, this space is fragmented and polymorphic. 
The explosion of the various phases of policymaking — formulating a policy, finding the means 
to operationalize it, designing activities and/or working procedures and then implementing 
them — among actors located at different scales, leads to a permanent negotiation between 
those actors, between different frames of understanding.  
In this multilevel environment, local officials in the four cities act as brokers, middlemen or 
‘ferrymen’ (or in French ‘passeurs’ in Pollard and Prat (2012)). They use their affiliation with 
national parties, such as Israel Beitenu or Likud, to access information about available budgets. 
They arbitrate and mediate between what they perceive as the local population's best interests, 
the need to set up economic development mechanisms, the benefits they are entitled to as a 
peripheral municipality, and other available budgets and subsidies.  
Even though municipalities are not the main funders of the activities they carry out in the city, 
their actions are essential to facilitate their implementation. Only if they proactively reach out to 
funds, establish units with professional agents, encourage multilingual services, or negotiate for 
new buildings to be constructed etc. can they claim to have an immigration and integration 
policy.  
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Conclusions 
If the preceding chapter aimed at providing a definition of immigrant integration, as a collective 
goal and an object of public action to be achieved by institutions, this chapter focuses on the 
various actors involved with this collective goal. In this sense, it presents the governance of 
immigration and integration, as a virtual space where multiple actors, located at various scales, 
meet around a common interest, (immigration and integration), and initiate actions which 
impact them. Multiscalar governance is the result of an explosion of the various phases of 
immigrant integration policymaking.  
This governance of immigration and integration is based at local level. In fact, the presence of 
local officials geared towards this issue is crucial to the production of a local agenda. More 
specifically, the municipal councillor in charge of immigration and integration, in each case an 
immigrant himself, holds a particular position as broker. Usually affiliated with the Israel Beitenu 
party, he has direct access to the MOIA, Israel Beitenu’s preserve. His operative arm is the 
department or unit in charge of immigration and integration within the municipality. He 
supports the successful channelling of a budget towards the municipality, while this department 
and its associated budget secures its legitimacy in the council. The conflicts that arise with 
another municipal department — the welfare department, and the associated community work 
service, Mishol, the Moked Klita, the Centre for Mediation and Dialogue in the Community — 
reinforce the quest for the legitimacy of a department that usually has a smaller budget and is 
voluntary established, although it requires less attention than welfare.  
Another feature of the governance of immigration and integration are the peculiar arrangements 
in peripheral areas. What I have called the ‘typical’ actors of the periphery collide in these 
spaces, from MOIA or Ministry for the development of Galilee and the Negev programmes, to 
Diaspora organisations such as the Joint, JAFI, Nefesh beNefesh or Shave Israel, to the religious 
groups Garin Torani.  
Looking at the different morphologies and the density of actors in each city helps to define the 
logic underlying each local agenda along two axes: one that defines the proactive or passive 
attitude of the municipality,; and one that defines the type of intervention it puts forward 
(although they often overlap and cross), either urban development, demographic stability or the 
status quo. If the two first encourage immigration through construction and immigration 
outreaching, the last focuses on actors who deliver sociocultural services in order to serve 
immigrant residents, without the goal of attracting new immigrants.  
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But more importantly, the charts unveil the double game of the municipalities, which on the one 
hand claim their autonomy, while on the other hand relying on programmes which confirm their 
dependence on central administration. If we look at immigrant integration, the same paradox is 
evident, and it is quite impossible to affirm that a local agenda was established to support the 
integration of newcomers, and therefore the municipalities reached out to available budgets or 
that those budgets available led the municipalities to set a local policy. In any case, there is 
constant negotiation where the municipality, in which the immigrant council members and their 
operative department, act as brokers.  
In this startling situation, decentralisation produces new channels to access central 
administration funding, and strong leaders benefit most from the new rules of the game. It is 
partly anachronistic though, to repeat conclusions drawn in the United States in the late 1980s 
already. For instance, the ‘entrepreneurial state’ as defined by Eisinger, and Cox and Mair, 
already described the necessity for cities to participate in interlocality competition to access 
federal grants (Kevin R. Cox & Mair, 1988; Eisinger, 1988). This trend has continued since and 
new networked hierarchies of power are constantly being produced, notably through the 
successes and failures of cities to attract public funding, private investments and other types of 
resources. However, I demonstrate that small and mid-sized cities also take part in this 
competition, although they target grants that are designed for the margins. It means that even 
funds which are imagined for more fragile communities answer the same neoliberal logic, once 
again reinforcing old hierarchies of power.  
To return to the question mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, I believe that the State of 
Israel has indeed managed, without major resistance, to shift to a neoliberal management of its 
administration. The fragmentation of power has had the effect of reinforcing the position of 
certain actors. Through their newly acquired power, protest is neutralised, but this power is 
insufficient to actively transform national contexts. It does induce changes, at a very slow pace, 
but they almost always resonate with a neoliberal ideology that encourages self-responsibility 
and competition, to serve so-called economic efficiency. Kiryat Shmona is perhaps the only city 
which refuses to adopt such discourse, relentlessly calling the government to its responsibility. 
In this city, the discourse of deservingness and active citizenship is also much less prevalent. 
Ironically, the mayor’s slogan which proudly markets the ability of the mayor to bring in State 
funding contrasts with a situation of economic failure.  
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Chapter 9 ◊ General conclusions 
This doctoral work aimed to measure the extent to which mid-sized cities located at the margin 
of capitalist economical networks govern the social life of the places they administer, or are 
being governed. Far from a straightforward answer, the analysis revealed complex relations of 
interdependences, reproduction of national frameworks and, only occasionally, protests against 
those frameworks.  
This general conclusion is organised along three sections. The first section replaces this research 
project within the wider framework of social geography, beyond the Israeli experience: firstly, it 
emphasises the mutual constitution of the concepts of scale, place and agency; secondly, it 
highlights the contribution to the study of ‘ordinary cities’; and finally, it suggests the extent to 
which this work contributes to migration studies. The second section focuses more particularly 
on the Israeli case. In fact, the analyses of immigrant integration policies in the four towns under 
scrutiny have permitted to reach a deeper understanding of the transformations of power in 
those development towns, established at the borders of the new state. Secondly, it unveils the 
motives of those towns to engage in immigrant integration policymaking. Thirdly, I challenge 
this engagement with questions of local democracy and participation. The third section proposes 
several recommendations, based on the analysis. It also presents the limitations of this research 
work and perspectives for the future.   
1 From the singular… to the general?  
In the introduction, I have suggested that this work could contribute to a better understanding of 
1) the mutual constitution of scales and places, with the interventions of social actors; 2) the 
‘ordinary city’, and its orientation towards a potential future, for which it acts and takes part in 
larger rescaling and placemaking processes; 3) immigrant integration policymaking, and more 
particularly policies made at the city level. Beyond the findings of the doctoral project, anchored 
in the Israeli multiple and complex realities, can we ‘rescale’ the results? To which extent the 
analysis has enabled an understanding of these loaded concepts?  
1.1 Multiscalar governance 
If social theorists have, for the most part, let go of the conception of scales as space envelops, 
current scholarship is dominated by critical stances which suggest that rescaling is a strategy of 
the State to devolve responsibility, in a context of capitalist accumulation. If I adhere to the 
description of these scales — “a mosaic of superimposed, tangled, crosscutting, and unevenly 
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overlapping interscalar hierarchies whose units are rarely coextensive or isomorphic” (Brenner 
in Schiller & Çağlar, 2010, p. 33) —, I argue that the production or reproduction of scales is a 
micro process which involves multiple social actors whose actions target particular places.  
Brenner’s conceptual framework discards the social actors, and rather emphasises State and 
institutions: “the institutional configuration, functions, history, and dynamics of any one 
geographical scale can only be grasped relationally, in terms of its upwards, downwards and 
transversal links” (Brenner, 2004, p. 10). Here, he hints towards the existence of relations of 
interdependency, which I agree with. Similarly, Le Galès’s contribution on European cities and 
governance, brings back the emphasis on horizontal interactions with other actors, 
interdependencies, regularity and rules of interactions and exchanges, the autonomy of sectors 
and networks vis-a-vis the State, temporal dimension, coordination processes of political and 
social acts and sometimes, constraints linked to decision (Galès, 2011, p. 66). However, a most 
stimulating argument for this work is Di Meo’s idea of intentionality of the actors. In fact, for Di 
Meo, those actors are located at different scales, so that endogenous, exogenous and transitional 
actors cross the territory for which they intend to form policies (Di Meo, 2008, pp. 6–7). The 
multiscalar governance that I have adopted is therefore grounded on those actors, located at 
different scales, but who have the intention to form public actions, policies and strategies that 
impact the places they govern.  
Earlier in this work, I have asked: how can I, in the context of a doctoral research, reconstitute 
the many dimensions that underlie decision-making processes from past experiences and 
collective patterns, to present judgements and future imagined possibilities? I therefore suggest 
to analyse — through narratives, discourses and biographic performance of the actors — their 
meaningful social interventions. Those endogenous, exogenous and transitional actors put in 
tension the ‘upwards, downwards and transversal links’ of scales, because of these very 
intentions and their consequent interventions.   
Methodologically, this means that the enquiry should focus on the social agents who cross 
places. Based on their interests, they produce, reproduce, and contest the hierarchy of power 
which organises the social life of a bounded territory. Di Meo (2008) argued that the actors 
undertake territory-oriented public actions. The place itself informs the actors, since it contains 
unique features, a legacy of multiple layers of social interactions and material traces of those 
interactions, as much as it is informed by the actors. As Young and Kaczmarek (2000) says, when 
it comes to small Polish communes: “As local government constructs policies which reflect their 
own priorities they are both shaped by an already existing set of institutional resources, and in 
turn themselves shape (to a degree) geographical variation in development”. In an open and 
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unbounded view of place, these layers contain bits of the local, the national and the global: as 
Schnell (2007) suggests, the place is a hologram of the internal and external forces that impact it.  
With the mutual constitution of scales, places and social actors, we rally to Massey’s progressive 
cities. She argues that: 
the reconstruction of spaces and places within the City was an active part of the reordering of the 
wider relations within which the City is set and the aim was that the local reconstruction would 
respond to—and hopefully even influence— the remaking of the wider relations. (D. B. Massey et 
al., 1999, p. 107) 
Later on, she states:  
For development towards city-dom what is needed is positively activated interaction. This could 
mean the bubbling-up of new activities, it could mean specific policies to trade on or maintain the 
potential effects of intersection (to turn it into interaction). (Ibid., p. 115)  
Through an analysis based on micro-histories, rather than macro structures, the variegated 
landscape of immigrant integration policies make sense. In fact, at the beginning of the project, 
all the typical variables — political orientation, socioeconomic situation, demographics and 
historical trajectories of the places — were rather similar among the four cities studied, and 
therefore suggested similar involvement in immigration issues. However, each one adopted a 
different policy towards immigration. The desire of the leadership to consider immigration 
issues as part of the agenda, beyond the formal responsibilities of the subnational government, 
proved crucial. This desire often hides, behind the walls of the city hall, electoral interests and 
power struggles on the council: representing a fifth to a quarter of the population, and providing 
a budget to the municipality which pays for several salaries are two sources of power for elected 
immigrant representatives on the council.  
However, these personal interests are not the only reasons which push certain municipalities to 
adopt immigration policies. In a context of relative deprivation, in those places of difference, 
produced by the elite, immigration is one of the controllable domains of policy. In fact, motivated 
by a desire to resemble the centre, the control over selection of newcomers is seen as an attempt 
to enter a wider competition and to rescale development strategies. If the success seems 
mitigated, at least, it informs us of the on-going construction of the city with small ‘n’ 
neoliberalisms, in which immigration issues in Israel, usually of an ethno-religious nature, are 
reframed through economic criteria. Beyond Berthomière’s proposal ‘immigrant logics vs. State 
logics’ (2002), the city logics emerge and add tensions. However, it also plays the role of 
neutralising those tensions, in part, at the city level.   
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Against these three sets of actors (State, immigrants and cities), non-governmental actors, 
grassroots organisations… are missing. Ironically enough, the cities that have a thinner 
organisational structure for immigration and integration issues, and are therefore labelled as 
less capable of taking action for themselves, are more prone to cooperate with a ‘civil society’, be 
it grassroots organisations, residents’ representatives, local branches of national ethnic 
associations etc. In fact, in Kiryat Shmona and Kiryat Gat, the absence of the MOIA ‘group Aliyah’ 
left some space for immigrant residents. This provides new pointers for the study of democratic 
channels in mid-sized cities.  
1.2 The ‘ordinary city’: between innovation and dependence   
The dialectics between place, scales and social agents is a fertile ground to analyse the potential 
of cities which were stereotyped as playing a ‘punitive game of catching up’. It reveals their 
orientation towards a potential future, and the innovative steps city leaders and their staff take 
to try and reach out to this ideal, even when it means adopting policies and programmes beyond 
the formal requirements of administrative and political decentralisation.    
Béhar has suggested that mid-sized cities are fields of innovation (Loubière, 2011). The 
creativity of these places is displayed in the following aspects: firstly, the cities under scrutiny 
have elaborated innovative programmes to rehabilitate the city’s population base — from 
immigration outreaching to housing development. Secondly, the professionalization of leaders 
lies mainly in the development of their ‘brokerage’ skills: benefiting from the fragmentation of 
power, they have taken advantage of the many actors they could reach out to, in order to capture 
more resources (in an environment where resources are becoming scarcer and more and more 
contingent upon self-funding). Thirdly, these places have acted as powerful neutralisers of 
various logics — State, city and immigrants at the very least — which collide in the governance 
of immigration. They have elaborated a synthesis between a national ideological framework 
whose symbol is the Law of Return, the pressure from immigrants to preserve sociocultural 
practices, and the economic interests of the city.    
However, each step towards resources, and each adaptation of the national ideological frame, 
translates into a growing presence of the State in the many interstices of governance. Our 
analysis unveils the development of pathways of high dependency between actors located at 
different scales, who need each other to maintain their power — whether it be their position, 
budget or prestige etc. One of the main results is the difficulty to design alternative paths of 
belonging. In chapter 4, I have asked about the role of the ‘singular’. I argued that those singular 
cases play a role in constituting the core. In the towns, the State is under disguise. But it is also in 
conflicts with locally-produced organisations, norms and logics.  
 365
The four cities under scrutiny have displayed institutional features that make us reflect on the 
rescaling processes occurring in mid-sized cities. In fact, the nature of scales in the case studies 
is polycentric — with the municipality, the ministries, but also transnational diaspora 
organisations and grassroots organisations as four main organisational aggregates —, 
interdependent and multiscalar. The different quasi-organic morphologies of the institutional 
features of immigration policies display many interactions, that look as many arteries 
connecting the different organs they revolve around. The municipality emerges as a new centre 
of gravity, in competition with the central administration, deploying connections with donors 
and grasping resources. But with every new connection, a new pathway of interdependency is 
created.  
This dismisses the idea that cities located out of the core networks are completely isolated. They 
do take part in the rescaling of power, even if these activities are not as substantial as in global 
cities. What about their role in immigration issues?   
1.3 Immigration and the (mid-sized) city 
Over the last decade, scholarship and practitioners have together questioned the potential for 
cities to be more accommodating than national frameworks — the latter suffering from a 
conservative backlash.  
This work does not provide a clear answer to the question of whether cities are more 
accommodating, or, whether, on the contrary ‘local conservatism prevails’? To understand the 
extent to which a city is more inclusive or exclusionary, if it belongs to those ‘sanctuary cities’ 
which are countering conservative, and even racist, national policies, my proposal is mainly 
methodological and suggests a need to ground research in place, and to acknowledge that the 
social actors in these places intervene, therefore producing continuity or change. The main 
question to be resolved is to define the interests of each group, their strategies and their weight 
in the governance of the place under scrutiny.   
Even though our research focused on Jewish immigrants in Israel, the adoption of more pluralist 
attitudes is limited to some privileged immigrants; and NIMBY logics for immigration settlement 
restrict the Law of Return. Pluralism and assimilation coexist in the city, and are rendered 
parallel with an economic imperative for the beneficiaries of the former, and moral obligations 
for the beneficiaries of the latter. Groups who are perceived as less capable of becoming 
productive individuals are still supported, in the name of the moral obligation to help new 
Jewish immigrants to Eretz Israel but their deservingness is conditioned by the necessity to 
comply as rapidly as possible with a priori defined norms and customs of the host society —
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including orthodox practice of religion (which a minority practices in Israel) and mastery of the 
Hebrew language. In that sense, even in the ethnonational framework delimitating the Israeli 
national immigration policy, some trends appear that are more general to immigration issues in 
the world. The observed trade-off, for which desirable individuals ‘buy’ their freedom, while 
vulnerable groups undergo more coercive assimilationist policies, feeds into a literature that 
highlights frames of ‘active citizenship’ (Soysal, 2012) or ‘deservingness’ (Chauvin & Garcés-
Mascareñas, 2012). Faist’s proposal applies here, and adds a new layer to the already 
exclusionary Law of Return:  
It is not only the categorization of people along nationality/citizenship and thus the accident of 
birthplace, but also their distinction with respect to economic utility and social adaptation that 
make a difference to the life chances of many individuals. (Faist, 2013, p. 1644)   
The raising interest for the ‘economic utility’ of immigrants, even in the Israeli context, is I 
believe deeply related to Glick-Schiller and Çağlar’s proposal. They connect immigration and 
placemaking, arguing that cities position and market themselves in order to attract migrants, 
themselves neoliberal agents. Indeed, they claim that “When it comes to urban studies, the 
robust literature on the neoliberal remaking, reimagining, and competitive marketing of cities is 
strangely silent about migration” (Schiller & Çağlar, 2010, p. 2).  
Kymlicka (2015)’s call to go beyond ‘neoliberal multiculturalism’ is certainly timely. My first 
hypothesis was based on the belief that the inclusion of immigrants in policymaking could lead 
to more accommodating policies. But, immigrant participation in councils is not entirely a 
guarantor of pluralism and openness. It is certainly a first step, but it should be accompanied by 
many other mechanisms.   
2 Municipalities engaging in immigration and integration matters  
This second section provides a brief summary of the findings regarding the production of scales 
and places by social agents in the four towns under scrutiny. Immigration issues emerge as a 
rather recent sector of intervention for municipalities. The adoption of local immigration 
policies is correlated with neoliberal pressure for interlocality competition for resources. 
Beyond an apparently simple devolution of responsibilities, the cooperation and conflicts 
between the various actors involved in immigration issues reveal the production of a new socio-
political space, which I have called a multiscalar governance of immigration and integration.  
Secondly, place issues, and more particularly the ‘sense of place’ as imagined in the towns, will 
be the focus. New immigrants disturb this collective imaginary, and oblige the residents to 
redefine ‘who belongs’. Under the pressure of local development, deservingness — that is the 
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definition of newcomers who are welcome to settle in the town, and to receive support from the 
public agencies — is reframed. While the ethno-religious criteria is still essential entailing a 
moral obligation to support Jews coming to Israel, the economic performance of new immigrants 
is a dimension that social actors put forward. They embrace the Zionist project of ingathering of 
exiles, but, for their towns, they would rather reach out to those who they perceive to be 
contributing and productive members. In addition to their economic performance, participation 
in community life, including local politics, is another variable of these new frameworks of 
deservingness.  
Lastly, the role of peripheral towns' residents and leaders is emphasised. Far from being 
dispossessed of political agency, their influence becomes more obvious once we take a step back, 
and try to understand what an analysis at the margin can bring to an understanding of the 
national. In fact, and particularly at the time this thesis was being written, when right-wing 
populist politics were proving so successful across North America and Europe, we cannot ignore 
the ‘shared destiny’ of immigrants living at the frontiers, and their influence on politics in Israel. 
The perpetuation of neo-Zionist hawkish politics finds its most virulent backers in these towns, 
wrongly depicted as ‘powerless’.   
2.1 How immigration became a new channel for resources? Towns engage 
in rescaling economic development strategies  
This doctoral research addressed the autonomy of four frontier towns in Israel, Acre, Arad, 
Kiryat Gat and Kiryat Shmona. Three years after the formulation of the hypotheses, the measure 
of their autonomy is limited. Forced to enter the ‘interlocality competition’ induced by a more 
neoliberal approach to government in Israel, their access to resources is dependent on their 
proactiveness. Municipalities gain access to funds through public tenders, for which they must 
provide a matching budget, proof of their ‘ownership’ and capacity to run the programmes they 
compete for. The result, one might say, is the same: public funding is still critical to run local 
projects. But the rules of the game have changed: securing funds requires professionalism and 
the ability to prepare a financial package with a wider range of donors. However, even if funds 
come predominantly from central administration, the level of inspection is lower and allows 
greater flexibility. For example, in the case of immigration and integration policies, I have shown 
that municipal programmes, even though they are mainly funded by the MOIA, are more 
pluralist than the assimilationist policies enforced by Israel before the 1990s — a result of 
decentralisation on the one hand, and pressure from one of the largest waves of immigration to 
Israel, on the other hand.    
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In a context where budgets are distributed on a competitive basis, rather than in accordance 
with redistribution of resources based on demographic, economic and social criteria, the 
professionalisation of municipal leaders and staff is decisive. At the beginning of this study, I 
asked the following question: how do the strategies deployed by social actors involved in 
immigration and integration policy formulation and implementation transform the urban 
governance that specifically targets this policy domain into a multiscalar and fragmented 
political space? Giraud suggests that defining the social actors involved in the definition of the 
‘public issue’, and then involved in the treatment of this issue, helps understand the politics of 
scales (Giraud, 2012). By intervening, actors produce a scalar space, he says (Ibid.). And indeed, 
leaders and municipal staff are pressed to become talented brokers. In fact, where the national is 
still quite present, a local governance emerges out of the brokerage of actors located in the city 
who attempt to access funds and programmes at central level — as well as funds located in the 
third sector, or even in the Diaspora. Even if this does not exactly translate into local autonomy, 
these empowered actors find their personal interests satisfied and work to neutralise issues 
arising from the progressive withdrawal of the State. Hence the transition to a neoliberal State 
does not trigger any significant social unrest, but rather isolated acts.  
Having said this, what is the weight of immigration issues in this competition for resources? I 
explored the question whether immigration is a possible lever for a city's economic development 
and social change on the one hand; and if there is a positive correlation between cities that are 
engaged in actions aiming at rescaling their development strategy, and cities that proactively 
address immigration issues, on the other hand. The answer is two-fold: efforts of the 
municipality to address immigration issues at the town-level is indeed often linked to the above-
mentioned competition for resources. However, it is mostly reduced to an ‘in-place economy’ 
approach. Here, Acre in particular, and Arad and Kiryat Gat to some extent, count on 
immigration as a way to attract more residents: immigrants justify applications for larger public 
budgets, maintaining public services, and they also become tax payers. Immigration issues are 
dealt with in parallel with housing development projects, and with culture, rather than with 
employment issues. In this sense, the first hypotheses I formulated in 2013, when I thought that 
new residents were seen as potential actors for local economic development or 
entrepreneurship no longer appear valid.  
What is confirmed, however, is that there is a parallel between a leadership who agree — if not 
in its declarations, but at least in municipal management — to the new rules of the game, and an 
increased involvement with immigration issues. Kiryat Shmona still refuses to compete with 
other municipalities, and calls on the government to respect its responsibilities towards a 
frontier town that has undergone the conflict with Lebanon for decades. And it has refused to 
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form a more proactive policy towards immigration. On the other side of the spectrum, the mayor 
of Acre’s belief’s that “There is money in the country. There is money in the country. You need to 
know how to get it. We know how to get it” (Interview 58, 2015), corresponds to the relatively 
large resources targeted at immigration.  
Nevertheless, peripheral towns seem to have access to a differentiated range of resources. In 
fact, if they are forced to engage in interlocality competition, they do not compete with Tel Aviv 
or other cities in the metropolitan areas. Through the mapping of actors, emerges a field of 
peripheral donors, which, in a way, maintain them in their peripheral position. They have access, 
and they can pretend to reach out, to marginal budgets: from the Ministry for the Development 
of the Galilee and the Negev, or, in this case, from the MOIA. Similarly, if they favour an in-place 
economy, rather than a productive economy, it is often because they cannot compete for new 
industries and businesses. To put it bluntly, municipalities investing in immigration policies and 
their implementation, do so in order to reach out to central funding, for which poorer towns 
have first priority.  
Leitner (in Sheppard & McMaster, 2008), in her work on European immigration policy, elaborate 
on the new scalar fixes in Europe. She argues that new hierarchies of power are based on old 
hierarchies of power. In the Israeli case, there is not a clear core/periphery (with the Tel Aviv-
Jerusalem axis representing the centrifuge force). I have argued earlier that cities with large 
Palestinian-Israeli citizens could be considered peripheries within the core district, as their 
access to resources is lower. Similarly, several cities in the centre suffer from low economic 
status, such as Lod or Ramle. Whereas kibbutzim located at the borders were generally 
considered as part of the Centre. In these archipelago-like networked hierarchies, differences 
are maintained along time, and inequalities are reproduced. However, this peripherality does 
not completely deprive the cities and their actors of will and a capacity to intervene; in short, of 
autonomy.   
2.2 NIMBY: Reframing deservingness, limiting immigration  
One of the specific questions I have raised is to what extent may an enquiry ‘at the margin’ allow 
the researcher to identify ‘practices, identities and autonomies’ (Carrier & Demazière, 2012) that 
either reproduce or produce specific scalar spaces of politics? What stems from the analysis is 
that enquiry in the margins provides new insight which helps to better understand ‘national’ 
phenomena. These towns are products of central planning. They are the result of the production 
of places of difference. However, they also wish to resemble the centre. Following Scott’s 
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subaltern politics, which I have developed in the theoretical chapter of this volume, the research 
confirms that actors borrow from the centre and its hegemonic national ideological frameworks.   
This is particularly salient when looking at city officials’ own immigration experiences and how 
they are presented to the public. A first important remark is that these stories are those which 
are known to the public, since they act as representatives of larger communities established in 
the towns. Their biographical performances, socially meaningful, are interventions that bend 
scales. In fact, they participate in the rescaling of integration issues, where the self is more 
responsible, the city is the space of ‘multiculturalism’, where sociocultural practices are 
segregated, and the nation, the scale of belonging, where access to institutions — conventions or 
public institutions — must be assured. In their narratives, they reconstitute a story of 
immigration success, based on values of the self-made man. They integrated thanks to persistent 
effort and their desire to help their peers led them to public office.  
But the analysis of their discourse shows the extent to which these leaders adopt a conservative 
stance. They are more inclined to limit immigration to newcomers they believe will contribute to 
the town. Other interviewees have adopted similar discourses. The towns that invest in 
immigration programmes undeniably try to reach out to those they perceive will become 
contributing residents. But, contrary to some immigrant politicians I have met, they point out 
the need to help out immigrants after they settle, in order to remove obstacles to integration.  
The immigrant-integration-narrative framing at work is as follows: immigrant integration 
mostly concerns Jewish immigration, under the Law of Return. This ‘repatriate’ migration should 
not lead to major crises, since immigrants and Israeli-born residents are part of ‘one people’. The 
municipality, partly taking over what was once the responsibility of the State, should therefore 
act to empower these new immigrants, and support their access to institutions — from religion, 
education, the armed forces, employment and politics —, so that they will become net 
contributors to the city.  
In that context, and after analysis, the proposal of Favell (in Giugni & Passy, 2006) remains 
highly relevant: “Integration is thus not only an ideal goal for society; it is also something a 
government sets out to achieve” (Ibid., p. 373). Favell conceives of “[…] integration as a collective 
societal goal which can be achieved through the systematic intervention of collective political 
agency […]” (Ibid., 374). There is indeed a crucial role of public agencies, in defining integration 
and in administrating it. This role has been determined from the 1950s, with the elaboration of 
absorption policies, with the help of the Israeli scholarship at the time (Ram, 1995). The terms of 
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this public function has slightly changed since then. Let us therefore look more closely at these 
processes.  
Access based on religion is crucial. With 30% of immigrants believed to be non-halachically 
Jewish (Lustick, 1999), there is a lot of pressure to demonstrate religious belonging, even when 
they do not observe a religious life. Narratives of interviewees always include several sentences 
proving to their interlocutors — myself, in this case — that they come from a religious family, 
spoke some Hebrew before they immigrated, or were simply defined as Jews when they lived 
outside Israel. The annex I have included on ‘joint research’ also contains a dialogue with a 
government clerk proving the type of pressure non-Jewish immigrants may experience.  
A second institution immigrants are strongly oriented towards is the labour market. The 
perceived economic contribution of immigrants has been highlighted in this project. Since there 
were not activities undertaken by the municipalities or other actors in enhancing 
entrepreneurship and business creation, why are immigrants perceived as an engine of 
development? The answer is two-fold: first, and I have mentioned it in the previous subsection, 
immigration is linked with place and placemaking, and participates in the repositioning of the 
cities on the national and transnational map (even when it simply means that those immigrants 
permit to reach out to budget, to maintain public services and to gain new tax payers); second, it 
is linked to an understanding of desirable vs. deserving individuals. And indeed, proactive 
outreaching programs seem to have a corrective effect on age/education of immigrants coming 
to development towns. Contrarily to Lipshitz’s analysis (1998) carried out some years after 
1990s immigration, controlling immigration to the city translates in the settlement of a younger 
workforce. Nevertheless, out-migration in the upcoming years could be expected, reinforcing the 
idea that those cities are transitional settlement areas. Once immigrants find their way through 
the labour and housing market, they might remigrate to the centre. To avoid out-migration — of 
immigrants and of Israeli-born —, cities invest more and more in the remaking of their image, 
diversity being one of the elements highlighted in those new — although rather preliminary — 
strategies.  
These poor towns do not always manage to attract the young working families that they target. 
Sometimes, newcomers do not fill the ambition of cities when it comes to their education and 
employment prospects. It does not mean that the city does not spend public funding for their 
sake. Immigrants who are perceived as being net receivers, usually from developing countries, 
fall under the ‘moral obligation’ of the city, in the Zionist project of ingathering of the exiles. Here 
again, the desirable vs. deserving frame comes into action. Additionally, immigrants from 
developing countries are the objects of targeted policies, and supplementary budgets can be 
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requested from central government when a population of individuals from Ethiopia, India, or 
Azerbaijan settle in the city — as is the case for Acre and Kiryat Gat. Their ‘vulnerability’ is a 
condition for the city to adopt specific policies toward their settlement, but it also implies that 
they will be the target of top-down, paternalistic decisions, intended towards the group as a 
whole, rather than individuals.   
Lastly, immigrants are expected to participate in political institutions. In that sense, they are 
responsible for electing representatives who will defend their interests in local government. 
Here, the cooperation with an older generation of leaders from the African and Middle Eastern 
communities, and the new immigrants predominantly from the FSU, shows that the main 
cleavages of the 1990s are slowly disappearing and being replaced. Solidarity grows out of a 
‘shared destiny’ in their predicament. The attempt of Shas and Israel Beitenu, during the 2015’s 
elections, to focus on welfare politics, rather than ethno-religious politics, is symptomatic of 
these changes.  
There is a continuity of the absorption policy of Israel from the national to the local level. In 
addition, even though development towns are the result of coercive, state-led production of 
places, they have not exactly managed to produce alternative paths of integration. In fact, these 
towns have facilitated the emergence of leaders from African and Middle East communities from 
the 1960s onwards, as well as the growth of new political movements and parties which better 
represent immigrants, such as Shas or Israel Beitenu. Nevertheless, better observation of 
sociocultural pluralism is restricted to Western immigrants, and those towns have even limited 
any further immigration around new frames of deservingness based on socioeconomic 
participation.  
The case of Acre is very interesting to assess the possibility of fostering pluralism, out of national 
politics of belonging. Indeed, local leaders go to tremendous effort to encourage peaceful co-
existence in such a disputed State. But despite these efforts, they do not succeed in shaking off a 
national ideology in which Jewish citizens are considered superior to their Palestinian peers. 
Paternalistic, condescending discourses are as present as in other towns which are marked by 
the conflict.   
2.3 Transformative potential of integrating immigrants within the political 
project? 
This brings me to the weight of social actors in the orientation of places and scales. Israel, the 
State, its cities and its immigration policies cannot completely be understood without the 
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conflict, and the conflict cannot be understood without those cities and immigration. As Uri Ram 
and Jeffrey C. Goldfarb argue, there are mutual relations between conflict and culture: “the way 
in which the conflict shapes ordinary lives, and the way in which ordinary lives in turn affect the 
conflict” (Ram & Goldfarb, 2009, p. 2).  
After living for several years in the centre of the country, spending time in those towns between 
2013 and 2016 was quite a culture shock, and brought to light a new layer of Israeli society, and 
its politics. This aspect of the society became even more crucial at the time of writing the thesis, 
since it strongly echoed the growing success of nationalistic, conservatory and populist politics 
in the United States and in Europe — the milestones of which have been the European response 
to the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ at EU level, as well as at national and local levels; the 2016 
‘Brexit’, where the fracture between London and large cities vs. rural and small town England 
determined the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union; and the more recent election of 
Donald Trump as president of the United States in November 2016, here again supported by a 
conservative rural America voting against the urban dwellers they have come to despise.  
In this international context, an analysis of the political weight of Israel’s periphery suddenly 
becomes more pressing. In fact, from 1995 onwards, Israel has witnessed the “[…] emergence of 
two mutually antagonistic alternatives: a liberal, secular, Post-Zionist civic identity, on the one 
hand, and ethnic, religious, Neo-Zionist nationalistic identity, on the other” (Ram, 2000). For the 
Neo-Zionist camp, their orientation towards ethnic nationalism endorses the Jewish people as 
the legitimate citizens.   
In this context, immigrants who settle in the periphery, once ‘trapped’ (Yiftachel, 2000), gain 
political weight and momentum. Right-wing nationalist political parties have virtually no 
opposition in these towns. They foster a growing resentment against the post-Zionist Tel Aviv 
bubble. And their claims to have supported the construction of the state, at the price of their 
sacrifice, are increasingly audible (Ibid.). Kiryat Shmona’s project to open a maabarot museum is 
one symbol of these claims and the actions led by leaders in these towns.  
The maabarot museum, not yet a reality when writing this volume, holds the promise of a 
‘rebranding’ of immigration in the city. It came together with a series of lectures, then called 
‘academia at the square’ (academia bakikar in Hebrew), which actively involved the residents of 
Kiryat Shmona, who gathered archives and retold the story of the town. Arad’s municipal 
museum exhibits a story of ‘chosen’ immigration, away from the narratives of development 
towns. Acre’s rebranding ‘the city of Mediterranean cultures’ leverages the architecture, culture 
and folklore of the many groups of immigrants from the 1950s to now. Through those examples, 
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immigration and placemaking are deeply intertwined, and serve as a basis for economic 
projects, mainly tourism-based. But they are also symbolic projects, highlighting the various 
elements of the Jewish presence in Israel, re-writing the pioneering narratives, and redefining 
immigration within new ‘diversity’ discourses.      
This raises the question whether this is not just a façade, by a political clique who have largely 
reduced politics to provocative declarations and ‘band aid’ actions, while stratification 
continues. But even if it is a mirage, it has the power to rally those frontier town’ residents who 
do agree when they speak of Palestine, and are active opponents of any peace process — even if 
they disagree on the definition of what it means to be Jewish, leading to harsh opposition 
between secular residents (often FSU immigrants) and religious residents.   
3 Recommendations, limitations and perspectives for the future 
This last section briefly presents some recommendations to cities engaging with immigration 
outreaching and immigrant integration. Second, it concludes with reflections on the scope of the 
work, as well as research perspectives for the future.  
3.1 Some recommendations 
Although the scope of this work does not explicitly enables the definition of a clear set of 
recommendations for municipalities in mid-sized cities which wish to engage more proactively 
in immigration issues, the following remarks can provide new leads. I will briefly address four 
issues in particular: leveraging immigration issues for economic purposes; alternative pathways 
of integration; local democracy; and institutional cooperation.    
Along this work, I have demonstrated that mid-sized cities in Israel have started to engage in 
immigration outreaching. In that sense, they have deployed resources — human and financial — 
to travel abroad and convince Jewish candidates to immigration to make their way to their cities, 
to ensure a personal accompaniment (with the figure of the proyektor), bring some sense of 
familiarity with the design of segregated sociocultural activities and multilingual service 
delivery, and finally to guarantee some political representation of the immigrant individuals in 
the city council. Those efforts are made, because immigrants hold the promise of a demographic 
burst, but also an economic boost. Nevertheless, municipalities do not dedicate many resources 
to build support systems and infrastructure for the economic integration of immigrants. New 
comers face a vacuum, partly filled with access to vocational training, and only marginally 
offering entrepreneurship workshops and support. Larger schemes could be envisaged, which 
would not leave immigrants as mere characters of (and this is just an example) a tourism plan, 
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but would apprehend their potential in actively participating in the design, the 
operationalization and the execution of tourism activities.      
Second, immigrant integration is still very much defined within the national project, dominated 
by a white European Jewish definition of citizenship. I assumed that investigating in places 
mostly inhabited by immigrants from Africa and Asia, as well as FSU immigrants, would provide 
a fertile ground for the analysis of alternative pathways of integration, and a more open 
‘imaginary of place’ (Walker & Leitner, 2011). In fact, those cities’ residents are important 
supporters of political parties offering an alternative citizenship — such as the Shas, or Israel 
Beitenu. It is true that the reinterpretation of the Law of Return at the local level has permitted 
new comers to benefit from a more open understanding of integration, particularly when it 
comes to sociocultural practices, i.e. with the public funding of a segregated landscape of culture 
for FSU immigrants. Nevertheless, the adoption of local multiculturalism is limited to 
immigrants coming from Europe. Assimilationist attitudes still prevail when addressing the 
integration of immigrants from Ethiopia, India, or even Azerbaijan or Uzbekistan. Similarly, the 
rehabilitation of Mizrahi immigrants in nation-building, is often an attempt to join the 
mainstream narratives. In that context, a multi-actor debate is profoundly lacking, to capitalise 
on the micro-history of those places, and invent a more open imaginary of place, inclusive to the 
many groups constituting those heterogeneous places.   
Following this point, I also raise the question of local democracy. Even though Israel exhibits a 
progressive case of immigrants’ participation in local and national politics, I believe we should 
not content with the inclusion of a small number of immigrant politicians, who partly reproduce 
patterns of domination. Nor should we rely on the municipal department of immigration and 
integration as a satisfactory institutional setting to channel the interests and needs of the 
immigrant individuals in the city. Conflicts often arise between this department, and the 
community work unit, which proposes to replace immigrant integration with ‘intercultural 
community development’. As the director of the community work service at the Ministry of 
Welfare argue: “Now, the new concept is ‘intercultural community development’. Immigrants are 
just one aspect. Conflicts are usually common between the different groups” (Interview 11, 
2014). The activities of community work, ranging from leadership, inclusion of residents’ 
associations, community associations… etc, hold the promise of a better representation of 
immigrants in decision-making and planning. Reaching out to residents’ associations, 
committees, or even facilitating their establishment, although often seen as a threat, can increase 
the legitimacy of the various actors engaged in immigration and integration activities. Kiryat 
Gat’s bottom-up design of activities for immigrants, or Kiryat Shmona’s inclusion of various 
immigrants’ associations in meetings, are first steps towards this local democracy. Ben Elia 
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(2006) has strongly suggested that the fourth generation of local governments in Israel ought to 
open new pathways for local democracy. This could be an important project to undertake.  
To achieve the creation of a wider space of debate and collective bottom-up planning, a better 
coordination between the various actors is necessary. If we are to acknowledge a shift from local 
governmental to multiscalar governance, new forums must be established, to foster the 
encounters between the various actors, and define where competences and activities overlap, or 
lack. I have recall in the previous chapters some experiences of collaboration. However, Kiryat 
Gat’s committee, or Acre’s temporary cooperation between departments, both revolved around 
the integration of a particular group — Ethiopian immigrants and Indian immigrants — rather 
than were based on the idea of collaboration around the issues of immigration in general.   
In brief, for local governance to function and offer better perspectives for local democracy, it has 
to provide with spaces of dialogue, debate and participation.  
3.2 Limitations and perspectives for the future 
At the beginning of this section, I have recognised the limited scope of this doctoral work. 
Several steps could be undertaken in the upcoming years to cope with these various limitations. 
A first limitation corresponds to the time of the investigation. I have chosen to focus on the 
discourses and narratives produced in four cities at the moment of the inquiry. In that 
framework, I could not assess the long-term impacts of those discourses. I hope that the last 
chapter of this volume, which highlights the organisational features of immigrant integration 
policies, provide the reader with some linkages between policymaking and policy 
implementation. However, I could not address issues of remigration of immigrants, formal 
integration in the labour market, access to housing, educational trajectories of immigrants’ 
children… etc. An interesting task would therefore be to examine the impacts of the policies I 
have set to analyse between 2013 and 2016 in several years, and offer a more longitudinal study 
of immigration in those towns.  
Second, I have decided to analyse this policy domain from the municipality, outwards. This 
raises the issue of censing and mapping the actors. In fact, the first interviews were conducted 
within the wall of the city hall. There, I have obtained authorisation to conduct the research, by 
the spokesperson and the mayor or deputy mayor in charge of immigration-related issues. If 
that enabled me to navigate freely in the various institutions, with the legitimate ‘stamp’ of the 
government, it meant that all interviews have trickled down from the municipality out. In order 
to prevent the mapping of actors to be an unfinished puzzle, I have shown the charts I had 
sketched to various interviewees, some months after our first encounter. Exchanging on these 
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drafts enabled me to complete the maps, hear their reactions, and strengthen my analysis of 
cooperation and conflict relations between actors. Nevertheless, I acknowledge the fact that this 
has limited the analysis, somehow. A future task could include the censing of actors from the 
point of view of the ministries, or even more challenging, from the immigrants themselves. In 
that last case, a better understanding of the ‘accessibility’ of the various organisations could 
emerge.    
A third reflexion concerns the methodology I adopted. In order to analyse the micro-politics of 
those cities, and show the production of new hierarchies of power, I have focused almost 
exclusively on the voices of the various actors involved in immigration integration issues. 
Although I am still deeply convinced of the importance of the task of rehabilitating agency in the 
production of scales, and in placemaking, I would like to explore more systematically the 
‘embodiment’ and practices, beyond the ‘sounds’ I registered during interviewees. Victory Day, 
the short documentary movie I have filmed in 2015, has captured to some extent those bodily 
practices. It has provided a new kind of micro events, necessary to understand the power 
dynamics and relations. In parallel, and although it differs a lot from the footages I have filmed, 
the preliminary attempts to transform questions of governance in data visualisation (such as 
maps and charts), have triggered new issues related to materialities, embodiments and visible 
demonstrations of State, power, and institutions.      
Finally, I would like to raise the question of joint research. This project has provoked many 
thoughts regarding ethics and participation. The annex I have produced on joint research 
reflects on the importance of conceptualising the encounters between the researcher and the 
participants to the research. In this dynamic, I have adopted some participatory methods, 
bringing back photos, charts and even results of the research to interviewees, to obtain 
confirmation, make adjustments, and simply, to show that I was grateful for the time they spared 
me. However, those were very small steps, compared to the possibilities offered by participatory 
action research. Participatory action research disagrees with the statement that scientific 
production is the only true knowledge, and holds the potential to acknowledge for a multitude of 
actors in the production of knowledge. It is therefore a participatory and collaborative process, 
involving researchers, decision makers and citizens. Additionally, it is a cyclical and iterational 
process. This type of research has been more common in the fields of education, community 
economic development and strategic planning, but also urban studies. Under those terms, we 
could therefore draw the basis of a sustainable channel between knowledge production and 
policymaking, especially in such a policy domain as uncertain and complex as immigration and 
integration policymaking.    
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Fostering a conducive environment to ‘living together’ — beyond ‘neoliberal multiculturalism’ 
or ‘welfare chauvinism’ (Kymlicka, 2015) — is a question that, I believe, deeply motivates our 
generation of scholars. As we engage increasingly with the ‘field’, with the people we meet 
during our research (who have been transformed from informants into participants in the 
research process) the ethics of our project are constantly being questioned. Similarly, the lines 
between research, active engagement and politics are also blurred. Today, just as much as fifty 
years ago, when immigration issues revealed the cracks in our societies (Tripier, 2004), scholars 
in social sciences must participate in a larger societal debate. A step I hope to take together with 
my peers.  
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Annex 1 ◊ Use of the concept ‘neoliberalism’ 
In The neoliberal city: governance, ideology and development in American cities, Geographer Jason 
Hackworth (2007) points out that neoliberalism has become “the next popular metaconcept in 
social sciences. […] States, provinces, policies, eras, people, countries, and institutions have all 
been deemed “neoliberal” or “neoliberalising”. […] Neoliberalism is everywhere, and apparently, 
everything” (p. xii). And indeed, neoliberalism seems to be the cause and the consequence, the 
root of all urban issues today, and the only possible path cities will take. It looks as it is 
altogether interchangeable with the concepts of globalisation, postmodernism, capitalism and a 
finance-based dematerialised economy.   
The term ‘neoliberal’ is quite recurrent in this thesis. Its controversial meaning therefore calls 
for a working definition, in the framework of this doctoral work. In this annex, I will first present 
the origin of the concept, which has changed a lot from its first use within the liberal 
philosophies of Enlightenment to its renewal in the 1940s, particularly developed with the work 
of the Mont Pélerin Society, to the academic works of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedmann at 
the Chicago School. Next, I will present the development of a more ‘political phase’ of 
neoliberalism (Storper, 2016), induced by Thatcher and Reagan governments. From that 
moment on, neoliberalism has been tinted with conservatism, and is closer to ‘capitalism in its 
millennial manifestation’ (Harvey). The third part will therefore look at the Israeli case and the 
penetration of a neoliberal ideology with the Patinkin boys in the 1960s, to the current ‘start-up 
nation’. Lastly, and as a conclusion, I will try to sum up some of the proposals made by various 
theorists to use neoliberalism as an analytical category. 
1 Origin of the concept 
When one looks up the word ‘neoliberal’, one is referred by the Oxford English Dictionary to the 
word ‘liberalism’, which is defined as the adoption of a liberal political view, “favouring 
individual liberty, free trade, and moderate social and political reform” 
(http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/liberal?q=liberal+).  
Neoliberalism is in fact inspired by the liberal philosophy of Enlightenment. Liberalism then 
meant “limited states, whose legitimacy comes from free citizens in self-governed democracies, 
rather than subjects governed by royalty or clergy” (Storper, 2016, p. 6). It was revived in the 
1930s by the Freidburg ordoliberalism school, and the Waller Lippmann Conference held in 
Paris in 1938 (Mirowski, 2014; Venugopal, 2015; Storper, 2016). This renewal was 
institutionalised in 1947 with the constitution of the Mont Pélerin Society in Switzerland, a 
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group of intellectuals who aimed at pushing forward a neoliberal agenda (they already used the 
term) against the welfare state (Ibid.) — hence the use of ‘liberalism’, which precisely aims at 
freeing citizens from what was perceived by the Mont Pélerin Society’s members as an 
oppressive ruler.  
Michael Storper (2016) therefore claims that early liberal economists made a distinction 
between inequality coming from properly functioning markets and inequality generated by 
powerful interests who take more than their proper share; while recent critics of neoliberalism 
“caricature market economies as inherently oppressive and inegalitarian” (Storper, 2016, p. 9). 
It is true that economists of the Chicago School, although their economic model meant at 
preventing monopolists and rent-seekers, started designing what resembles today’s 
neoliberalism (Ibid., p. 14).  
The confusion between the liberal philosophy and neoliberalism can also be explained by more 
recent definitions of neoliberalism. In fact, the term neoliberalism changed quite radically when 
it became a way to describe the political reforms led by Thatcher and Reagan, but also by 
international organisations as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, soon 
followed by many other governments. Neoliberalism therefore meant a wave of market 
deregulation, privatisation and welfare state decline (Venugopal, 2015). Moreover, it was 
accompanied by the support of “different types of new organized interests, mostly private and 
increasingly plutocratic” (Storper, 2016, p. 15). 
2 Contemporary meanings of the concept of neoliberalism 
Nowadays, neoliberalism is no longer used by its supporters, but “exclusively by scholars who 
are critical of markets, de-regulation, and capitalism in general” (Ibid., p. 10). What makes 
neoliberalism coherent today?   
Brenner defines the neoliberal discourse as one emphasising “market-driven growth, flexibility 
and locational competitiveness” (Brenner, 2004, p. 3). Brenner also argues that deregulation 
does not mean that the State withdraws but that its role shifts to favour the capitalist enterprise 
of accumulation. Similarly, Harvey (2005) argues that neoliberalism is a political project aiming 
at creating new means of capital production (cited in Clarke, 2008).  
This political project is channelled through new political parties and new institutional forms, 
emerging partially through scalar restructuring, that act towards the expansion of the scope and 
reach of corporate capital, the indirect ‘economisation’ of areas of social and political life, and 
benefits from the rise of population control technologies (Clarke, 2008, p. 136). When it comes 
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to city governments, this scalar restructuring, through the “political pressure for market-
oriented and voluntarist modes of governance, based on the principles of devolved and 
outsourced responsibility” (Peck, 2013, p. 147), is usually implicit with the use of the term 
‘governance’.  
In that context, the concepts of scaling, governance and place-making that I mobilised in my 
theoretical framework do echo with neoliberalism. In fact, John Clarke argues: “new spatial and 
scalar organisation — and their implication with questions of multiple, graduated, or 
overlapping sovereignties — seem to me to bear directly on the issues of ‘making up place’” 
(Clarke, 2008, p. 144). 
3 Neoliberalism in Israel 
The social, economic and political changes inherited from a flexible accumulation regime, 
technological advances and globalisation hit Israel a little later. Indeed, we can date the shift of 
Israel from a semi-socialist society to a free market economy to around 1985 (Kay 2012), a shift 
that has occurred through remarkable pressure from the United States.  
In his article “From Altneuland to the New Promised Land: A Study of the Evolution and 
Americanization of the Israeli Economy”, Avi Kay analyses the Israeli shift from a semi-socialist 
planned economy to today’s free market economy. Even if he dates pressures to adopt a more 
liberal approach to economy to the 1960s, Kay shows the role of the 1973 Yom Kippur war in 
triggering major changes (Kay, 2012). Indeed, a combination of the costs of war, economic 
disruption and fuel price increases led Israel into spiralling inflation in the 1970s. At that time, 
the Chicago university-trained free-market advocate Dan Patinkin, accompanied by his students, 
the Patinkin boys, started to get more and more present in the Israeli media to lobby for 
economic changes (Ibid., p. 107). The Likud, elected in 1977, was then promoting, at least in its 
discourse, a pro-market ideology. Kay describes the meeting of economist Milton Friedmann 
with Likud leader Menachem Begin. Friedmann submitted a reform proposal for Israel to move 
forward a market economy. But these recommendations were only followed by marginal 
changes in policy, and public expenditures actually rose during that period (Ibid., pp. 108-109). 
Inflation and public expenses led to a situation such as “by mid-1984 Israel was totally 
dependent on the United States for its economic survival” (Ibid., p. 111). The United States did 
apply some pressure but seeing that there was no change, it decided to freeze all monetary 
transfers to the country. This ultimatum had the expected effect. In 1985, the government 
adopted Israel’s 1985 Economic Stabilisation Plan.  
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Central budget cuts also have an impact on social expenditures: education in particular suffers 
from the withdrawal of the State. Welfare expenses increased a bit, but it is more of a ‘band aid’ 
effect, the State having given up on solving deeper social problems (Kimhi, 2015). But more 
importantly for our matter, immigration absorption policy changed entirely, from a State 
responsibility to individual responsibility. 
Conclusion: neoliberalism as an analytical category?  
In order to escape the totalising effect of neoliberalism, which runs the risk of turning it into a 
‘contextual wallpaper’ (Venugopal, 2015, p. 169), I now turn to two proposals of what Rajesh 
Venugopal has named ‘deep neoliberalism’ (Ibid., p. 170): Aihwa Ong and Jamie Peck’s. Ong 
suggests that neoliberalism is a radically decentred and amorphous phenomenon. In fact, “Ong 
treats neo-liberalism’s spread by examining it as an assemblage of technologies, techniques, and 
practices that are appropriated selectively, that come into uncomfortable encounters with ‘local’ 
politics and cultures, and that are mobile and connective (rather than ‘global’) (Clarke, 2008, p. 
138). The term ‘assemblage’ is helpful to understand practices of articulation, disarticulation and 
re-articulation (Ibid.). In turn, Peck argues that neoliberalism is a decentralised and deeply 
contextualised force (Peck, 2010 cited in (Venugopal, 2015, p. 170).  
Following Peck or Ong’s proposals, “neoliberalism is but one transformative pulse among many, 
and not necessarily the dominant one” (Peck, 2013, p. 134). Neoliberalism coexists with other 
political projects, he argues. It is omnipresent, but it does mean that it is an all-determining 
superstructure. “More like an ideological parasite, neoliberalism both occupies and draws 
energy from its various host organisms—bodies politic ranging from post-Soviet states to East 
Asian developmental regimes and European welfare states—but it cannot, ultimately, live 
entirely without or outside them” (Ibid., p. 144).  
In that sense, it brings us to understand some common trends, which were also common to the 
governance of the cities under scrutiny — from the withdrawal of the central State in the social 
and public life to the resulting rescaling of responsibility and the devolution to subnational 
governments, private actors or even the residents themselves; the rise of ‘active’ citizens; and 
the penetration of market logic in the regulation of public life —. At the same time though, 
Storper argues that “as in policymaking in general, much urban policy change is indeed less 
motivated by macro-ideology than by a complex pragmatics of dealing with an urban 
environment shaped by changing technologies, migration patterns, lifestyles, economic 
specialization, and economic development” (Storper, 2016, p. 29). Only through the analysis of 
people’s and institutions’ interests and actions can polices be understood. Neoliberalism 
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therefore stands as one of the ideological frames influencing the way they narrate their 
experience and view the future.  
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Annex 2 ◊ Immigrant integration  
Immigrant integration has been a constant object in this doctoral project. However, I have 
decided to not dedicate a full section of the theoretical background to defining it, mainly because 
its ontological and epistemological implications have been discussed so often in the literature of 
the past few decades, but also because I adopted a grounded approach to integration, informed 
by narratives and statements recorded during the data collection period.  
Nevertheless, it cannot appear in this thesis title, be the central topic of one chapter, and recur so 
often in each page of this work without a brief overview of those works focusing on immigrant 
integration.  
I will start this annex with an entry in a dictionary of geography. In Jacques Levy and Michel 
Lussault’s Dictionnaire de Géographie, integration means the inclusion of a reality A into a reality 
B, therefore changing reality B and creating a new reality (Lévy & Lussault, 2003, p. 516). 
Following this definition, the integration of immigrant populations involves their inclusion into 
the new society, but also the change experienced by this society. This definition allowed me to 
accept terms such as incorporation, inclusion or integration as quite interchangeable. 
Assimilationist and multicultural models are two opposite visions of the new reality entailed by 
immigrants’ incorporation: assimilationist policies provide for the abandonment of a previous 
identity and culture to fully embrace the host societies’ values in order to gain full membership; 
multicultural policies provide for the protection of ones’ identity and culture and lead to a 
pluralist society.  
Integration here means a rather successful inclusion in society, which is not always the result of 
immigrant settlement. Canadian social psychologist John Berry describes a typology where 
integration is one of the possible outcomes of immigrant settlement: “Berry regards 
assimilation, integration, marginalization, and separatism as a continuum stretching from 
complete inclusion to total exclusion of minority groups from the host society” (Berry (1991) in 
(Remennick, 2003, p. 26).  
1 When integration means performing as well as a national average 
The literature on immigrant integration can usually fall into two categories: more theoretical 
works focusing on integration as a result of identity politics in the nation-state; and empirical 
studies which consider that integration is the moment when immigrants perform as well as 
nationals.  
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The Israeli scholarship has focused primarily on the latter, producing large amounts of 
knowledge on immigrants’ and second-generation immigrants’ performance in education, 
occupation, spatial integration and more (see for instance Cohen & Haberfeld, 2007; Haberfeld, 
Semyonov, & Cohen, 2000; Kanas & Tubergen, 2009; Remennick, 2003; Semyonov & Lewin-
Epstein, 2004). Regarding integration as ‘the moment when immigrants perform as well as the 
receiving country’s nationals’ is practical as it allows us to define dimensions of integration, 
which are measurable and comparable. This is actually the most dominant approach of 
integration in the scholarship. Studies usually focus on one or several of the dimensions of 
integration: politico-legal, socio-economic, cultural-religious, and spatial. Research sets 
indicators (civic rights, political rights, employment and earnings, education, language 
proficiency, religiosity, spatial segregation, social networks and so on) and compares the 
performance of immigrants to the results of the native population.  
There are three main limitations to this approach. First of all, it does not take into account the 
power relations between the different groups, and the socio-historical processes that led one 
particular group to become the benchmark population for integration assessment. Similarly, it 
raises the problem of the unit of comparison. Indeed, the systematic ‘ethnic lens’ adopted by 
scholars often ignores the diversity among immigrants in terms of class, religiosity, region of 
origin, gender and more. For instance, in the case of former Soviet Union immigrants in Israel, 
measures are often made looking at the whole population of immigrants from the former USSR, 
while differences between Russian Jews, Georgian Jews, Caucasus Jews and Bukhara Jews are 
substantial and often lead to racism among FSU immigrants themselves (Bram, 2008).  
Second, integration is not so much measured as ‘non-segregation’ (Ruiz-Tagle, 2013a). Let me 
give an example to illustrate: integration will mean that immigrants are not concentrated in the 
same neighbourhood. If they are, the policy will aim at dispersal. The same applies to social 
networks: multiplying contact with the local population is seen as a sign of integration for 
immigrants, although locals are not requested to have contacts with immigrants to be integrated 
in their society (Schinkel, 2013).  
Last, immigrant integration measurements look at their performance without assessing the 
feelings and perceptions of the main object of those measurements. In this context, it is worth 
mentioning the work of Karin Amit, who takes into account the perception of the immigrants 
themselves when studying integration of Western immigrants rather than performance in terms 
of education, occupation or housing (Amit, 2008).  
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2 Nation-states, citizenship and foreigners  
Addressing the first limitation, measuring integration by comparing it to the native population 
also calls for an analysis of the norms and standards of dominant groups. It means that there is a 
dominant group to which the rest should adapt. The same dominant group is the one that 
defines Otherness, but also the one that controls access to society membership (Hans van 
Amersfoort in Martiniello & Rath, 2010; Paulle & Kalir, 2013; Hans Mahnig in Penninx et al., 
2004). When we ask ourselves “who is the dominant group?”, “who decides”, we are challenging 
the ontology of ‘integration’. This inevitably leads us to look at the abundant scholarship 
developed around the nation-state and citizenship (Castles, 2005; Cresswell, 2006; Favell in 
Giugni & Passy, 2006; Glick Schiller & Salazar, 2013; Brubaker and Favell in Martiniello & Rath, 
2010; Sassen, 2005; Yuval-Davis, 2006). Indeed, the politics of citizenship in the nation-states is 
fundamental to understand the construction of a figure of ‘outsider’. In nation-states, citizens are 
equal, they enjoy full membership, they should be ready to perform sacred acts (e.g. be drafted 
to the army), they belong to a community of culture, they enjoy democratic participation, they 
belong to one single nation and they are entitled to important privileges (Brubaker in 
Martiniello & Rath, 2010).  
The control of access to the political community can be observed through the politics of 
belonging, defined as the “specific political projects aimed at constructing belonging in particular 
ways to particular collectivities (…)” (Yuval-Davis, 2006). Politics of belonging largely call for the 
study of power relations within society. Indeed, the established group – through the 
appropriation of scarce material and symbolic resources – exists as a group and achieves 
dominance (Paulle & Kalir, 2013). The nation-state is the relevant scale to analyse the making of 
citizens against outsiders (Cresswell, 2006; Favell in Giugni & Passy, 2006; Favell in Martiniello 
& Rath, 2010). Indeed, French sociologist Abdelmalek Sayad states, “immigration is the limit that 
reveals what [the State] is intrinsically, or its basic truth” (Sayad in Martiniello & Rath, 2010) 
The new patterns of migration led to deviations from the nation-state model with which States 
struggle (Brubaker in Martiniello & Rath, 2010). The methodological nationalism adopted when 
framing the debate along the nation-state boundaries is also challenged today (Glick Schiller & 
Salazar, 2013; Vertovec, 2007). Globalization and the strengthening of supranational 
organizations (like the European Commission) accelerated the displacement of claims towards 
supra and sub-levels (Castles, 2005; Glick Schiller & Salazar, 2013; Sassen, 2005). 
And indeed, as I showed in the theoretical chapter of this doctoral project, subnational spaces 
are worth investigating to understand the new developments of immigrant integration issues. 
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New works on immigrant integration and the city have been published (Caponio & Borkert, 
2010; Penninx et al., 2004; Schiller & Çağlar, 2010) based on the assumption that “in every 
European context, most immigrants live in cities. That is where the jobs, housing, schools, 
support services (whether governmental or non-governmental), religious and leisure facilities, 
and their own social networks are concentrated” (Penninx et al., 2004).  
3 Public action towards the integration of foreign-born populations 
In exploring the motives pushing local governments to form immigration and integration 
policies, as well as the different sectors those policies address, I assumed that integration was a 
function of the State. As Favell argues: 
Sociologically speaking, we can, of course, conceive of integration taking place without the 
structure-imposing involvement of the state. Immigrants can be ‘integrated’ into the local labour 
market as employees or service providers, or they can be ‘integrated’ into complex inter-
community relations at, say, city or district level. […]. Multiculturalism as a descriptive state-of-
affairs, in this sense, could be the product of something that never had any- thing to do with the 
‘multicultural’ policies or institutions of the state. (Favell (2003) reprinted in Martiniello & Rath, 
2010, pp. 373–374)  
Nevertheless, as integration is deeply related to citizenship and nation-state building, 
“Integration is thus not only an ideal goal for society; it is also something a government sets out 
to achieve” (Ibid., p. 373). In this context, Favell conceives of “[…] integration as a collective 
societal goal which can be achieved through the systematic intervention of collective political 
agency […]” (Ibid., 374). A year later, Rinus Penninx, Karen Kraal, Marco Martiniello and Steven 
Vertovec introduce their edited volume Citizenship in European Cities with their definition of 
integration: a “process of becoming part of the society” (Penninx et al., 2004, pp. 1–16). They 
argue that the process occurs at three levels: individual, collective (e.g. immigrants’ associations) 
and institutions (Ibid.). Again, governmental institutions or agencies are considered central to 
integration.   
How do we account for the role of national ideology and institutional involvement of Israeli 
government in immigrant integration? So far, Israeli scholarship has explored the role of 
governments and institutions in two cases: the segregation of Jewish immigrants who arrived in 
Israel after the establishment of the state and originated from North African and Near East 
countries (Khazzoom, 2005; Shama & Iris, 1977; Tzfadia, 2007; Yiftachel, 2000); and 
comparative studies of similar groups of Jewish immigrants who settled in Israel and elsewhere 
to unveil the impact of institutions on integration (see for instance the impact of institutional 
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differences (immigration policy, labour market structure, education, welfare) on the 
performance of FSU immigrants in Israel and Canada in Lewin-Epstein, Semyonov, Kogan, & 
Wanner, 2003; and integration of  Moroccans in Israel and the Netherlands in Oudenhoven & 
Eisses, 1998).  
4 Types of policy responses  
Michael Alexander has developed an immigration policy typology. Five policy types derive from 
the attitudes or assumptions of local authorities, applied to four domains (legal-political, socio-
economic, cultural-religious and spatial): a non-policy, considering migrants as a transient 
phenomenon; a guestworker policy, where migrants are seen as temporary workers; an 
assimilationist policy, where migrants are seen as permanent, and their otherness will 
disappear; a pluralist policy, where migrants are permanent but their otherness is supported; 
and an intercultural policy, where migrants are seen as permanent, but their ethnic otherness 
should not be overemphasised (Alexander, 2003; Penninx et al., 2004, pp. 57–84; Schnell, 2013).  
Israel is representative of at least two of these models: an inclusive model as “(The Law of 
Return) became the most important legal expression of Israel’s self-definition as a Jewish state. 
It established ethnonationalist citizenship that, in principle, encompassed all Jews, and only 
Jews, by virtue of their ethnic descent” (Shafir and Peled in Semyonov & Lewin-Epstein, 2004). 
However, this model has been highly challenged by the FSU immigrants of the 1990s, who have 
pushed for a more pluralistic model, as many newcomers were not Jewish (Elias & Kemp, 2010; 
Lustick, 1999). Israel also adopted a guest worker policy towards non-Jewish foreign workers 
(Alexander, 2003; Elias & Kemp, 2010; Raijman & Kemp, 2002; Schnell, 2013). 
5 The immigrant himself as ultimately responsible for his 
integration 
In the past decade, integration has been increasingly viewed as ‘civic integration’. Myrte 
Hoekstra’s doctoral work shows that major immigrant cities in the Netherlands have 
emphasised of late the economic independence and social participation of immigrants as a 
prerequisite for their integration (Hoekstra, 2014, 2015). This corresponds to a larger shift 
where the ‘deservingness’ of immigrants is widely adopted by policymakers at European level 
(Soysal, 2012), country and city levels, but even among civil society organisations (Garcés-
Mascareñas, 2015). In Europe, “integration acquires a new purpose – the purpose of achieving 
social cohesion in society driven by active, participatory and productive individuals” (Soysal, 
2012). Soysal’s approach of “active citizenship” is not isolated. Prominent intellectuals such as 
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Arjun Appadurai, Manuel Castells or Zigmunt Bauman all claim that we are witnessing a 
polarization of citizens: desirable, mobile, highly-educated individuals on the one hand; 
marginal, low-skilled, malleable labour force on the other hand (Appadurai, 1996; Bauman, 
2013; Castells, 1998). Similarly, geographer David Ley calls active citizens ‘homo economicus’ 
(David Ley, 2003). In this doctoral work, I emphasise more particularly the concept of 
‘deservingness’, as developed by Sébastien Chauvin and Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas. They show 
that new categories of deservingness are being designed, where economic performance, social 
integration and vulnerability become new variables through which integration is viewed 
(Chauvin & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012). 
Israel ethno-national immigrant regime has also incorporated ‘active citizenship’ features. 
Already in the pre-state period, ‘penniless’ Jews were excluded from the construction of a Jewish 
home in Zion (Shilo, 1994). Stories of ‘non-productive’ immigrants who were discouraged from 
coming to Israel in the 1960s/1970s can be found in literature (for instance the fiction Aliya of 
Liel Leibovitz). Nowadays, regulations towards degree equivalency (for lawyers, medical 
employees, psychologists…) are at the advantage of English-speaking Western nationals while 
other immigrants must take exams if they want to practice their former profession in Israel.  
Conclusion  
The concept of integration has generated a fruitful scholarship, where one can easily get lost. 
This thesis aims at contributing to the debate, but is limited to the role of agencies in integration, 
and therefore more towards the debate on the governance of integration: its definition as an 
object of public action, its framing and the outcomes it aims at. In this grounded approach, I have 
shown that immigrant integration is conceived as a process in time, in which public agencies 
have the responsibility to foster a favourable environment for immigrants to quickly access the 
country’s main institutions: religion, education, the armed forces, employment and politics. 
Under that framework, the bureaucratic process of absorption, partly decentralised to the 
municipality, is associated with personal accompaniment, immigrant-friendly public service 
delivery and local political representation. In that sense, it displays some continuity with the 
national conception of absorption, as defined by the State since its early years.  
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Annex 3 ◊ Joint research, when research and 
participants co-produce knowledge 
The last few decades have witnessed a fundamental change in social sciences. Today, there is a 
wide consensus among social theorists that there is not one single truth, but multiple truths, not 
one single reality but multiple realities, that objectivity is not possible and that subjectivity is 
inherent to research. Self- and collective narratives are performances, anchored in spatial and 
temporal frames, as well as situational. In this context, the researcher is not a simple observer of 
social life. He/she is an actor who participates in the construction of social life.  
This subsection will briefly present the principles of this co-construction of knowledge. Then, 
several examples will explicitly show the disruption caused by my presence – as a PhD student, 
as an immigrant, as a woman – in my encounters. But these interpersonal subjectivities are 
present at every moment of the research: from the definition of the arena and the mapping of 
actors, during interviews, as I transcribed interviews from Hebrew into English, and even more 
during the process of restitution in writing.  
1 Principles of ‘joint research’ 
In a perspective of constructivist grounded theory, Kathy Charmaz acknowledges the 
researcher’s active role in shaping the data and analysis. While conducting research, the analysis 
must take into account researchers’ and participants’ relative positions and standpoints. Indeed, 
the researcher introduces subjectivity as “realities are multiple and the viewer is part of what is 
viewed” (Charmaz, 2001, p. 366). For her, “researchers and participants co-construct the data 
through interaction” (Ibid.).  
This position has also been adopted by Franco Ferrarotti. Ferrarotti coins the concept of ‘Joint 
Research’ (Ferrarotti, 2003, p. 53). In this communication between the observer and the 
narrator, he maintains: “Every biographical interview is a complex, social interaction, a role 
system, a system of expectations, orders, norms, and implicit values, often also of sanctions. 
Every biographical interview hides tensions, conflicts, and power hierarchy” (Ibid., p. 27-28). 
And indeed, being invited to a meeting with a local politician as a PhD student induces power 
relations or conflict between academic knowledge and local practices, among other tensions. 
The following two examples will shed light on this complex interaction.   
But moreover, adopting a reflexive approach induces an understanding that we – as social 
scientists - study social actors, who themselves locate their actions in comparison to other social 
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actors, and in comparison to their expectations. Their experience is analysed by them in 
comparison to what they had in mind and to the meanings they attribute to things. In that sense, 
researchers engage in comparing comparisons (Remaud et al., 2012, p. 18). If we are to escape 
ethnocentrism and ideological judgment at the moment of analysis, “it is always preferable to 
compare the difference of hierarchies of evaluation forms within each culture in given 
circumstances.” (Ibid., p. 19). The adoption of a constructive grounded theory therefore makes it 
possible to situate knowledge not only at the time and place where it was produced, but also to 
identify with whom this production took place.    
2 Grabbing opportunities: the researcher to legitimate an area of 
public action 
The sessions I conducted along fieldwork almost always occurred during working hours. I 
wondered what the reason was that let people spend two hours of their working day in the 
company of a doctoral student. Some people I even met several times. I believe that part of the 
interests of those agents was the potential power they could gain from showing that 
immigration and integration could legitimately be an area of responsibility of the municipalities. 
Indeed, the municipal reform law does not provide that municipalities should take over 
immigration and integration issues. It is rather a voluntary sector of municipal intervention. 
Most of the budget derives from the Ministry of Immigration and Integration. The matching 
funds of the municipality against national budget amount to 10%, while usually requested 
matching by other public agencies is 25%. Therefore, it is a relatively marginal topic, usually 
pushed forward thanks to the immigrant councillors, who were elected by their communities.  
I would like to give two examples of the use of my work: one occurred in Acre municipality, after 
the two attacks which occurred in Paris in January 2015 and triggered a wave of immigration 
from France to Israel; one occurred in Kiryat Shmona, after I shot the documentary on Abram.  
In Acre municipality, I had several meetings with Christian, a former staff member of the 
immigration and integration department, today an advisor to the mayor on French relations. 
Christian was employed for two years to outreach to French immigrants, as a municipal agent, 
but financed by the Ministry of Immigration and Integration. Seeing the relative failure of his 
efforts – only twelve families from France have settled in Acre -, his position was made 
redundant in 2006. However, his role towards French immigration to Acre was reconsidered in 
February 2015. Indeed, on the very day of the attacks on the headquarters of Charlie Hebdo in 
Paris, on 7 January 2015, I had an interviewee planned with Zion, deputy mayor and city 
councillor in charge of immigration and integration. We watched the terrible news together on 
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his computer. Following our session, I met two more municipal agents: the director of the 
employment department, as well as a staff member of the department of immigration and 
integration dealing with English speaking immigrants. Lastly, on 10 February 2015, I met the 
city mayor. Four days after our meeting, Christian sent me an email saying:  
Another piece of news: I was summoned by the deputy director of the municipality for an 
emergency meeting on Jewish French immigration, which will take place tomorrow at the city 
hall. Did your meeting with the mayor of Acre stir up renewed interest for the immigration of 
Jews from France???   
Christian believed that my intervention has helped to bring together a forum on the potential of 
French immigration. In September 2015, there was another meeting involving Christian, the city 
mayor and myself. It seems that no action was taken apart from what Christian called ‘renewed 
interest’. However, this meeting brought him back to the centre of immigration issues. Even if he 
had worked ten years for the municipality, the department of immigration and integration did 
not consider him as their colleague. Indeed, one of the staff, Oleg, talks about the absence of 
policies towards French Jews: 
Oleg: Look, first of all, nobody until today offered them [French Jews to come to Acre]. 
Me: What? Don’t you know Christian?  
Oleg: There is Christian, but I don’t know what he does.  
Me: He works on twin cities but until 2006, he was a coordinator from the Ministry, like you, and 
they tried for two years to bring French people here. That’s how I met him, with the spokesperson. I 
have to meet him again, but they sold some houses, more for investment than Aliyah.  
Oleg: This I know. But we don’t count investment. We count people.  
Me: I think the idea was to get them to invest, so when they leave France, they come where there is 
a home. (Interview 26, 2015)  
The situation of Christian therefore probably changed after my intervention and after the 
establishment of this forum in February 2015.  
The second example I wanted to present was the one of Abram, whom I filmed and who was the 
main character of the documentary Victory Day (2015). During the shooting, it was quite evident 
that the topic of immigration in Kiryat Shmona suddenly enjoyed renewed interest. Officials 
were eager to talk to the camera, and share their views. But for Abram who had been struggling 
to get the municipality engaged, it was even more crucial. In his attempt to leverage this 
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opportunity, Abram informed a local journalist, Avner Lotan, who works for Yediyot Acharonot, 
that I was carrying out research on the topic and gave him my cell phone number for a short 
interview. Lotan contacted me in September 2015. At the end, the article was not published but 
we can see here that the involvement of academia supported Abram in his struggle to impose 
immigration as a public issue.  
3 Being a non-Jewish immigrant female researcher in Israel 
Being a PhD student has an influence, as we have just seen. But other facets of my identity were 
also crucial in determining the goal of my research in Israel.  
First of all, being French – and this is difficult to dissimulate when they hear my name and my 
accent – proved to be quite difficult to describe the scope of my research. Very quickly, I was 
considered a researcher on French immigration, while it was fundamental for me to adopt a 
spatial approach rather than an ethnic approach in determining fieldwork. In the first session 
organised with the spokesperson of Acre municipality in June 2014, even before I could explain 
what the purpose of my visit was, the spokesperson called and invited Christian, formerly in 
charge of French immigration, to our meeting. Christian has little to do with the current 
immigration and integration policy in Acre. The first half hour of the meeting therefore revolved 
around topics that were marginal in Acre today. Any mention of my French nationality would 
generally trigger reactions of the same kind.  
The fact that I was myself an immigrant was also special. Indeed, my interlocutors were careful 
to explain the best their city could offer for immigrants. However, they also usually assumed I 
was a Jewish immigrant and that I had gone through the usual bureaucratic process of 
‘absorption’ which entitles immigrants to many rights and privileges for a time period within 
which it is believed integration occurs. However, I sometimes told them that I was not a Jewish 
immigrant. Reactions varied, from unease to indifference. Here, I would like to transcribe an 
interview at the local branch of the MOIA in Kiryat Shmona. The session involved three of us: the 
local officer, the regional supervisor and myself. At the end of the interview, the regional 
supervisor Hila asked:   
Hila: You also ascended (a term reserved for Jewish immigration to Israel)?  
Me: I, not exactly. I am here for five years. My partner is from here, from Kfar Yuval. We met while 
I was doing my Masters, in Belgium. He was working, after the army. And he wanted to come back 
home. I said why not? And I came.  
Hila: Ok.  
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Me: But I don’t have all the rights. I am not Jewish. I first had a B1. Now I am a resident.  
Hila: Ok. Why did not you convert?  
Me: Huh. Because I… It’s not me. I’m curious, I’m learning a lot. But, my identity is important to 
me. What my parents gave me.  
Hila: But. Wait, we’ve been there. Ok. I, actually, lived in a very very Jewish family. But I am… a 
badass, ok? I arrived here thanks to the rights I got from Grandma and Grandpa, from both sides, 
ok?  
Me: Yes.  
Hila: My mum told me, for Pessah, don’t eat matzah outside. I would take the matzah and go out. 
The children ask me: what is it? I tell them: “the bread of Jews. Take it, it’s not tasty”. It’s really not 
tasty. Really, it’s not tasty. […] But without anything, it tastes like nothing!  
Me: What are you trying to tell me?  
Hila: I want to say that if you want to stay in Israel, convert. Do it. Look. You can look at the glass 
half full or half empty. Ok? You have a partner… Jewish?  
Me: Yes.  
Hila: You want to have children from him?  
Me: (pause) I guess yes.  
Hila: Ok. At the end, you want your children to be fine?  
Me: Yes but 
Hila: That’s for the children.  
Me: Yes but for the children, it’s important that both parents feel strong and secure.  
Hila: There is no problem. But they will grow up here, in Israel. Why do they have to hide and 
carry something with them. You can transmit your identity to your children without any 
connection with that. He [your partner] will give his education. Without any connection. The 
children will only gain from that. But you, and your children, it will be easier personally. So it’s 
another tool (we laugh). That’s it! Someone forces you to eat what you don’t want? No! You will 
pass it. First, it enriches you as a person. It’s a lot of knowledge. It’s tradition, also all the habits, 
and you are a good student. Masters! Go ahead!  
Me: That’s my doctorate.  
Hila: You did it already! So it will be your fourth degree, ok! It’s nothing. Look at it as a diploma.  
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Me: It’s a bit more than that.  
Hila: It’s nothing for you. If you like to study. Look at the glass half full. You don’t do it for you. You 
do it for your children and your partner. Believe me. For your partner, it’s very good. Not so much 
for him, but for his parents. […] Give this as a present to your children. (Pause) Look, we went 
through that, in our flesh. Ok? There, we were Jews. We arrived here, they said we were Goyim. 
And they said Russians, Russians, Russians all the time. Russian prostitutes and all that. Ok? We 
went through that. And you see, we look all right! (We laugh) Do it, why do you mind? Someone 
takes something from you? No. You add up. Because I still speak Russian, I write in Russian, I still 
eat what I am used to. I have a friend, a close friend of mine, she observes the traditions. She eats 
at my place what she is allowed to. I eat at her place everything! Ok? And we get along 
fantastically. She in her direction, I in my direction. I am secular. I eat what I eat. Her husband eats 
anything that moves, and she eats what she wants to eat. And we don’t annoy each other, we 
respect each other. And it’s good. We’re good. It does not bother her. Really not. My son in law 
does not eat all what my daughter eats. I bring her food. He looks and says, “what’s this? Yurk!” I 
tell him, say yurk again and you will not get what we prepared. My husband cooks too. (Pause) 
Here and there, we came from different cultures. When I came to Israel, someone changed me? 
No. I was in the communist party. This part stays in. You can’t avoid it. Here, the same way I spoke 
there in Russian, I speak in Hebrew (we laugh). That’s it. Think of it. (Pause) Do you have other 
questions? (Interview 50, 2015) 
Considering that Hila deals with a rather large population of former Soviet immigrants who are 
themselves not Jewish (Elias & Kemp, 2010; Lustick, 1999), this type of discourse inside the 
institution evidences the pressure those non-Jewish immigrants can experience. The first part of 
the transcript shows the obvious importance of showing that she herself is not part of those non-
Jewish immigrants, but that she lived as a Jew before her immigration to Israel. The second part 
is a relatively consistent pattern in my sessions with Jewish Israelis: it shames the mother – who 
transmits Judaism – for not making the effort to convert and ease up her children’s life. If I do 
not convert, she asks: “Why do they have to hide and carry something with them”? It is also 
much reinforced by gender, as men engaged in relations with Jewish Israelis do not ‘threaten’ 
the Jewish identity of their potential offspring. Lastly, she shows that the converting process is 
no more than several years of studying, it is a ‘diploma’, therefore minimising the extent to 
which conversion to Judaism leads to major life changes, from the organisation of the week, 
separation of dairy and meat – including use of different cooking tools -, clothing, to the use of 
birth control and so on.  
This psychological violence I experienced during and out of the research framework could have 
been avoided by dissimulating my non-Jewishness and by taking a fake Jewish identity. 
However, I believe that this brings insights into the research. The presence of non-Jews in the 
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four cities constituting fieldwork is not marginal. In Acre, a colleague translated signs hanging 
outside the department of immigration and integration, which advertised courses for conversion 
to Judaism. Bnei Menashe immigrants from India whose Jewishness is considered uncertain 
went through group conversion. Similar procedures were imposed on Ethiopian immigrants for 
some time in Israel. However, the public agencies minimise the effect that those conversations 
can have in the long run. Indeed, someone born Jewish does not have to observe to be Jewish. 
However, converting to Judaism means engaging in a religious life, which is not a mainstream 
life style in Israel.  
The different strands of scholarships I have been influenced by replace the researcher at the 
heart of the research. Far from being an objective observer of the society, the simple act of 
research makes him/her a participant to the research. Similarly, interviewees orient the 
research. In this project, I want to do justice to this ‘joint’ effort.  Additionally, through several 
stories, I emphasised the reflexive path I have engaged in throughout this thesis.    
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Mizrahi: Since the 1970s, it refers to Jews emigrated from the Middle-East and North Africa. 
MOIA: Ministry Of Immigration and Absorption.  
Moshav (plural moshavim): Rural settlement, where land and property are private. 
Moshava (plural moshavot): Jewish settlement established by members of the 1st and 2nd Aliyot. 
NIMBY: Not in My BackYard. 
Proyektor (plural Proyektorim): Agent hired under the MOIA programme ‘Group Aliyah’.  
Ulpan: Hebrew classes.  
Yidud Aliyah: Outreaching to Jewish immigration abroad. Literally ‘encouraging immigration’.  
Yishuv: Establishment of a Jewish national home in Israel.  
Yoets (plural Yoatsim): Ministry clerk working at MOIA. Literally ‘counsellor’.  
Zabar (plural Zabarim): Israeli born in Israel. Literally ‘prickly pear’.  
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Abstract: Mutations of scales of power, as well as the role of immigration in the physical and symbolic 
production of the city, are analysed through immigrant integration policies in the cities of Acre, Arad, Kiryat Gat 
and Kiryat Shmona in Israel. Jewish immigration policies, as defined by the State of Israel from 1950s onwards, 
are challenged by decentralisation. However, only some local governments actively make local immigrant 
integration policies. The inquiry shows that these mid-sized cities proactively formulate a local policy in order 
to “choose” the immigrants that settle on the one hand; and to access new channels of public resources on the 
other hand. 
In that context, the implementation of an immigrant policy in the city leads to interdependence between actors 
located at various scales of power. With the fragmentation of responsibilities, actors compete to obtain the 
public and private resources for immigrant integration.  
Immigration is part of the making of place. Through the reintegration of former waves of immigration, and the 
imagined potential of future immigrants, immigration is foreseen as a demographic, economic or cultural 
renewal. It is a lever to redefine the development scales of those frontier towns.  
 
Résumé: Les mutations des échelles de responsabilité, ainsi que le rôle de l’immigration dans la production 
physique mais aussi symbolique de la ville, sont analysés à travers le prisme des politiques locales 
d’immigration et d’intégration mises en œuvre dans les villes israéliennes d’Acre, Arad, Kiryat Gat et Kiryat 
Shmona. La politique volontariste d’accueil des immigrés juifs en Israël, datant des années 1950, est mise à 
l’épreuve de la décentralisation. En réalité, seule une partie des autorités locales mettent en place des 
politiques locales d’immigration et d’intégration. L’enquête montre que ces villes moyennes font souvent le 
choix de former de façon proactive une politique locale afin de « choisir » les immigrés qui s’y installent d’une 
part ; et de développer de nouveaux canaux d’accès à des ressources publiques d’autre part.  
Dans ce contexte, la mise en place d’une politique d’immigration dans la ville engendre une situation 
d’interdépendance entre des acteurs situées à des échelles de pouvoir différentes. Avec l’éclatement des 
responsabilités, les acteurs sont mis en concurrence pour obtenir les ressources publiques et privées dédiées à 
l’intégration des immigrés.  
L’immigration prend part à la fabrique du lieu. Via la mise en valeur de la contribution des anciennes vagues 
d’immigration, et le potentiel imaginé des futurs immigrés, l’immigration est envisagée comme un renouveau 
démographique, économique ou culturel. Conçue comme un levier, elle permet de redéfinir les échelles de 
développement de ces villes frontières.    
 
 
ש ל  ו ה ס י מ ב ו ל י  ה פ י ז י  ב ע י צ ו ב  ה ה גי ר ה  ש ל  ב ת פ ק י ד ה  ה ת מ ו ר ו ת  גם  כ מ ו  ה כ ו ח , ש ל  ה מ י ד ה  ב ק נ ה  ש י נ ו י י ם                  ת ק צ י ר :
ש מ ו נ ה . ו ק ר י ת  גת  ק ר י ת  ע ר ד , ע כ ו , ה י ש ר א ל י ו ת : ה ע ר י ם  א ר ב ע  ש ל  מ ה גר י ם  ש י ל ו ב  מ ד י נ י ו ת  ד ר ך  מ נ ו ת ח י ם                  ה ע י ר ,
ה ב י ז ו ר . ת ה ל י ך  ב י ד י  מ א ו ת גר ת  ו א י ל ך , 1950 מ  י ש ר א ל  מ ד י נ ת  י ד י  ע ל  ש ה ו גד ר ה  כ פ י  ע ל י ה , ל ק ל י טת                  ה מ ד י נ י ו ת 
מ ן  ה מ ק ו מ י ת . ב ר מ ה  ו ש י ל ו ב  ה גי ר ה  מ ד י נ י ו ת  מ י י צ ר ו ת  ב י ש ר א ל  ה מ ק ו מ י ו ת  ה ר ש ו י ו ת  מ ן  ח ל ק  ר ק  ז א ת , ע ם                  י ח ד 
א ת  "ל ב ח ו ר " ל ה ן  ל א פ ש ר  ב כ ד י  פ ר ו -א ק טי ב י  ב א ו פ ן  מ ק ו מ י ו ת  מ ד י נ י ו ת  מ ק ד מ ו ת  ב י נ ו נ י ו ת  ע ר י ם  כ י  ע ו ל ה                 ה מ ח ק ר 
 ה מ ה גר י ם  ה מ ת י י ש ב י ם  ב ת ח ו מ י ה ן  מ צ ד  א ח ד ; ו ב כ ד י  ל ק ב ל  גי ש ה  ל מ ש א ב י ם  צ י ב ו ר י י ם  מ צ ד  ש נ י .
ש ו נ י ם . מ י ד ה  ב ק נ י  ה פ ו ע ל י ם  ש ח ק נ י ם  ב י ן  פ נ י מ י ת  ת ל ו ת  ה ו ב י ל ה  ב ע ר י ם  ה גי ר ה  מ ד י נ י ו ת  ש ל  ה טמ ע ה  ז ה ,                 ב ה ק ש ר 
ל ש י ל ו ב  ה מ י ו ע ד י ם  ו פ ר טי י ם  צ י ב ו ר י י ם  מ ש א ב י ם  ע ל  ב נ י ה ם  מ ת מ ו ד ד י ם  ה ש ו נ י ם  ה ש ח ק נ י ם  ה א ח ר י ו ת , פ י צ ו ל               ע ם 
 מ ה גר י ם .
ה גי ר ה  ש ל  ה פ ו טנ צ י א ל  ה ע ר כ ת  ו ד ר ך  ק ו ד מ י ם , ה גי ר ה  גל י  ש ל  מ ח ד ש  ש י ל ו ב  ד ר ך  מ ק ו ם . מ ב נ י י ת  ח ל ק  ה י א                   ה גי ר ה 
ל ה גד י ר  י ה י ה  נ י ת ן  ב א מ צ ע ו ת ו  מ נ ו ף  ז ה ו  ו ה ת ר ב ו ת . ה כ ל כ ל ה  ה ד מ ו גר פ י ה , כ מ ח ד ש ת  נ ת פ ס ת  ה ה גי ר ה               ע ת י ד י ת ,
 מ ח ד ש  ק נ ה  מ י ד ה  ל פ י ת ו ח  ע ב ו ר  ע ר י  פ ר י פ ר י ה .
 
